

Collection of Essays on Korea's Public Diplomacy:
Possibilities and Future Outlook

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**COLLECTION OF
ESSAYS ON KOREA'S
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY:
POSSIBILITIES AND
FUTURE OUTLOOK**

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YouTube Diplomacy: A Sentiment Analysis of Global Reactions to the 2018 Concert in Pyongyang

Jenna Gibson

Abstract | In early April 2018, a delegation of South Korean musical artists performed in Pyongyang, North Korea as part of a prominent public diplomacy initiative aimed to attract positive attention ahead of the first summit meeting between President Moon Jae-in and Chairman Kim Jong-Un later that month. By inviting Hallyu stars like Red Velvet and Baek Ji Young, this event successfully tapped into global fan communities, smoothly bringing political content into the consciousness of K-pop fans around the globe. But how did those fans respond? In this paper, I scrape more than 4,000 comments left on official YouTube clips from the concert and conduct a sentiment analysis to determine their emotional valence. Overall, I find that fans responded positively to the concert footage, cheering on their favorite singers and even empathizing with some of the songs' emotional lyrics. The only exception to the positive tone was when clips included footage of the North Korean audience, creating a dissonance between fun performances on stage and stoic viewers in the seats. This analysis thus argues that integrating pop culture strategically into public diplomacy campaigns can be highly successful, but cautions that these initiatives can sometimes highlight cultural differences while attempting to bridge them.

국문초록 | 2018년 4월 말 문재인 대통령과 김정은 의장 사이에 있을 첫 정상 회담을 앞두고 긍정적인 관심을 이끌기 위한 중요한 공공 외교 계획의 일환으로 그 달 초 대한민국의 음악가 대표단이 북한 평양에서 공연을 했다. 이 행사는 레드 벨벳과 백지영 같은 한류 스타를 초대함으로써 정치적 주제를 자연스럽게 전 세계 케이팝 팬들의 의식으로 끌어오면서 성공적으로 세계적 팬 커뮤니티에 다가갔다. 하지만 팬들이 어떻게 반응했는가? 이 논문은 이 콘서트와 관련된 유튜브 동영상에 남겨진 4,000 개가 넘는 댓글을 가져와 그들의 감정적 값을 측정하기 위해 감정 분석을 한다. 전반적으로 팬들은 그들이 좋아하는 가수를 응원하고

몇몇 노래의 감정적 가사에 공감하기까지 하며 콘서트 영상에 긍정적으로 반응했다. 이러한 긍정적인 분위기에 유일한 예외는 무대의 밝은 퍼포먼스와 관중석의 냉정한 관중 사이에 부조화를 만들어내는 북한 청중이 비취졌을 때였다. 따라서 이 글은 대중 문화를 공공 외교 캠페인에 전략적으로 통합시키는 것이 매우 성공적일 수 있음을 보여주면서도, 이러한 계획들이 문화적 차이를 좁히려는 동시에 부각시킬 수도 있다는 점을 경고한다.

In early 2018, South Korean President Moon Jae-In and his administration embarked on a policy of diplomatic engagement toward North Korea, often bridging public diplomacy efforts, such as creating the inter-Korean soccer team that competed in the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics, with more traditional forms of governmental exchange and summit diplomacy. In particular, the April 2018 Inter-Korean Summit between President Moon and his counterpart, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, was a major moment in traditional government-to-government diplomacy, but the event also drew the attention of public audiences from around the world thanks in part to an extensive public diplomacy campaign from the South Korean government. Ahead of the meeting, South Korea employed a range of public diplomacy tools designed to promote international interest and persuade audiences of the prudence of the Moon administration's North Korea policy. In the run-up to the summit, the government launched an official website that included information in 10 languages, hosted various messages of support from world leaders and celebrities, graphics explaining Moon's policy goals, and even a live video feed of the main event. (Korea.net, 2018) On the social media front, the Korean government partnered with Twitter to create a limited-edition emoji to pair with the summit's official hashtags, showing two small hands high fiving, representing the two Korean leaders coming together for the first time in more than a decade.

One of the most prominent and visible events in the lead-up to the summit itself was a two-day concert in Pyongyang that featured 11 prominent South Korean singers and bands, as well as a taekwondo demonstration team. The delegation, led by South Korean Minister of Culture, Sports, and Tourism Do Jong-Hwan, performed in Pyongyang on April 1 and 3, 2018 under the hopeful theme of "Spring is Coming" (봄이

온다). The event also involved high-level North Korean officials including Kim Jong-Un himself, who attended the first night of the concert his wife. (Kim, 2018) The performances ranged from pop hits from girl group Red Velvet to tearful ballads from veteran crooners like Cho Yong-pil, and even a chorus number with the full lineup singing a song entitled “Our Wish is Unification” (우리의 소원은 통일). The full show was carried live in South Korea by the country’s three main broadcasters, KBS, MBC, and SBS, racking up combined ratings of 36.6%. (Yoon, 2018)

But while the concert drew significant domestic viewership, the inclusion of internationally recognized stars also guaranteed the attention of Korean pop culture fans from around the world. In recent years, the number of people actively following Korean pop culture has exploded, bringing even more depth to South Korea’s well of latent soft power. Through the concert in Pyongyang, the Moon Administration was able to tap into that interest, helping an enthusiastic and engaged audience learn about Korean foreign policy between costume changes. And they did, indeed, grab the attention of international fans, who trended hashtags like “#RedVelvet_our_pride” on Twitter to show support for the group’s performance, and racked up nearly 3 million views on official MBC YouTube clips of the show.

But just because the performance drew an international audience does not necessarily mean that it was a public diplomacy success. Getting a large number of people to view the performances or support specific singers on social media does not necessarily mean they internalized or agreed with the message of inter-Korean engagement that formed the basis of the show. Therefore, in order to more accurately gauge audience responses to the Pyongyang concert, I collected and analyzed more than 4,000 comments that viewers left on 18 YouTube clips posted on YouTube by MBC. Through a sentiment analysis and word frequency search, I was able to determine that viewer comments were largely positive, with most focusing on the singers involved. However, while much of the attention was on the performances, there was indeed a significant number of comments that explicitly discussed the political implications of the concert, remarked on the emotional weight of the songs, and expressed hope for peace on the peninsula. There were some negative comments that focused largely on one aspect of the show – the North Korean audience, who remained stone-faced

during even the most upbeat of pop performances. The attention that commenters paid to the North Korean audience is a perfect example of one of the enduring difficulties of public diplomacy – the fact that cultural exchange can often highlight cultural differences, at times distracting from or even completely undermining the intended message.

Nevertheless, the amount of positive attention that the concert got from international fans – attention that did not wane even as inter-Korean talks stalled – shows the power of a public diplomacy event that smoothly integrates non-governmental actors, in this case celebrities, into a cohesive outreach strategy. The success of the Spring is Coming concert thus provides three key lessons for future attempts to integrate South Korea's incredibly popular pop culture into public diplomacy initiatives. First, choosing the right interlocutors is key to engaging a target audience. Second, finding a subtle, relatable message that can be authentically communicated via those interlocutors will retain more audience members than perfectly crafted policy statements from government officials. Third, recognizing that cultural differences can create awkward moments, especially when a public diplomacy campaign is aimed at such a broad, global audience, but that there may be ways to mitigate that awkwardness with careful planning and learning.

This paper will proceed as follows: first, I will examine the extensive literature on public diplomacy, particularly focusing on the practice of public diplomacy in digital spaces. Then, I will introduce my dataset of YouTube comments, explaining how I gathered, cleaned, and analyzed more than 4,000 observations. Then, I further analyze some of the key themes that emerged in the comments, showing how remarks about the singers, the emotional resonance of the songs, and back-and-forth discussions among commenters show that the international audience watching the Spring is Coming concert online was highly engaged with both the musical and political content of the show. Finally, I conclude with several key takeaways for further integration of South Korea's powerhouse pop culture into public diplomacy campaigns.

LITERATURE

One of the major focuses of recent public diplomacy scholarship has been exploring how the study and practice of public diplomacy has changed with the expansion of the digital world. Scholars like Ilan Manor (2019) have explored the ongoing and often non-linear process of the “digitization” of public diplomacy, noting a shift from broadcasting to network-based communications, from targeting messages at certain audiences to tailoring content to actively engage those audiences, and from focusing on short-term moments to creating policy narratives that build over time. Others have pointed out that these different modes of communication, rather than being an evolution in public diplomacy, are merely different tools that can be used to further different goals - Zaharna (2010), for example, writes that network-based communications build soft power, while mass communications wield it.

Bringing public diplomacy to where the people are – online – creates many new opportunities to reach foreign audiences, often at a fraction of the price of traditional, offline public diplomacy programs. But it is also no silver bullet – digitalized public diplomacy still comes with many of the same challenges that plague all cross-cultural communication efforts. Cultural contexts shape how individuals receive and interpret messages, so any cross-cultural communication that hopes to be successful must take the audience’s perspective into account. Min-Sun Kim (2002) points out that many U.S. public diplomacy efforts have been met with backlash in part for this reason – because American messengers assumed that their interpretation of “the truth” as something universal and objective would be shared by their audiences, when in fact many cultures regard truth as informed by social contexts and norms.

Other scholars separate different cultures of communication itself – communication can be used to transmit signals or messages, or it can be part of a ritual of understanding where “nothing new is learned, but a particular view of the world is portrayed.” (Carey, 1992, p. 20) Entertainment and pop culture, which create groups of fans who find, connect, and communicate with each other based on a shared love of a particular show, artist, or genre, are examples of ritual communications, focused on building connections

amongst the group and affirming shared beliefs. (Giese, 2002) Public diplomats must therefore take both the culture of the audience and its mode of communication into account when choosing a messaging strategy, or risk being seen as an outsider at best and an intruder at worst.

All of these problems still underlie the practice of public diplomacy in its increasingly digitized forms. In fact, figuring out how to take into account cultural context and identities has only become more difficult with the expansion of digital life. Indeed, the digital world has developed to the point where it has become its own society, with its own set of norms and values (Manor, 2019). Any conception of culture must now contend with the fact that the digital world now informs and morphs images of the self, one's relationships with others, and even societal institutions. (Lupton, 2015) On top of that, the number of options to reach different target audiences has expanded exponentially, and practitioners must make a myriad of choices before even considering the message itself. Does the audience prefer print, audio or video? Can they be found mostly on Twitter or Weibo? Are they highly active or more passive in their content consumption? The expansion of digital space keeps adding layers of complexity to public diplomacy.

Public diplomats who fail to understand the rules of digital society – or even more specifically the norms of the particular social media platform or media tool they are using for a given project – will either fail to get their message picked up by the mighty algorithms that arbitrate what content gets distributed and to whom (Manor, 2019), or, worse, will inevitably face scorn from the audience. Take, for example, the State Department's Digital Outreach Team (DOT), which in 2009 stepped up its efforts to talk to Muslim youth in the wake of President Barack Obama's speech in Cairo in which he called for the beginning of a more positive relationship between the United States and the Muslim world. The DOT actively went to popular Middle Eastern websites and attempted to converse with users about Obama's policies, hoping to create a more positive view of the United States. However, because of bureaucratic protocol, it took diplomats almost three days on average to respond to a single post, (Khatib, Dutton, & Thelwall, 2012) a time frame which may as well be an eternity in the digital world. Worse, they responded to emotional posts and even graphic photographs of Muslim victims of violence with anodyne talking points or

by deflecting blame to terrorist groups. In this project, the DOT team failed to understand the rules of digital society – that time is of the essence in keeping a conversation flowing, and that, unlike at a negotiating table, sticking only to formal policy points will not fly, especially when the topic is a particularly emotional one. In the end, the DOT’s engagement on these websites actually led to an overall more negative tone among participants than before the U.S. government got involved. (Khatib, Dutton, & Thelwall, 2012)

The failed DOT outreach effort shows that cultural contexts matter not just in the sense of religious, national, or ethnic background, but also in the sense of shared norms for certain digital spaces. When Korean public diplomacy efforts target fans of K-pop, for example, they are opening engagement with an audience that brings identities from their own personal identities, as well as their experiences within the culture of fandom. Both of these bring a set of rules and norms, shared understandings, and even vocabulary to the table (ask a K-pop fan who their “bias” is, for example, or whether they’re a “multi”). This makes the Korean public diplomat’s job harder, in the sense that they have to contend with both of these cultural contexts when crafting a message. However, if done well, a message that connects with that audience without pandering to them can be highly successful – take, for example, a recent tweet by U.S. Ambassador to Korea Harry Harris in which he asked fans to guess his favorite BTS song, which garnered 17,500 Retweets and 71,100 Likes within just a few days. (Harris, 2020)

South Korea’s understanding of public diplomacy has been quickly evolving, particularly in the last few years, and it is now taking a more active stance in fostering dialogue with foreign audiences and tapping into existing wells of soft power created by its powerhouse pop culture. Over the last few years, the Korean government has shifted from a pure focus on nation-branding to a more complex understanding of public diplomacy (Ayhan, 2017), although there is still some confusion on terms and limitations (Ayhan, 2020). This shift from nation-branding – promoting a generally positive but potentially shallow and fleeting image of a country – to active engagement with audiences may help make Korea’s soft power more lasting and meaningful. (Pastreich, 2016; Ayhan, 2017) In this sense,

connecting audiences who already have an existing interest in the more consumerist notion of Korean pop culture with deeper messages like the pain of Korean separation and hope for reunification through the concerts in Pyongyang is doing exactly what these scholars suggest.

DATA

On April 6, 2018, a YouTube Channel called MBCKpop posted 18 recorded clips from the Spring is Coming concert in Pyongyang. The channel, run by Korean broadcaster MBC, boasts 8.36 million subscribers, and updates regularly with clips from MBC's weekly K-pop music program and other K-pop related shows on the network. (MBCKpop) For this analysis, I used YouTube's application program from this channel, including the number and content of all comments left on the videos as of September 2020. These 18 videos have garnered a combined total of nearly 3 million views, with a total of 4,768 comments, of which I was able to scrape 4,032. The discrepancy in number of comments is due to limitations in the number of replies that can be captured by my scraping tool – if a comment gets more than five replies, the extraneous ones may not be captured in the dataset. However, my dataset of more than 4,000 comments should still yield a good picture of the overall tone of responses to these videos. The breakdown of each video's reach can be seen in Table 1 below.

Because the purpose of this analysis is to examine the efficacy of the Pyongyang concert as a public diplomacy effort, I am specifically interested in how *international* audiences viewed and interpreted the concert as seen through these clips. While it is impossible to know exactly where each viewer is located, several factors indicate that the MBCKpop clips were aimed at, and primarily consumed by, non-Korean audiences. First, while the MBCKpop channel does use Korean for the titles and descriptions of most of its videos, its use of English across the channel indicates its aim to draw in international audiences. The channel's name and About section are both written in English, unlike several of MBC's other affiliated YouTube channels, including MBC트로트 (a channel for Korean trot music popular domestically) and MBC스포츠탐험대 (for Korean sports-related content). In

Table 1. Summary Statistics, 2018 Spring is Coming YouTube Clips

	Title	Views	Likes	Dislikes	Number of Comments
1	Red Velvet - 'Red Flavor'	1,293,536	34,425	432	3,216
2	Baek Ji Young - 'Please, Don't forget me'	496,336	7,869	72	229
3	Seohyun - 'Blue Willow'	475,108	13,409	70	678
4	Baek ji Young - 'Like being hit by a bullet'	159,643	2,550	8	96
5	Jung-in - 'Uphill road'	134,715	1,676	25	128
6	YB - 'I am a Butterfly'	88,663	2,033	12	109
7	Lee Sun Hee - 'Beautiful Scenery'	70,449	1,309	8	92
8	Chorus - 'My friend'	61,387	1,053	7	46
9	ALi - 'PUNGPUNG'	45,124	585	7	27
10	Chorus - 'Until We Meet Again'	41,850	749	6	54
11	Kang San-ae - 'Raguyo'	37,597	763	3	41
12	YB - 'Man is ship Woman is harbor'	24,533	376	4	13
13	Jung-in and ALi - 'Face'	18,200	228	2	8
14	YB - '1178'	15,835	356	6	15
15	Cho Yong-pil - 'Dream'	11,256	127	0	4
16	Choi Jin-hee - 'Labyrinth of love'	8,876	122	2	3
17	Cho Yong-pil - 'The Winter Teahouse'	6,977	103	2	7
18	Choi Jin-hee - 'A belated regrets'	3,363	48	2	2
19	Total	2,993,448	67,781	668	4,768

addition, unlike many of the other K-pop videos posted on the MBCkpop channel, the Spring is Coming clips all had titles and descriptions entirely in English, indicating that these clips in particular aimed to attract a non-Korean-speaking audience. The language preference followed through in the comment section as well - while there were indeed some Korean comments on the Spring is Coming videos, they were few and far between. Instead, there were comments in Japanese, French, Russian, Arabic, and more, with the vast majority written in English.

Contrast this with other versions of the concert, which have been posted to both YouTube and the Korean-language platform Naver TV. The choice of YouTube rather than (or, in this case, in addition to) Naver indicates a

desire to broaden the audience beyond domestic Korean viewers. But even YouTube can capture an exclusively Korean audience if the video's title and description are written in Korean. For example, the full two-hour version of the concert was posted on YouTube by Yonhap News, with the title “무삭제 풀버전] ‘우리는 하나’...남북평화협력기원 평양공연” and a description written entirely in Korean. (YonhapNewsTV, 2018) The comments followed suit – the vast majority were in Korean with only a handful in other languages.¹

The use of English for both the channel, title, and descriptions of the MBCKpop clips of the Spring is Coming concert indicates an intention to appeal to an international, non-Korean-speaking audience. And the prevalence of languages other than Korean, mainly English, in the comment sections for all of these clips lends credence to the assertion that an analysis of the comment sections from these videos will provide a window into how international publics viewed and responded to this soft power-laden event.

With that in mind, I ran a sentiment analysis on 4,032 comments for these 18 videos using the SentimentR package and dictionary. While all sentiment analyses are fraught with the complexities of quantifying language, the SentimentR algorithm is generally believed to be the best option for R-based sentiment analysis, in part because it can capture both negation and amplification. (Naldi, 2019) For example, most dictionaries would rate the sentences “It was good,” “It was very good,” and “It was not good” with the same sentiment score based on the appearance of the word “good.” However, SentimentR explicitly searches for negation words like “not” and “never,” and would know to attach a negative score despite the appearance of the word “good.” Similarly, with amplifiers like “very” or “more,” which the algorithm would rate as more positive than just the word “good” on its own.

This method improves, but does not eliminate, issues that can arise with sentiment analysis. One of the remaining issues is context, which is all but

1 While outside the scope of this analysis, the gap between how audiences responded in English to the MBCKpop videos versus how audiences responded in Korean to the same clips posted on Naver TV is striking and could provide interesting insight into how foreign and domestic audiences can interpret the same content differently. Many of the international comments on YouTube focused on the performers themselves, praising the singers and at times commenting generally on the political context or hoping for unification. This was also the case for Korean comments to an extent, but these comments also discussed the political context more and with more detail, often expressing emotional reactions to the songs themselves and their meaning.

impossible for an algorithm to account for. Take a comment like “Song was beautiful but why i feel sad and crying 😭😭😭. that means she’s a good singer and i feel her ♡,” which was left on a video of Baek Ji Young singing an emotional ballad at the concert. Within the context of the show, the song, and the political landscape surrounding it, this comment clearly conveys an emotional connection with the video which, while not necessarily positive in the same way as joyful praise, is certainly not as negative as the sentiment dictionary assessed. This need for additional context is one of the reasons I conducted an additional qualitative analysis on the results. And while the analysis may not capture the nuance in more complex comments like the one above, the use of a more robust algorithm, plus the large number of observations in the dataset, lends confidence to the results.

In addition to calculating an overall sentiment score for the words in each comment, I also used an emoji dictionary to capture the positive or negative valence of any emojis that commenters included in their post. (Novak et al., 2015) Emojis have become an important part of online communication and can significantly increase or decrease the sentiment score of a comment. In my dataset, 785 comments included emojis, about 20 percent of the total. The additional positive or negative score from any emojis included in a comment was thus added onto the original sentiment score to create a total sentiment score for each comment.

Finally, I believe it is important to capture not just the comment itself, but how much it resonated with other viewers. This can be proxied through the like count on each comment. Essentially, if another viewer agreed with the sentiment expressed in a comment, they may choose to simply like the comment rather than writing a similar one themselves. In fact, likes appear to be an important way that people interact in the comment section of these videos; while most comments have fewer than 10 likes, some have thousands – the most-liked comment has 10,802 likes, more than the total number of comments on all the videos combined. Therefore, I duplicated each observation based on the number of likes that the comment received. So a slightly positive comment with zero additional likes will appear once in my dataset, to represent the one time that someone posted it without anyone agreeing with its sentiment. However, a slightly positive comment with 1,000 likes will appear 1,001 times in the dataset, because 1,000

people in addition to the original poster agreed with the sentiment that comment expressed. This method essentially created the equivalent of 153,525 “comments” that I can use to analyze the overall valence of audience reactions to each video.

Finally, I removed any remaining comments that had a total sentiment score of exactly 0, as well as outliers. The sentiment algorithms I used are extremely precise, with scores going into the 8th decimal place. That means a comment can only have a score of exactly 0 for two reasons: it was either a comment entirely in a non-English language, with no emojis that could indicate an emotional valence whatsoever, or it was an English comment with absolutely no emotional information whatsoever. An example of a truly neutral comment in the dataset was one that merely read “Google.” This comment, while in English, does not give us any information about how this person perceived the video. Thus, no information is lost by dropping this type of observation. For outliers, I used the standard rule of thumb of dropping any observations outside 1.5 times the interquartile range. This method removes any extreme observations – including, in this case, several comments with more than a dozen repeated emojis, including one with more than 200 emojis. The final total number of observations in my dataset after dropping non-English, true neutral, and outlier comments is 131,855. Figure 1 below shows the comments for each video, including the 95% confidence interval.

As Figure 1 shows, out of the 18 videos, 16 videos had average sentiment score above 0 – indicating commenters viewed the clip positively. One video – Jung-in and ALi’s “Face” – had a neutral average score. Only one, Baek Ji Young’s “Please Don’t Forget Me,” had a negative average score. However, as I will discuss further in the analysis below, this may be due to the emotional nature of the song, which is about separation and loss.

In addition to examining the overall spread of comments left on these videos, I also wondered whether the tenor of the comments was at all tied to the political context of the inter-Korean talks that inspired the concert in the first place. While early 2018, when the videos were first posted, was full of hope for the inter-Korean summit that was to come, enthusiasm waned over time as the talks reached a stalemate. However, interestingly, the emotional valence of comments left over time, as seen in Figure 2, did not drop off

despite this changing context.

The consistency of this positive tone throughout the period from 2018 to 2020 says one of two things. Either the positive comments are largely tied to feelings about the performers in the video – which would not wane over time no matter the political context – or the hopeful tone of the videos is still convincing to the audience regardless of the less than positive turn that the peace talks took. Regardless of which – or both – explanations are true, the durability of positive sentiments expressed on the Spring is Coming videos shows its success as a lasting generator of positive sentiment among a foreign audience. This implies that, much like digital diplomacy hopes, the concert is a step toward building a network of interest that is not




Figure 1.



Figure 2.

necessarily tied only to the success or failure of one specific foreign policy event or goal, but can continue to have legs and engender positive interaction over time.

ANALYSIS

As the results above show, viewers expressed overall positive thoughts in their comments after watching clips from the Spring is Coming concert, with some rare exceptions. In addition to the general sentiment analysis above, I further delved into a qualitative examination of the comments to

learn more about what, exactly, the audience was saying in response to these videos. The broad themes that appeared in these comments broke down into four, non-mutually exclusive categories: comments praising the performers, comments indicating an emotional response to the clips, comments educating other viewers about the concert and its political/social context, and comments about the North Korean audience in attendance. Each of these types of comments has implications for the concert's efficacy as a South Korean public diplomacy tool.

First, many comments were very straightforward, praising the performer in any given clip for their singing, dancing, or even just their appearance. These were among the most common types of comments in the dataset – in fact, the two most common words in the entire corpus of comments were “Joy” (a member of Red Velvet who was not able to attend the show because of a prior commitment), and “Seohyun.” Examples of this type of comment include “She is so amazing. A beautiful legend,” left on Lee Sun Hee’s performance of “Beautiful Scenery,” or “Seohyun is so graceful and beautiful 🍷💖,” left of Seohyun’s cover of the North Korean song “Blue Willow.”

On first glance, these comments mean very little for the overall message of the concert – to promote inter-Korean exchange and detente. However, recalling the literature on public diplomacy – particularly digital public diplomacy – the picture may be a bit rosier. The abundance of comments that mention the singers directly shows that these concert clips have successfully tapped into the network of K-pop fans on YouTube – a network that, once properly accessed, can become a built-in audience for other messages. And while some, or even most, of the fans who just wanted to see their favorite singer may not have come away with an entirely new opinion on inter-Korean reconciliation, that does not at all mean that the messaging was useless. After all, as Carey (1992) noted, a message does not have to directly state a new fact or directly change someone’s mind to be a powerful form of communication. Just shaping the context of a message and re-forming the audience’s worldview can also be an important form of communication and persuasion.

In this case, fans who watched the concert may not have learned about inter-Korean politics in a deep way from the videos, but they did learn at the

very least that their favorite singer, who they admire, is supportive of cultural exchange and reconciliation. Take, for example, this comment from Seohyun's video: "For me it's really not about how well she sang. It's about her sincerity in wanting to be part of this cultural exchange occasion. The way she handled everything from relations with the sk and nk performers [sic], the interviews etc, really showed her maturity and good heart. She's really beautiful inside out." While praising their favorite singer, the commenter clearly acknowledged Seohyun's role in the broader political context. This kind of subtle paradigm-shifting communication, while difficult to show concretely and even harder to sell to oversight agencies demanding metrics for public diplomacy campaigns, should nevertheless be considered an important part of the overall success of the concert as a messaging tool.

The second type of comment, which is perhaps more promising as an indication of deeper positive responses to the concert, were those that indicated an emotional resonance with what the person was viewing on the screen. Many commenters expressed hope for reunification: "Both Koreas want the reunification of their countries. This is a step towards it." (Red Velvet, "Red Flavor"); "I got goosebumps from her performance. Hoping one day the two countries will unite once more!!" (Seohyun, "Blue Willow"). Others expressed how the themes in the songs resonated with them on a personal level, like this commenter from Germany indicated:

"I can relate so much to this as Germany once was also separated, they unified the same year I was born. It makes me really sad to see Korea divided. Same fate, but different outcome as my country... so we understand you. I hope one day, Korea becomes one country as we did. That day I will celebrate ;) Stay strong dear koreans[sic]." (Baek Ji Young, "Please Don't Forget").

Some commenters even explicitly expressed how music can tear down walls between people: "This song always makes me feel emotional. A beautiful concert demonstrating the power of music and how it touches the hearts of people. Best wishes Korea." (Chorus, "My Friend"), or contextualized the songs in light of North Korean policies: "Take note that the song that is

about following your dreams and flying away from all your troubles and worries is the song that they loved the most and cheered the loudest for then any other song. This performance was like a big eff you to the regime and I love it” (YB, “Butterfly”).

Many commenters also expressed empathy both with the tone and lyrical content of the songs, connecting them with the enduring separation of the Korean Peninsula: “For me this is the best performance of the concert! The meaning of this song hits a very true and sad topic about people wishing for the day when the two nations are finally at peace, but it’s been a long wait and for some the time has run out...” (Kang San-ae, “Raguyo”); ““We used to love each other, Now we’re breaking up. Even if we’re in different places. I hope you don’t forget me’ The emotional lyrics fit the situation between South & North Korea” (Baek Ji Young, “Please Don’t Forget”); “Hooked on this song. The delivery is sorrowful yet delightful. His voice is art itself tears keep falling down effortlessly. I wish the reunification happens soon” (Kang San-ae, “Raguyo”).

The fact that so many people found parts of the concert that deeply resonated with them, whether because of their own personal experience (as in the case of the German commenter) or just through empathy with the Korean people, shows that music can be a powerful way to connect with a broad audience regardless of their level of knowledge about inter-Korean politics. One doesn’t need to understand the intricacies of the negotiations to hear the sorrow in Kang San-ae’s voice when he sings about separation. This is another way in which the choice of a concert was a smart one for Korean public diplomacy – the themes and emotional resonance are self-evident to the audience, and do not require extensive background knowledge or explanation.

That does not mean that there was no learning going on amongst the audience, however. Some expressed that they had qualms about their favorite singer going to North Korea, but ended up enjoying the results. Further, many commenters took it upon themselves to teach others about inter-Korean relations, the songs themselves, and North Korea more generally. For example, under Kang San-ae’s performance of his song “Raguyo,” one commenter explained the song’s context in detail:

“The song is so so intimate since his parents were North Korean refugees who escaped on a US battleship during the Korean war at Hungnam. So the lyrics say for the first chorus that his dad’s repertory was that he always used to say ‘... I wish, if only just once before I die, that I could go back home’; and for the second chorus his mom says the same thing. So he’s appealing to the audience that he is North Korean descent, and in his next song called Myungtae (a fish caught near his parents’; hometown) he appeals to them that he knows the stories of the North.” (Kang San-ae, “Raguyo”)

Another commented on how the concert itself fit in with the ongoing peace talks, albeit with a slightly oversimplified view of the agreements reached: “Now the USB of red velvet’s performance going viral all the way in NK. Also today, the president Moon had a meeting with the NK leader Kim declaring the permanent peace. NK removed their nuclears too. I think that this spring Performance affected to this meeting[sic].” (Red Velvet, “Red Flavor”) And, under a comment about how North Koreans don’t know about anything outside their own country, several commenters replied correcting that stereotype, writing things like: “The majority of North Koreans these days (especially the younger generations) regularly watch Korean dramas and listen to Korean music in secret - well, honestly these days it’s not even really a secret, you just can’t get caught doing it. Like, everyone does it and everyone **knows** everyone does it, but it’s still ‘secret.’” (Red Velvet, “Red Flavor”)

Not all of this education had a positive tone, however. Some took the opportunity to point out the flaws of the North Korean system and criticize the brutality of its leader, Kim Jong Un. Others pointed out that only elites loyal to the regime would have been allowed to attend the concert:

“These north korean elites are chosen ones by the party. There is no such freedom like you and i to buy concert tickets as we like. These people are carefully selected for their hardcore royalty[sic] to the communist party and they know too well that their mouth will be shut after watching the south korean performance.” (Baek Ji Young, “Like Being Hit by a Bullet.”)

But even these negative takes got some pushback at times. In one response to a commenter who criticized the concert as “propaganda” while saying that North Korea was poor and corrupt with a “murderous” leader, another responded forcefully:

“How do you help the people of the country when you cant get in to that country? Do you realize what you are saying has no possibility of happening in reality? At least this way, some north koreans will be exposed to new ideas and maybe some will start to be more open. Its time to stop demonizing and use excuses to not talk to the other side. You have to talk first before you can do anything. After peace is finalized, then maybe we can do the things you are talking about...”
(Red Velvet, “Red Flavor”)

Regardless of the tone, the fact that some in the audience took the time to discuss not only the concert itself but its deeper political implications shows how engaged they were with the content. This type of conversation among audience members also shows some of the pros and cons of good, network-based public diplomacy. This event allowed the audience to educate themselves and each other further on the topic, rather than relying on a public diplomat or blatant policy messaging campaign. Not only does an approach that leverages the community in this way save time and energy on the part of diplomats, it also creates a more organic, trustworthy conversation among the audience members. Having a diplomat spend time engaging with the audience directly to continue to push the message of reconciliation could easily run into the same problems that the State Department faced when messaging to Arab audiences – it could invite more dissent, and any direct messaging by a diplomat would likely be dismissed as mere policy talking points at best or propaganda at worst. However, the main downside to allowing these conversations to play out on their own is that misinformation can easily spread unchecked – like with the comment above that suggested North Korea had agreed to give up its nuclear weapons program.

The final topic that came up throughout the comments, but particularly underneath the clip of Red Velvet’s performance, is related to the North

Korean audience in attendance at the concert. In the clip, the Red Velvet girls smiled wide while dancing to their smash-hit single “Red Flavor,” an upbeat summer-themed song with energetic choreography. Every once in a while, the camera would cut away from the exciting spectacle on the stage to show the completely stone-faced North Koreans in the audience. The contrast between the two halves of the auditorium could not be more stark – and the commenters definitely noticed. In the entire weighted corpus of comments across all videos, “audience” was the third most common word, and the words that appeared most often alongside “audience” were “disgust,” “disinterest,” and “stone.” On the Red Velvet clip alone, 12 percent of the comments explicitly mentioned the word “audience” (279 out of 2,285 comments).

Many of the comments joked about the juxtaposition visible on the screen, often using emojis like 😐 or 🙄 to imitate the audience members’ blank stares. Others mentioned being scared or anxious because of the audience, or expressed sympathy for the group having to perform in front of such an unresponsive crowd. Some took it as a sign of North Korean repression, commenting that the audience may be jailed or killed if they even show a smile, while others empathized with their plight:

“Imagine being in the audience and coming home crying over the fact that you would have been a lot happier being born in South Korea, and how much of life you haven’t fully explored. It’s weird watching and knowing that a lot of the people there aren’t even sure how to act during this and just sit to be polite. Must be hard on people to not be happy with the way their life has turned out because of dictatorship and higher power in the country and knowing there’s nothing they can do about it.” (Red Velvet, “Red Flavor”)

On the one hand, the fixation on the North Korean audience and their reactions shows some of the pitfalls of public diplomacy. As with all cross-cultural communication, sometimes exchange can expose cultural gaps rather than bridge them. In this case, in a concert meant to represent hope for a more unified future in Korea, the juxtaposition between the South Korean performers and the North Korean audience may have just made the

division between the two countries more stark.

But similar to the examples of discussion and education described above, many commenters took it upon themselves to explain more about why the audience might be behaving this way. Some comments pointed out that North Koreans – especially the generally older, more elite people who would have been invited to this type of event – might not be used to the pop-y performance that Red Velvet was showing. Others claimed it was just a cultural difference, assuring other fans that the audience was just being polite according to North Korean standards and not trying to snub the performers. Several comments also deliberately tried to bridge the cultural gap directly – “Some comments are just overreaction. North Korea is just another country on earth. Some comments made me feel they are aliens, which is ridiculous. Just enjoy RV’s comeback PLZ.” (Red Velvet, “Red Flavor”) One commenter even acknowledged that their opinion changed after reading the discussion going on underneath the video:

“I was going to comment and make an acceptable joke about how unimpressed and judging the audience is until I read the comments and realised this is their performance in North Korea. This whole performance must have been so new and strange for North Koreans to watch, and I really wonder what they were thinking, if they liked it or not. I don’t know much about the rules in North Korea but I wouldn’t be surprised if they weren’t allowed to show any emotions while Red Velvet performed...” (Red Velvet, “Red Flavor”)

The somewhat mixed, although still overall positive, reaction to the Red Velvet performance could serve as a good lesson on the difficult balancing act of public diplomacy programs. Red Velvet brought a lot of extra attention from an audience that may not have tuned in otherwise. However, the culture gap they revealed between the South Korean performers and the North Korean audience, as well as between the North Koreans and the international viewers, may have undermined the concert’s intended message of unity. In contrast, some of the other performances were more in line with the theme and tone of the event. Seohyun, for example, sang a North Korean ballad that the audience visibly resonated with, and commenters

took notice: “in my opinion this type of k-music is more fitting to be exhibited in pyeongyang[sic]. you see the north korean audience reacted so well and enjoyed it better. it was a right decision to bring seohyun there.” (Seohyun, “Blue Willow”) As this example shows, by working to balance the appeal of including big performers who can draw a larger audience while still trying to match the theme and tone of the event and its message, Korean public diplomacy efforts can become even more effective.

IMPLICATIONS FOR KOREAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

While the incredible popularity of Korean pop culture around the world has drawn admiration and interest as a potential source of Korean soft power, it is still unclear if, and how, that soft power reserve could be mobilized by Korean public diplomacy efforts. Fans of Korean pop culture are a ready-made audience for related messaging – but can they actually be activated? And, if so, how?

The overwhelmingly positive response that the Spring is Coming clips received from international viewers via the MBC YouTube channel is a good sign for Korean public diplomacy efforts that tap into the popularity of Korean culture abroad. Even when expressing negative emotions such as sadness, the fact that international audiences were connecting with the videos and finding emotional resonance with its content and with the Korean separation should be seen as a sign of success for this public diplomacy campaign. Future campaigns can, and should, learn from this model, including its relatively minor shortcomings. Based on this analysis of international viewer responses to the Spring is Coming concert clips, I offer three key takeaways for public diplomacy efforts that want to take advantage of hallyu's popularity.

First, choosing the right people to participate in the event based on the target audience that the government hopes to reach is key. The Spring is Coming concert aimed to reach both a domestic audience through territorial broadcasters and Korean-language videos online, and aimed to reach an international audience through the MBC channel's English-language clips posted on YouTube. The inclusion of a variety of singers in the concert,

some of whom would only be known to the Korean audience and some of whom would be more internationally popular, helped make this event a success on both counts. In fact, internationally known acts like Red Velvet, Seohyun and Baek Ji Young racked up by far the most views and of comments on YouTube, showing that the inclusion celebrities in public diplomacy efforts can, indeed, get the attention of fans online.

Second, the concert succeeded in part because it let these popular figures create authentic connections with the audience through their performances rather than nakedly trying to push a political message. In these clips, the singers and their music came first, and the political context served as an important but not necessarily overt backdrop. The message – support for inter-Korean peace efforts – was consistently present throughout the videos but not belabored fits perfectly with the type of ritual-based communication that works particularly well with fandom communities. The fact that this was a concert was taking place in North Korea and that it was part of a larger peace effort was not explicitly mentioned in English anywhere except in the descriptions of the videos (the full name of the concert in Korean, “남북평화협력기원 평양공연, 봄이 온다,” was in the top corner throughout all the clips but it was not translated for a non-Korean speaking audience). Nevertheless, as the analysis above shows, the audience clearly understood the fact that this concert was special because of its location, and even took time to discuss and educate each other about the songs, the artists, and their place in inter-Korean peace efforts. This public diplomacy effort shows that a message does not have to be overt in order to get its point across. By centering the stars and their music, the audience responded more organically to the content and its implicit political message.

Third, one cautionary point. As discussed above, cultural exchange often runs the risk of exposing differences rather than bridging them. In this case, the visible gap between some of the performers and their audience was distracting to international viewers, and caused many of them to focus on the awkward audience and their inability to enjoy the performances – hardly the message South Korea wanted to be the takeaway from the show. It’s important to be genuine, and show the event as it was, awkward audience and all. But these sorts of gaps could also be rectified through the event planning process – perhaps asking Red Velvet to perform one of their many

ballads, or cover a song like Seohyun did, would have fit with the theme of the other stages better, and may have caused less of a dissonance for viewers watching the clips later on.

This analysis has used the example of the 2018 Spring is Coming concert in Pyongyang to illustrate some of the key ways that South Korean public diplomacy efforts can, and indeed have, connected well with audiences around the world. By following this type of campaign in the future, using internationally beloved Hallyu stars to deliver authentic, relatable messages, South Korea can more effectively activate its latent soft power to attract attention and support from a broad, engaged audience.

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To the Sea, to the World: Public Diplomacy and the Republic of Korea Navy

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Abstract | Navies in Northeast Asia are increasingly taking on non-combat, public diplomacy roles in the pursuit of soft power at a regional and global level. This chapter examines the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN)'s use of public naval diplomacy to build soft power in the Asia Pacific maritime theatre and as far as the Gulf of Aden, motivated by interwoven functional and status logics. It identifies three main pillars of the ROKN's public naval diplomacy: (i) anti-piracy operations and evacuation efforts, (ii) naval cooperation, and (iii) humanitarian assistance and disaster response. It highlights three advantages the ROKN faces when conducting public naval diplomacy compared to other Northeast Asian states: (i) it is not seen as a potential threat, (ii) it is not expected to contribute as many public goods as Great Powers, and (iii) South Korea enjoys solid soft power foundations as a liberal democratic capitalist state that has undergone rapid economic and political development through sea-based trade. Finally, this chapter engages with contemporary policy debate within South Korea's maritime strategy community, considering adjustments to ROKN's acquisitions of new naval platforms, and the creative retirement of old platforms, in pursuit of public diplomacy leadership in maritime environmental conservation.

국문초록 | 동북 아시아 해군들이 지역적, 세계적 차원에서 소프트 파워를 추구하며 점점 더 비전투적인 공공 외교의 역할을 맡고 있다. 이 글에서는 실용적이면서도 높은 위상을 뒷받침하기 위해 아시아 태평양 해역에서 아덴만(Gulf of Aden)까지를 무대로 소프트 파워를 확립하고자하는 대한민국 해군의 공공 외교를 살펴본다. 대한민국 해군의 공공 해군 외교는 (i) 반(反)해적 작전과 대피 노력, (ii) 해군 협력, 그리고 (iii) 인도주의적 지원과 재난 대응 등 세 개의 주요 부분으로 이루어져 있다. 이 글에서는 다른 동북아시아 국가들과 비교해 대한민국 해군이 공공 외교를 실행할 때 마주하는 이점들을 강조한다. (i) 잠재적인 위협으로 여겨지지 않고, (ii) 강대국만큼 공공의 이익에 기여할 것을 요구받지 않으며, (iii) 해상 무역을 통해 경제적, 정치적으로 급격히 발전한 한국은 자유민주 자본

주의 국가로서 견고한 소프트 파워 기반을 누리고 있다. 마지막으로 이 글은 해양 환경 보존 분야의 공공 외교 선두주자가 되기 위해 대한민국 해군의 새로운 해군함 인수 및 독창적인 방식의 해군함 퇴역을 고찰하며 오늘날 대한민국 해양 전략 커뮤니티 내에 존재하는 정책 토론을 다룬다.

INTRODUCTION

Navies in Northeast Asia are increasingly taking on non-combat, public diplomacy roles in the pursuit of soft power at a regional and global level (Bukh 2017; Erickson & Strange 2015; Forster 2015; Mizokami 2011). In part, this is symptomatic of a broader rivalry between Great Powers for influence in the Asia Pacific (Sohn 2011). However, these activities are not confined to the forces of China, Japan, Russia and the US. The Republic of Korea (hereafter ‘South Korea’), too, has used its navy to engage with international publics, protecting its interests while exercising leadership on major maritime issues, self-consciously reaching for increased status through its naval activities (Bowers 2019).

Sealed off from continental Asia along the inter-Korean border since becoming a republic in 1948, South Korea has frequently been referred to as a geostrategic ‘island’ (e.g. Hynd 2019; Roehrig 2019) in recognition of its economic and political dependency on global sea lines of communication (SLOC). Despite this, investment in South Korea’s military forces has traditionally prioritized the army and air force over the navy, the latter being given a limited role in defending peninsula waters for much of the second half of the twentieth century (Bowers 2019, 110). This was partially as a consequence of the South’s role within its military alliance with Washington, in which US naval dominance required Seoul instead to counter North Korea’s numerical advantage on land until reinforcements arrived; and was also influenced by the institutional dominance of the army, whose involvement in pre-democratic era domestic politics was substantial (Bowers 2019, 110; Park S.Y. 2012, 148).

The Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) has undergone steady transformation in both blue-water ambitions and capabilities since the end of the Cold War, with a changing strategic environment leading to greater awareness

of China and Japan's own naval forces (Park S.Y. 2012, 149). It has employed the slogan 'to the sea, to the world' since 1992, underlining how the maritime domain has come to be seen as a means with which Seoul is able to engage with wider international society (Bowers 2019, 153). Debate remains, however, around the extent to which the ROKN should prioritise its local, regional and global interests. Delivering a keynote speech to a maritime conference in Seoul in 2013, Geoffrey Till asked his audience to consider whether South Korea is 'aiming to be seen as a global naval power, a regional one or should it focus primarily on responding to the threat from the North?' (Till 2014).

The challenges Seoul faces in peninsula waters are as varied as they are severe. In 2010 alone, the sinking of the ROKS *Cheonan* by a North Korean submarine led to the deaths of 46 crew, and the North's shelling of Yeonpyeong island resulted in four further South Korean fatalities (Lee J.H. 2020). At the same time as it guards against unexpected attack, the ROKN is responsible for preventing infiltration via sea by North Korean crafts that are sometimes small enough to escape detection (Choe 2019). Elsewhere, in the East Sea the ROKN is tasked with maintaining South Korea's control over the islets of Dokdo, which is disputed by Japan, and in the West Sea the submerged rocks known as Ieodo, disputed by China (Harold 2012). Additionally, illegal fishing remains a major issue, with more work needed to achieve agreement on and enforcement of maritime boundaries between South Korea and neighbouring states (Harold 2012, 288-289). There are strong reasons to argue that the ROKN should limit its operational focus to these local issues. Why, then, has the ROKN also developed the capability to engage in public diplomacy as part of its blue-water strategy? What form has this public diplomacy taken, and how is the ROKN able to compete for soft power influence with the better resourced Great Power navies of Northeast Asia?

I argue that South Korea's behaviour is informed by a mixture of functional and status-seeking logics, with the country recognising its interests in protecting vital SLOC, as well as the opportunities it has to promote its image through 'nation branding' as a middle power (Ayhan 2019). The analysis presented in this paper is informed by a review of South Korea's diplomatic and defense white papers, together with domestic and

international media, think tank reports and academic literature.

The remainder of this paper consists of four main parts. It first outlines the concepts of soft power and public diplomacy, and how they relate to military activities, introducing the term 'public naval diplomacy' as a way of understanding soft power naval activities. Second, it provides an overview of three pillars of ROKN public naval diplomacy: (i) anti-piracy and evacuation activities (ii) naval cooperation through port visits and joint naval exercises, and (iii) humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR). Third, it makes a case for the comparative strengths of the ROKN in pursuing public naval diplomacy when compared to larger neighbouring naval forces. Finally, it engages with contemporary policy debate within South Korea's maritime strategy community, considering adjustments to the ROKN's acquisitions of new naval platforms, and the retirement of old platforms. Building upon South Korea's existing successes in public naval diplomacy, it calls for policymakers to consider the ROKN's potential role as a leader in regional maritime environmental conservation.

SOFT POWER, PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND NAVAL DIPLOMACY

Soft power has been defined as the 'ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments' (Nye 2004, x). Following Vuving (2009, 8-12), this attraction can be generated by three complementary power currencies: benignity, brilliance, and beauty. By engaging positively in good faith with foreign publics, an actor's benignity 'generates soft power through the production of gratitude and sympathy' (Vuving 2009, 8). In being seen to perform functions well, brilliance 'generates soft power through the production of admiration' (8). Finally, by following a persuasive value-driven agenda, beauty 'generates soft power through the production of inspiration' (9).

Soft power has a symbiotic relationship with public diplomacy—the work done by governments, and increasingly non-government actors, to nurture, build, and ultimately wield soft power currencies. In the South Korean context, public diplomacy is officially viewed as 'diplomacy activities through which the State enhances foreign nationals' understanding

of and confidence in the Republic of Korea directly or in cooperation with local governments or the private sector through culture, knowledge, policies, etc.’ (MOFA 2016, 1). In practise, discussions of South Korea’s public diplomacy have typically focused on Korean cultural exports and exchanges, its hosting of sporting and diplomatic events, and its demonstrated leadership in areas such as official development assistance and environmental concerns. Among Seoul’s environmental initiatives have been its push for a ‘me first’ approach to tackling emissions and its involvement in green growth governance, including its decision to provide a physical home for international organisations such as the Global Green Growth Institute and the Green Climate Fund (Blaxekjaer 2016; Lee J. 2016). Away from the peninsula, existing works on South Korea’s maritime public diplomacy focus on local issues such as the Dokdo island dispute (Ordaniel 2016), without considering the country’s broader regional and global maritime theatres.

According to Hall and Smith, ‘(t)here are two arms races happening in Asia today: one for military capabilities and another for the weapons of “soft power”’ (2013, 1). While for Hall and Smith ‘traditional and new media, as well as cultural events and academic exchange programs’ are the main ‘weapons’ of soft power (1), this binary distinction between hard and soft power resources is, in reality, not so clear-cut (Capie 2015, 329). As Nye himself acknowledges, ‘Military... resources can sometimes be used to attract as well as coerce’ (2009). However, not all military resources are equally well-suited to this role. Naval platforms have increasingly been used in non-warfighting capacities due to a combination of instrumental and normative influences. They have been praised for their versatility and manoeuvrability, with Capie noting that ‘(a)mphibious warfare vessels, often equipped with helicopters, have proved to be ideal vehicles for the provision of humanitarian aid’ (2015, 314). Furthermore, in comparison to other military components, naval vessels are in some circumstances more easily perceived as non-threatening by foreign publics. As Till notes of port visits by navy warships, ‘It [is] certainly quite hard to conceive of an equivalent courtesy visit by a division of main battle tanks’ (Till 2009, 256).¹

1 This point was demonstrated forcefully in March 2018, when a US aircraft carrier arrived

Traditional naval diplomacy consists of a variety of peacetime maritime activities, including coercion and collaboration (Le Mière 2014, 27); reflecting diverse mission sets that can ‘entail both “hard” and “soft” power dimensions’ (Strating 2019). Classic accounts of naval diplomacy have tended to focus upon the more coercive ‘gun boat diplomacy’ (Widen 2011). More recent studies have instead emphasized soft power activities, such as anti-piracy missions and evacuations, naval cooperation projects and HADR (Jevsejevas 2020; Patalano 2015). These activities can provide opportunities to demonstrate a country’s benignity, brilliance, and beauty—and may therefore be considered forms of what I call ‘public naval diplomacy’. The following section examines South Korea’s record in each of these areas, contributing to a growing literature on the soft power utilization of resources previously seen as inseparable from hard power.

PUBLIC NAVAL DIPLOMACY AND THE ROKN: MIXING SEA POWER WITH SOFT POWER

South Korea’s public naval diplomacy efforts can be divided into three pillars: (i) anti-piracy operations and evacuation efforts off the coast of Africa since 2009, (ii) cooperation projects, including joint naval exercises and regular port visits, and (iii) its Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response (HADR) activities in South and East Asia. As the following analysis demonstrates, through these overlapping actions the ROKN has been able to contribute functionally to the reduction of maritime piracy and tensions between naval forces, increased international cooperation, and alleviated the impact of natural disasters and other humanitarian crises; all while elevating South Korea’s status as a middle power capable of contributing limited public goods.

The first pillar of South Korea’s public naval diplomacy is its anti-piracy and evacuation efforts, closely associated with its Cheonghae Unit, formed in 2009 as part of a multinational response to a dramatic surge in maritime

in the Vietnamese port city of Danang, signaling an improvement in the two states’ post-War bilateral relations (Beech 2018).

piracy in the Gulf of Aden and waters off the eastern coast of Somalia (Roehrig 2012, 28). At the peak of this crisis in 2010, a record-breaking US\$9.5 million ransom payment was delivered to Somali pirates for the release of South Korea's *Samho Dream* oil tanker (Kaprove 2013, 114) underlining the threat posed to the country's interests in the region. At risk is the country's vital South-bound SLOC, one of the country's four major shipping arteries (Park S.Y. 2012, 146). Many of Seoul's energy imports pass through the Gulf of Aden along this route, alongside around 29% of the country's entire maritime cargo (MND 2019, 217).

Deployed continuously from 2009 as part of the multilateral Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151), the Cheonghae Unit consists of a single Chungmugong Yi Sunshin DDH-II class destroyer, together with several rigid-hull inflatable boats and a helicopter—assets manned by just over 300 troops (MND 2019, 217).² Although the Cheonghae Unit is primarily tasked with protecting the security of Seoul's commercial shipping assets and South Korean sailors, it rarely makes use of its hard power capabilities by facing off against small pirate skiffs. Instead, it is routinely engaged with foreign publics, having protected 4,729 non-Korean vessels through a combination of safe voyage escort and convoy services up to November 2018 (MND 2019, 218), financed by the South Korean government. One grateful message addressed to the unit by a Chinese vessel's crew in June 2016 thanked it for its 'earnest and professional escort' (MND 2017a), suggesting an appreciation among international commercial sailing publics for the contribution provided by the ROKN. Added to this is the fact that on the 16,327 occasions (MND 2019, 218) in which South Korean vessels were given protection by the Cheonghae Unit, the guarded ships were typically manned by crews of mixed Korean and non-Korean nationality. For example, when the 17,000-ton Korean vessel *Azalea* was successfully defended from pirate attack by the Cheonghae Unit in July 2011, its crew consisted of four Koreans, two Britons, and 18 Filipinos, a fact that did not escape the attention of the

2 These required assets are, in practice, multiplied due to the distance of the deployment. As Roehrig (2012, 42) notes, in order to achieve a continuous presence in the theater, the Cheonghae Unit requires a commitment of three DDH-II ships. While one is actively carrying out its mission, another is in training or transit to or from the Korean Peninsula, while repairs and essential maintenance are being carried out on a third ship after its return from the theatre.

Philippines' media (PNA 2011).

South Korea has repeatedly justified its deployment of the unit in terms of its practical interests, alongside explicit reference to its own global status. In its 2009 Diplomatic White Paper, Seoul claimed that '(a)s the world's sixth largest maritime country, the ROK has a legitimate concern over the scourge of piracy' (MOFA 2009, 208). In 2013, it similarly stated that '(a)s the ninth largest maritime economic power and a country affected by piracy, the Republic of Korea has actively participated in the global fight against Somali pirates with a keen interest in its eradication' (MOFA 2013, 271). Promoting the Cheonghae Unit to an international audience, in 2017 South Korea's English-language broadcaster Arirang TV released the documentary *Cheonghae Unit: Peacemaker of Aden*, documenting the actions of the unit and its role in protecting commercial shipping (Arirang TV 2017). The Ministry of National Defense has similarly produced its own promotional materials directed towards English-speaking audiences (MND 2017a).

In support of these actions at sea, South Korea has also been actively involved in the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), an inclusive, informal forum for international maritime actors established in 2009 to coordinate anti-piracy efforts in the region. Much of the CGPCS' contribution has been conducted through working groups, of which Working Group 4 (WG4) had a clear, targeted, public diplomacy brief (Meron 2014, 50). WG4's two central aims were to inform the international community of the work of the CGPCS, and to influence public opinion by delegitimizing piracy both inside Somalia and among external Somali diaspora communities (50). South Korea was actively involved in this group, financing the creation of a CGPCS website in 2011, and along with the UK and US governments paying maintenance costs for the site and an associated Facebook page (51). By backing the CGPCS' website, Seoul demonstrated its awareness of, and commitment to, public diplomacy as a method for combatting piracy in the region. As South Korea's 2015 Diplomatic White Paper notes, 'the Korean government operated the official website of the CGPCS from 2011 till 2014, thereby contributing to the facilitation of communication among the CGPCS participants and raising public awareness on piracy issues' (MOFA 2015, 321).

Expanding on these activities, the Cheonghae Unit has been tasked with

conducting three evacuations, twice from Libya (2011, 2014) and once from Yemen (2015), transporting 61 South Korean nationals and 92 non-Koreans to safety (Dong-a Ilbo 2014; MND 2019, 218). Commenting on the inclusion of six non-Koreans in its evacuation from Yemen in 2015, South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that '(o)n humanitarian grounds, the ROK government evacuated two Americans, two Canadians, one New Zealander, and one Swiss... at the request of their countries' (MOFA 2015). Once again, the actions of the ROKN appear to be motivated as much by status as functional concerns, with the South's 2014 Defense White Paper noting of the Cheonghae Unit's missions that '(s)uch accomplishments raised the status of the ROK's armed forces in the world' (MND 2015, 147), and similarly two years later that '(s)uch accomplishments raised the stature of the ROK armed forces in the world' (MND 2017b, 175).

The second pillar of South Korea's public naval diplomacy is its naval cooperation projects. In addition to protecting Korean and non-Korean citizens from the threat of piracy, by joining CTF-151 the ROKN has had opportunities to collaborate with leading regional and global naval forces, legitimizing the presence of the ROKN and enabling it to play a leadership role in the international maritime realm. One highly visible display of this leadership role is the fact that South Korea has taken temporary command of the CTF-151 five times during the last decade, most recently in June 2019 (Naval Today 2019), a role described by the South Korean government as 'an opportunity to internationally demonstrate the excellence of the ROK Navy' (MND 2017b, 147). At the same time, the Cheonghae Unit has contributed to enhancing South Korea's international status by engaging in joint naval anti-piracy training exercises with major powers, such as those held in the Gulf of Aden with China's People's Liberation Army Navy in 2010 and again in 2012 (Erickson & Strange 2015, 78). However, the ROKN's involvement in joint training is far from limited to the Gulf of Aden. In fact, South Korea has been participating in major multinational naval exercises far from peninsula waters for around three decades.

Alongside a number of smaller drills, ROKN vessels have been actively involved in the large biannual US-hosted Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) since 1990, at which time it 'acquired the honor of best marksmanship' (Meconis & Wallace 2000, 101). By 2018, a much-

expanded ROKN committed the Aegis destroyer *Yulgok Yi I* to the drills, in addition to two other ships, three planes and 700 personnel (Yonhap News 2018). Per Bowers, 'RIMPAC has been used by the ROKN as [an] indicator of its status among the world's top navies' as well as 'an arena to build operational expertise, not just with the United States but also other navies' (2019, 100). The ROKN has increasingly been included in even more exclusive regional joint maritime drills, such as the inaugural Pacific Vanguard exercise in May 2019 alongside naval contingents from the US, Japan and Australia (Yonhap News 2019).

In 1992, two frigates completed the ROKN's maiden voyage to Europe (Meconis & Wallace 2000, 101), a statement of intent of Seoul's expanding maritime interests. Subsequently, the ROKN has steadily built up its capacity to conduct port visits outside peninsula waters, a key element of its ongoing engagement with foreign publics and attempts to build blue-water soft power. To take one example, in 2019 the Philippines' media reported on the friendly three-day call of 700 ROKN personnel aboard destroyer *Munmu the Great* and support ship *Hwacheon* in Manila, noting 'scheduled shipboard tours, sports events, and joint performances... throughout the visit,' and that '(t)he Philippines is the first stop of the ships, which aim to drop anchor in 14 ports and 12 countries' (Mangosing 2019). During such port calls, Seoul's soft power is cultivated in target countries through interactions between ROKN personnel and foreign publics, joint events with local naval forces, and through the favourable media coverage that the visits inevitably prompt (e.g. Gotinga 2019). In sum, such projects provide an opportunity for exchange and dialogue in target countries, while simultaneously naturalizing the presence of South Korean naval vessels on the high seas in cooperation with other navies.

The third pillar of the ROKN's public naval diplomacy, humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR), has taken shape over the last two decades through its involvement in East Timor (2000-2002), Afghanistan (2001), the Asian Tsunami (2005) and in response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines (2013) (Bowers 2019, 68). In preparation for further humanitarian campaigns, the ROKN has also cooperated closely with other regional navies in drills specifically focused on enhancing HADR coordination, such as the Multilateral Naval Exercise Komodo (MNEK)

hosted by Indonesia in 2018 (Naval Technology 2018).

The ROKN has been actively involved in disaster relief since at least 2005, when it was deployed to Indonesia following the devastating Asian Tsunami (Hyun 2010; Park S.Y. 2012, 160). In fact, in the context of the Asia Pacific theatre, there is a strong logic to empowering the ROKN to play a leading role in delivering South Korea's HADR. The predominantly littoral location of recipient states allows for relatively quick, easy and safe access for naval platforms in what may be unstable operating environments. Hitherto, ROKN HADR campaigns have utilized Landing Ship Tank (LST) platforms, able to unload personnel and large quantities of supplies without access to infrastructure such as docks, giving it greater flexibility in delivering support where it is most needed. However, in recent years the ROKN has begun to invest in larger Dokdo-class Landing Platform Dock (LPD) vessels that, in addition to their warfighting capabilities, are 'tasked with PKO (Peace Keeping Operations) support, humanitarian operations and national prestige enhancement' (Bowers 2019, 91).

The ROKN's HADR projects have engaged with local communities in several countries in the Asia Pacific region. In 2002, it was reported that, in addition to official assistance, ROKN staff had personally raised US\$2000 to donate to local schools in East Timor (Kookmin Ilbo 2002), with a later report citing an ROKN officer as saying that such 'humanitarian gestures will also promote the image of the ROKN and South Korea' within the country (BBC 2003). In a further symbol of the public diplomacy bond formed between the ROKN and East Timor during this engagement, ROKN personnel formed a cheer squad for East Timor's athletes at the 2002 Asian Games in South Korea (Yonhap News 2002). A decade later, South Korea's US\$3.8 million contribution to disaster-relief efforts in the Philippines following Typhoon Haiyan included the dispatch of 'two ships full of restoration equipment and relief supplies' (KBS World 2013). Senior figures in the Philippines' government subsequently visited South Korea's HADR unit, with one commenting that 'Korea is the only country that helps the Philippines with heart'³ and President Aquino even saying 'thank you' in the Korean language (*gamsahamnida*) (Korea Policy Briefing 2014).

3 Author's translation.

Overall, with the Asia Pacific region being uniquely vulnerable to natural disasters (Wood 2018), ROKN HADR support is well-poised to continue making a modest but vital contribution to the wellbeing of communities affected by disaster, while simultaneously shaping perceptions of South Korea in ways favourable to its desire for enhanced status. Together with anti-piracy and evacuation efforts and the ROKN's cooperation projects, it is clear that Seoul is actively pursuing public diplomacy in the maritime arena. The following section outlines three key elements working to the advantage of the ROKN's public naval diplomacy in comparison to other regional navies.

COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES OF ROKN PUBLIC NAVAL DIPLOMACY

South Korea's military forces are outnumbered and outspent by many of its neighbours in the Northeast Asian region, including China, Japan, Russia and the US (MND 2019, 330). As much in peacetime contexts as in conventional conflict scenarios, this disparity in resources would appear to put Seoul at a major disadvantage in its use of military means for soft power ends. Clearly, there have been limits to the naval resources that Seoul has been able to spare away from peninsula waters in pursuit of its regional and global interests, a factor exacerbated by continuing provocations along its maritime border with North Korea (BBC 2020). However, when it comes to deploying the ROKN in a public diplomacy role in the Asia Pacific region and beyond, South Korea also enjoys several advantages over some of these peers that have gone largely unrecognised.

First, South Korean naval activity is unlikely to be seen as threatening at a regional or global level. This is a particular strength in Asia, where 'states remain deeply sensitive to foreign attempts to influence domestic public opinion' (Hall & Smith 2013, 11). Seoul benefits in this respect partly due to its smaller size, its lack of territorial claims, and the fact that it has fewer resources than its neighbours, but its policies are also not prone to 'appear as narrowly self-serving or arrogantly presented' in ways that 'prohibit rather than produce soft power' (Nye 2008, 102). In this battle of perceptions

central to the generation of soft power in the region, Seoul has neither the historical baggage of Japanese imperialism, nor the contemporary position of China, often seen as a militarily aggressive and potentially threatening revisionist power (Lee S.J. 2011, 143). Nor does it share the US' predilection for unilateralism (Hocking 2005, 34). In the maritime arena, Seoul has been careful to stay neutral in sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea, and has not suffered from tensions with regional partners of the sort that led to the closure of the US Naval Medical Research Unit Two (NAMRU-2) in Indonesia in 2010 (Smith 2014). In a discussion of Beijing's attempts at naval public diplomacy, Zanardi (2016) argues that the intended effects of its maritime activities are potentially disrupted by perceptions that its naval power is threatening due to its ongoing maritime disputes such as the South China Sea. Similarly, Erickson and Strange note that 'there are objections to the notion that China's antipiracy missions are benign' (2015, 82) and even China's port visits are at times viewed with suspicion (Greene 2019). Whereas Beijing has, along with Moscow, had its soft power public diplomacy initiatives maligned as 'sharp power' (National Endowment for Democracy 2017), Seoul has rarely faced distrust or public backlash related to its own activities. Even when the ROKN has exercised considerable force—such as the killing of eight Somalian pirates during Operation Dawn of Gulf of Aden in 2011—this resulted in largely positive international media coverage (e.g. NPR 2011).

Second, while Great Powers like China and Japan are expected to contribute public goods in the Asia Pacific region (Goh 2013, 216), as a middle power South Korea is not viewed as having the same responsibilities for the management of international society. Consequently, even more minor contributions in the form of narrowly guarding individual SLOC or HADR aid distributed by the ROKN are likely to be viewed positively. One prominent example of this phenomena came during the 2013 humanitarian response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, when China faced sustained criticism for 'contributing only' around US\$2 million in donations, and was subsequently shamed into sending additional resources in the form of its *Peace Ark* hospital ship (Zanardi 2016, 440). In contrast, South Korea's decision to involve the ROKN in delivering US\$3.3 million, along with a 'Disaster relief team; food assistance; (and) emergency health services'

(Lum and Margesson 2014, 21) was viewed positively, with Manila's Department of National Defense Secretary, Voltaire Gazmin, later saying that those impacted by the South Korean presence in the country 'only had good things to say,' and that '(w)e truly thank you.' (Asia News Monitor 2015). One slight caveat to this advantage is that it may diminish over time, with an expectation that Seoul can and should contribute more, on land and sea, in line with its status as a rising middle power (Roehrig 2013).

Finally, as a young, vibrant, liberal capitalist democracy conforming to international maritime norms, South Korea's public diplomacy is potentially more appealing to regional and global publics than that of more authoritarian states such as China and Russia. As Choi notes, 'South Korea's strength lies in its experience of democratisation and liberal capitalist development' (2009, 61). While Seoul's limited Cold War public diplomacy was focused upon defeating communism, its rapid economic development and consolidated democratization over the last 30 years is seen as a 'more solid basis for its... public diplomacy' (Lee S.J. 2015, 107) and a potentially attractive model for publics in developing states. Notably, Seoul's economic development was achieved in part through its once unrivalled shipping industry and its sea-borne trade (Park B.S. 2015). It is fitting that this period in the country's history is often referred to as the *Miracle on the Han River* (Scarlatoiu 2008). In contrast to the other two advantages listed above, this factor is not related to the country's size and strength, meaning that even were South Korea to continue to grow in hard or soft power terms, it would not necessarily be weakened.

In sum, despite a deficit in material resources, at a regional level South Korean public naval diplomacy has three core advantages. It benefits from existing perceptions that it is comparatively non-threatening in its policy prescriptions; from the fact that, unlike Great Powers, it is not expected to contribute public goods to international society; and from its soft-power underpinnings as a liberal capitalist democracy seen to have rapidly transitioned from 'developing' to 'developed state' status via its maritime trade. Recognizing these advantages, the following section offers two modest practical recommendations that would enable it to build on the ROKN's existing public diplomacy strengths, while simultaneously recognising the resource limitations placed upon it.

STRENGTHENING SOUTH KOREA'S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AT SEA

The ROKN has laid strong foundations in its public diplomacy work by offering protection to international commercial shipping, expanding dialogue and cooperation with international maritime publics, and engaging in HADR work in the region. Looking ahead to the future, what can be done to strengthen and expand upon this work, without detracting from the essential role of the ROKN in peninsula waters? What follows is a brief, exploratory outline of two interrelated arguments. First, that the ROKN should be cautious about following other regional navies by purchasing hospital ships to upgrade its HADR public diplomacy. Instead, it should preserve maximum operational flexibility by maintaining and expanding its fleet of LST and LPD platforms, capable of both combat and non-combat functions. Second, building on its record of leadership on environmental issues, that the ROKN should add a fourth pillar to its public naval diplomacy work by pursuing an explicit environmental agenda in the maritime domain. In the pursuit of this goal, the ROKN could begin by considering donating some of its retiring platforms to be strategically sunk in locations throughout the region as artificial reefs.

Hospital ships have existed at least as far back as the 17th century as a means of providing medical support services to expeditionary forces; yet only in recent decades have they begun to take on an explicit humanitarian and public diplomacy brief (Ray and Naidu 2017). The use of these vessels is regulated through the 1907 Hague Convention X, which states that, among other conditions, 'Governments undertake not to use these ships for any military purpose' (IPC 1907, Art. 4). As a result, hospital ships cannot take on combat functions, and are a potentially attractive platform for public naval diplomacy—offering a visible sign of humanitarian support without risk of being perceived as threatening. Following Washington's use of the *USNS Mercy* and *USNS Comfort* in pursuit of soft power objectives (Sokolowski, 2011) other navies have begun operating hospital ships in the region, including Moscow's *Irtysh*, and also Beijing's *Peace Ark*, which entered service in 2008 (Mackenzie 2011, 11). Meanwhile, pressure has been steadily building in Japan towards the same approach, and Tokyo now appears poised to invest in similar platforms (Nishioka 2020).

In line with this regional trend, senior naval officers and academics in South Korea's maritime strategy community have begun to publicly advocate for the ROKN to acquire its own hospital ships (Yu 2020; Song H.C. 2020). Whilst such proposals deserve praise for instigating a debate over how to expand Seoul's public naval diplomacy, the analysis presented here suggests that any acquisition of hospital ships should proceed with caution. Domestically, South Korea needs to ensure it moves in lockstep with public opinion, which 'has not yet fully embraced the idea of... assuming a leading role in the provision of public goods' (Choi 2009, 64). Internationally, too, Seoul is not expected to contribute as many public goods as Great Powers, and it is broadly trusted by actors at the regional and global level, meaning that the ROKN's combat ships can more easily be converted into temporary use for South Korea's HADR projects. Moreover, the ROKN's existing LST platforms have greater operational flexibility during a disaster than hospital ships, as they can land on almost any beach—unlike the larger, more cumbersome hospital ships. Seoul is also more heavily constrained in its resources due to its smaller economic base and the challenges posed by the (North) Korean People's Navy in peninsula waters. Besides which, if navy funds were diverted to such a project, South Korea's hard naval power would likely fall further behind its neighbours. The purchase cost for a single hospital ship has been estimated at as much as \$US327 million, with maintenance costs running as high as US\$23 million per year (Japan Times 2020). Were the ROKN to make such a large investment in a hospital ship platform, it would leave itself open to allegations that it had prioritised its blue-water ambitions ahead of its core mission of protecting peninsula waters, leading to a potential public backlash if it were to find itself exposed to any major provocation along its local maritime boundaries. Overall, taking account of these advantages and constraints, the ROKN's best option in the short to medium-term may be to continue to invest in LST and LPD platforms that can be utilised in both combat and non-combat roles.

How, then, could the ROKN feasibly expand its public diplomacy activities, while taking into consideration the country's distinctive advantages, constraints and agendas? One promising avenue for consideration is to develop the ROKN's status as a leader in maritime environmental conser-

vation issues. Seoul has long been concerned with declining fishing stocks and ‘other environmental factors’ in peninsula waters that ‘have put increased emphasis on conservation measures’ (Bowers 2019, 9). However, despite its recent attempts to ‘demonstrat[e] environmental leadership at low costs’ (Song A.Y. 2020) on the global stage, there are few signs that Seoul is yet applying this agenda in the maritime arena.

One way that the ROKN could begin to craft such a role for itself is by donating some of its retiring naval vessels for use as artificial reefs throughout the Asia Pacific region. Until now, such platforms have predominantly been used as training vessels for the ROKN and Korean Coastguard (Park 2019; Ahn 2019), as public displays, and as artificial reefs in peninsula waters (Park 2019)—the latter proving that the ROKN has the expertise required to safely prepare its retired platforms to be used as artificial reefs. Recently, retired vessels have also been employed in more soft power-oriented ways. In 2017, Seoul Battleship Park was opened to the public, and has since been promoted as a destination for foreign visitors to Korea (VisitSeoul.Net 2017). Old ROKN platforms have also been donated for use by around ten smaller friendly regional navies (Park 2019). With the ROKN’s fleet having expanded significantly since the end of the Cold War, however, it could now examine the feasibility of donating retired platforms for use as artificial reefs in the Asia Pacific region. A recent study by Williams (2015) of the US’ so-called ‘Ships 2 Reefs’ program concludes that the construction of artificial reefs is ‘(a)n important nonmilitary use of navies’ (114) that ‘provide(s) one practical solution to the precipitous decline in marine resources’ and ‘can play an important role in conservation and restoration of natural reefs by relieving pressure of use and establishing habitats to increase marine life’ (123-124). By engaging in this practise, the ROKN could enhance South Korea’s attractiveness to regional maritime publics by contributing to increased fish stocks and boosting scuba-diving tourism industries around the sites of these wrecks, with corresponding economic development payoffs to the affected communities. Put simply, instead of acquiring new costly single-use hospital ship platforms to pursue expanded public diplomacy goals, this paper suggests ROKN may be strategically better placed to first consider how it can more creatively dispose of its existing vessels, while simultaneously expanding its naval public diplomacy

activities.

CONCLUSION

In December 2018, ten years after its initial deployment in the Gulf of Aden, the ROKN's Cheonghae Unit was awarded the prestigious Prime Minister's Award, in recognition of its 'contribution to protecting the country's vessels and citizens off the coast of Somalia' (Arirang TV 2018). It would be wrong, however, to think that such activities by the ROKN beyond peninsula waters in the last two decades have benefitted only South Korean nationals and businesses. Instead, as this paper has argued, the ROKN has engaged in sustained public naval diplomacy at a regional and global level, providing leadership on major international issues such as maritime security, international cooperation and HADR, while elevating South Korea's status as a country capable of providing the international community with valuable public goods.

By seeking to examine the ROKN's public naval diplomacy in isolation from other non-state maritime actors, one limitation of this work is its traditional focus on state-based activity. As Christian Le Mièrè (2014) has argued convincingly, diplomacy in the maritime arena is no-longer the sole preserve of naval forces. Future research could fruitfully build on this work by examining the existing and potential role of South Korean conglomerates, non-governmental organisations, charities, and even Seoul's small maritime security industry in contributing to the country's public maritime diplomacy; supporting efforts to strengthen maritime order and provide humanitarian support while engaging in dialogue about the country's maritime role with foreign publics at a regional and global level. Additionally, it would be highly valuable to periodically survey strategic maritime publics and elites in the Asia Pacific and around the Gulf of Aden, to better gauge the impact of Seoul's public naval diplomacy on international maritime publics' perceptions.

Ultimately, despite its strong maritime history and identity, Korea 'has often ignored both the advantages the sea provides and the vulnerabilities the sea exposes' (Bowers 2014, 443). During the first two decades of the

twenty-first century, however, South Korea has successfully bucked this trend, recognizing many of the opportunities and risks that await it on the high seas. As such, it is well-placed to begin to expand its public naval diplomacy into new areas. While the ROKN faces continued constraints and resource limitations as a result of the unique challenges posed by the maritime environment in Northeast Asia, the ROKN's ambitions outside peninsula waters can be further harnessed by the country's public diplomacy entrepreneurs, if they are willing to think creatively about how to engage with its capabilities and limitations, providing leadership on maritime environmental conservation and other global challenges.

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Korean Health Diplomacy Amidst COVID-19 and Its Impact on Public Diplomacy

How Korean health diplomacy amidst the COVID-19 pandemic serves as a soft power tool
Korean Public Diplomacy paper contest – 30 September 2020

Floortje Fontein

Abstract | South-Korea's health diplomacy efforts amidst the COVID-19 pandemic can play a meaningful role in the country's global public diplomacy strategy. This paper aims to broaden the understanding of public diplomacy by engaging different international relations subfields. It advocates a Korean public diplomacy strategy that does not rely solely on efforts of cultural diplomacy, but on those of health diplomacy as well. It argues, based on data collected and analyzed through a literature study, that Korea has implemented two important policies during the pandemic which serve as soft power tools. First, Korea's successful response to the pandemic resulted in a growing international demand for Korean medical supplies that the Korean government has met in a way that advances the country's diplomatic interests. Secondly, the Korean government launched a public campaign, in which their democratic and transparent response to the pandemic is promoted to the foreign public. The above discussed efforts of health diplomacy may significantly enhance the country's public diplomacy strategy by establishing supportive relationships with other nations and improving Korea's image to the foreign public.

국문초록 | 코로나19 전염병 중 대한민국의 보건 외교 노력은 국가의 세계 공공 외교 전략에 의미 있는 역할을 할 수 있다. 이 논문에서는 여러 국제 관계론의 하위 분야를 끌어들이으로써 공공 외교에 대한 이해를 넓히고자, 한국의 공공 외교 전략이 단순히 문화 외교 노력만이 아닌 보건 외교 노력에도 의존하고 있다고 보았다. 문헌 연구를 통해 모으고 분석한 자료를 바탕으로 한국이 코로나 19 전염병 동안 소프트 파워의 도구로 작용한 두 가지 중요한 정책을 시행했다고 보았다. 첫째, 전염병에 대한 한국의 성공적인 대응이 한국의 의료 물자에 대한 국제

적 수요의 증가를 불러왔고, 대한민국 정부는 이를 국가의 외교 이해관계를 진보시키는 방향으로 충족시켰다. 둘째, 한국 정부는 그들의 민주적이고 투명한 전염병 대응을 해외 대중에게 홍보하는 공공 캠페인을 시작했다. 위에 언급된 보건 외교 노력은 다른 국가들과 지지적인 관계를 쌓고 해외 대중에게 한국의 이미지를 개선시킴으로써 한국의 공공 외교 전략을 상당히 강화시킬 수 있다.

INTRODUCTION

On the 20th January 2020 the first case of COVID-19 in South-Korea (*hereinafter: Korea*) was confirmed. The COVID-19 virus originated from Wuhan city, China, and rapidly spread to various countries around the world. The number of infected cases in Korea gradually increased throughout February. According to the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC), the critical case that led to a quick transmission of the virus throughout the rest of the country was labeled ‘Patient 31,’ a 61-year-old Korean woman from Daegu (Cha & Kim, 2020). Several months after the first infected case, Korea is now praised as one of the leading countries in reducing the number of deaths caused by the virus. By 5 August 2020, Korea had about 14,456 confirmed infected cases and 302 deaths. Furthermore, Korea has a case fatality rate of 2,09%, compared to the global case fatality rate of 3,76% (Coronaboard, n.d.).

Korea's successful response to the pandemic can be used to establish diplomatic relations through activities relating to ‘health diplomacy’. The COVID-19 pandemic is an example of a health issue that transcends national boundaries and requires global action. The broad political, social and economic implications of the pandemic have brought more actors, including diplomats, into the health arena (Kickbusch, 2007). Health diplomacy involves activities that improve global health while strengthening international relationships (Wise, 2009). Successful health diplomacy efforts amidst the COVID-19 pandemic can play a meaningful role in improving the image of Korea in other nations, thereby making a positive impact on ‘public diplomacy,’ i.e. “the means by which governments, private groups and individuals influence the attitudes of other people and governments in such a way as to exercise influence on their

foreign policy decisions” (Cho, 2012, p. 279).

Thus far, public relations scholars have not yet noted the importance of health diplomacy efforts in relation to public diplomacy (Wise, 2009). For the diplomatic studies to further develop empirically and theoretically, it is important that we engage different international relations subfields in order to contribute to a more complete view on the forces reshaping modern world politics. Moreover, the Korean government has mainly based its public diplomacy strategy on the narrow terms of cultural diplomacy, which has its shortcomings (Cho, 2012). Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to advocate a Korean public diplomacy strategy that relies more on the country’s health diplomacy efforts amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. This paper will thus focus on the impact of Korean healthy diplomacy during the pandemic on the country’s public diplomacy. According to this, the research question central to this paper is: *How do Korea’s health diplomacy efforts during the COVID-19 pandemic impact its public diplomacy?* In what follows, this paper starts by laying out the theoretical framework on public diplomacy and health diplomacy. Followed by the data which will then be analyzed using a qualitative literature study. Finally, the paper closes with a discussion of the findings. This paper will contribute to academic literature as the COVID-19 pandemic is a new phenomenon, especially in combination with public diplomacy-health diplomacy literature.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The following will outline the most relevant existing literature on the concepts of public diplomacy and health diplomacy. Conducting a literature review will demonstrate the crucial role public relations and diplomacy play in the era of globalization, in which health issues, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, affect countries all over the world and require global action. This will set the theoretical framework this paper is based on.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND SOFT POWER

The term 'public diplomacy' was first used in 1965 by former American diplomat E. Guillon, he defined the term as "the means by which governments, private groups and individuals influence the attitudes and opinions of other people and governments in such a way as to exercise influence on their foreign policy decisions" (Cho, 2012, p. 279). Public diplomacy involves dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy. First of all, public diplomacy focuses not only on establishing inter-governmental relations, but also emphasizes supportive relations with foreign publics. Secondly, central to public diplomacy are 'soft power tools' (Istad, 2016). Soft power refers to the means and efforts to establish supportive international relations based on a nation's attractiveness: for instance, a nation's appealing values and desirable international reputation. Soft power diplomacy might enable a nation to achieve diplomatic objectives that otherwise could not have been achieved through hard power instruments, i.e. the use of military or economic force (Cho, 2012). Finally, public diplomacy involves governmental as well as non-governmental actors, such as citizens, private groups and non-governmental organizations (Istad, 2016).

The main purpose of public diplomacy would be to establish supportive relationships with a range of (non-)governmental stakeholders that influence a nation's capability to achieve their foreign policy objectives (Wise, 2009). To achieve this purpose, the practice of public diplomacy focuses on soft power tools and the way one nation communicates with citizens of another nation (Cho, 2012). Through the means of soft power, as opposed to hard power, we can get others to want the outcomes you want by shaping their preferences, rather than relying on coercion (Nye, 2004).

According to American political scientist Nye (2004), the soft power of a nation comes from three resources, that is: 1) the attractiveness and (moral) legitimacy of its culture, 2) political values and 3) foreign policy. He further lists the three dimensions of public diplomacy through which a nation can accomplish its diplomatic objectives:

1. Daily communication: this first dimension involves explaining the

background of domestic and foreign policy decisions, for instance by offering (one-sided) information to the press. Hereby, it is important to focus on domestic and foreign journalism to justify policy decisions not only to the nation's own citizens, but the foreign public as well.

2. Strategic communication: the second dimension involves developing a set of themes, as in political or advertising campaigns, with the purpose of promoting central themes of a particular policy. For instance, by launching a public campaign surrounding a particular policy that emphasizes the central values behind it.
3. The development of lasting relationships with individuals: the final dimension involves human exchange programs; such as scholarships, seminars and conferences. This dimension advances interactive communication between the providers and receivers of public diplomacy.

Technological advances and other dramatic changes of the 21st century international arena have emphasized the ever-growing importance of public diplomacy. In the era of globalization, public attitudes and opinions now directly impact a nation's capability to achieve their diplomatic objectives through the development of information and democratization. Costs of processing and disseminating information have been reduced, public citizens' power to access information and express their opinions on foreign policy has increased (Cho, 2012). Promoting a positive reception of a nation's policies, culture and values to a foreign public through the means of public diplomacy is now more significant than ever.

HEALTH DIPLOMACY

As mentioned before, 21st century diplomacy has transformed to fit a globalized international arena. There is an ever-growing scope of health issues that transcend national boundaries and that need to be approached with global action. In addition, these health issues are interdependent with

broad political, social and economic implications that bring more stakeholders, including diplomats, in this arena. Diplomacy is no longer solely the practice of traditional diplomats; public diplomacy entails that increasingly many new actors and an informed (foreign) public are also engaged in these processes. International relationships are managed at numerous diplomatic venues and they function on a multi-level global governance structure, which increasingly includes a regional level. Regional international organizations; such as the EU, the African Union and ASEAN, are acquiring new strength as decision-making platforms as they are expanding their areas of work and putting health issues on their agendas (Kickbusch, 2013). Finally, there is a much greater need to consider the interaction between domestic and foreign policies and cooperation with national ministries (Kickbusch et al., 2007).

Diplomacy is traditionally understood as the conduct of international relations through the negotiations of professional diplomats from ministries of foreign affairs. The term 'global health diplomacy' or 'health diplomacy' is a form of diplomacy that works against the backdrop of a 21st century globalized international arena, it refers to the multi-level and multi-actor negotiations that manage the global health policy environment (Kickbusch et al., 2007). It is considered a method for reaching consensus on health issues while taking into consideration other interests that are interdependent with these issues; such as political, economic, social and ethical interests (Kickbusch, 2013). In the face of a pandemic, policies that are not health related; such as environmental, trade, economic development and security policies, need to be complemented by those in the area of health (World Health Organization, 2020). Moreover, health diplomacy is a method to deal with health issues working together with other nations, non-governmental organizations and other private sectors (Subarkah & Bukhari, 2020). The global governance structure in which health diplomacy functions increasingly includes the regional level. More countries are participating in decision-making through international platforms, more power centers are rising and negotiation and coalition-building becomes more important (Kickbusch, 2013).

Even though these health issues have a transnational scope, sovereign nations remain the core actors that must shape their health and foreign

policies in such a way that aligns their national interests with international ones (Drager & Fidler, 2007). Health diplomacy can therefore be a useful instrument to maintain global health and build relations with other nations. Health diplomacy is recognized as a key contributor to significant benefits in the areas of health, development, peace, reduced poverty, social justice and human rights (World Health Organization, 2020). According to the World Health Organization (2020), health diplomacy has three main purposes:

1. To improve population health and health security.
2. To improve relations between nation states and to establish commitment of a wide range of actors to work together to improve health.
3. To achieve outcomes that are deemed fair and support goals of reducing poverty and increasing equity.

Many examples show how governments use health programs to improve their relations with other nations, to build coalitions and improve their international reputation (Khayat-zadeh-Mahani et al., 2018). For instance, the United States used health diplomacy during its war efforts in 2003 through the US President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). This program was initiated during the internationally criticized Iraq war, besides its humanitarian purpose and it being a successful program in reducing infection rates and mortality, it also served to improve international public perceptions of the United States (Khayat-zadeh-Mahani et al., 2018). Another example is Brazil, which was the first developing country during the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual property Rights agreement (TRIPS-agreement) in 1995 to successfully link the trade and public health arenas, which resulted in the country offering free treatments to AIDS patients leading to a decrease in mortality. Brazil's initiative supported the expanding of global support for AIDS treatment in other countries, such as Thailand, South Africa and India (Khayat-zadeh-Mahani et al., 2018). These diplomatic efforts in the health arena that lead to achieving foreign policy goals can be understood as the exercise of soft power. Brazil's effective use of soft power in this case has led the country to play a leading role in

negotiations on the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) by building broad coalitions (Khayat-zadeh-Mahani et al, 2018).

CASE SELECTION

This research paper focuses on Korea's health diplomacy efforts during the COVID-19 pandemic and the possible influence this has on the country's public diplomacy performance. By early March of 2020, Korea became the country with the most infected cases of COVID-19 after China. However, due to the country's early and rapid response to these first cases, Korea was soon praised in being able to maintain a relatively low case fatality rate (Cha & Kim, 2020). Korea has proven itself capable of responding quickly and decisively to the crisis, while keeping the public informed by frequent and transparent information dissemination (World Economic Forum, 2020). Korea's response to the pandemic; focused on widespread testing and contact tracing, while pursuing democratic values of transparency and openness, serves as a model for other countries battling the virus. Especially as recently there has been a debate on whether democratic versus autocratic governments are better able to contain the virus. Korea has shown how being open and transparent about how the virus is spreading and how the government is acting is the key to their success in managing the crisis (Ferrier, 2020).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Korea has plans to promote the country's reputation as "a leading nation that upholds international order of solidarity and cooperation while prioritizing human life and public safety" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, 2020b). For this purpose, the Ministry has launched a public campaign, dubbed the "TRUST campaign" to promote the country's democratic, open and transparent response to the pandemic, while emphasizing the need for solidarity and cooperation. The Ministry shows its willingness to utilize their efforts during the COVID-19 pandemic to influence the country's international reputation and to establish supportive relationships with other nations. This paper aims to find out how these efforts of health diplomacy could impact Korea's ability to achieve their foreign policy objectives, i.e. how Korea's

health diplomacy during the pandemic influences its public diplomacy.

EXPECTATIONS

As established before, health diplomacy efforts, particularly those during the pandemic of a new virus that also carries political, social and economic implications, can be understood as the exercise of soft power. Health programs to assist other countries in containing the virus; for instance, by supplying quarantine supplies such as test kits, can help strengthen relations and improve political reputation (Khayat-zadeh-Mahani et al, 2018). Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Korea has established plans to promote their response to the crisis and the values they are pursuing through a public campaign, once more showing their ambition to utilize their accomplishments to improve the country's international reputation. This paper therefore expects that Korea's health diplomacy efforts amidst the COVID-19 pandemic will positively impact its public diplomacy and therefore instill a positive perception of Korea among the foreign public.

Hypothesis 1: Korea's health diplomacy efforts during the COVID-19 pandemic, such as the granting of quarantine supplies to strategic partner countries and the carrying out of public campaigns to promote their successful response to the pandemic, will positively impact its public diplomacy by strengthening relations with other countries and improving their reputation with the foreign public.

The research question central to this paper will be studied through a qualitative research method. To explain how Korean health diplomacy efforts during the COVID-19 pandemic influence its public diplomacy, this paper has collected data through a literature study, analyzing various existing documents such as academic articles, reports, official published government documents and online news articles that are relevant to the research. The data is analyzed and presented in order to draw conclusions and formulate recommendations on how to further utilize health diplomacy efforts during the pandemic to advance the country's public diplomacy strategy.

DESCRIPTION OF EXPLANATORY FACTOR: KOREAN HEALTH DIPLOMACY AMIDST THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

In what follows, recent efforts of health diplomacy amidst the COVID-19 pandemic and the Korea's current public diplomacy strategy will be more closely examined. Next, findings that have been analyzed through a qualitative literature study will be presented and it will be considered whether this paper's previously formulated expectations may be confirmed or disconfirmed.

As discussed previously, Korea has shown itself capable of responding quickly and decisively to the COVID-19 virus outbreak, which resulted in the country maintaining a relatively low case fatality rate (Cha & Kim, 2020). The government further explained how being transparent to the public about how the virus is spreading and how the government is responding has been vital in securing people's trust and the key to their successful handling of the crisis (World Economic Forum, 2020). Korea was able to utilize their experience from the sudden and unexpected Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) outbreak in 2015, which established the country's belief that rapid action, social distancing, transparent dissemination of information and most importantly mass testing should be central to an effective response to a viral epidemic. Korea's strong trust in mass testing learnt from the MERS outbreak, has set the country apart from other nations in dealing with the COVID-19 virus (World Economic Forum, 2020).

As Korean biotech companies followed the development of the virus in China, they rapidly produced tests in response. The country was therefore able to open various drive-through testing centers, where as much as 20,000 people a day could test themselves for free. Information of identified infected cases was obtained so the government was able to track the spread of the virus and share this information with the public (Al Jazeera, 2020). Another feature of the Korean response that stands out in comparison to other countries is that there has not been a lockdown. Korean citizens practiced voluntary passive social distancing, citizens' immediate and widespread cooperation has helped the country to avoid a total lockdown as implemented in countries like Italy, China and the UK (Attias, 2020).

Korea is now actively seeking to utilize their successful response to the virus in order to support similar attempts by other countries through efforts of health diplomacy. There has been a growing international demand for Korean quarantine supplies, such as testing kits. Seoul has been given the task of meeting this demand in a way that advances the country's diplomatic and economic interests. Seoul officials have therefore instituted the "interagency team on the strategic decisions" that is in charge of sending support to strategic partners in a way that maximizes Korea's "soft power as an advanced nation in terms of quarantine expertise" (Korea Herald, 2020). Seoul officials have stated that the United States, the United Arab Emirates and Indonesia are the countries placed on the priority list for exporting quarantine supplies.

The United States has been chosen because of Korea's longstanding diplomatic relationship with the United States, and since president Trump had personally requested help from Korea because of the sudden surge in new infected cases in his country (Korea Herald, 2020). Furthermore, the United Arab Emirates has been chosen because the country has maintained a very successful diplomatic relationship with Korea for 40 years now. It was during the 2018 visit of Korean president Moon to the UAE that both countries agreed to the status of a "special strategic relationship" between the countries (Miere, 2020). Finally, Indonesia was chosen as a priority country because of Korea's recently established commitment to support regional partners and to improve relations with ASEAN member countries (Korea Herald, 2020). In a telephone conversation between the Korean and the Indonesian Ministers of Foreign Affairs it was agreed that the two countries would communicate and work closely together in responding to the pandemic. Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Retno, had praised Korea's testing capacities and ability to contain the virus and stated that he would like to learn from these experiences (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, 2020b). With the choice of these three priority countries, Korea has clearly conducted efforts of health diplomacy to contain the spread of the virus and to improve relations with strategic partner countries.

In addition to directly supporting other countries through the export of quarantine supplies, Korea has plans to launch a public campaign in which

the country's democratic, open and transparent response to the pandemic will be promoted. This campaign, named the "TRUST campaign," aims to solidify Korea's status as "a leading nation that upholds international order of solidarity and cooperation while prioritizing human life and public safety" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, 2020b). The first TRUST campaign stands for: Transparency, Robust screening and quarantine, Unique but universally-applicable; and Strict control and Treatment. Whereas the second TRUST campaign stands for: Transparency, Responsibility, United Actions, Science and speed; and Together in solidarity. These abbreviations aim to summarize the Korean response against COVID-19 and the values it pursues. It mostly emphasizes Korea's testing capabilities, data monitoring and sharing, technological innovations, free treatments and citizens' compliance to self-quarantine. While the second campaign stresses more Korea's interest in working together and sharing their experiences, information and testing supplies with the global community (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, 2020b). The goal of these public campaigns is to share information and key values of the Korean response with the foreign public and improve the country's international reputation.

Moreover, Korean president Moon has voiced his ambition of pursuing climate conscious policies in fighting the virus. The administration wishes to enact the 'Green New Deal' in which the country commits to reducing emissions. This policy is part of a bigger policy plan designed to prepare the Korean economy for growth after the COVID-19 economic decline (Stangarone, 2020). This recent reinforcement of pursuing green initiatives aims to help revitalize the economy during the crisis, it could also help to improve the country's international reputation. In 2017, Korea was the world's seventh largest carbon dioxide emitter and recent studies concluded that Korea's commitments to reduce emissions under the Paris Agreement were insufficient (Stangarone, 2020). This Green New Deal could positively transform the foreign public's perception of Korea as a country that actively pursues green policies.

DESCRIPTION OF OUTCOME: KOREAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

This paper focuses on Korea's public diplomacy efforts from the 2000s until today. Korea's public diplomacy strategy during this period was focused predominantly on improving the country's international reputation through the so-called 'Korean Wave' (Hallyu) and secondly on developing a new era of public diplomacy activities by officially introducing the term 'public diplomacy' in government for the first time in 2010 when the first Korean Ambassador for Public Diplomacy was instituted (Choi, 2019). In addition, the term 'cultural diplomacy' was officially first introduced when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Korea instituted the Bureau of Cultural Diplomacy, which today is called the Public Diplomacy and Cultural Affairs Bureau. Finally, Korea's first Public Diplomacy Act was established in 2016, creating a legal framework to ensure the stable and successful implementation of public diplomacy activities (Choi, 2019). The Public Diplomacy Act lays down general outlines and broad directions for the strategic implementation of public diplomacy activities. The law gives the Ministry of Foreign Affairs legal authority to strengthen cooperation with other ministries, local governments and the private sector. It further specifies that the state is the main actor to lead public diplomacy activities, the local governments and private sector are cooperative actors. According to this law, the goal of public diplomacy is to increase foreign public's understanding and confidence in Korea by using tools as culture, knowledge and policy (Choi, 2019).

As more power centers are rising, like China in East-Asia, various governments and citizens in the global community would like to see an effective counterbalance to China. Korea constitutes a strong contender as the country pursues attractive values and is strongly committed to democracy. It has a thriving economy and longstanding ties to Western countries, such as the United States. In addition, Korea is improving every year in terms of soft power performance because of the country's widely acknowledged and popular culture, as well as technological assets (Seib, 2013).

China is also committed to using public diplomacy and soft power to appeal to the foreign public. China is trying to promote a reputation of the country as an attractive partner and a source of inspiration in terms of

economic development, which in combination with development aid is very appealing to developing countries in the region. They have set out clear and realistic public diplomacy goals and selected target groups for each of these goals, making use of a wide variety of instruments to convey their message (d'Hooghe, 2007). In spite of these successes, China's public diplomacy efforts are often undermined by suspicion of the country's motives and goodwill. The foreign public worries about China's increasing economic, political and military power, particularly in combination with the country's violations of human rights. China undermines its image as a responsible member of the international community by denying the Chinese public certain basic freedoms (d'Hooghe, 2007). Korea could use this to their advantage by employing a public diplomacy strategy that emphasizes the values and attributes that contrast with those of China. By using freedom as a public diplomacy tool, Korea has a great advantage over China's restrictive government (Seib, 2013). For instance, through the use of social media and underscoring the country's political and cultural freedom, as illustrated by the Korean Wave.

Thus far, Korea has thought of public diplomacy mostly in terms of 'cultural diplomacy,' i.e. the exchange of various aspects of culture among nations and the foreign public in order to advance mutual understanding (Waller, 2009). Korea's cultural diplomacy since the 2000s was driven by the so-called Korean Wave. The Korean Wave (or: Hallyu) refers to the global increase of interest in popular Korean culture, first driven by the spread of Korean dramas and pop music through the internet and social media (Farrar, 2010). While these products of the Korean Wave serve as a strong soft power resource and have proven to increase the foreign public's interest in Korea, they are also products of private businesses and there are worries associated with the reliance on the private sector for public diplomacy resources. For instance, the private sector is unstable and responsive to changes in the market and economic environment (Cho, 2012). In addition, these businesses can be sensitive to scandals, such as the 'Burning Sun scandal' that happened in the entertainment industry in 2019, where several Korean Wave celebrities were involved in allegations of sex crimes (Kil, 2019). When Korea depends too much on cultural diplomacy and the Korean Wave for their public diplomacy strategy, their international

reputation will change based on whether these developments in the private sector are good or bad (Cho, 2012).

Korea could improve their public diplomacy strategy by using the increased awareness and interest in their country and culture by taking follow-up measures through diplomatic missions and actively promoting its values, culture and policies through appropriate channels (Cho, 2012). Korea should establish a well-organized objective for its public diplomacy and set up effective strategies in order to grow and be recognized as a leading nation in the international community.

FINDINGS: HEALTH DIPLOMACY AS A SOFT POWER TOOL

Associated with the interest in public diplomacy is a recent increase in scholarly activity regarding health diplomacy (Wise, 2009). Increasingly the role of relationships and collaboration between multiple stakeholders, such as governments, diplomats, the private sector, non-governmental organizations, the media and the public, becomes important when addressing global health issues. In addition, global health challenges are paired with issues in other areas such as the economic, environmental and security policy fields. Addressing global health issues through international cooperation has become an important part of foreign policy (Wise, 2009).

As previously discussed, health diplomacy can act as a tool in improving Korea's international reputation and eventually lead to the achievement of several other foreign policy objectives. The COVID-19 pandemic requires an increase in global collaboration and diplomacy, it is in this context that Korea is pursuing a public diplomacy campaign to improve the country's global image (Attias, 2020). Activities of health diplomacy may serve as a soft power tool and can help to elevate this public diplomacy campaign, through the sharing of information, action plans and medical supplies that have proven to be essential to other nations in battling the virus. Korea's leadership in the global health crisis caused by COVID-19, can provide a positive framework to push towards what is in their interest as well as that of the global community (Wise, 2009). Accordingly, this paper hypothesized that Korea's health diplomacy efforts during the COVID-19 pandemic will

positively impact its public diplomacy, by strengthening relations with other countries and improving their reputation with the foreign public. In what follows, this paper will further lay out the specific actions of health diplomacy that served as soft power tools in Korea's public diplomacy campaign, and what this means for the achievement of Korea's foreign policy objectives.

Korea was once the country that suffered the second largest outbreak after China. Now they have successfully shown that their swift government intervention was effective in flattening the curve, forming an example for other nations (Lee, 2020). The virus rapidly spread to countries outside of Asia, and Western countries turned to Asian countries like Korea to find solutions quickly and learn from their experience. The COVID-19 outbreak and Korea's effective response led to an improvement in the country's international reputation (Attias, 2020). Korea's mass testing capacity has impressed the global community and led to a vast increase of international demand for Korean testing kits and medical equipment, and will most likely come paired with an increase in foreign investment (Attias, 2020).

Besides Korea, China has also attempted to join the soft power race during this pandemic, exporting medical supplies and face masks to other nations. Korea however, has not fallen behind China in this race. Korean test kits and quarantine supplies have become a major export item, with demand by over 120 foreign countries. The Korean government utilized their diplomatic connections, among others with the US and ASEAN countries, such as Indonesia and Vietnam, to export quarantine supplies and to bring Korean residents overseas back home (Lee, 2020). Korea has a further advantage over China in this soft power race, as their COVID-19 response strategy; based on values as democracy, transparency and openness, is highly praised in international media (Lee, 2020). After all, Korea was able to avoid a total lockdown imposed on its citizens, because the country continuously disseminated information about the spread of the virus and the actions the government had taken in response, which resulted in Korean citizens voluntarily complying with government recommendations of social distancing (Attias, 2020). Korea is currently promoting their response strategy with public campaigns such as the previously discussed 'TRUST campaign,' that emphasizes exactly these values that are very attractive to the global community and that contrast with China's restrictive government.

FINDINGS: CONSEQUENCES FOR KOREAN FOREIGN POLICY

After having discussed what activities of health diplomacy in particular serve as soft power instruments for Korea's public diplomacy strategy, this paper further goes into what the consequences of these efforts may be for Korea's foreign policy objectives.

It was previously discussed how Korea has chosen the US, the UAE and Indonesia as the three priority countries to grant medical supplies and testing kits. The choice of these partners has positively impacted Korea's diplomatic relations with these countries, as well as helped them achieve their foreign policy objectives. For instance, in return for Korea's aid, the US has not hindered the entry of Korean citizens into the US, and struck a currency swap deal which brought stability to the Korean market that was marked with uncertainties amidst the pandemic (Korea Herald, 2020). Secondly, the UAE has agreed that in return for Korean aid, they will closely cooperate with Korea further in various important policy sectors, such as the trade and energy sectors. Finally, Indonesia was an important choice because Korea is trying to strengthen their relationship with ASEAN countries. This may enable Korea to diversify its foreign policy strategy by expanding trade and investment with these countries. Doing this allows Korea to rely less on fellow superpower China and diminish risks of Chinese economic coercion and US-China trade friction. Additionally, Korea and ASEAN countries could also collaborate to boost regional security cooperation and protect their interests, further helping Korea to become an effective counterbalance to China's power in the region (Yeo, 2020).

Furthermore, Korea's commitment to mutually beneficial international collaboration and serving as an honest intermediary in the region may aid to mobilize cooperation in various policy areas between China and the US amid their declining relationship. Korea may serve this role of middle agent that could be very critical as more and more issues, regarding for instance health and climate, require a global approach and international cooperation for solving; and a superpower fall-out between the US and China could have great negative consequences when it comes to addressing these issues (Ferrier, 2020).

Korea may gain considerable international advantages by using health

diplomacy to achieve their foreign policy objectives. Supporting global health efforts worldwide may enhance Korean national security, increase prosperity and promote democracy in developing nations (Kassalow, 2001). The COVID-19 pandemic provides an opportunity for international leadership that is grounded in Korea's strength in handling the crisis. It may help Korea grow and be recognized as a leading nation that supports global solidarity and cooperation, while promoting values of democracy and public health.

In the theoretical framework of this paper it was briefly mentioned how the soft power of a nation comes from three resources; the attractiveness and moral legitimacy of its culture, political values and foreign policy (Nye, 2004). Before, Korea's public diplomacy strategy relied mainly on cultural diplomacy and the Korean Wave. Increased interest in Korean culture is a great soft power resource, but relying solely on efforts of cultural diplomacy and the private products of the Korean Wave can limit public diplomacy achievements. Therefore, this paper argues, that the above discussed efforts of health diplomacy during the COVID-19 pandemic serve as powerful additional soft power resources that will enhance the country's public diplomacy strategy and will help establish supportive relationships with other nations as well as improve Korea's image to the foreign public.

Moreover, according to Nye's (2004) dimensions of public diplomacy; the daily communication of Korea's health policy decisions through international media and strategic communication through the public campaigns issued by the Korean government will further aid the country to achieve their diplomatic objectives. In short, this paper concludes that the hypothesized positive impact of health diplomacy efforts during the COVID-19 pandemic on Korea's public diplomacy may be confirmed.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

In this research paper it has been discussed how Korea's health diplomacy efforts during the COVID-19 pandemic impact the country's public diplomacy campaign. The COVID-19 pandemic came paired with broad social and economic implications that have brought more actors, such as

diplomats, in the health arena. The pandemic requires to be approached with increased global cooperation and diplomacy. In this context, efforts of health diplomacy can be a useful instrument to maintain global health and build relations with other nations.

Successful activities of health diplomacy can play a significant role in improving Korea's global image. Health diplomacy then serves as a soft power tool that positively influences Korea's public diplomacy, through the establishment of supportive relationships with a range of (non-)governmental stakeholders that influences the country's capability to achieve their foreign policy objectives. Especially in the 21st century era of globalization, public attitudes and opinions of the global community directly impact a nation's capacity to achieve their diplomatic goals. Theory explains how the soft power of a nation comes from three resources; the attractiveness and moral legitimacy of its culture, political values and foreign policy (Nye, 2004). In this paper's findings it was concluded that Korea has done two things in particular during this pandemic, that serve as important soft power tools.

Firstly, Korea has demonstrated how their mass testing abilities were vital in being able to maintain a relatively low case fatality rate. As a result, there has been a growing international demand by over 120 foreign countries for Korean medical supplies and testing kits. The Korean government has attempted to meet this demand in a way that advances the country's diplomatic and economic interests, by prioritizing close cooperation with and support to strategic partner nations, such as the US, the UAE and ASEAN countries. Establishing strong relations with ASEAN countries, such as Indonesia and Vietnam, may enable Korea to diversify its foreign policy strategy by expanding trade and investment, as well as boost regional security cooperation. This is very important for Korea to become an effective counterbalance to China's power in the region. With this attractive foreign policy, Korea is demonstrating their dedication to mutually beneficial international cooperation, serving as a strong soft power resource and boosting their public diplomacy campaign.

Secondly, the Korean government aims to advance their political values by launching a public campaign, called the 'TRUST campaign' in which their democratic, open and transparent response to the pandemic will be promoted to the foreign public. By promoting values of openness,

transparency and democracy; that contrast with those of China's restrictive government, Korea further holds an advantage over China in this soft power race. Moreover, Korea's reputation as an honest intermediary in the region may help them serve the critical role of middle agent in supporting cooperation between superpowers China and the US. This may help Korea be recognized as a leading nation that supports global solidarity and cooperation.

Previously, Korean public diplomacy efforts were mainly focused on increased international interest in Korean culture as driven by products of the Korean Wave. This may serve as a powerful soft power resource, but focusing too much on the private products of the Korean Wave can limit the effects of public diplomacy. The above discussed efforts of health diplomacy therefore may significantly enhance the country's public diplomacy strategy, by establishing supportive relationships with other nations and improving Korea's image to the foreign public.

RECOMMENDATIONS

This paper thus advocates a Korean public diplomacy strategy that relies more on the country's health diplomacy efforts, particularly those efforts amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. However, for Korea's public diplomacy strategy to be strengthened even more there are a few other shortcomings and focus areas that need to be addressed.

First of all, studies point out how problems have emerged as a result of the absence of overall coordination and consultation among the various actors participating in Korea's public diplomacy (Choi, 2019). As mentioned previously, modern public diplomacy involves the actions of many different actors; including governmental, non-governmental and private actors. When there is a lack of overall coordination at the government-wide level between these actors, it may cause inefficiencies and inconsistencies that damage the effectiveness of the public diplomacy strategy (Choi, 2019). This paper therefore recommends that Korea *organizes a network among the major organizations involved in its public diplomacy*. The participation of non-governmental and private actors besides governmental actors becomes ever

more important and working together in this network may enable them to cope more effectively with the rapidly changing international environment (Cho, 2012). Additionally, 21st century foreign public has become more suspicious about propaganda, skeptical of authority and often mistrust governments. As credibility is an important soft power source, it may be helpful for governments to work closely with non-governmental and private actors as channels of communication for public diplomacy (Nye, 2004).

Secondly, because of the short history of public diplomacy in Korea, only a small number of citizens understand its nature and objectives. Most public diplomacy efforts are initiated without due recognition of them as public diplomacy (Choi, 2019). It is for the effectiveness of the public diplomacy campaign very important that the domestic public is aware of the necessity of public diplomacy and its possible outcomes. *Public diplomacy should be a feature of domestic public affairs*, citizens need to be aware of the essentiality of public diplomacy and a national consensus over public diplomacy should be established. National images and values that are not acknowledged by the domestic public are unlikely to be effectively recognized by the foreign public (Cho, 2012).

Thirdly, as international affairs increasingly include the regional level, it is necessary for Korea to *construct public diplomacy strategies that are region-specific*. Strategies may be adapted considering the different cultural backgrounds of these regions and the images of Korea that the people of these regions hold (Cho, 2012). As we have briefly discussed before, it is very beneficial for Korea to prioritize public diplomacy efforts targeting developing nations in the region, such as some ASEAN countries. Korea should share its experience of having risen from poverty to becoming a prosperous and advanced democratic nation. Korea may take on the role of exemplar by sharing their knowledge on economic growth and development and establish a positive image of itself on the developing countries as a leading nation in the international community (Cho, 2012).

Finally, in our 21st century information age, the costs of disseminating and processing information has drastically been reduced. Consequently, the public is faced with an explosion of information, causing them to be overwhelmed with the information they have available and having difficulty of what to focus on (Nye, 2004). Korea should therefore fully utilize

interactive communication as a major means of its public diplomacy, *employing its strong digital assets to make itself more accessible to the international community and better communicate its positive global image*. By doing this, Korea can fill the current existing gap between the country's soft power assets and the perceptions the foreign public has of Korea.

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Analysis of Rok Public Diplomacy on Social Media

Abdou Chakour Arouna and Maissou Yacoubou

Abstract | The revolution in Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) has had significant impacts on public diplomacy. The way people communicate, and exchange diplomatic information has dramatically changed. This paper aims to analyze the Republic of Korea's public diplomacy on social media. It investigates the way Korean MOFA and embassies use social media (Facebook and Twitter) for public diplomacy, the effectiveness of embassies by country and public engagement, and the perception of the Korean social media public diplomacy by foreign publics. Using quantitative and qualitative approaches, findings show that user engagement in general is very low. For instance, despite having the highest number of followers, MOFA has one of the lowest rates of user engagement per follower (below 0.5%). The ROK embassy in Kenya has the highest user engagement per follower (2%). This may be due to the nature of the content posted by these social media platforms. Moreover, these social media accounts do not reflect the ambitions or the technological and digital strength of the Republic of Korea's position on the international scene. The scope of activities on the accounts is very limited and Korea focused. The posts and tweets rarely discuss geopolitical matters and controversial topics. Finally, survey responses show that the followers of these platforms are not totally satisfied with the content being published or the language in use.

Keywords | Digital Diplomacy, Social Media, 4th Industrial Revolution, Republic of Korean (ROK) Public Diplomacy,

국문초록 | 정보통신기술 혁명은 공공 외교에 굉장한 영향을 미쳤다. 사람들이 외교 정보를 소통하고 교환하는 방법이 극적으로 바뀐 것이다. 이 논문은 공공 외교에서 대한민국의 소셜 미디어 활용을 분석하고자 한다. 양적이고 질적인 접근법을 이용하여 우리는 대한민국 외교에 대한 대중의 의견(설문을 통해) 뿐만 아니라 대한민국 외교부와 몇몇 대사관의 소셜 미디어 계정(페이스북과 트위터)을 조사했다. 양적 연구를 통한 결과는 소셜 미디어 사용에 있어 외교부와 대사

관, 그리고 대사관과 대사관 사이에 통합된 전략이 없음을 보여준다. 외교부와 같이 각 대사관은 소셜 미디어를 각자의 방식으로 사용한다. 이 계정들의 활동 범위는 매우 제한되어 있으며 한국 중심적이다. 게시물들과 트윗은 지정학적 문제나 논란이 많은 주제들을 거의 언급하지 않는다. 따라서 사용자 참여율이 전반적으로 매우 낮다. 질적 접근 면에서 설문지 응답은 이 플랫폼들의 팔로워들이 게시되고 있는 내용물이나 사용되는 언어에 완전히 만족하지 않는다는 것을 보여준다. 결론적으로, 4차 산업 혁명 속 해외 대중과 강한 관계를 성공적으로 쌓기 위해서는 목표 대중에게 무엇이 중요한지 관심을 갖고, 목표를 성취하기 위한 적절한 전략이 무엇인지 정의할 필요가 있다.

INTRODUCTION

In this era of the fourth industrial revolution, the revolution in Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) is having significant impacts on public diplomacy. The way people communicate, and exchange diplomatic information has dramatically changed. Referred to as “digital public diplomacy” or “public diplomacy 2.0” by the Obama administration, today’s diplomacy leverages on the Internet and social media to achieve its goals. Lee B. J. (2017) states that social media and public diplomacy go hand in hand, with both relying on interactive two-way communication with the public. With more than 3 billion people using social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and LinkedIn daily, digitalization has truly made the world a global village (Olubukola S. Adesina, 2017).

The Republic of Korea (ROK), one of the technologically advanced countries investing in building powerful networks to promote its geopolitics, can maximize its diplomatic presence on digital platforms. Since the middle of twentieth century, the Republic of South Korea has reconstructed its land and its connectivity with the support of technology, which has transformed it into one of the most high-tech countries in Asia and the world today (Jan M. et al, 2017). The internal information and communication of the country has reached a very desirable level. Access to needed information at the time when it is needed is not a problem anymore for the government or the public. This can be illustrated by the example of the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. South Korea is easily coping with the issue due to the free

circulation of information around the country and the ability to track both confirmed and suspected cases. However, in the international arena, the country does not seem to be doing so well. Byung Jong Lee (2017) suggests that a well-defined strategy will help South Korea improve its way of promoting its culture and building its connectivity with international partners.

In this paper, we aim to analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of Korean Digital Public Diplomacy, identify the challenges it faces, and propose a few measures the country should consider taking to achieve its diplomatic objectives in the era of digital revolution. To do so, we first explore the Facebook and Twitter accounts of the Minister of the Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Republic of Korea's embassies (ROKE) in a few countries. Moreover, we design a survey to collect data from the public about their interactions with the Korean diplomacy.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Public diplomacy is usually described as 'soft' power. According to Nye (2004), "soft power means getting others to want the same outcome as you want." Soft power is "a kind of mental power" that enables nations to rally national and international will (Nicolae HANEŞ & Adriana ANDREI, 2015). Nye also divided soft power into 3 dimensions:

- i. Daily communications
- ii. Strategic communication
- iii. Development of lasting relationships with key individuals.

Daily communications entail briefing the press corps and the public about domestic and foreign policy, while strategic communication focuses on promoting the vision or policies of the government. Building solid partnerships with key individuals is achieved through "scholarships, exchanges, trainings, seminars, conferences, and access to media channels" (Nye,2004).

Soft power or Public diplomacy is defined in the Korean Public diplomacy act as "diplomacy activities through which the state enhances

foreign nationals understanding of and confidence in the Republic of Korea directly or in cooperation with local government or private sector through culture, knowledge, policies” (Act No 13951, Feb 3, 2016). By this definition, the state, local government, and Korean firms can be identified as the entities responsible for representing the position of the Korean Republic on the international scene. “The tools of public diplomacy listed as, culture, knowledge, and policy are to be used to enhance foreign audience understanding of and trust in South Korea” (Kwang-Jin Choi, 2019). According to MOFA, the goal of the Republic of Korea’s public diplomacy is to (i) share Korean culture, (ii) deepen understanding of Korea, (iii) gain global support for Korea’s policies, (iv) strengthen public diplomacy capacity, and (v) promote public-private partnership. To attain these goals, the Korean government has put in place a series of strategies, among which figures the development of online platforms for communication and information sharing.

Following those strategies, the Korean public diplomacy is shifting from the traditional ways of conducting diplomacy (exclusive exchange between governments or diplomats) toward digital diplomacy. Digital diplomacy “involves the use of digital technologies and social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and weibo by states to enter into communication with foreign public usually in a non-costly manner” (Olubukola S. Adesina, 2017).

Although the concept of public digital diplomacy is broadly known and practiced by the Korean government, there is little existing literature about it. Journal articles such as “South Korea’s Digital Deficit “and “Korea’s Digital Diplomacy: The Most Technologically Advanced Avoider?” by Jeffrey Robertson, point out the absence of a master plan or clear strategic narrative from the Korean government to enhance its public digital diplomacy. These sources highlight that despite Korea being among the topmost connected countries in the world in terms of internet connectivity and speed and smartphone ownership, it falls behind other technologically advanced countries in terms of leveraging technology to advance public diplomacy. However, “Korea’s Soft Power and Public Diplomacy Under Moon Jae-In Administration: A Window of Opportunity” by Kadir Ayhan, showcases Korean public digital diplomacy as in transition from being a

mere cultural promoter to a global leader of development cooperation.

In this new era of big data, high speed internet and IoT, the use of digital platforms for publicity or public relations is becoming a popular topic of academic research. Saxton and Watson (2014) studied the Facebook accounts of the 100 largest noneducational nonprofit organizations in the US over a period of two months. The study focused on the number of likes, comments, and shares of the posts to measure the public's interest in and reaction to organizational messages. The number of likes were used to quantify the sentiment of the public toward the posts, comments to measure followers' responsiveness and shares to reflect the number of people willing to advocate for the organization.

Following the same rules as Saxton and Watson (2014), B. J. Lee (2017) analyzed 715 Facebook posts of major embassies in Korea. Their research highlights the overall communication strategies of the embassies, public diplomacy domain and user interactions by counting the number of shares, likes, and comments. The posts were classified into two public diplomacy dimensions (information and engagement), which were then subdivided into 6 different public diplomacy domains: advocacy, information & news, listening, exchange, contribution, and cultural program. The research concluded that one-way information-based public diplomacy was more practiced, while two-way engagement received more reactions from the public.

But it was not just Facebook accounts that were studied. Embassies' accounts on Twitter were also subject to academic research (Meghan Sobel, Daniel Riffe, & Joe Bob Hester). Their study focused on US embassies in 8 countries across different region. It found that there was "a lack of consistency among US embassies with regard to formally furthering US department mission" (ibid.) by leveraging twitter.

These studies will serve as reference points as we seek to answer the following questions:

RQ1: How do The Korean MOFA and embassies use social media (Facebook& Twitter) for public diplomacy?

RQ2: Which embassies receive more interest from the public?

RQ3: What is the foreign public perception of the Korean social

media public diplomacy?

METHODOLOGY

We adopted several approaches to analyze how the Korean Government uses social media for Public diplomacy. Two primary data sources were used, one quantitative and the other qualitative.

QUANTITATIVE METHOD

We analyzed 10 Facebook & twitter accounts comprised of Korean MOFA and Korean embassies around the world. We counted not only the number of posts made by each embassy and MOFA but also their number of followers and users' interactions (Likes, Comments, Shares) from June 1st, 2019 to May 31st, 2020. Korean MOFA has two different accounts on social media, one in English and the other in Korean.

For our research, we analyzed only the English account on both Facebook and Twitter. The selection of the embassies was based on several criteria, such as the economic power of the country based on the 2019 GDP ranking by the world bank, the popularity of ROK in the country, location, and whether the embassy has both Twitter and Facebook accounts. These factors were used to make the comparisons as fair as possible between embassies on the same continent and others. To measure the popularity of ROK in a country, we used the ratio of followers to population. The Korean embassy in China, for instance, was excluded because it does not have Facebook and Twitter accounts, and the Korean embassy in India was excluded because the ratio of followers to population was very low. We ended up with 9 Korean embassies (United States of America, Canada, Singapore, Indonesia, United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Kenya, and Ethiopia).

Table 1. Summary Of Selected Embassies

Embassies	Location
ROK Embassy to the USA	America
ROK Embassy in Canada	America
ROK Embassy in Singapore	Asia
ROK Embassy in Indonesia	Asia
ROK Embassy to the UK	Europe
ROK Embassy in Germany	Europe
ROK Embassy in Spain	Europe
ROK Embassy in Kenya	Africa
ROK Embassy in Germany	Africa

PARAMETERS

Our quantitative analysis focused on parameters such as the number of posts, likes, comments, shares, and followers. The number of posts will help us understand the frequency with which MOFA and embassies communicate with the public, and the number of followers will help translate the popularity of the embassy in each country and the popularity of MOFA on social media. Also, through statistical analysis (likes per follower, likes per post, etc.), we analyze if user interactions depended on the popularity of the account, the number of posts, or the contents. Through those analyses, we gauged the strategies used on social media by the South Korean government.

QUALITATIVE METHOD

Our second primary source of data was gathered via survey. It was created on Google surveys and made available online, where it was spread for approximately a month through Facebook groups that deal with Korea related issues. It targeted anyone interested in Korea whether the person lived in Korea or not. Overall, 174 participants were registered. The purpose

Table 2. Summary Of Collected Data


Accounts	Facebook					Twitter				
	Followers	Number of Posts	Likes	Comments	Shares	Followers	Number of Posts	Likes	Comments	Shares
MOFA	58232	77	10645	377	1218	21612	81	58967	1837	39215
ROKE USA	3327	167	930	20	100	2477	343	1180	30	414
ROKE Canada	2751	382	1812	75	366	1154	336	326	2	241
ROKE Singapore	5013	145	1935	64	222	27	108	69	2	41
ROKE Indonesia	4261	356	14914	454	2368	3685	200	2590	168	1987
ROKE UK	6074	284	5204	307	825	2710	138	411	40	240
ROKE Germany	4699	117	6169	228	469	233	94	91	2	95
ROKE Spain	3613	158	6749	251	1200	1258	70	564	10	184
ROKE Kenya	4699	81	5998	178	144	804	33	151	31	60
ROKE Ethiopia	1226	142	1762	163	120	221	53	27	13	3
Total	92895	1909	56118	2117	7032	34181	1456	64376	2135	42480

Source: Authors

of the survey was to understand the sentiment of the public toward ROK digital public diplomacy accounts. Also, it will help us to determine whether the conclusions drawn via statistical analysis make sense.

FINDINGS

USER ENGAGEMENT ON FACEBOOK



Source: Authors

Among the analyzed accounts, MOFA has the highest number of followers on Facebook with almost 60,000 followers, representing 63% of the total. This is followed by ROKE in the UK (6%). ROKE in Ethiopia has the lowest number of followers (1%). MOFA has the highest number of followers not only because it has accounts and contents in English, but also while embassies’ unique missions permit them to only target the countries in which they are located, MOFA has the ability to systematically attract any foreign public. Also, the increasing interest in Korea’s foreign activity may have played a role in the popularity of MOFA’s account.



Many MOFA posts are about the diplomatic activities of the minister of foreign affairs, such as meeting with foreign diplomats, while on the embassy level, most posts focus on new decisions made by the government concerning people traveling to Korea, cultural activities and exchanges, and more recently, COVID-19 related news.

User engagement in general is very low. Despite having the highest

number of followers, MOFA has one of the lowest rates of user engagement per follower (below 0.5%). This may be due to the nature of the content posted by MOFA. Contents such as donations, exchanges, and health campaigns received more reactions from the public compared to diplomatic news. Also, the presence of spam comments on many of MOFA's posts may be another factor contributing to low engagement by followers in the comment section. Interactions between MOFA's page administrator and followers are non-existent. The posts are in general one-way engagement posts. Other factors, such as followers' willingness to like or comment and share diplomatic activities of a country other than their own on Facebook may also explain why the MOFA Facebook page has less engagement from its followers.

ROKE in Kenya has the highest user engagement per follower (2%), followed by Spain, Germany, Indonesia, and Ethiopia. Many embassy followers prefer to like posts rather than comment. Although rare, some followers are willing to share specific posts, usually posts concerning Korean cultural exhibitions or performances. Followers in Spain and Ethiopia appear to be more willing to advocate for embassy activities.

USER ENGAGEMENT ON TWITTER



Source: Authors

MOFA has the highest number of followers on Twitter among the 10 accounts we analyzed. It is followed by ROKE of Indonesia, the UK, and the USA. The Korean embassies in Singapore, Ethiopia and Kenya have the lowest number of followers. With Kenya and Ethiopia being in Africa, and many other Korean embassies on the continent such as the ROKE in south Africa and Ghana not having a twitter account, we can speculate that the reason why those embassies in Africa have lower number of followers on Twitter compared to Facebook is due to the fact that the latter is more popular in Africa.

The characteristics of the tweets were like the posts on Facebook, but unlike on Facebook, MOFA has the highest rate of user engagement per follower on twitter, followed by ROKE in Singapore. There is a clear difference in attitude between MOFA followers on Facebook and Twitter. Followers of the MOFA account on Twitter appear to be more willing to like the tweets and advocate for it by retweeting. Likes per follower is around 3.5%, while shares per follower is around 2.5%. However, the percentage of comments per follower is still insignificant.

The rate of user engagement per follower on the ROKE Singapore account is high because despite having the lowest number of followers (27), there appears to be a clear willingness from those followers to like and share the content that is being posted on the platform. Compared to the ROKE in Singapore account, the followers of the ROKE accounts in Africa are less active on Twitter, even though they have similar number of followers.



Followers of ROKE accounts in Europe and Americas are moderately active on twitter. ROKE in UK and Canada are the exception, and just like on Facebook, the followers on Twitter are not very engaged either.

OVERALL ACTIVITIES ON SOCIAL MEDIA BY EMBASSY

Korean embassies use social media differently. There does not seem to be a general strategy behind embassies' posts on social media, and the frequency of posts varies from embassy to embassy. Although many of the contents are written in both Korean and local languages, some of them are only in Korean. We should note that no interaction between the followers and the

embassies has been recorded after analyzing the posts on Facebook, but there have been answers to inquiries from followers on Twitter.

EMBASSIES' ACTIVITIES ON FACEBOOK



Source: Authors

The Korean embassy in Canada has the highest number of posts (382 posts), but it has the least average user interaction per post. This might be due to the fact that most of the posts are informative and do not incite the viewer to engage with them. Unlike in Canada, the embassy in the USA posted less content, but just like the one in Canada, it generated few reactions from users. The embassy has a lot of posts in only Korean although it is located in the US. This might be one causes of the lack of reactions from users.

The ROK embassy in Kenya, has the highest average interaction per post (74 Likes, 2.2 comments, and 1.8 shares) despite having the lowest number of posts (81). Although many posts are one-way engagement posts, the followers seem to have an interest in specific content. Posts by the

embassy that are on culture and exchange seem to create more reactions from users. For example, posts about the Korean government scholarship received a noticeable amount of attention from the public. Positive actions toward the improvement of the diplomatic relationship between the republic of Korea and Kenya incited lots of reactions from the host public on Facebook.


The Embassy in Ethiopia generated less reaction (12.4 Likes, 1.1 comments, 0.8 shares per post) than the one in Kenya, although it has more posts (142). Just like in Kenya, posts about exchanges (donation and Scholarships) created more user reaction than news or embassy notices.

The accounts of the South Korean embassy in Indonesia (356 posts) and Singapore (145 posts) generated user reactions proportional to the number of posts. On average, the embassy in Indonesia received 41.9 Likes, 1.3 comments, and 6.7 shares per post, while the embassy in Singapore generated an average of 13.3 likes, 0.4 comment, and 1.5 shares per post. In Indonesia, contents that were in either English or Indonesian, whether news or not, received attention from the public. However, the lack of two-way engagement content may have affected the number of comments per posts. Unlike in Indonesia, the Singaporean account did not generate as much reaction from political or diplomatic news. The users reacted more to cultural events and cultural news.


The embassy in the UK had 284 posts with an average of 18.3 Likes, 1 comment and 2.9 shares per post. Compared to the embassy in the UK, the embassy in Germany (117 posts) and Spain (158 posts) has put out less content but generated a higher user reaction per post. The Republic of Korea embassy in Germany received on average 52.7 likes, 1.9 comments, and 4 shares per post, while the Korean embassy in Spain received 42.7 Likes, 1.6 comments, and 7.6 shares per post. Based on these results, we can conclude that there is a weak presence of the Korean diplomacy in the UK as opposed to its presence in Spain and Germany on Facebook.

EMBASSIES' ACTIVITIES ON TWITTER

ROK Embassies Twitter Accounts Activities



ROK Embassy Twitter account Followers by country



Source: Authors

Apart from the Korean embassies in Africa, the remaining embassies were very active on Twitter. The embassies in the USA and Canada have the highest number of tweets, but just like on Facebook, user reaction was very low. On average, the embassy in Canada generated 1 Like and 0.7 retweets per tweet. The one in the USA received 3.4 likes, 0.1 comment, and 1.2 retweets per tweet.

The embassies in the UK, Germany and Spain were moderately active. Compared to the Korean embassy in Germany, the other two received more reactions from the public, but in general the reactions were low. There is still a lack of interest in Korea's digital diplomacy in Europe. The European public seems to be more interested in the cultural aspects of Korea.

Therefore, Geopolitical activities of Korea do not seem to receive much attention.

The activities of the embassy in Indonesia generated the highest user reaction. Just like on Facebook, the embassy tweeted frequently and received on average 13 Likes, 9.9 retweets, and 0.8 comments per post. Compared to other countries in general and Singapore in particular, the public in Indonesia appears to be very interested in matters that concern the Republic of Korea.

OVERALL SOCIAL MEDIA ACTIVITY OF MOFA

As the first representative of the Korean diplomacy, MOFA's account on social media is in general very active. On Facebook, MOFA had 77 posts with an average of 138.2 likes, 4.9 comments, and 15.8 shares per post. The user reaction level was quite high compared to embassies. On Twitter, MOFA had 81 tweets with an average of 728 likes, 484.1 retweets, and 22.7 comments per tweet.

Interactive posts and tweets are very rare, which in turn might affect the number of comments received on both social media accounts. The MOFA account on social media does not reflect the ambitions or the technological and digital strength of the Republic of Korea's position on the international scene. The scope of the activities on the account is very limited and Korea focused. The posts and tweets rarely discuss geopolitical matters or controversial topics.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This paper is designed to analyze "Korean Digital Public Diplomacy in the 4th (fourth) Industrial Revolution." To do so, the study was structured into two objectives. The first objective was to examine the usage of social media (Facebook & Twitter) by the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and nine embassies for public diplomacy. In the interval of one year, from June 2019 to May 2020, the total of 1456 posts on Twitter and 2167 posts on

Facebook were registered. The posts covered multiple issues such as political and economic relations, businesses, aids and supports, culture, news and information, and health care (especially during the COVID-19 period). The results show that social media is still not used efficiently and effectively. Interactions with the public are not as strong as expected in the 4th industrial revolution from a technologically advanced country such as the Republic of South Korea.

More specifically, the followers of those platforms appear less engaged in conversation and seem to show less interest in what is being posted. For example, on average, 0.237%, 0.008%, and 0.027% of the total Facebook followers of the Korean MOFA have respectively liked, commented, or shared each post that is posted. This raises several questions concerning which strategies the public diplomacy needs to adopt on digital platforms about the contents that are published, the languages to use, and so on. To illustrate, on a platform where 70% to 80% of the followers speak only English and French, should contents be posted only in Korean? Korean posts should have adequate English or French translations for the efficiency of the platform. By re-strategizing the way it uses social media, Korean public diplomacy could take advantage of its high-tech status to promote its country and to build better relationships with the foreign public. The perfect achievements come with the perfect strategies—there are no miracles in the 4th industrial revolution.

Another objective of this paper was to find out the perception of the foreign public toward the Korean digital public diplomacy, or in other words, Korean social media public diplomacy. Here, a survey was conducted (see the survey questions and direct responses in appendix). A total of 174 participants were registered. Although this number is very low, some meaningful conclusions could be drawn from the survey. The responses show that the followers of these platforms are not totally satisfied with the content that is being published and the language in use.

Also, the survey's findings suggest an issue related to translation of the contents on these platforms. The translations, most of the time, devalue the real meaning of the published content compared to the original. Many more suggest the irrelevance of the content on these pages, often a mismatch of content with the objectives of the platforms, which leads to withdrawal of

some followers. This sheds light on the questions previously raised about the strategies of the Korean digital public diplomacy in the 4th industrial revolution. One possible way to effectively address the issue is to carefully analyze what the foreign public really wants and needs to know about ROK. Another one is to know how to provide it. Referring to the responses of the survey, more than half of the participants suggested topics related to art and culture, tourism, politics, and business.

In summary, the findings of this study show that to succeed in building a strong relationship with the foreign public in the fourth industrial revolution, you need to pay more attention to what is essential to your target audience and define the proper strategies to achieve that goal. Olubukola S. Adesina (2017) state that the objectives of the Nation to be achieved and the structured way to achieve them are the two major ingredients of foreign policy in the era of digital diplomacy. ROK possesses more than enough technology to excel at such a challenge.

LIMITATIONS

Yet, this paper cannot claim to be the most accurate one for multiple reasons. First, the social media account activity analyzed in this paper encompasses a period of one year. What happened before that and what is happening now were not taken into consideration. In addition, the survey has registered only a fraction of the target audience, and the responses cannot be taken as completely unbiased. Another shortcoming is the fact that some countries could not be chosen due to our criteria, such as China, France, Brazil, Russia, India, etc.

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APPENDIX: THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES

ROK Digital Diplomacy Survey

This survey is for an academic research purpose. Our goal is to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of Republic of Korea's (ROK) digital diplomacy, broadly defined as the use of the Internet and new information communication technologies (New ICTs) to help achieve diplomatic objectives. Your survey responses will be strictly confidential and data from this research will be reported in the aggregate. The survey will take only 3 to 5 minutes of your time and be assure that your information will remain anonymous. Thank you for your time.

1. Do you live in Korea?

- Yes
- No

*(If no the survey continues to 2. If yes it goes to 3)

2. Where do you live?

- Africa
- Asia
- Europe
- North America
- South America
- Oceania

3. What is your Gender

- Female
- Male
- Other

4. What is your age

- 20 or below
- 21- 30
- 31-40
- 41 or above

5. What is your occupation?

- Student
- Instructor/Teacher
- Unemployed
- Other

6. What is your proficiency level in Korean?

- Beginner
- Intermediate
- Upper-intermediate
- Advance
- Native
- Other

7. Do you have any social media account?

- Yes
- No

*(If no the survey will terminate and you will submit. If yes it continues to 8)

8. Which one(s)?

- Facebook
- Twitter
- Instagram
- Other

9. Do you follow any K-pop group(s) social media account?

- Yes
- No

10. Do you follow any Korean government official social media account?

- Yes
- No

*(if No the survey will terminate and you will submit. If yes it continues to 11)

11. which one(s)?

- Presidency
- Ministry
- Embassy
- Foundation
- Other

12. How often do you check those account(s)?

- Very often
- Often
- Sometimes
- Rarely

13. What topics about the ROK interest you?

- Politics
- Business
- Culture & Art
- Tourism
- Other

14. Are the contents published on those accounts only in Korean language?

- Yes
- No

*If No, in which other language are the contents published in?

- English
- Chinese
- German
- Other

15. What is your level of satisfaction with the contents published by those accounts?

- Very satisfied
- Satisfied
- Neutral
- Dissatisfied
- Very dissatisfied

16. What is the level of difference between the contents published in Korean and those published in other language?

- Very different
- Different
- Neutral
- Similar
- Very Similar

17. How do you engage with the contents on those platforms?

- Like
- Comment
- Share
- Other

18. Have you ever unfollowed any of those accounts?

- Yes
- No

*If yes, what were your reasons?

- Irrelevant topics
- Inappropriate topics
- Language barriers
- Other

19. On a Scale of 1 -10 how do you rate Korean's digital diplomacy platforms?

Very bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very good

20. If you could suggest any change(s) to these platforms what would it be?

Addressing Global Issues through Science Diplomacy: Towards a South Korean Approach

Thyene Ribas Moreira

Abstract | This research seeks to portray how science diplomacy has gained strength in recent years, and how South Korea has become one of the major players in terms of global scientific and technological cooperation. South Korea is an economic and technological power and has presented its economic and social development through organized mechanisms. Furthermore, the country also boasts one of the best hubs of technology and innovation in the world. Based on a qualitative and exploratory research this study demonstrates that, with all its know-how, South Korea has great conditions to become one of the great actors to lead world science diplomacy and cooperate to solve global issues.

Keywords | Public Diplomacy, Science Diplomacy, South Korea, International Cooperation, Science and Technology

국문초록 | 이 연구는 과학 외교가 어떻게 최근 힘을 얻었는지, 대한민국이 어떻게 국제 과학기술 협력의 주요 국가들 중 하나가 되었는지 설명하고자 한다. 대한민국은 경제적, 기술적 강국이며 체계적인 구조를 통한 사회경제적 개발을 보여왔다. 나아가 대한민국은 전세계 기술과 혁신의 중심지 중 하나임을 자랑한다. 이 연구는 질적이고 탐색적인 조사에 기반해 대한민국이 과학 외교를 이끌고 전 세계적인 사안들을 해결하기 위해 협력하는 주요 국가 중 하나가 될 훌륭한 조건을 보유하고 있음을 보여준다.

1. INTRODUCTION

Among the tools of South Korean public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy¹ and sports diplomacy² are undoubtedly the most explored channels in the country. However, science is also a channel for public diplomacy that can be used for the construction of a nation's brand and, with a greater potential to influence the international system. In recent years, debates on complex global issues, such as climate change, sustainable development goals (SDGs) or internet governance, have placed science diplomacy (SD) at the center of the international agenda (Onuki, 2020). Science diplomacy can be understood as the process through which States represent their interests in the international system when it comes to the areas of knowledge, i.e. science, and its uses, acquisition, and communication. (Turekian et al., 2015).

In this context, this article aims to address the topic of South Korean science diplomacy as an important tool of the country's public diplomacy³. It is understood that public diplomacy is an umbrella concept, which incorporates state practices of formulation and projection of image, information, and communication, as well as building and maintaining relations with foreign audiences. (Cho, 2012). Science diplomacy is the set of actions that connect diplomacy and science, aiming at building joint solutions to global problems.

Issues of global interest (climate change, sustainable development, global health, etc.) must be worked on along with other actors in the international system. The role of public diplomacy and, consequently, science diplomacy, is to correctly address these issues, positively influence and coordinate actions in favor of building a safer and better developed world. In this sense, the congruence of the actions of science diplomacy, reinforces the objectives of Korea's public diplomacy "to enhance our diplomatic relations and national image by gaining the trust of the international community and increasing our country's global influence" (MOFA, 2020).

1 Hallyu (Korean Wave)

2 Examples of sports diplomacy : Taekwondo and PyeongChang Olympic Winter Games (2018)

3 Korea's public diplomacy entails promoting diplomatic relations by sharing history, traditions, culture, arts, values, policies, and views through direct communication with foreign nationals.

According to Turekian (2015), science diplomacy is increasingly critical in addressing many of the planet's most urgent challenges - such as management of global commons, faltering public health systems, and the threat of collapsing ecosystems. It can also be used to enhance one nation's interests with respect to another and to defuse international tensions.

Thus, for Krasnyak, (2018) building South Korea's reputation among the core of scientifically developed countries will not only increase trade benefits, but also help to solve the current security dilemma, shape future geopolitical outcomes in a multilateral world, and accelerate Korea's participation in emerging scientific projects. Science diplomacy is an essential tool for addressing global issues, increasing cooperation between countries, and leveraging a country's influence. In this sense, it is a significant soft power⁴ generator, a potent form of attraction that uses national image, reputation and brand to convince, persuade and influence in the international scene (state, private actors, international organizations, civil society, etc.).

Interest in science diplomacy is growing at a time when international relations are changing. Fortifying the contribution of science to foreign policy objectives and facilitating international scientific cooperation through science are essential tools of the 21st century. Improving relations between countries, leveraging the technological system, and directing policies towards current global issues - which can lead to historic crises, such as the current Coronavirus pandemic - are among the main objectives of science diplomacy. Accordingly, as it has been very well highlighted by Oliveira and Onuky (2020), there is no unilateral solution to a phenomenon that demands a level of global coordination.

International cooperation in Science, Technology, and Innovation (ST&I) has achieved increasing prominence in the scope of international relations in recent decades. Technological innovations, the constant need for technical improvement, is among the main goals of governments of different states. In the contemporary scenario of economic globalization and striking social challenges, science diplomacy enables the development of answers through scientific cooperation linked to countries' foreign policy

4 Term coined by Joseph Nye as the country's ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment. A country's soft power rests on its resources of culture, values, and policies.

(Anunciato and Santos, 2020). Science diplomacy seeks to facilitate access to technological products, the internationalization of knowledge, the attraction of investments in research and development, and the mobilization of researchers who work outside and inside their country of origin.

It is within this larger context of the relationship between the knowledge produced in academia and the doing of international politics that this article is offered and justified. Based on a qualitative and exploratory research, this study seeks to contribute to the enrichment of conducting and studying science diplomacy and for South Korean's contribution to be increasingly influential and assertive, being an incentive for researchers and scholars to carry out researches on the country's potential for global cooperation and collaboration. The current new Coronavirus Pandemic scenario reinforces this need and broadens the discussion on the creation of dialogues with other areas of knowledge and science, through the creation of joint investment projects, the facilitation of state, academic and private investments for cooperation and incentive for academic research in this area.

This article is structured as follows. In addition to the introduction, the first chapter will explain the development of science diplomacy in the 21st century. Subsequently it will discuss how South Korea has a structured body for "using" science diplomacy, and how it has already been practicing this type of diplomacy. Thirdly, we will analyze some projects where these partnerships tend to be the beginning of South Korea's science diplomacy. And lastly, the final considerations will be made.

2. SCIENCE AS A TOOL OF DIPLOMACY

The use of science as an ally of diplomacy and international politics is not a recent phenomenon.⁵ However, the use of science as a central tool for international relations is new (Turekian, 2018). This is a phenomenon that is increasingly relevant to the 21st century society, which has been taking shape through great technological advances and innovation. Scientific-

5 There is a long historical association between Science and international cooperation. In the West, for example, the post of Foreign Secretary of Royal Society was instituted in 1723.

technological development then becomes a fundamental requirement to understand the dynamics of conflict, negotiation, and international cooperation (Royal Society, 2010). In this context, science offers new spaces for engagement in addition to making itself more and more notorious/evident in the international agenda, offering answers for the articulation of policies and collaborative projects in ST&I that aim to face main global issues.

Although the term *science diplomacy* has been gaining ground in academic and governmental discussions, its definition is still much debated, as it has many attributes and practices, and it is not possible to have just one understanding or definition of it. However, it is possible to assert that it consists of the intersection between science and technology policies and foreign policy (Flink & Schreiterer, 2010). The term “*science diplomacy*” has been increasingly used to address the international insertion of states in the field of S&T, and has replaced the subject “international cooperation” as the most discussed topic in articles, conferences and presentations on how S&T and IR interact and bear fruits to national states (Domingues, 2019). Science diplomacy is more than just international scientific collaborations; it is the involvement of actors and political interests.

Facing global challenges through science diplomacy and scientific excellence are essential, especially in a society marked by the current pandemic of the new coronavirus. According to Ademar Seabra da Cruz Jr (2010), the link between diplomacy, innovation and development becomes evident when pointing out that national innovation systems only develop in international environments and networks of knowledge, productive investments, factor mobility and innovation. The scientific community may be able to mediate new and different types of international partnerships. Thus, science diplomacy enables the creation of responses through scientific cooperation linked to the countries’ foreign policy, and is now at the heart of the international agenda. Science being considered an instrument of engagement and contribution to world policies.

In recent years, debates on complex global problems, which go beyond territorial limits, such as climate change, sustainable development goals, internet governance and threats to global security, justify the greater importance of technical-scientific knowledge in international relations and

in the formulation and development of policies that facilitate and go about these partnerships.

The circulation of knowledge through the internationalization of partnerships and the involvement of different stakeholders may also produce multiplying results that go beyond the effect of the sum of the participations (Costa, 2020). Charles Weiss (2015), the first S&T adviser to the World Bank, also stresses that International Relations professionals need to understand the scientific and technological dimension of international issues and their economic, political, legal and cultural impacts to mobilize knowledge that supports solving critical global problems (so-called “societal challenges”). Diplomats act as promoters and facilitators to bring scientists and innovative companies into contact. Scientists work to bring countries closer together in search of multinational solutions.

The very character of the science of rationality, transparency and universality allows the development of a universal language (Royal Society, 2010). These are the values that, through the neutrality of science, allow more channels of dialogue between nations to be developed and help to build trust and international governance in a nation. Science offers a non-ideological environment for the participation and free exchange of ideas between people, regardless of cultural, national, or religious origins. It allows international actors to cooperate, regardless of their origins.

The scientific community often works across national borders, addressing issues of common interest, so that it has a good basis for providing support for emerging forms of diplomacy, which require non-traditional alliances between nations, sectors and non-governmental organizations. If these channels of scientific exchange are aligned with broader international policy objectives, they can contribute to building coalitions and resolving conflicts. Cooperation on the scientific aspects of sensitive issues, such as nuclear non-proliferation, can sometimes provide an effective route to other forms of political dialogues. (Royal Society, 2010) The premise is that no single country will be able to tackle global problems such as climate change, food security, poverty reduction, and nuclear disarmament. The scientific journey is based on the need for collaboration and connection, which are no longer based solely on historical, institutional, or cultural ties. This creates an opportunity for the international policy-making community.

The Royal Society, a leading institution, has attempted to characterize SD programs according to its various possible developments. As maintained by the *New Frontiers in Science Diplomacy* memo published in 2010, science diplomacy can be understood as three different dimensions:

- **Science in Diplomacy** – Science providing information and support for the purpose of international policies. Strengthening the scientific contribution to foreign policy objectives. Science will be crucial to address these challenges, and its priority, along with diplomacy. Establishing and encouraging links between the scientific and foreign policy communities is helpful to advise both scientists and policy makers. The scientific community must keep policymakers informed and updated about the dynamics of the Earth's natural and socioeconomic systems (Royal Society, 2010).
- **Diplomacy for Science** – Diplomacy facilitating international scientific cooperation. International scientific and engineering collaboration is imperative to meet global challenges. Models of international scientific collaboration can lead the way for international political diplomacy. Whether seeking top-down strategic priorities for research, or bottom-up collaboration between individual scientists and researchers, science can be a bridge to communities in which political ties are weak. However, in order for relationships to develop in these areas, scientists may need diplomatic assistance, whether in contract negotiations, intellectual property agreements or to deal with visa regulations. (Royal Society, 2010).
- **Science for Diplomacy** - Scientific cooperation improving international relations. Cooperation on scientific aspects of sensitive issues can sometimes be the only way to initiate a wider political dialogue. The convincing power of science and the universality of scientific methods can be used to redeem tensions, even in hard power scenarios, such as those related to traditional military threats. Scientific soft power interacts with international relations in several ways, from cultural diplomacy to the more traditional forms of negotiation and mediation.

Seeking to establish a more pragmatic view of science diplomacy, Glukman et al., in 2017, drew up new distinctions for a country's motivations to develop this type of diplomacy. The authors understood that the dimensions developed in the memorandum contained - and still do - a theoretical framework developed for academic studies, and thus also developed new models for the recognition of science diplomacy. In this approach, the authors sought to develop a spectrum of political reasoning and needs, as they recognize that functions will be managed by different government agencies. Consequently, the clarity of expectations, as illustrated in this more practical framework of science diplomacy can help producing effective initiatives and coordination. They are:

- *Actions designed to directly promote a country's national needs:*

Science diplomacy can be used to meet several domestic needs, from the employment of soft power to meeting economic interests and promoting innovation. Countries are looking to become more strategic in identifying how scientific relations can promote trade and other diplomatic interests. Much of the aid has a technological dimension, either to address water and other environmental and resources issues, public health, food, and energy security, or to grow and diversify the economy. The scientific contribution, therefore, needs to be incorporated into the evaluation and design of the proposed programs.

The National Security and Emergency Response also benefits from science diplomacy as science and technology can instruct on transnational scientific responses, and assistance in arms control treaties for scientific verification. *Economic Dimensions* also fall into this category, as more and more scientific and health parameters are included in trade regulations, intellectual properties and products manufactured between different countries, etc. Finally, *the National Science, Technology and Innovation Systems* benefit from these approaches as they engage globally with other research and innovation agencies, with their own scientific diasporas, or with access to large research infrastructures not present in their own systems.

- *Actions aimed at serving cross-border interests:*

This application involves bilateral issues or shared natural cross-border

resources and the exploitation of shared technical services (pharmaceutical regulations, food security assessment, refugee crisis, pollution, etc.).

• *Actions designed primarily to meet global needs and challenges:*

In this group, the authors include the SDGs, which comprise a global context for development and partnership where both developed and developing countries can have measurable goals to increase their international and domestic development activities. The SDGs provide an excellent meeting point for global interests and national priorities. These actions would also involve access to scientific exploration of ungoverned spaces, such as Antarctica, the digital world, or space.

Scientific organizations, including national academies, also play an important role in science diplomacy; the range of actors involved in these efforts should be expanded to include non-governmental organizations, multilateral agencies, and other informal networks. A nation's scientific diaspora is also strategically important since scientists who live outside the country are eager to maintain close involvement with their place of origin.

More effective mechanisms and spaces will be required for the dialogue between policy makers, scholars and researchers working in scientific and international policy communities to identify projects and processes that can advance the interests of both communities. International policy institutions and thinktanks can offer leadership through the dedication of intellectual resources to science as an important component of diplomacy today.

Science diplomacy needs the scientific community to have support and encouragement at all levels. Younger scientists need to have career opportunities and incentives from the early stages of their professional journeys, so as to engage in political processes. Science diplomacy also provides researchers with an opportunity to become ambassadors on behalf of their national academic community.

For Dolan (2012), science diplomacy is an important soft power tool, facilitating a transformation of diplomatic relations by building bridges using science as an instrument, through decisions based on merit, transparency, and evidence. Highlighting cooperation between nations and showing the value of S&T commitments to diplomats who are, for the most part, focused on issues such as the threat of terrorism, tough economic choices or disputes over territories, should contribute to the protection of

national security and building relationships with long-term benefits to mitigate and smooth out international conflicts.

3. SOUTH KOREAN SCIENCE DIPLOMACY

South Korea is an economic and technological power, a world leader in a variety of technologies (digital technologies, materials, and nanotechnologies, biotechnology, and green technology). It presented economic and social development through state and private organized mechanisms, and today boasts one of the best hubs of technology and innovation in the world.

In the 1960s, South Korea was one of the main beneficiaries of international development assistance and has now changed its status from beneficiary to donor. It took about four decades and plenty of governmental, private, and academic effort for the Korean innovation system to be developed from the beginning of the STI capacity building to the model presented today (STEPI) being recognized as a high-end and technologically advanced country among its partners in the OECD (OK, 2011).

With all its know-how, South Korea has great conditions to become one of the great actors to lead world science diplomacy and become an important research and innovation partner for other countries. Although science diplomacy is briefly mentioned in the 2019 diplomatic Whitepaper, dealing with collaboration in the Arctic, this tool can become a powerful vehicle for the country's influence in the international system. Science and scientific cooperation, in this regard, may be among the most expressive manifestations of Korean soft power, along with its already successful cultural diplomacy. Science diplomacy must be included in Korea's political and institutional vocabulary, especially considering the enormous potential for its success, based on Korea's scientific excellence with well-known applied technologies and its medium-powered diplomacy (Robertson, 2017).

Thus, understanding how science is developed in South Korea is very important. A top-down innovation system promotes collaboration between government, industry, and the academic community in the nation-building process (Shin, et al., 2012). Science and politics were decisive for the development of internal structures in the country, which built a structurally

well-developed and strategic body. An advanced educational model, with institutes focused on advancing technology and private companies at the forefront of innovation. By adopting a prominent role for science diplomacy, the country will benefit from bilateral and multilateral, cooperative and collaborative scientific cooperation, completing the relationship between science and diplomacy.

The South Korean government has been demonstrating very strategic efforts in the relationship between ST&I and national innovation systems and has been spearheading a series of potential cooperation agreements in technological and social development projects with countries in the North and the Global South. The formation of these collaborative research networks with other countries reinforces the country's political and scientific capital, and the need to include science diplomacy on the agenda of political and strategic decisions. It seems likely that more and more advances will occur to support the interaction between states and civil society, including actors in the scientific community. Nevertheless, efforts to define and strengthen the role of scientists in this architecture of change of government and diplomacy (South Korean) are still at an early stage (Krasnyak, 2018)

According to Pierre Runifi, there are three fundamental actions for science diplomacy: *attraction, cooperation and influence*. Korea is successfully undertaking the first - and to some extent - the second, in seeking the image of a scientifically attractive and technologically developed country (Krasnyak, 2018). However, Korea's ability to generate knowledge-based soft power from science diplomacy and increase international influence is now their new aspiration.

ATTRACTION - BUILDING KNOWLEDGE AND BRAIN CIRCULATION

South Korea is internationalizing its university curriculum, recognizing that both native Korean and foreign speakers are demanding graduate programs in English, and many of the universities have started offering classes in English. One of the initiatives was to establish partnerships with universities and institutions from around the world to exchange students and transnational education projects. Attracting even more researchers interested in taking both South Korea as an object of study (mainly in the fields of international relations and social sciences) and in South Korea, due to its

investment in infrastructure in the exact sciences, such as physics, sciences, mathematics, chemistry, nanoscience, engineering, biological sciences, computing, and material sciences. Additionally, the government has invested in attracting foreign students through the “Study in Korea” project. Attracting these students is essential for the development of greater collaborations among researchers and to improve Korea’s international competitiveness.

Universities like SKY (Seoul National University, Korea University and Yonsei University) are internationally recognized among the best in the world, increasingly offering an international study environment. Among these programs is the Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS). This program, by training highly qualified professionals in a multidisciplinary approach, encourages students to expand their perspectives beyond national and cultural borders.

Furthermore, universities like POSTECH, founded in 1986 to provide advanced education for potential engineers, are also internationalizing education in the quest to attract even more qualified students. The university also offers courses and opportunities for students to become entrepreneurs, such as membership in clubs, preparation groups for startups, and training on patents and licenses to create a new venture. UNIST stands out with a reputation for rapid growth for its research and impact in a wide range of fields dedicated to science and technology research. The university’s research facilities and state-of-the-art equipment are examples of how the entity invests on its campus.

KAIST (Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology), probably one of South Korea’s largest technology centers, has become a prolific institution, often found among some of the leading universities in global scientific education and research. The Institute has a project called Vision 2031 “innovation in science and technology for the happiness and prosperity of humanity.” Among its initiatives, KAIST intends to transform the campus into an environment without linguistic and cultural barriers, to increase the diversity of the student body, form a globalized faculty, create educational centers abroad, send research volunteers to developing countries and various other actions to increase the globalization of education.

Korea has a large network of contacts, with an increased demand for “brain circulation.” According to OECD statistics in 2011, Korea is the third largest student exporter, behind only China and India. It is true that these Korean students who have studied abroad have played significant roles worldwide to increase the value of the “Global Korea” brand. (Minara, 2012).

Shin, Hong, and Kang (2012) point to the significant increase in the 2000s in the demand for highly qualified labor, quantitatively and qualitatively, according to the structure of the new knowledge-based economy. But since the 1970s, the government has already started efforts to attract new researchers from abroad and to train its personnel internationally. According to the data reported by the authors (2012), the number of full-time research personnel was 5,628 people in 1970 and shot up to 264,118 people in 2010; an increase of about 47 times in the last 40 years. In addition, the government implements several policies and programs to connect research personnel abroad, whether foreigners or Korean. These policies promote the global exchange and flow of knowledge. The connection with the diaspora is one of the main tools for the development of science diplomacy, alongside the quality of brain circulation in the country.

COOPERATION - BUILDING BRIDGES

Korea today develops scientific cooperation projects with countries in the North and the Global South, in addition to establishing research and innovation institutes and centers interested in expanding South Korea’s influence internationally and strengthening the country’s research and innovation. With their neighboring countries, South Korea and ASEAN have developed agreements to expand the promotion of cooperation in science and technology, and in 2019 South Korea and ASEAN have agreed to establish a center for science and technology partnership to promote exchanges and policy sharing programs (Ministry of Science and ICT).

The relationship of cooperation and partnership with the United States is a long one, and they were one of the great promoters of South Korea’s development through economic and technological agreements and development aid. The emergence of South Korea as a global leader has led

to an increasingly dynamic US-South Korea Alliance, focused on future-oriented partnership opportunities, including space, energy, health, climate change and cybernetics. (USA, Department of State). In 2019, the United States and the Republic of Korea entered into a bilateral partnership for deeper cooperation in scientific and technological research and the development of solutions for natural disasters and issues closely related to public security, such as security and infectious diseases.

In 2007, a scientific and technological cooperation agreement with the European Union was established. This agreement was already aimed at the rapid expansion of South Korean scientific knowledge. After the scientific cooperation agreement, three new agreements were settled addressing a wide range of international issues, including the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, human rights, cooperation in the fight against terrorism, energy security, climate change and development assistance. Even today, cooperation with South Korea is a priority for the European Union.

The relationship with Latin American countries started at the end of World War II. However, these gained strength as of the 2000s. The rapid economic and technological development in South Korea is very relevant for the analysis and comparison between the development policies carried out by Latin countries and the trajectory developed by the Korean country. There is a range of possibilities for cooperation between the region and South Korea, as Berry (2018) points out in the support for innovation clusters and technology parks, in cooperation for the development of knowledge management systems, and for the development of partnerships in important sectors of knowledge export, such as biopharmaceuticals, radioisotopes, satellites, vaccines, biokerosene, nanomaterials and advanced manufacturing.

With regard to the African continent, the intensification of relations is even more recent, and can be marked by the visit of President Roh Moo-hyun in 2006, being the first by a South Korean president to the continent in 24 years. The visit was also the debut of the Korean Initiative for the Development of Africa, which promoted a rapid increase in official development aid from South Korea (ODA) to the continent.

In low-income countries, South Korea provides personalized assistance

in the areas of education, technology, and infrastructure, while collaboration with middle-income countries develops on specific research and development projects. Due to the increase in its budget during its development, the Korean government started to deliberate on creating an effective and efficient system to manage South Korea's aid programs. Currently, KOICA's goal is to "*Create innovative values and solutions through Technology.*" Its main cooperation modalities are projects, training programs and volunteer programs in other countries. It looks to strengthen development effectiveness through Science, Technology, and Innovation (STI) in the context of the SDGs. The SDG reports highlighted STI as an important means of implementation to address social problems and facilitate economic growth in developing countries. Global partnerships and knowledge sharing are being facilitated in the STI area. Priority sectors include education, health, governance, information technology and communication, rural development, and the environment (Chun Muhye Lee - 2010).

Likewise, other institutes, such as STEPI - Science and Technology Policy Institute, are fundamental for the development of Korean science diplomacy. In addition to being responsible for research in S&T and R&D activities, they promote the strategy for the innovation system, expanding the scope of international cooperation for the help in solving global problems. Bridges are important between government, industry and the academy and other research institutes. In addition to carrying out consultancy in technology management for other countries and research on the relationship between S&T economy and society, it works in international collaboration, education and international training. Providing a meaningful platform to bring together various global opinion leaders to exchange knowledge, share lessons and ideas, build networks and engage in mutual learning.

The Korean Institute for Advancement of Technology (KIAT) was established in May 2009 as a public institute, under the Ministry of Knowledge Economy, in accordance with the government's public institutes' plan for advancement. To promote Korea's industrial development and industrial technological innovation, KIAT will play a crucial role in suggesting R&D strategies for industrial technology through systemic technology planning and political research. It will also enhance the

competitiveness of the industrial technology ecosystem in Korea, promoting various activities, such as transfer and commercialization of industrial technology, establishing an industrial technology infrastructure, supporting components and materials industries and regionally specialized industries

INFLUENCE - BUILDING A BETTER NORMAL

President Moon Jae-In's speech in March 2020 makes clear Korea's strategy to act as an influential actor in the international system: *"we will take the current crisis as a driving force for new opportunities and development ... Our goal is a Republic of Korea that takes the lead in the world. This is the new Republic of Korea, which we aspire to."* According to the president, the country has *"ample resources to lead the digital economy combining technologies from the Fourth Industrial Revolution, such as artificial intelligence and big data. We will work to help the Republic of Korea emerge as a leading global digital power with innovative business ventures and startups serving as the main driving force. We will create engines for future growth by promoting three new growth sectors - system semiconductors, biological health, and future-generation cars - with more vigor."* (Moon Jae-In, 2020).

The country has been developing a knowledge-based infrastructure, improving strategic communication, increasing awareness to support cooperation, increasing the network, and promoting innovation through joint activities. Science diplomacy, in collaboration with S&T, is determined to attract the best students, researchers and companies from around the world. This intention could make the country more competitive, improve its reputation and make it more attractive for investment. The influence on the use of SD may attract talent, capital, and political support, improving the country's international projection, emphasizing the image of Korea as an attractive and scientifically developed country, thus gaining an earned recognition and influence.

Korea should certainly adopt a strategy for building a high science diplomacy profile. Paving the way for the foundations of public diplomacy, MOFA got off to a good start in mobilizing Korea's soft power, which science diplomacy can continue to improve (Krasnyak , 2018). It is necessary to promote the intellectual and practical foundations of education

on science diplomacy and the expansion of its knowledge, developing its best practices, creating a favorable environment for networking, the training of diplomats interested in science and in diplomatic scientists and providing input for the academy to be increasingly connected and engaged with the development of this knowledge.

This focus on science diplomacy should include what Professor Krasnyak understands as “points of attention,” which make it possible to increase the efficiency of Korean diplomacy and also improve scientific cooperation and, ultimately, allow Korea to shape its future as an important one. Geopolitical actors are: (1) the awareness and broad implementation of knowledge-based policies as a national effort, (2) the direct involvement of external non-state actors related to the academy in diplomatic affairs, (3) the adaptation of the network of embassies and consulates abroad as centers of science diplomacy.

4. ADDRESSING GLOBAL ISSUES

So far, we have seen how Science Diplomacy is important for building influence in the international system and how South Korea already has a well-structured national system of innovation and research and development. According to Krasnyak (2018), although South Korea does not have an official policy of science diplomacy, it has a series of practical experiences from diplomacy to science, projects directly linked to Korean technology and innovation, which are in progress and have already been delivered and show the strength of the country’s international capacity.

These are just a few examples that show the complexity of intergovernmental cooperation in scientific initiatives. Korea’s fundamental understanding of the importance of international programs, its scientific and financial capacity to participate in them, and full government support demonstrate that it has the foundation for science diplomacy to continue. Although Korea is not yet a key player in international science diplomacy, the potential for this is enormous. (Krasnyak, 2018).

GLOBAL HEALTH

Amazônia - Basic Health Unit

In 2015, during President Park Geun-Hye's visit to Brazil, a series of cooperation agreements were established between the two countries. These agreements involve companies, universities and research centers in joint initiatives that provide opportunities for new businesses, the development of high technology and the exchange of specialists. Among these agreements, there is also the memorandum of understanding between the Ministries of Health of both countries, which seeks to strengthen relations in the area of health care and medications.

This was the beginning of the project that made possible the first intelligent Basic River Health Unit (UBSF)⁶ in Amazonas. Named Catarina Brota dos Santos, it is the first to have Korean technology to provide medical care in riverside communities and will initially serve families living in the region of the Manacapuru River. The technology equipment was donated by the Korean government, which will serve about 5,000 inhabitants of Manacapuru who still had no family health coverage.

There were several stages of cooperation and coordination of various actors, such as the Korea Institute for Advancement of Technology (KIAT), Yonsei University, Catholic University of Korea, Bit Computer, and the University of Taubaté. The project is the result of a deal signed between the Brazilian and Korean governments and aims to improve medical care provided to communities, facilitating, for example, diagnoses and expanding prevention actions. Korea has invested around R\$ 15 million in cutting-edge equipment, providing not only the implantation of this equipment, but also training of professionals who will be on board. With Korean technology the storage of information about patients and the Regulation System of the State of Amazonas will be connected. With this, the state hopes that there will be a significant advance in basic health care, especially for people in riverside areas. With the Intelligent River UBSF, the population of Manacapuru will have access to medical, dental, prenatal care, child health, vaccination, ultrasound, preventive and laboratory tests, among other services that are

6 Basic River Health Unit (UBSF) are vessels that hold Health Care Equipment for Riverside Families (ESFF), which provide ambience, furniture and equipment required to assist the *ribeirinha* population of Amazon.

characteristic of Primary Health.

“The Korean Government and several institutions and the people know the importance of the project. In 2019, it celebrated 60 years of this integration, friendship, and immigration between Brazil and Korea, officially celebrated by the Korean and the Brazilian Governments. No healthcare project, despite this long period, had taken place. That is why we are very satisfied with what is happening today ,” said Young-Ro Yoon, general coordinator of the project at Korea’s Yonsei University.

“ODA KOREA: Building TRUST”

In 2020, with the new Coronavirus pandemic, South Korea was quick to launch an initiative with ODA to help partner countries in combating COVID-19. Being itself an example of how to deal with the causes and consequences of a virus of great potential for dissemination, Korea launched the Development Cooperation Initiative for a Safe World Together - ODA KOREA: Building TRUST: *“an initiative to contribute to the strengthening of Transparency, Resilience, Unity and Security alongside partner countries.”*

The program, structured into 3 pillars, provides humanitarian assistance, health cooperation for the main countries and quarantine organizations and support to respond to the economic and social impacts on vulnerable groups, and also increase their resilience in areas such as education, sanitation and food security, in partnership with the private sector, civil society and multilateral organizations. (MOFA, 2020).

The countries and organizations targeted for support this year were selected considering the political priorities of the Korean government, the need to strengthen health capacity and relations between countries. Nonetheless, there are plans to expand target countries according to demand.⁷

The program aims to expand medical facilities for COVID-19, providing diagnostic and medical equipment, educating and training medical personnel and establishing a cooperative system with government, civil

7 Indonesia, Uzbekistan, Ethiopia, Colombia, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Myanmar, Philippines, Intensive support for the African CDC.

society and international organizations to support the strengthening of the response capacity to vulnerable individuals in the region. Thus, the aforementioned support elements will be packaged and widely supported so that the country's ability to respond to COVID-19 and prevent infectious diseases can be substantially and continuously enhanced beyond simple quarantine supplies. (MOFA, 2020)

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Korea Green Growth Trust Fund

In partnership with the World Bank, the Korea Green Growth Trust Fund (KGGTF) was established in 2011 to strengthen and expand the Bank's global green growth portfolio, drawing on the experience of Korea's successful green growth experience and investment through public and private resources. Its central approach is to support the World Bank and its clients to operationalize inclusive green growth initiatives, strategies, and investments. The KGGTF has a close partnership with the World Bank's Global Practices, while working with client countries to develop a holistic green growth strategy and, most importantly, implement the projects identified in its strategies.

Today, the Korea Green Growth Trust Fund finances local programs, as well as knowledge exchange activities, and has so far approved 144 grant programs in the urban, transportation, information and technology, energy, environment, water, climate and agriculture sectors, focusing on low and medium-low income economies.

Operating green growth and sector integration to develop green policies and programs that increase productivity and create jobs and providing clear and specific technical concepts and activity planning. They have the potential to become large-scale projects led by the World Bank Group or client countries.

Knowledge sharing and building networks are an integral part of implementing green growth. Facilitating the sharing of best practices for green growth and technical knowledge through on-site learning and the development of hands-on learning tools is part of what makes the Korea Green Growth Trust Found unique. (KGGTF, 2020).

The Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI)

Korea successfully launched GGGI in 2012. From a domestic thinktank, GGGI is today an international intergovernmental organization. GGGI has a unique presence in the country and a prominent role as a neutral and reliable advisor and integrated strategic development partner in member governments and partners. These advisers are directly involved with national governments in defining the strategic direction for the development of the national program guided by a Country Planning Framework with the Government. GGGI's operational model maximizes the potential to translate green growth strategies and policies (especially economic policies) into green investment plans, mobilizing green financing commitments needed to support low-carbon economic development.

SECURITY

Through joint initiatives, science can help foster bilateral cooperation between South and North Korea. Both Koreas undoubtedly have great potential to cooperate in science diplomacy. Scientists alongside diplomats, directly or/and with the mediation of other partners, should promote the importance of working on science projects, emphasizing their peaceful, scientific and non-military approach. This is the chance for science diplomacy to build relationships between counterparts in favor of the development of science to reduce inter-Korean regional tensions. Some meetings have already been held aiming at the scientific approximation between both Koreas. In 2006, in a "historic" meeting, researchers from the North and South met in Pyongyang to discuss ways to boost scientific cooperation. In this meeting, the organizers sought to catalyze joint projects in nanotechnology, information technology, environmental sciences, and biotechnology. More recently, in a forum sponsored by the Korea Federation of Science and Technology Societies, a favorable environment for joint research was recreated. (Science, 2018)

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The goal of the present work was to demonstrate how science diplomacy can be an excellent opportunity for the performance of Korean Public Diplomacy and its international influence, working collaboratively to solve

global problems, participating in international projects and building new opportunities for dialogue between different peoples. With a highly technology-based society, South Korea is an important partner for countries in both the North and the Global South, and science diplomacy allows the advancement of sharing their views in the search for creative and constructive solutions to common global challenges.

The work presented how science diplomacy has been working and how it will be a defining model in the construction of actions in this current pandemic and in the post-pandemic world. Science diplomacy strategies allow for a more effective alignment of interests and more efficient coordination of resources. It is an extremely useful tool to face global challenges and to improve international relations, as long as it is not distorted by ideological objectives that compromise the independence of science. Thus, science diplomacy must play a greater role in efforts to solve global challenges and promote sustainable development.

South Korea already practices science diplomacy. However, the subject still needs more academic strength and increased political articulation to enter the vocabulary of the government and its scientists. The conjunction of these two worlds will open many borders to help with global problems and to build a profile of an attractive and scientifically influential country. South Korea has one of the largest networks of circulation of scientists, it can use the circulation of brains so that each researcher is an ambassador of Korea and train more academics and diplomats informed about and concerned with science. Encouraging discussions on the topic is essential if South Korean aspirations are to become an influential power in technology. It is still possible to develop a Korean model of doing science. Korea can further advance the “Korean Wave to the Korean Way” of doing science.

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“Smart” Korea and COVID-19: Exploring the Potential of Smart City as a Tool of Public Diplomacy

Ayse Durakoglu

Abstract | The term *smart city* refers to the improvement of urban fabric, community services and life standards via high-technology infrastructure, inclusive governance and connected resource management. Korea’s vision and experience of early *ubiquitous* and now *smart* cities have transformed it into one of the leading nations of smart urbanism in the past two decades. This study explores Korea’s strategic usage of smart city technologies in its effective COVID-19 management and its significant potential for the country’s public diplomacy and nation branding. In addition to the advanced physical infrastructure and efficient policy framework, this paper highlights Korea’s human capital (*smart people*) as an important dimension of the country’s holistic smart branding in the international scene. This exploratory study relies on online sources including government websites, official papers, speeches, interviews and online news media articles. Consequently, this paper suggests that Korea’s effective pandemic control via the utilization of advanced smart city resources can provide the country with a significant leverage for promoting Korea for global smart city leadership and branding it as a *smart nation*.

국문초록 | ‘스마트 시티’라는 용어는 연결된 자원 관리와 통치를 포함한 고기술 기반시설을 통해 삶의 기준, 지역 사회 활동, 도시 구조가 향상됨을 일컫는다. 한국의 이른 ‘유비쿼터스’ 그리고 이제는 ‘스마트’한 도시 경험과 비전은 한국을 지난 이십 년 간 스마트 도시화를 이끈 국가들 중 하나로 바꾸어 놓았다. 이 연구는 한국이 코로나19의 효과적인 관리를 위해 어떻게 스마트 시티 기술을 전략적으로 사용했는지, 그리고 이것이 공공 외교와 국가 브랜딩에 어떤 상당한 잠재력을 갖는지 알아본다. 이 논문은 세계 무대에서 국가의 전체적인 스마트 브랜딩의 중요한 측면으로, 발전된 물리적 사회기반시설과 효율적인 정책 체제에 더해 한국의 인적 자원(‘스마트 피플’)을 강조한다. 이 탐색적인 연구는 정부 웹사이트,

공문, 연설, 인터뷰, 그리고 온라인 뉴스 기사를 포함한 온라인 출처들을 이용한다. 결과적으로, 이 글은 선진적 스마트 시티 자원의 활용을 통한 한국의 효과적인 전염병 통제가 한국을 세계적인 스마트 시티 리더십으로 홍보하고 ‘스마트’ 국가로 브랜딩하는 데 큰 영향을 끼칠 수 있음을 시사한다.

INTRODUCTION

COVID-19 has taken the known world by storm and is changing it into a different one. Pandemic control is essentially a major public health concern and domestic affair for countries; however, in every crisis there is opportunity. The South Korean government has been proactive by setting a K-quarantine model for effective pandemic control and exporting it to other countries as a standard management model. A top government official evaluated this initiative as a chance for the “nation to strengthen its global leadership” and “play a leading role in forming a new international order” (Shim, 2020). This paper approaches Korea’s advanced smart city infrastructure as a potential leverage for promoting the country in global smart city leadership and branding it as a “smart nation” in the COVID-19 pandemic context.

This study is an attempt to explore South Korea’s smart city resources, with its smart people emphasis, as a potential public diplomacy instrument and nation brand for the country. Korean policies of early *ubiquitous* then *smart cities* in the past decades have given high priority to the transformation of urban fabric, community services and life standards via high technology infrastructure and inclusive governance. Under ongoing COVID-19 circumstances, Korea’s smart city infrastructure and resources have proven to be vital for its effective pandemic management. This study proposes that promotion of its smart city vision with reference to this success can provide Korea with an opportunity to cement its influential position in smart urbanism and to establish a positive “smart” image of the country for the international gaze. While Korea’s ICT and IoT-based smart technologies are better established in its national image, this study underlines the further potential of its human capital, or “smart people,” as a significant pillar of a holistic smart Korea branding.

This paper presents an exploratory research on Korea’s smart city

experience and its utilization in a pandemic situation. The research relies on secondary data available from Korean government websites, official papers, speeches, interviews and online news media articles about Korea's smart city policies and pandemic management. Its limitation is its timing, which is a period of hectic effort for pandemic containment in Korea and in the world. Any ongoing process is innately volatile and fragile, which can invalidate the realities and suggestions of its premature study in the long run. Focusing on COVID-19 circumstances, this paper aims to humbly reflect the spirit of its time and provide some perspective from a specific point in history. It also attempts to contribute to literature by incorporating smart city policies and discourses within the discussion of public diplomacy and nation branding agendas of Korea.

Korea's vision of public diplomacy is about "fascinating the world with Korea's charms" (MOFA, 2020a). The concept of public diplomacy fundamentally refers to a governmental "process of the communications with the public of foreign countries to promote a nation's goals and policies and to promote the understanding of its thoughts and ideals as well as systems and culture" (Tuch, 1990, p.3). Shifting towards a "new public diplomacy" perspective, the relevance of non-state actors, digital technologies, relationship-building, soft-power terminology and marketing practices such as branding has steadily gained significance in past decades (Cull, 2009, p.13-14). In this context, by sharing its history, culture, values, policies and vision "through direct communication with foreign nationals," Korea appears determined to improve its diplomatic relations and national image, build trust in the international community and increase global influence" through public diplomacy (MOFA, 2020a).

Public diplomacy is a key instrument in exercising "soft power." Soft power is "getting others to want the outcomes that you want" by generating attraction and admiration instead of resorting to coercive measures to obtain desired results (Nye, 2008, p.95). The exercise of soft power makes other countries "want to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example, and/or aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness" (p.94). Korea has abundant soft power resources including cutting edge technology and a booming cultural industry. The ever-expanding sphere of K-branding, from K-wave and K-cosmetics to K-food, showcase the country's effective

branding and role model potential by presenting a Korean way of doing things. Recent promotions of the smart urban model called “K-City Network” and standardized pandemic management design called “K-quarantine” reaffirm Korea’s desire to establish itself as a prominent and exemplary soft power in the international community.

Nation branding has risen as an important strategy for building soft power and its exercise through public diplomacy. A nation brand is a “unique, multi-dimensional blend of elements that provide the nation with (...) differentiation and relevance for all of its target audiences” (Dinnie, 2008, p.15). Nation brands highlight distinct qualities of countries to improve their reputation and build a positive association with their image. Having established a Presidential Council on Nation Branding (PCNB) in 2009, Korea put top level state attention on the betterment of its national image. Approaching nation-branding as a matter of “the dignity of a country,” official vision emphasized an improved international status and national self-esteem as the foundation to create a reliable, credible, likable and dignified Korea (PCNB, n.d.). This study will discuss “smartness” as a potential brand for Korea and show the possibility of expanding said label beyond smart technologies in a way to include its advanced human capital.

This paper starts with a literature review of the smart city concept and its dimensions such as smart governance and public health services. The following two sections focus on the Korean experience of smart cities. The first section discusses smart urban infrastructure, planning and practices with reference to administrative and discursive frameworks and policy agendas. The second one concentrates on the human component of smart city notion, highlighting smart people and governance in Korean smart cities. The next section overviews Korea’s effective COVID-19 pandemic control with reference to smart city infrastructure, services and citizens. The analysis section discusses the possibility of Korea’s effective smart city policy and pandemic control as a “smart” public diplomacy and nation branding agenda. Lastly, the conclusion provides a brief summary and underlines the main points of the study.

LITERATURE REVIEW: THE CONCEPT "SMART CITY"

"Smart city" refers to a multidimensional concept that has become relevant among academics and policy makers in the past two decades. Growing urban studies literature, alongside economics, governance and policy areas attached various adjectives to cities and urban trends such as "sustainable," "digital" and "global." Lately "smart city" has gained wide recognition for encompassing both technological and social dimensions of the urban fabric and for doing so without political connotations (Eremia, Toma & Sanduleac, 2017, p.14). Caragliu, Del Bo and Nijkamp (2011) observe that a large body of scholarly works focuses on the role of ICT (*information and communication technologies*) infrastructure in urban fabric alongside human capital, education, social inclusion and environment in smart cities (p.66). In a broad sense, smart city refers to "a city in which ICT is merged with traditional infrastructure, coordinated and integrated using new digital technologies" (Batty et al., 2012, p. 481). Smart "labelling" of cities encompasses several key elements, such as the "utilization of networked infrastructures for economic and political efficiency," an "emphasis on business-led urban development," "social inclusion of various urban residents," the "role of high-tech and creative industries," as well as social and relational capital in urban development (Hollands, 2008).

Technological infrastructure and resources, increasingly with reference to the Internet of Things (IoT), Artificial Intelligence (AI) and ICT, constitute core dimensions for a smart city. As Heo et al. (2014) argue, smart city applications "revolutionize" cities by providing a city-scale infrastructure that integrates information from different application systems, thereby creating a city where "the citizens can securely collect, manage and share information that relates to all aspects of their everyday lives in a ubiquitous and sustainable manner" (p.109). In smart cities, technology plays a central, strategic yet instrumental role that far exceeds the mere celebration of technical achievements seen in *digital*¹ and *intelligent*² cities. In this context, the human component is equally essential in smart city

1 See Dameri & Cocchia, 2013.

2 See Nam & Pardo, 2011, p.285, also in Deakin & Al Waer, 2011.

philosophy, which aspires to use technology to bring about a higher quality of life and citizen well-being alongside the consolidation of social and cultural capital in the city (Dameri & Cocchia, 2013). For Angelidou (2014), it is a conceptual urban development model “based on the utilization of human, collective, and technological capital for the enhancement of development and prosperity in urban agglomerations,” emphasizing its social welfare objectives (p.53).

With this emphasis on human component, changing dynamics of urban governance and citizenship through smart urbanism has been explored in academic works (Lee & Lee, 2014; Rodriguez-Bolivar 2015). Meijer and Rodriguez-Bolivar (2016) point out that governing a smart city is “about crafting new forms of human collaboration through the use of information and communication technologies” (p.392). This approach underlines the fact that *smartness* is not only about installing the latest technologies, but also about the political understanding of said technology through more participatory processes and its role in promoting public values alongside economic gains. “Smart governance,” often combined with “e-government,” is noted as one of the six main axes of a smart city, alongside smart people and smart living (Caragliu, Del Bo and Nijkamp, 2011). Bringing government together with various stakeholders and social actors, smart urban governance underlines the significance of inclusivity, citizen participation in urban procedures, transparency and access to information. Cities are increasingly approached as “constellations of active agencies and groups” and a mixture of top-down and bottom-up procedures (Batty et al, 2012, p.497). Smartness is also noted to possess positive connotations with respect to pro-business neoliberal urban governance in a way that smart labelling is used for city branding to improve cities’ images (Hollands, 2008, p.304).

Public health and healthcare services in smart cities have also gained increasing attention in recent years. There has been rapid progress in “developing smart healthcare and health monitoring in non-clinical environments” (Jalali, El-Khatib & McGregor, 2015, p.111). Organization, accessibility and coordination of healthcare services for citizens and management of public health have become a subject of urban governance with the help of digital infrastructures. Scholars have discussed “smart management of medical equipment and supplies” (Su, Li & FU, 2011),

integrated healthcare systems to early detection of potential epidemics (Yigitcanlar, 2015), monitoring of increasing and aging urban populations and ubiquitous management of public health (Heo et al., 2014; Hussain et al., 2015). Compared to everyday healthcare applications, epidemic control via smart applications has received limited attention, yet it can be expected to expand with the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic (Kickbusch & Sakellarides, 2006; Allam & Jones, 2020; Xu et al., 2020).

In the Korean context, smart cities have been discussed in policy making and academic contexts alongside the "ubiquitous city" (U-city) concept. Promoted as a comprehensive urban policy since early 2000s, the country has attracted academic and professional attention via its booming urban developments and projects. Korean smart cities have been studied for their urban governance (Lee and Leem, 2016; Kim & Jung, 2019), impact on national economy (Kim, Jung & Choi, 2016), smart services and applications (Lee & Lee, 2014), as well as e-government services (Lee, 2010). Some case studies focused on New Songdo City, which was built from scratch upon smart city principles (Shwayri, 2013; Kshetri, Alcantara & Park, 2014; Benedikt, 2016). The role of smart city applications in effective mapping and contact tracing during the pandemic has also received recent academic attention (Sonn & Lee, 2020).

SMART CITY IN SOUTH KOREA

South Korea's experience with technology based pro-active approaches to urban space goes back to the 1990s and early 2000s. Launching the Ubiquitous City Comprehensive Plan, a national government program as early as 2003, the concept "ubiquitous city" (U-City) has been central to Korea's urban growth and management approach in the new millennium. In the Korean context, the U-City concept is often used interchangeably or in a complementary way with the smart city concept. The term refers to the "integration of ubiquitous computing within an urban environment" (Kogan, 2014). The U-City framework was further established with R&D programs; the Korean Ubiquitous-Eco-City Project (2007), which developed ICT-based eco-technologies for sustainable growth; The Business

Management Guidelines for the Construction of Ubiquitous Cities (2009); a Five-Year U-City Master Plan and the K-ICT Strategy (Lee & Lee, 2014). After two consecutive Ubiquitous City Comprehensive Plans (2009-2013 and 2014-2018), currently the Smart City Comprehensive Plan (2019-2023) is under operation (Smart City Korea, 2020b). The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transportation (MOLIT) operates as the main government body for coordination of smart city policies along with the Ministry of Science and ICT (MSIT), the Ministry of Interior and Safety (MOIS), the Ministry of Environment and other government bodies. The Smart Cities Special Committee within the Presidential Commission on the Fourth Industrial Revolution (PCFIR), which was established in August 2017, also plays a key role in policy making procedures on smart cities in Korea (Intralink, 2019).

The Korean government has continued its prioritization of smart urban management throughout the 2010s, this time by shifting to “smart city” terminology. President Moon Jae-in highlighted smart cities as “one of the government’s top priorities” and “the cradle of the Fourth Industrial Revolution” in his speech in February 2019 (Maresca, 2019). The President also pointed out that Korea is the first country to adopt laws related to smart cities, emphasizing Korea’s pioneer role (Lee & Ko, 2019). The “Korean Smart Cities” brochure released by MOLIT defines the Korean vision of smart city as “a platform to improve the quality of life for citizens, enhance the sustainability of cities, and foster new industries by utilizing innovative technologies of the 4th Industrial Revolution era” (2020, p.4). U-City is defined as a phase of Korea’s smart city development while the country’s rapid urbanization journey is worded as a trial-and-error process for the further smartization of Korean cities on the local and national scales. The same document shows that the Korean government has played an active role in promoting the development and expansion of smart cities across the country with fiscal investment and drastic deregulation. Seventy-eight local governments are reportedly promoting smart city services and developing solutions that fit their local circumstances (p.7).

This emphasis on smart city policies in past two decades, alongside the country’s advanced human, technological and R&D capital on ICT have given Korea considerable leverage in terms of smart city development and

implementation. One example is the Songdo International Business District, located in the Incheon Free Economic Zone. This District, though controversial, was built entirely on smart city principles and largely on private capital. The government is currently pursuing a three-step strategic plan for national smart urban development, consisting of "national pilot projects" (in Busan and Sejong), developing "smart city foundations" (e.g. R&D, "living labs," smart solutions in cities and villages) and creating an "innovative ecosystem" for public and private actors (Smart City Korea, p.12-18). By establishing this national scale government policy, President Moon framed pilot cities as "business models" that can be exported as "overseas development projects" and expressed his full support for smart city industries "as a platform for innovative growth" which is expected to grow at full speed on a global scale (Yonhap, 2019).

South Korea's investment in smart cities is best manifested in the country's capital, Seoul. As of 2020, the metropolitan area has over 10 million residents, while the larger Seoul Capital Region has over 25 million residents, roughly half of the Korean population (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2020). Former Mayor Park Won Soon promoted a smart vision for a city "based on data" with "citizens as mayors" in the past decade (Smart Cities World, 2020). In March 2019, the Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG) announced a 1.2-billion-dollar investment plan to fund further smart initiatives in the city through 2022 (Carter, 2020). SMG plans to deploy an enterprise-grade, city-wide IoT network to increase connectivity and create one of the "world's first hyper-connected cities" by 2022 (Weekes, 2019). Other 2022 Smart City Goals include real-time monitoring of senior citizens, a 70 percent reduction in traffic fatalities and deployment of 50,000 IoT sensors in the entire city (Carter, 2020, p.3). Public-private partnerships and involvement of various industrial and societal actors are widely encouraged for the city's smart initiatives. Start-ups are supported and employed in city-wide smart platforms. With the launching of Open Data Plaza in 2012, third-party developers and researchers gained access to urban datasets to generate new services and technologies.

Korea has been expanding its smart city vision beyond national territories as well. The Korean government promotes the exportation of "K-smart City" models to overseas markets in cooperation with government-

owned developer LH (Korea Land and Housing Corporation). The first such export was Abdullah Smart City Project in Kuwait, launched in 2016, and the first Latin American export was made to Santa Cruz New Town in Bolivia (Smart City Korea, p.22). During his speech at a smart city conference in 2019, President Moon expressed his confidence in Korea's "possibilities and capacities" and underlined the fact that the country is globally recognized for its "advanced information and communication technology, including the IoT, and its experience in building many successful new cities" (Yonhap, 2019). The President expressed government support for new smart city projects and promoted the export of said Korean smart business model that encompasses "the entire process of planning, design, construction and management of the city in a single package." To make this vision true, Busan and Sejong test-cities are expected to receive 3.7 trillion won funding from the government by 2021 to serve as blueprints for the K-smart city model to be exported overseas.

In July 2019, Korea stepped up with standardization and systematic exportation of "K-smart City" as a business model with MOLIT announcing a government investment of 500 billion won for overseas smart city projects (Lee & Ko, 2019). In January 2020, the Ministry launched a new program called K-City Network Global Cooperation Program. The Director of the Overseas Urban Cooperation Team, Ahn Sae Hee, defined this program as a "key policy tool with which Korea expands its efforts to promote and export Korea's smart city technologies" and expressed MOLIT's strong wish to work in cities in ASEAN and other countries to build smart cities. Director Ahn further emphasized that the vision of the program was to "help Korea position itself as the leader in global smart city development" and that "the government will continue to give active support to make that reality" (MOLIT, 2020). The program envisions a "full-package approach" that will provide both software and hardware support for selected overseas projects. Opening the first round of applications in early 2020, MOLIT received 80 applications from 23 governments and public institutions around the world. The program selected 12 smart city projects and plans to export smart city technologies, know-how and expertise to 11 countries including Peru, Myanmar and Russia (Choi, 2020).

SMART PEOPLE OF KOREA'S SMART CITIES

The Korean vision of smart cities is intertwined with a strong emphasis on the human component of this urban model. In line with the smart city concept's strong humane, social, inclusive and communitarian motivations, South Korea's experience with smart cities has shown the importance of the smart human factor both in theory and implementation. Korea has a considerably high rate of urban population with 84% of its residents living in cities, in comparison with the world average of 54% urbanism rate (Lee & Ko, 2019). In 2018, Korea ranked second in the World Bank's Human Capital Index, which measures the "amount of human capital that a child born today can expect to attain by age 18," including the factors of expected years of schooling, test scores and survival rates (Yonhap, 2018).

In Korea's smartization of cities, smart citizenship and governance appear among the core principles in Korean government alongside SMG's vision of smart urbanism and governance. Comparing former U-city policy with the Smart City, a report by the Institute of Construction and Environmental Engineering underlined the differences in their focus: the former focuses on "means," which is installing the necessary infrastructure, while the latter is about "purpose," providing services that improve citizens' quality of life (Lee & Ko, 2019). Government discourse underlines smart citizens as one of the two strengths of Korea's success in developing smart cities, alongside smart technology by world-class ICT companies (Smart City Korea, p.5). Korea is defined as smart and an "IT-friendly country with the world's highest smart phone penetration rate and high internet usage." The same paper shows Korea's top worldwide rankings in human capital indices such as the Bloomberg Innovation Index, OECD data and ICT Index on IT development to underline country's significant human capital.

In a similar vein, Seoul City's smart city masterplan identifies "smart citizens" as one of the three cornerstones alongside smart services and infrastructure (Carter, 2020). Having established the first steps of its e-government in the 1990s, South Korea's experience of electronic and digital services as an interactive tool of governance has further expanded in the 2000s. The former Mayor Park expressed his vision of Seoul citizens as "mayors" who would "co-create their cities" with open access to urban data

and the “free data city” plan aiming to extend free public wi-fi infrastructure to the entire city by 2022 (Stevens, 2020). ICT platforms and services such as the Citizens Complaint and Comprehensive Advice Center (CCPIS), the Mobile Voting App and Oasis of 10 Million Imagination have been made available to the public for better citizen access to government services and increased transparency (Seoul Solution, 2020). With the Digital Mayor’s Office launched in 2017, citizens are able to access a website version of the Mayor’s information system notifications on “city status, public opinion, key project progress, decision-support tools and operational control,” providing greater connectivity in urban management (Smart Cities World, 2020). The Seoul Digital Foundation, the Seoul Social Economy Centre and the Seoul Youth Hub are some examples of inclusive platforms for different segments of society (Smith, 2018).

Seoul was globally recognized by constantly ranking the top spot in the E-Governance Survey by the United Nations (2003-2018, 8 times) and the Municipal e-Governance International Survey by Rutgers University. The city has become a trademark example in e-government strategies across the world as a special report on Seoul was published by UN-affiliated International Telecommunication Union (ITU) where the city was referred as “one of the world’s tech-savviest cities” (Holzer et al., 2016, p.5). The Seoul Metropolitan Government also took the leadership and President City roles in 2010, in the establishment of WeGO (World e-Governments Organization of Cities and Local Governments) currently an organization with over 150 members from local governments, companies and organizations.

Korea’s smart city vision emphasizes its human component as a core pillar through new projects and technologies as well. In his participation to third Smart Tehran Congress in Iran, WeGO representative Lee defined smart city as a “happy city for smart people.” He emphasized that smart cities are possible with and for smart people, and “homo sapiens (smart people)” build smart cities because they are capable and happy doing so (Iran Press, 2019). Similarly, President Moon emphasized the value of new technologies not limited to their invention but “in the way it is used to improve the quality of life” (Lee & Ko, 2019). Recently, SMG and Seoul Design Foundation have hosted the second Human City Design Award,

aiming to "design a sustainable urban environment in which humans can enjoy creative lives" by overcoming the harmful effects of human alienation and materialism (UNESCO, 2020).

KOREA'S SMART MANAGEMENT OF COVID-19

As one of the first countries infected by COVID-19, South Korea's experience with epidemics in the twenty-first century goes back earlier than the current global pandemic. In the past two decades, East and South East Asian countries experienced two highly infectious diseases: SARS in 2002 to 2004 and MERS in 2015. These earlier epidemic experiences in the region appear to have had a positive influence on these countries' preparation and ability to control COVID-19 effectively, as evidenced by the relatively successful pandemic control in countries like Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea (Fox, 2020).

Earlier epidemics have brought policy shifts and structural changes to the public health system in Korea. Without a confirmed SARS case in the country, there was still a paradigm shift in the national disease control mentality which led to the establishment of the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC) in 2003. The MERS outbreak in 2015 was more impactful in the country, with 186 confirmed cases and 38 deaths, the highest number outside of the Middle East "despite the country's world-class medical infrastructure" (Kim, Lee & Lee, 2020). Issues with disclosure of cases and data, failure in early diagnosis and containment of the virus in hospitals, the cumbersome testing procedures led KCDC³ to further reform its system, strengthen its risk communication and assessment strategies and establish an Emergency Operations Center (Cho, 2020). After the MERS experience, public disclosure provisions were added to the Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act, the legal framework for disease-prevention policy in the country.

The first case of COVID-19 in Korea was detected on January 20 in an

³ In September 14, 2020, before this paper was finalized, KCDC was reorganized as KDCA (see KDCA, 2020).

imported case from China. The number of cases did not accelerate until February 17, the infamous 31st case. The Patient 31 who refused medical attention and joined a gathering after showing symptoms has become a global example of the importance of social distancing and isolation. In three days, the numbers increased to 70 new cases and blew out as an outbreak. In February 29, the pandemic hit its peak with 909 news cases. In the following two weeks, efficient response greatly slowed down the viral contagion, which resulted in only 64 new cases in March 23. In parallel to the global second of wave and rapid spread of the pandemic, case numbers considerably increased throughout the summer (going up as high as 441 new cases in August 26). Currently, the cases have been in decline as of early Autumn. According to the Ministry of Health and Welfare, as of September 19, 2020, 2,219,162 people have been tested; 22,893 were confirmed positive; while 19,970 recovered. 2,545 people are currently isolated, with 110 new cases; and 378 people in total deceased due to COVID-19. (MOHW, 2020c).

The Korean response to COVID-19 has been deeply influenced by its ineffective measures in past epidemics. The core values of Korea in the face of COVID-19 are officially named (and abbreviated as) “TRUST,” standing for transparency, responsibility, united actions, science & speed and together in solidarity (MOFA, 2020b). In a WEF COVID Task Force meeting in March, Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-hwa explained her country’s effective response as a “joined up, all-government approach” which integrated all central, regional and city governments, “absolute transparency with the public” and testing as the central course of action (Fleming, 2020). Korea’s current government response system consists of three main steps: 1. preventing importation of the virus through border screening, 2. early detection and control and 3. preventing spread of the virus through epidemiological investigations and quarantine of contacts (MOHW, 2020a). Early intervention, fast, frequent and widespread testing, effective tracing, case surveillance and active public help and engagement are noted as key characteristics of the country’s pandemic control strategy (Fisher & Choe, 2020).

Korea’s extensive ICT, AI and big data infrastructure is central for the management, analysis and usage of the immense flow of information

regarding COVID-19. Since the first confirmed cases, public health authorities have collaborated with local governments for the detailed documentation of infected people, having a thorough investigation of patients' and potential patients' moving histories via testimonies, CCTV records and smartphone GPS data (H. J. Kim, 2020). Data accessibility in the country has been high with the help of central and local governments sharing information via websites, text messages and media organs, and private companies developing applications to provide user-friendly access to pandemic-related information. KDCD and MOLIT jointly developed the Epidemic Investigation Support System (EISS), a system for epidemiological investigations with the use of data provided by Smart City Data Hub, an urban data analysis tool launched in 2018 (Millard, 2020). The system allows health investigators to access surveillance cameras and credit card transactions of confirmed cases. The self-quarantine safety protection application by the Ministry of the Interior and Safety puts people in quarantine in touch with case workers and can track their real time locations. The Corona 100m (Co100) app allows citizens to be alert about locations within a 100-meter radius visited by an infected person. Coronaita functions as a search engine for risky areas and the Coronamap website shows the travel histories of confirmed cases (Wray, 2020).

In addition to digital infrastructure; high public awareness, transparency around data, widespread internet usage and digital literacy are critical in Korea's fight against COVID-19 through public support and trust in government measures. Poll results displaying public trust in the government's response, high confidence and low panic also highlight people's awareness, cooperation and direct involvement in the pandemic control process. With a "near wartime like common sense of purpose," the Korean public has been well informed and directed about the risks of the pandemic and primed by the government to handle it as a national emergency (Fisher & Choe, 2020). Vice Health Minister Kim Gang-lip credited the Korean people for the effective flattening of the curve and underlined the importance of fully informed citizens for the cooperation and public support in their fight against pandemic (A. Kim, 2020). Similarly, Seoul Metropolitan Government underlined international media attention on "Korea's open democracy and mature citizenship respecting the community spirit" and

highlighted the citizens' strong sense of hygiene and voluntary participation in social distancing as positive factors for effective pandemic control in the city and country (Andrews, 2020).

With a response system that assumes looser lockdown measures, Korea has expressed its intention to become a pioneer country in managing this pandemic and doing it so with a distinct Korean style. Having effectively flattened the curve of contagion as early as April, the government expressed confidence in its effective measures to contain the virus and willingness to share K-quarantine model with the international community. Defining it as a "sturdy shield against COVID-19," Korea pushes the standardization of its K-quarantine model as a global standard for the effective management of pandemics (MFDS, 2020). Based on a 3T approach (Testing/Confirmation, Tracking/Epidemiology, Treatment/Quarantine), K-quarantine proposes an 18-step model including "drive-thru/walk-thru screening clinics" and "the community treatment center operation model" (Shim, 2020). 11.4 billion won (\$9.5 million) is reported to be allocated "specifically for promoting" K-quarantine (Lee & Baek, 2020).

By exporting K-quarantine, Korea aims to establish itself as a model country in the face of a global pandemic. Sung Yun-mo, the Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy underlined that "by making K-quarantine an international standard, the nation will strengthen its global leadership and play a leading role in forming a new international order" (Shim, 2020). Similarly, Minister of Economy and Finance Hong Nam-ki emphasized Korea's "elevated stature in the international society for its handling of the COVID-19 outbreak" and noted it as a chance for enhancing Korea's global reputation and branding as a "developed nation in the realm of preventing the spread of infectious diseases" (Lee & Baek, 2020). The World Economic Forum (2020) acknowledges the role model status of Korea by putting "setting an example during a pandemic" as one of the major key words on its strategic trends profile. Moreover, the K-quarantine model is promoted for providing Korean brands and companies with an opportunity to expand and become internationally better known. To showcase the increasing demand across the world, government-led online platform Korea.net has released an article series that "features every week a 'K-quarantine' company that is expanding internationally through an opportunity presented

by the pandemic" (Xu & Lee, 2020).

Korean official information services are doing an effective job in promoting Korean pandemic management to the international community. Government websites are largely available in English and COVID-19 data is conveniently accessible for the international audience. Supported by charts, daily press releases contain regional data, cluster outbreaks (industries, hospitals, events etc.) and chains of transmissions in an intelligible and transparent manner (MOHW, 2020c). The Ministry of Health and Welfare releases material for foreign media on its website (MOHW, 2020b). COVID-related official data are also delivered via Arirang TV/Radio, an English-language public service agency that aims to "burnish Korea's image in international communities and to improve relationships with foreign countries" (Arirang, 2018). Arirang's TV, radio and online platforms cover daily pandemic data, provide commentaries and broadcasts government briefings to inform international audience.

"SMART" KOREA AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The Korean style of doing things, or "K-style" is an important public diplomacy item for Korea's international recognition. Korean smart city policy and official discourse showcase that the country takes pride in being a role model in smart developments across the world and intends to ensure it by exporting Korean style smart city package programs to other countries. This study observes that Korea's smart city policies and implementations in the past two decades can serve as an instrument for forming and conveying a "smart Korea" image to the foreign publics. Led mainly by the government, Korea does not only aim to perfect its smart technological infrastructure but also to improve public-private partnerships, corporate initiatives, urban governance tools as well as social inclusivity to actualize this comprehensive urban model in practice. Continuing to grow into one of the textbook examples of the smart city concept itself, smart Korea carries great public diplomacy potential for Korea's future.

Korea's smart city infrastructure has displayed a pivotal role in the effective management of open data, contact-tracing and successful

containment during the COVID-19 pandemic. By utilizing the smart infrastructure of cities, Korea has been able to set itself apart as one of the leading examples of efficient control and management of a pandemic via smart technologies, governance and citizens. This real-life example of a positive experience of smart city tools can serve as evidence of the effectiveness of smart infrastructure and overall smart urban models in the country. Tangible results obtained via effective use of smart city tools during a global pandemic can be expected to attract a greater international audience since sharing best practices and applying them in local contexts proves especially important during a global public health crisis. K-quarantine modeling, which was initially produced for the domestic containment of the virus, shows the Korean government's determination to make country's name connote positive, smart and capable solutions in the middle of a crisis.

The smartness of Korea is not limited to its technology. In line with the smart city concept's emphasis on social and humanitarian applications, Korean smart cities are able to function with and for Korean people. While the central government sets the legal and administrative framework, official discourse highlights the importance of the participatory, inclusive and interactive nature of smart cities with its citizens. From the Seoul Metropolitan Government's "citizens as mayors" approach to "smart people" being one of the major pillars of the government's smart city masterplan, smart people are a fundamental part of the Korean smart city vision. Korean citizens are also an essential component for the country's smart response to the pandemic. Utilization of smart city infrastructure during COVID-19 has underlined the importance of citizens' management, self-control and understanding of flexible lockdown measures on their daily lives. Officials crediting Korean people for their cooperation and commonsense, effective containment of the virus is made possible not only with smart technologies but also with smart people who utilize them to produce better life conditions.

Given pandemic circumstances, Korea's will to establish itself as a role model in smart city developments has found solid ground in the COVID-19 world. In this new configuration, Korea displays a remarkable example of smart urbanism. Led by administrative and financial support of the central government, public-private partnerships, large industries, small start-ups

and social stakeholders have ensured the sustainability and adaptability of smart systems in Korean cities. High internet penetration, digital literacy and e-government experiences have prepared the Korean public for an open data circulation and equipped them with a smart citizen attitude. This smartization also represents a breakaway from less-transparent management of the MERS crisis with lower levels of public confidence and knowledge.

In a COVID-infected world, Korean smart city resources, both with technologies and people, can be more relevant than ever as nation brands. Korean smart cities were already important urban models for better life standards and sustainable urban spaces in the pre-COVID world, but they reemphasize their immense potential as engines of public health and wellbeing now. Pandemic circumstances have presented Korea with a chance to establish or further improve a "smart Korea" brand with the effective use of its smart resources and its promotion in the international community. The country already invests extensively in smart city policies, possesses and develops high-tech infrastructures along with expertise, highlights its merits in official discourse and exports them under Korean named commercial packages. With this leverage, Korea can take a step further and expand its smart branding beyond high-technology to include its human capital and expertise. A comprehensive "smart Korea" / "smart nation" brand which simultaneously encompasses technology, citizens, governance and know-how would enhance Korea's overall nation brand and highlight it as a smart international player.

CONCLUSION

This paper observes that the Korean smart city experience proposes a high potential for the country's smart branding and provides it with a strong public diplomacy leverage as a leading model in holistic smart systems. Actualizing the smart city ideal, which incorporates ICT and IoT-based connected technological infrastructure with communitarian, inclusive and humane ends, Korea's COVID-19 experience highlights the country's leading role in smart urban developments and enables it to set itself apart as an exemplary case. Both governmental and citizen level *smart* attitudes

appear to have played an important role in the transparent, accountable and clear communication of pandemic-related data in Korea's COVID-19 management. With local government and business level contributions for a smoother communication across the country, Korea has served as an example of a smart national experience of a pandemic situation.

Smartization policies and smart technological advancements are nothing novel for Korea, even less in the world. While physical infrastructure is a significant component of smart urban systems, their positive, communitarian and inclusive results in real life are not guaranteed. Massive flow of data, mapping and tracing contacts, keeping travel histories and utilization of surveillance systems are susceptible to create unbalanced, authoritarian and nearly dystopian managements. This paper suggests that pandemic control in Korea has presented the opportunity for the international community to witness utilization of smart technologies by purposeful management of central government with local, corporate and citizen partners to function altogether for effective and transparent crisis management. Korean people, already well-accustomed to ICT and smart data literacy and inclusivity through smart and e-government services on daily lives, have shown the possibility for participatory use of smart technologies. The post-pandemic world may remain unpredictable; however, it can be one in which Korea reaffirms its role as a smart urban model and inspires the world with its enhanced smart image.

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Korean Anti-Corruption Public Diplomacy

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Abstract | No country is free of corruption and the Republic of Korea is no exception. In the last decade, civil society has taken an active role in the fight against it: the Candlelight Revolution and the removal of Park being the most important events. The Moon administration has tried since the beginning to portray a renewed and more proactive attitude in the fight against corruption around the world. In order to demonstrate the changes occurring in regards to anti-corruption, public diplomacy has become key. This paper focuses on the international work of the ACRC as a public diplomacy tool and the values transmitted by the ODA regarding anti-corruption. Furthermore, it points out the changes of the official authority's speech and the efforts to strengthen and deepen bilateral and multilateral relations.

Key words | Corruption, Korea, Public Diplomacy, Candlelight Revolution, ACRC, ODA, Speech, bilateral relations.

국문초록 | 어떤 국가도 부패에서 자유로울 수 없으며 대한민국도 예외는 아니다. 지난 십여 년 간 시민 사회는 부패에 맞서 적극적으로 싸웠으며, 촛불 항쟁과 박근혜의 하야가 그 중 가장 중요한 사건들이었다. 문재인 정권은 처음부터 전세계의 부패에 맞선 싸움에 대해 새롭게 적극적인 태도를 보이려고 노력했다. 반(反)부패에 관련해 일어나고 있는 변화들을 보여주기 위해 공공 외교가 매우 중요해졌다. 이 논문은 공공 외교 도구로서 ACRC의 국제적 사업과 공적개발원조가 반(反)부패에 대해 전달하는 가치에 초점을 맞춘다. 나아가 이 글은 공권력 담화의 변화와 양자적, 다자적인 관계들을 강화하고 심화시키기 위한 노력들에 주목한다.

INTRODUCTION

In 2016, for the first time in history, the Republic of Korea went through a successful impeachment for corruption and influence peddling, which ended in the anticipated exit of the former president Park Geun-hye. Since this scandalous event, Korea's new administration has been trying to strengthen and deepen its bilateral and multilateral relations in various regions of the world, in order to portray a renewed and more proactive attitude towards fighting corruption.

Before the impeachment, the Republic of Korea was actively trying to grow as a *good international citizen*. Not only helping multiple countries of the world to economically develop by following its historical experience, but also fighting against corruption and keeping high levels of transparency, vital for any democratic model. The most vital tools for the development of this stance were the approval of different plans of action against corruption from international forums and organizations as, for example, the G20 and the OECD (organization for economic cooperation and development), the formalization of economic relations and the use of elements like the ODA (Official Development Assistance) with different states.

Nevertheless, the impeachment process wrecked these plans. On the one hand, it called into question the integrity of Korea's own political system. On the other hand, it questioned the integrity of the plan to show Korea as a diplomatic example for other countries. In this unique context, the Moon Jae-In administration came to power with the difficult task of improving the country's internal transparency and making the heavily criticized public diplomacy mechanisms more efficient.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the context, the mechanisms and the changes that the Republic of Korea underwent during the Moon administration, in regards to anti-corruption and public diplomacy. In order to do so, this paper will focus on a series of specific questions which shift from horizontal to vertical approaches of the society and the state.

1. How has public diplomacy related to anti-corruption changed during the Moon administration in the Republic of Korea?
2. What changed in the official authorities' speech regarding the

corruption and which was the international reception?

3. Which is the role of ODA in the public diplomacy of the Republic of Korea in matters of anti-corruption and what have been its recent changes?

Corruption is a wide concept with multiple definitions, Arvind K. Jain explains that “How corruption is defined actually ends up determining what gets modeled and measured” (Jain, 2001, p. 73). It is because of this that this paper is going to use the next definition that frames itself within the public sector and is proposed by Norman Abjorensen (2014):

In its general use in public discourse, it is understood, firstly, to categorize those practices, mostly illegal but not always, in which people or organizations bribe officials responsible for granting permissions, awarding contracts or issuing licenses contracts. It is also understood secondly, in the sense of avoiding punishment for offences committed. In other words, corruption is understood as obtain privileges against the law or against the rules and regulations of the bureaucracy. (...) (p. 14).

This becomes especially important because during the destitution process, a great number of public figures, with economic and political power were involved in alleged fraudulent connections, in order to obtain benefits and privileges.

Moreover, another main concept is Public Diplomacy, which has had multiple definitions over time. According to Snow (2009) public diplomacy was traditionally understood as the dialogue between governments and the international public, where they aim to influence, communicate and create acceptance to the national interests. However, the proliferation of different actors and mass media created a need for a redefinition of public diplomacy. Hans Touch understood then the concept as “a process of the communications with the public of foreign countries to promote a nation’s goals and policies and to promote the understanding of its thoughts and ideals as well as systems and culture.” (Yun. 2012. pp. 279-280). On the other hand, Paul Sharp defined it as “a process of forming a direct relation with the people of

other nations in order to enhance the interests of the people and to promote their values.” (Yun. 2012. p 280). These two definitions are, under the context in which this paper is framed, more accurate as they show the different channels of public diplomacy. As Ma, Song & Moore (2012) say “Public diplomacy is aimed towards winning the hearts and minds of foreigners. Governments are not alone in enacting public diplomacy, but enterprises, non-government organizations (NGOs), and even private citizens can play a large role.” (p.3).

One of the biggest challenges of this paper lies in the intrinsic nature of the problem studied. Corruption is hardly ever outsourced beyond the borders of a country or discussed as a priority to public diplomacy. It is important to mention, as public diplomacy is the main element that states like the Republic of Korea use to express their image on an international level. For this reason, it becomes a key factor in this study.

Therefore, this paper will be focused in a qualitative and quantitative analysis using public declarations and statistics from different official institutions of Korea like the presidential office, the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (ACRC) and other international organizations like the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the International Anti-Corruption Academy (IACA), the United Nations (UN) and others. Furthermore, some specific indicators like the volume and type of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) that Korea destines for Education and Government and Civil Administration will be taken into account.

Regarding structure, the paper will, firstly, explain the context previous to the arrival of the Moon Jae-in administration, with a brief historical analysis of the Republic of Korea, and the historical changes regarding the fight against corruption. Secondly, there will be an analysis of the changes caused by the demonstrations known as the Candlelight Revolution, with an emphasis in the new international role of the current administration as an active force in the fight against corruption. Thirdly, the main element of Korean public diplomacy, the ODA, will be analyzed through its executing bodies and its variations during these last years. Finally, there will be conclusions and challenges drawn from the investigation.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The history of corruption in Korea is complex and full of variations. Its beginning can be tracked to the rise to power of dictator Park Chung-Hee in 1962. Chung-Hee ruled the country for almost two decades and was the progenitor of the current economic model. This new economic model aimed to break the agrarian nature of the country to transform it into an urban and industrial one that would be closely controlled by the government. Thanks to its success, the Republic of Korea evolved from one of the poorest countries, dependent on international help, to one of the rising Asian Tigers, a country in the process of industrialization¹ (Cho. 2017. P.11).

During this period and the following military regime of Chun Doo-Hwan (1980-1988), the government “was characterized by the shameless and ruthless exercise of power, the ordering of policies in a one-way fashion, cronyism and rampant corruption from the top.” (Cho. 2017. p 13), there was a close relationship between economy and government. This relationship was so strong that the political donations that the big corporations gave to the governing group came to consideration as a method of “Quasi taxation” (Park. 1995. P.177). Many of the recently consolidated *Chaebols*² were looking to establish good relationships with these regimes in order to create favorable power relations. Besides, it was believed that state officials and other persons with access to secret information exploited this privilege to obtain different benefits (Park. 1995. P.180).

All the above was socially acceptable due to the huge desire from the society to get out of poverty and accomplish material prosperity. As Kim said (2006) “the traditional Confucian work ethic and the willingness of parents to sacrifice for their children’s education must have played a role in economic development.”³ (Cho. 2017 p 12). This imperious need of economic growth avoided for some time the debate about those dubious practices, creating some kind of tolerance or as Lintjer (2001) would say, they started to be seen as “an indispensable lubricant for economic growth.”

1 Personally translated quote. The original text is in Spanish.

2 They are large economic conglomerates that specialize in multiple areas. The best known are Samsung, Lg, Hyundai or Lotte.

3 Personally translated quote. The original text is in Spanish.

(Abjorensen, 2014, p. 6).

As a consequence of the repressive nature of those regimes and their hierarchical and competitive character, a new movement in favor of the democratization of the country was born between university students, intellectuals and religious sectors. This demand was highly influenced by the excessive work hours that the working class (to which a lot of students belonged) endured, their bad economic remuneration and the lack of civil rights and liberties because of the abuse of power. Those movements aimed to establish democracy in a country known for being ruled by authoritative military regimes that prioritized the economic development over the welfare of the citizens⁴ (Cardenas. 2017 p. 99).

The theoretical term *Minjung* started to be used for all those movements in favor of democracy. The theory addresses the importance of an emotional connection between the oppressed and demands that the ruling elite respects the minimum of moral norms (Cárdenas. 2017. p.99). This is important because it is the first time that the Korean society demands responsibility and good use of trusted power.

After the return of democracy in 1988, the civil governments found themselves in a highly favorable situation (both internal and international) to make changes and expand in the diplomatic field. On the one hand, the end of the Cold War gave those governments the ideal opportunity to expand their relations with other parts of the world. During the '90s the Republic of Korea experienced a peak in its public diplomacy, especially by joining the UN in 1991 and the OECD in 1996. Furthermore, the government created some tools to communicate its plan of public diplomacy:

The Foreign Ministry created the Korea Foundation in 1991 in order to do the following: (1) raise awareness of Korea in international society; (2) promote international friendship and cooperation; and (3) support Korea's increasingly proactive diplomatic status in the international community as a result of its entry into the UN and OECD (Choi. 2019 pp 11-12).

4 Personally translated quote. The original text is in Spanish.

Meanwhile, in the internal affairs, the government tried to consolidate some cultural elements (language, sports, gastronomy). Besides, they created some regulatory mechanisms for activities inside the country. For instance, in 1993, the Kim Young-Sam's administration introduced new asset disclosure regulations for senior government officials and certain elective office holders (Park 1995 p. 181). Or the creation of the Korea Independent Commission Against Corruption (KICAC) in 2002, as a product of the joint effort between civil society, the academy and the government to emphasize the fight against corruption as a key element of their agendas, in tune with global anti-corruption initiatives like the Anti-Bribery Convention of the OECD.

This was the first time that the anti-corruption agenda coincides with an international guideline and it's shown as an important part of public diplomacy, no longer being only an internal issue but an international one.

Regardless of the Korean efforts and the ideal context, the country could not control corruption in the highest levels of political and economic power, the one that most impacts citizens. Every president, except Park Chung-Hee (who was killed in 1979), was investigated for causes of corruption or involved in fraud scandals both during and after their terms (Pohlmann & Kwon. 2017). This was due to multiple factors that occurred simultaneously:

In regards to party politics, Korea has very closed and highly competitive politics, which according to Cho (2017) are of personal nature and create patron-client relations, where the voters of a political faction should try to have strong links with the leader to obtain benefits, which causes favoritism or personal cronyism relations⁵ (p 23). This coincides with You's statement that "In today's South Korean politics, clientelistic competition based on particularistic provision of constituency services and favors for political support is still significant (...)" (You. N.d p. 4).

Regarding the economy, the huge concentration of business power of the *Chaebols* and their deep links with politics are historically known. They

⁵ Personally translated quote. The original text is in Spanish.

tend to maintain clientelistic relationships and sustain a vertical political status quo thanks to their capacity to give resources, especially money. Cho (2017) says that those relations have generated economic groups to seem “untouchable” by society. In addition, they were protected by state sectors that consider them essential for the development of the country⁶ (pp. 21, 24-25).

Socially, you would say that after 1987 there was a big social pressure and civil interest to deal with the issues related to corruption and transparency, especially via NGOs (pp 24-25). As seen previously, this pressure led to the government caving to these demands. However, Cardenas (2017) states that the lack of agreement between progressive sectors (heirs to the pro-democracy movements) and the shift towards more economic interest by the citizens after the crisis of 1997 made the *Minjung* smaller⁷ (p. 101). Consequently, it resulted in a gradual loss of interest in the fight against corruption that made it difficult to maintain cohesion of the message at the international level.

THE CONSERVATIVE RETURN AND THE CANDLELIGHT REVOLUTION

The arrival of the “conservative decade” increased those problems. Lee Myung-Bak came to power in 2008, reinforcing the economic rhetoric again. Cho (2017) states that “Lee sought policies that favored the concentration of national resources in the capital, Seoul, as well as the economic stimulus based on mega-projects of large-scale civil engineering construction and the reduction of the corporate tax” (p 14). In comparison with the previously mentioned era, it meant an increase in the power of the large economic groups, which benefited greatly. And, it meant the decline of social freedoms, for example, workers’ protests tended to be repressed. Using these mechanisms, the new administration prioritizes security over freedoms. This was reflected in various international indexes and reports⁸

6 Personally translated quote. The original text is in Spanish.

7 Personally translated quote. The original text is in Spanish.

8 Personally translated quote. The original text is in Spanish.

(Bavoleo, 2016 p. 20).

Despite this, the conservatives won the elections again in 2013, now under the leadership of Park Geun-Hye, the daughter of the dictator Park Chung-Hee. Her rhetoric was not only focused on the economic premises that her party proposed, but also contained a strong traditional element that echoed her father's former mandate during the 60s and 70s. After having a rapid ascension in politics, Park quickly styled herself as a candidate with principles and created a lot of expectations. Sung & Uk (2017) argue that:

“(...) there were high expectations of her administration as no woman had previously played an important role in South Korean politics. Thus, Park Geun-hye's victory in the presidential election led to the belief that South Korea's democratic system would further mature, and gender inequality in politics and society would improve.” (p. 2).

Nevertheless, Park would go down in history not because of the positive changes people expected from her, but, in fact, because she was the first president to be successfully removed from office after being involved in multiple corruption scandals during her term. This would generate, given the high level of the scandals, a social turmoil that would radically change the control over this type of activities.

Even though the country was continuing with Action Plans against Corruption from forums like the G20, a series of controversial and internally mishandled events began to show that corruption and transparency were not properly addressed and there was no correlation with the international message that was taking place.

In 2014, a ferry carrying students on a school trip sank and left more than 300 dead. The media immediately covered the incident while the government chose to remain silent. Later on, instead of clarifying the facts behind the sinking or supporting the families of the victims, the government reacted by repressing both the relatives and those who demanded in depth investigations⁹ (Cardenas. 2017 p.104). This proved again that there is certain secrecy and private control of information in an exclusive sector,

9 Personally translated quote. The original text is in Spanish.

which limits transparency.

Moreover, there was an even worse case in 2016. Cho (2017) mentions several news stories started to emerge about the diversion of funds in the form of large donations from *Chaebols* to shell companies that belonged to a close and unknown friend of the President Park.

These revelations aroused the anger of the population. Even more so when it was discovered that the mysterious friend, later known as Choi Soon-Sil, had used part of those suspicious funds to place her daughter in one of the most prestigious universities in the country, when she did not meet the minimum requirements for admission. People were outraged by the scandal because it proved that the political system was flawed and full of special privileges, irregularities and inequalities (Lee. 2018. p. 10).

In parallel, several civilian groups began to demand justice and changes within the system (in addition to Park's own removal) in their Saturday marches characterized by the use of small candles. Named the Candlelight Revolution, the movement that started with the marches was fully horizontal, reviving some of the old *Minjung* and showing high levels of consensus and common interest. Its enormous size helped the demands be collected by the political parties, the same that would later organize the impeachment trial. The Legislative Power approved the impeachment and the constitutional court ruled against Park (both with conservative majorities), establishing that she would be removed from office on March 10, 2017.

This experience of citizen expression made clear some questions that Cho (2017) points out:

The importance of the power of the people (People Power) is as follows: first, it drives the change on truly important issues for society; second, it provides a psycho-political catharsis; third, it plays a concrete role in the civic and political education of the nation. (pp 21-22)¹⁰

As a result of the Candlelight Revolution, civil society brought back the need for moral and political responsibility. Society felt a change was needed

¹⁰ Personally translated quote. The original text is in Spanish.

to transform from mere spectator to active monitor in their democracy.

THE ACRC'S ANTI-CORRUPTION PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND THE MOON JAE-IN'S ERA, AN OPPORTUNITY FOR CHANGES

Moon Jae-in became the direct heir to most of the demands from the Candlelight Revolution following his inauguration in 2017. In light of this, Moon's opening speech¹¹ had a peacemaking undertone that made it clear that the demands for increasing control and prosecution of corruption were not going to be ignored (Arirang News, 2017). At the same time, the horizontal approach from the president and his efforts to be closer to his countrymen showed the intention to create a new governmental standard where disinformation and concentrated power will no longer be tolerated. This optimistic tone and the growing relations between society and state were used to emphasize the need to answer the demands and show a new methodology to do so. An interesting change in the rhetoric is that from here on, more active relations with the world will be proposed in order to fight its inequalities. This clearly implies that what happened is not going to remain in Korea, but will be shared with a double purpose that is worth mentioning, we consider pertinent to the study: (i) the mention that he would take into account the international environment is a clear way of signaling the path of public diplomacy. One that would go hand in hand with the idea of "Korea as an example." (ii) The country's increased international participation in activities against corruption can be seen as an indicator for the society that their demands are taken seriously and are a priority in the government's agenda.

Inside the wide concept of Public Diplomacy, declarations and speeches are considered valid elements for its analysis. In this particular case study, we found that corruption is greatly considered in these matters. Specially, through a specific organism like the ACRC that its related with multiple forums and international organizations like the UN, OECD, IAAC, and

¹¹ For more details, we recommend watching the full speech. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iu0xFdKcLRs&ab_channel=ARIRANGNEWS.

others.

The words of Moon's opening speech quickly became part of a continuous rhetoric in forums with his citizens and with other world leaders. In 2017, his first year as a president, he made a point to contact other leaders. For example, during the visit of the president of Sri Lanka, he pointed out the similarities between the two countries and the shared interest in defending human rights and advocating towards more transparency. Besides, this also happened after the summit between North Korea and USA in Singapore, when Moon gave a speech in a university. In it he encourages both societies to participate in the fight against corruption and acknowledge that Korea can learn a lot of lessons from Singapore. (Cheong Wa Dae, 2018)

Abjorensen (2014) states that the Asian continent is considered one of the most vulnerable to corruption due to its large size, fast economic growth and large demographics that make it difficult for the government to reach and control irregular activities. Because of this, it is not surprising that most allies and examples for Korea during Moon's presidency have been Asian states. Furthermore, Asia is the main destination of Korea's ODA and most of its public diplomacy efforts.

The importance given to the president and what he says and does can be explained by two reasons. The first is the high degree of presidentialism that strongly represents the Korean political system according to Cho (2017). This major element has a lot to do with its importance and representativeness. In addition, the presidency has historically been one of the most vulnerable figures to high level corruption (his predecessor being the clearest example). The second reason is that the president and the ACRC are the greatest exponents to show changes and continuities in the matters of transparency since they both contribute and are vital for an adequate and clear development of public diplomacy.

At the international level, Korea has always shown itself as a country with some elements that allow corruption, acknowledging it and always searching for new ways to fight it. Park's impeachment and the Candlelight Revolution were reinforcement of this will for change and the country used this experience to be an example for others in different forums and conventions.

The ACRC serves as the other great Korean weapon to fight against corruption and create transparent frameworks. This Commission was created in 2008 and is the merger of its predecessors, the KICAC, the Ombudsman's office and the Administrative Appeals Commission. It works as an independent body from the political power and only responds to the president. Furthermore, in regards to public diplomacy, it is more often than not the head of the delegations in front of conventions, forums and organizations that fight corruption and work towards higher levels of transparency. It also contributes to bilateral cooperation against corruption with other states and its counterpart organizations, mostly in Asia. (ACRC, 2015)

From the beginning, the ACRC has made efforts to implement the international conventions that the country and the organization had signed and ratified. Its presence as an advocate to the country in matters of corruption shows the status that the organization has, one that has been strengthened with the new administration, which has a very similar agenda.

One of the main elements used by the ACRC in public diplomacy is the Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) that are signed by different states and organizations, most of them about anti-corruption cooperation that encourages the exchange of tools, experience and information. The MOU on anti-corruption cooperation with Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia were signed before 2013 and have had different renewals.

In 2011, the G20 Anti-corruption Working Group was created and the ACRC has been in charge of leading the Korean delegation in it since then. The organization is also responsible for monitoring and making reports on the activities of different governments to the group. The presentations vary every year but the ACRC always makes sure to be present and take part in the discussions. (ARCR, 2015)

In 2012, the ACRC signed a MOU to share information and experience with the International Anti-Corruption Academy (IACA). They seek to form professionals and public officers to be able to make lasting impacts in the fight against corruption.

During Park's government in 2014, the commission worked closely with the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other government agencies to fulfill their role as head of the Korean delegation in

the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group, where they reported the country's efforts against corruption. Additionally, it held talks with the World Bank about techniques to improve transparency. In addition to this, in an attempt to improve the Corruption Perception Index, the ACRC held its seventh briefing session for all CEOs in the country and to present their plans to the Center for Public Integrity (CPI). It helped that an ACRC officer was elected senior academic officer for the IACA educational program.

Meanwhile, the commission carried out a bilateral project with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom to improve the Korean legal frameworks against corruption, while reporting activities to the public and the private sectors. Together they also hosted an informational seminar.

In 2015, the ACRC signed an anti-corruption MOU with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in order to share Korea's best practices with developing countries. The Republic of Korea seeks to open up via its public diplomacy about its successful model of growth and development. This agreement is very important because it comes along with measures and tools to be used by developing states to prevent problems that come with growth, like corruption and the mishandling of public information. (ACRC, 2015)

The MOU with the UNDP bolsters the Korean efforts of accomplishing the Sustainable Development Goals that the country signed as part of the Agenda for Sustainable Development. In this case, the SDG number 16 is taken into account, which stands to promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies and two of its goals are to significantly reduce corruption and bribery in all its forms and to create effective and transparent accountable institutions at all levels. (UN, 2015)

Furthermore, the ARCR co-created next to the UNDP a project to introduce anti-corruption policy evaluation in public institutions of Vietnam. It was called the Anti-Corruption Initiative Assessment (AIA).

In addition, the importance that Korea gives to its regional allies in cooperation with transparency was shown in the signing of a MOU with Indonesia's Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) with the presence of both presidents, Park Geun-Hye and Joko Widodo. This time without the presence of the presidents, the ACRC also signed a MOU with Vietnam to

continue cooperating for two more years (when it would be renewed).

The presence and participation of the ACRC in the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group Meeting, in the APEC and in the ADB/OECD (Consultative Group for Asia Pacific) during 2016 was shadowed by the internal turmoil. (ACRC, 2016) They created a series of questions about the correlation between what was shown and its effectiveness.

The election of Moon meant a new opportunity to make amends for past errors and increase efforts in the international fight against corruption. The ACRC underwent multiple changes in internal personnel. It changed and updated its logo and its networks, as a way to show the change and the intention to meet the demands of the people. At the international level, the presence in forums and conventions was maintained and in some cases increased, while more MOU were signed and there was an effort to organize more international activities.

In the first year of the new administration, two big conventions were organized in the capital to present cases of anti-corruption that the Commission was working on and during the G20 it shared its experience from the last year. This was also used as a way to promote the 2018 Winter Olympics that took place in Pyeongchang.

Besides, the ACRC with the UNDP replicated the AIA project in Kosovo and Myanmar. (ACRC, 2017)

During 2018 four MOU of anti-corruption cooperation were signed with Tunisia, Myanmar, Iraq and Qatar and the ones with Indonesia and Vietnam were renewed. In the APEC Working Group the ACRC presented the Korean system for protection of public interest whistleblowers, which was deemed the best practice of the year by countries like Canada, Taiwan and Malaysia. Furthermore, the Commission published the Best Practice Compendium based on the studies from 2017 about the policies that the G20 countries did to encourage public organizations to take the initiative in the effort against corruption. And the ACRC presented its system for prevention in public institutions called the Korea Online E-Procurement System at the ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative meeting.

Korea also received an inspection from the OECD secretariat, which recruited the help of Italy and Finland to see the progress in implementation. The inspection resulted in a series of recommendations about strengthening

regulations for corporations and promoting cooperation between police and the prosecution. (ACRC, 2018)

The ACRC continued to work toward the increase and straightening of bilateral relations with other countries during 2019, when it signed two MOU with Kuwait and Uzbekistan. This meant that in the three years of the new administrations, six MOU were signed.

The commission was the head of the delegation in various conferences and forums, setting its plans into motion. It drew attention because of the technical assistance it gave to developing countries to fight against corruption. (ACRC, 2019) During these presentations it mentioned the conferences that would be held in 2020 in the country. Specially the International Anti-Corruption Conference (IACC), the largest conference about corruption, that is programmed to take place in December 2020 in the city of Busan. In order to prepare properly for it, the ARCR signed a MOU to organize it with Transparency International. The agenda will be "Designing 2030: Truth, Trust and Transparency."

In February of 2020 the council chair Hughete Labelle of the IACC visited Korea and gave a conference to motivate civil society to continue participating in anti-corruption activities. President Moon acknowledged that part of the reason he was elected was due to the interest in society for a more transparent government. For this reason, he wants to reach the top 20 in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index by 2022. (Cheong Wa Dae, 2018). Even though Korea has been rising steadily in that index, this goal is very ambitious and shows the interest in increasing transparency.

It can be said that Korea has always shown an interest, participating in forums, conventions and projects to fight corruption, even though it is a systemic problem of the country. But the Candlelight Revolution can be considered an inflection point in the country that obliged the new administration to have more correlation between its international and internal message and its policies and projects against corruption.

THE USE OF ODA AS A COMPLEMENT AGAINST CORRUPTION

After Korea's sustained economic growth, it started to invest and participate in aid programs with developing countries of various regions of the world during the 80s. In the beginning, under a military regime, the aid programs were used for political and diplomatic purposes, or as Teo, Singh and Tan (2013) mention "Korea's deeper engagement was driven by "an attempt to increase its worldwide legitimacy in contrast to the influence of [North Korea]" (p. 10). Years later, under democracy, the aids started to be closely related to specific government goals, like deepening bilateral relations, economic goals or the exportation of Korean culture.

After joining the OECD in 1996 and the DAC (Development Assistance Committee) in 2010, the ODA became the main element in Korean public diplomacy because it is a good way to maintain deep relations with the states that received the aid and permits the country to share its experience as an exemplary state. Especially since Korea is the latest country to join the DAC to date.

The Committee for International Development (CIDC) is the main one in charge of ODA in Korea and recognizes it as "government aid that is designed to promote the economic development and welfare of developing

ODA by regions (2018)
(based on net expense)


Oceania
0,8%

Latin America
11,8%

Unallocated
13,6%

Africa
27,0%

Asia
46,7%



Source: OECD.stats and CIDC.

Figure 1.

countries, and includes the provision of grants, loans and technical assistance to developing countries or international organizations” (CIDC. 2017. P. 8). It is chaired by the Prime Minister and formed by a group of experts in development cooperation, different ministers (especially Minister of Economy and Finance and Minister of Foreign Affairs) and the president of KOICA and KEXIM.

The ODA does not have a specialized sector to fight against corruption. Because of it, many scholars cannot find an agreement on the effects the ODA has on transparency in the recipient countries. Especially because of how difficult it is to measure its overall effectiveness. As Jeong (2018) explains:

“The criticism leveled against foreign aid volumes given by donor countries is that it has led to grown government bureaucracies, bad governance, and high corruption within governments where a few elites benefit as the majority poor become poorer since they have to shoulder the burden of repaying the concessional loans given through tax.” (p 1446).

Nevertheless, it is possible to analyze two specific areas that can be seen as pillars to generate more regulated frameworks and stronger and more transparent institutions in the recipient states. Those two areas are Education and Government and Civil Administration, where Korea shares its experiences and knowledge.

Even though the previous administrations were essentially different, they both placed a strong emphasis on ODA for Education, mostly at the secondary and university level. According to the CIDC definition, the ODA has an economic and commercial perspective of productive development and its derivatives. But in this case, it comes with the promotion of Korean culture, history and values.

ODA for Education is not only to acquire tools and knowledge for professional development but to get values and costumes that are vital for the next generation of a transparent government. According to Lintjter's definition these values are extremely necessary to fight parsimony and passivity in the face of corruption or private management of public

Table 1.

South Korea	2016	2017	2018	2019
Total ODA	2190.65	2151.88	2358.25	2520.56
Bilateral ODA	1492.96	1565.55	1734.45	1903.12
Multilateral ODA	697.69	586.33	623.8	617.44
Type of ODA	2016	2017	2018	
Education	366.68	222.07	364.21	
Govt. and Civil Society	114.82	166.75	120.57	
ODA by sector (Mul + Bi)	2016	2017	2018	
1.1 Education (unspecified)	70.7	38.09	78.34	
1.2 Basic Education	45.12	43.01	42.94	
1.3 Secondary Education	113.69	82.1	82.52	
1.4 Post secondary Education	167.77	66.11	160.4	
2.1 Gov. and civil Society in General	89.1	165.36	105.54	
2.2 Conflict, Peace and security	35.31	6.81	15.04	

*all the numbers are in millions US\$. Source: OECD.Stats

information. Education creates a movement of ideas and a greater awareness, which indirectly, have an impact on the treatment of corruption and the search for greater transparency frameworks.

In addition, the ODA for Government highlights the importance of strong institutions, vitals to democracy and as a control mechanism between the government and the society. It is important, then, to observe Robert Dahl's (1979) polyarchy concept: "polyarchies are substantially liberalized and popularized systems, that is, very representative while frankly open to public debate" (p 18). Polyarchies are characterized by being democratic regimes with a high degree of transparency in regards to transparent management of information. Besides, they value equality and equity between who composes them. Finally, citizen participation and shared information are key elements to the shaping of political agendas.

The Candlelight Revolution could be used as an example to developing countries, reflecting the values necessary in a society to work towards transparency.

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS

No country is free of corruption. It is an evil that affects all levels of governments to a greater or lesser extent. In the case of the Republic of Korea, through time corruption became a systemic problem strongly related to its corporation-centered economic model. Regardless, in the last decade, civil society has taken an active role in the fight against corruption, demanding government openness. The Candlelight Revolution and the removal of President Park are proof that the civil society will not accept corruption anymore. The new administration or the ones to come know what is to be expected from them and that a good economic plan does not exclude their moral responsibilities.

The Moon administration understood that people needed a change in the way to fight corruption, and as a result, created different plans of action implementing them with the assistance of the ACRC. The commission also handled a big part of the international relations regarding anti-corruption. Delegating has always been a part of the ACRC's activities, but, since the change of government, it can be seen as a growing international presence and an effort to cooperate with other countries against corruption. This was well received and helped to build the image of Korea as a country advocating transparency and giving it an important place in its public diplomacy.

Korea's ODA is not specialized in the fight against corruption. Still, some side benefits can be recognized that help inform and provide tools to encourage transparency. Specifically, the ODA for Education and Government and Civil Administration, in spite of having the strong commercial undertone of the ODA, encourage good values. These values point out to developing countries the importance of looking beyond the Korean economic model and take into consideration the effects of not demanding government openness. During the Moon administration the ODA regained momentum because they were complemented by the actions of several institutions and from civil society.

Corruption is one of the most difficult problems to measure and control and is usually considered only from an internal perspective. Studying corruption through the ODA indicators is a challenge because they are not specified for that task. This paper intended to analyze the changes made by

the Korean government to fight against corruption, highlighting the importance of international transparency in order to achieve sustainable democracies and economic growth.

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Personalized Soft Power: An Innovative Model for South Korea's Public Diplomacy

Bui Linh Nguyet Ha

Abstract | Public diplomacy is a resourceful channel for a country to change its image in the global landscape through the employment of different national assets, among which emerge soft power and its diverse variations. Policy makers, nevertheless, tend to lock the definition of soft power within the narrow constraints of their countries' cultural appeals without giving thoughts to other less conventional but potential sources. One of these overlooked sources that policy makers can utilize to influence how others perceive their countries and devise public diplomacy campaigns accordingly is through the image of leaders. This paper examines the concept of personalized soft power and its implications for public diplomacy practices by reviewing different theories in transnational political communication, the effect of credibility in cognitive psychology as well as the source cue effect in the social and political psychology literature. It also attempts to systematically conceptualize public diplomacy, soft power and their dynamic relationship, as well as proposes ways for South Korea to navigate between elements of favorability and familiarity to better its image internationally through an assessment of the foreign public's attitude towards the country itself and its incumbent.

Keywords | personalized soft power, public diplomacy, image of leader, familiarity and favorability, transnational political communication

국문초록 | 공공 외교는 다양한 국가 자원의 활용을 통해 세계 무대에서 국가의 이미지를 바꿀 수 있는 유용한 수단이며, 그 와중에 소프트 파워와 그것의 다양한 변형들이 나타난다. 하지만 정책 입안자들은 다른 잠재적인 덜 전통적인 원천들을 고려하지 않은 채 소프트 파워의 정의를 국가의 문화적 어필이라는 좁은 제약에 가두는 경향이 있다. 이렇게 경시되는 원천들 중에서 정책 입안자들이, 다른 국가들이 그들의 국가를 어떻게 인지하는지와 그에 따라 어떻게 공공 외교 캠페인을 고안하는지에 영향을 끼치기 위해 이용할 수 있는 것 중 하나가 지도자의 이미지이다. 이 논문은 맞춤형 소프트 파워의 개념과 이것이 공공 외교 관행

에 끼치는 영향을 국가 간 정치적 소통, 인지 심리학에서 신뢰성의 영향, 사회 심리학과 정치 심리학의 소스 큐 효과(source cue effect) 문헌의 다양한 이론들을 검토하며 살펴본다. 이 논문은 또한 공공 외교, 소프트 파워, 그리고 이들의 역동적인 관계를 체계적으로 개념화하며, 대한민국이 국가와 재임자를 향한 해외 대중의 태도를 평가함으로써 국가 이미지를 향상시키기 위해 호의성과 친숙성의 요소들을 어떻게 다룰 수 있는지 제안하고자 한다.

How can a country move others to change their perceptions of its image? What can a government do to improve its international standing, which is instructive of its country's overall standing in general? The answer is obviously multifactorial, but this paper argues that one of the most important factors behind a country's attitude shift toward another lies in the latter's personalized soft power. Put differently, how favorable a leader's image is can influence other countries' perception of the country in question.

A probe into the inner working of this potentially useful mechanism would shed light on how impactful leaders can be in shaping the attitude of outsiders about the countries they're representing. This study will attempt to separate soft power of cultural origins from that of politics, and will posit that while cultural capitals can create a wide-ranging effect on the country's overall image in general, they tend to be perceived independently from that of the government. This begs the question of how a government can improve its standing in the eye of other countries' publics by utilizing the resources at its fingertips that would have an immediate associative effect on the reputation of these institutions. What could qualify, aside from the traditional appeal of a country's ideology and culture, to be a new, albeit short-term resource of national soft power?

Because of the experimental and speculative nature of this proposition, it is very difficult to vigorously test the initial hypotheses against empirical data. This is especially true when one thinks about the availability of public opinion data, let alone that of a foreign country about South Korea. Regardless, the thrill of possibly discovering a new approach to the old cookie-cutter mold of public diplomacy analysis outstrips that reservation of mine and results in the birth of this paper. It is also clear that due to the gradual exhaustion of research avenues on a broader scope, recent studies

often focus on individual cases and hence have low generalizability. This is in no way synonymous with saying that they are unnecessary, in fact it is actually through having knowledge about a large number of small cases that political scientists and policy makers can search for a commonality, a unifying framework with high applicability and devise appropriate initiatives for their countries thereafter. But to switch place and view the transnational diplomacy effort from a big picture perspective, the paper offers a fresh theory that draws the perceptual connection between the image of a country's leader and that country itself in the realm of public diplomacy. It is vital to keep in mind that this search for a new theory is the premise leading to the work's incubation, and that the end goal is to encourage future empirical research to support, or falsify its hypotheses and assumptions.

In her comprehensive probe for a theory of public diplomacy, Gilboa (2008) spoke about the need to have a clear "conceptual and operational relationship" between public diplomacy and soft power, citing incidents of the terms' misuse. Recognizing that deficiency, this paper strives to illustrate the main differentiating features between the two, before proposing an innovative framing to think about the latter. It then goes on to address two questions concerning the individual political leader's image along with its role in the larger realm of international relations and the smaller public diplomacy framework. The research will expand on Entman's theory of magnitude in political communication, Goldsmith and Horiuchi's of credibility in cognitive psychology and the source cue effects in the social and political psychology literature. It will also offer a model to determine when the effect of the so-called personalized soft power, defined as the framing of political leaders as soft power resources, can be realized and maximized on a target public. To that end, a review of the geopolitical climate and bilateral relation between the US and South Korea on several issues provide the basis to examine the latter's ability to 'soft power' its leaders. The study makes extensive use of international media reports, government policies and public data from various authorities. The suggestions are tentative, but remain an important and much-needed starting point for future research on the intersection of personal branding, public diplomacy and political communication.

Q1: How can personalized soft power assist nation-states in enhancing their public diplomacy and management of interstate relations?

Q2: Can this apply to South Korea and what are the possible implications of such an application?

THE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND SOFT POWER CONUNDRUM

The origin of public diplomacy is considered by the majority of the scholarly community to date back to the Cold War. Employed by the US government to actively influence the foreign publics in other jurisdictions during the Cold War, public diplomacy was, at its most basic form, the means through which a country's government harnesses and exports its attractive values to another country to serve the former's goals. The goal of public diplomacy, as often claimed, is to persuade the foreign publics and win their support for a policy initiative of a country. In 2008, Joseph Nye expounded greatly about the concept of public diplomacy, its potential effect and how to exercise it in a close-knit relationship with soft power. But since then, many scholars have accidentally or conveniently conflated these two concepts, blurring the distinction between the two by using them interchangeably. A larger body of work delineates soft power and public diplomacy as the resource and tool through which its value is extracted. Others allude to the possibility of different origins. In his discussion of the same topic, David Shambaugh points to the source where these two concepts originate to distinguish them. While soft power largely finds its root in civil society, public diplomacy is an instrument of governments. Although that comparison seems less apt today where not only governments but also non-state actors can utilize this tool, his clarification of their difference remains relevant. Similar to Nye, he emphasizes the importance of having intrinsic soft power, which is the key factor in producing effective public diplomacy practices – “no matter how well resourced by government, if the message is not sellable the messenger will have difficulty selling it” (2013). Only when seen as legitimate and having moral authority will people act through cooperation rather than force or coercion (Nye, 2004). As a result, public diplomacy is usually regarded as effective only if it can

maximize the possible returns on its soft power in the form of outsiders' support and affinity for a country. But is this entanglement warranted?

As the conventional wisdom makes clear, public diplomacy is not the substance, but a tool that governments utilize to extract benefit from their countries' soft power. Seeking to use an ambitious analogy, the author proposes to think of soft power as something that accumulates and builds upon itself in the course of history, much like fossil fuels. As a matter of fact, the values of these resources can only be realized if they are converted from their natural form to a different form of energy usable by potential consumers - electrical power. If this analogy survives criticism, then similar to fossil fuels, soft power does us no good if it remains crude and unprocessed, its potential left untapped into. In other words, no matter how appealing a message is, without a resourceful messenger, it will remain far from sellable. As a result, it would be deeply flawed to view the interaction between these two concepts as one-sided. This is especially relevant in interstate public diplomacy when soft power is enlisted to "sell" a foreign audience. Because there might be obstacles in translating the values of a country's soft power into something harmonious with another's local culture and politics, a government needs to devise appropriate converting tools to gradually introduce its soft power to the foreign market. In other words, just like how public diplomacy needs to base itself on a valid appealing source of soft power, soft power also needs public diplomacy to transform into concrete foreign policy initiatives carried out by the governments. Most of the time, people seem to overestimate the power of one and underestimate the other.

Another critical but frequently overlooked point is that public diplomacy does not have to be associated exclusively with soft power all the time. As a matter of fact, since soft power is valued for its authenticity and relatability (which makes it both unique and universal), it remains scant in its existence. Not all public diplomacy efforts can lead to soft power, but that does not mean they should be lumped together as uninteresting, bad-faith or worse, fruitless. In their unsubtle attacks against public diplomacy campaigns carried out in undemocratic states, some critics tend to deride the essential link between the local governments and such initiatives, lauding the true soft power coming only from society and rejecting any other state-

sponsored attempts to promote the same thing: "...China's government does not know how to get out of the way... trying itself to generate soft power by the use of public diplomacy" (Buzan, 2016). To support this claim, they argue that the full potential of soft power will not be realized if the government is behind its circulation, whether publicly or not. Some even go further and warn against these state-centric attempts because when the value chosen (assuming that governments sincerely believe this chosen property would be appealing to outsiders) for promotion is incongruent with the target subjects' native values, they will backfire. This caveat does not seem to hold much water. Except for cases between states with extremely salient divergence or convergence in history and culture, it is likely that a perceived soft power of a country is neither diametrically opposed nor enthusiastically received by another. Indifference, occasionally coupled with a piqued curiosity would tend to dominate the reaction spectrum. Given that human beliefs, social constructs, ethics, norms and taboos normally exist on a huge spectrum, a value offering will most of the time be of little to no interest where it's offered and generate insubstantial return. After all, the main reason for a government's inability to flex its soft power could also be just that, a limitation.

Others invoke people's natural disposition to be suspicious of governments as a legitimate cause for group-shaming state-sponsored promulgation of soft power. But democratic or not, governments will always be governments. An intrinsically good soft power is by no means synonymous with an intrinsically pure motivation behind the selling of that soft power. The label of democracy is not, although too often considered to be, clear from all vestige of propagandization. In fact, the line between benign public diplomacy and manipulative propaganda is incredibly thin, and their distinction can only become visible once the promise of a nation's rhetorics shows signs of departure from the reality. For example, although the US was perceived as very credible at the dawn of the War on Terrorism, its public diplomacy efforts after that period were indisputably followed by lots of international blowback. A large majority of the public during this time believed that the phrase public diplomacy and propaganda were used interchangeably by the US government to camouflage its true intention and draw its allies into an already anticipated quagmire in disguise of heroism

(Zaharna, 2004). This accusation was probably too far-fetched and apocryphal. But even granted that no tangible benefits of soft power in changing public attitude can be realized in such “government-meddling” cases, they are still legitimate efforts of the representative body to genuinely promote its culture or implicitly seek to advance an interest of its own, targeting a foreign subject. Either way, the utility of public diplomacy ought not be judged by its relationship with soft power. The former does not always have to exist in equality with the latter.

NATIONAL LEADERS AS SOFT POWER RESOURCE

This trend of pushing back against government-sponsored public diplomacy and what it promotes leads to a failure among scholars and researchers to recognize a latent source of soft power that is on the horizon. Country leaders and heads of state, most often presidents and prime ministers, have increasingly been shown to possess a far-ranging capability to influence foreign publics and sway these societies’ opinions in their countries’ favor. Some scholars have tried to categorize soft power into different dimensions, one of which centers on increasing the approval ratings of a leader or support for a government, but only in a domestic context (Lee, 2009). Although in recent years there have been many empirical findings about the connection between a country’s image and its leader through experimental research, nevertheless, to the author’s knowledge no one has ever tried to dissect the phenomenon and its potential impacts from the analytical angle of soft power. Rather, not many studies on political personalization and foreign leaders’ appeal to both the domestic and foreign public have been conducted in the arena of public diplomacy. At best, the ability to engage with a foreign public is only conceded to be a form of public diplomacy carried out by political leaders (Goldsmith & Horiuchi, 2009), but not a potential source of soft power for the countries they represent. In this interpretation, a political leader is not the source of power, but accepts the role of a tool that converts soft power into realizable benefits. Although this characterization can be true, constraining the role of a foreign leader to a body that orbits around the barycenter instead of embracing its rightful

place reduces the possible payoffs from sourcing soft power directly from the subject. What is the cause of this large schism in the public diplomacy literature? If it's visible, what is the rationale for this intentional exclusion of powerful and attractive leaders from the soft power table? If the incomplete account merely goes unnoticed, how can we make sense of this myopic observation in the international relations landscape?

One possible answer for this question would bring us back to the initially discussed feature of soft power. As opposed to public diplomacy which is an instrument in the hand of the state, soft power has traditionally been viewed as a "product of the civil society" (Shambaugh, 2013). A leader apparently does not fit into this realm. More than anything, he or she is typically thought of as a self-interested individual who represents, above all things, the government which he also leads and is often the antithesis to the free, vibrant, organic forces of a civil society. But is this image a fair evaluation of all leaders in all countries across the board? And even if it applies in all cases, does that description of self-interest and political calculation proscribe him from being a legitimate influencer that can change outsiders' opinions in a positive way? If one re-examines the definition of soft power, which is said to be "the ability to attract and co-opt rather than coerce" through appeal and attraction, no phrase in this statement would disqualify a leader from asserting himself as a source of soft power. Yet, the close political association between a leader and his cabinet, party, coalition and government seems to be the stage of vetting in which he fails to persuade meticulous and demanding scholars to list him somewhere he should be. Indeed, it might be hard to make a clear distinction between the impact of a leader's true appeal with the variety of tools available for pressuring another leader or country at his disposal.

In fact, it is actually unfathomable how far the study of soft power and public diplomacy in international relations has lagged behind compared to other fields dealing with the power of individual leadership. In an article written in 2004, the Harvard Business School discussed soft power which was newly coined by Joseph Nye, the then Dean of the Kennedy School and drew a starkly similar analogy in the world of business. It says: "smart executives know that leadership is not just a matter of issuing commands, but also involves leading by example and attracting others to do what you

want.” At the same time, the article recognizes the importance of individual soft power in individual leadership: “Soft power is a staple of daily democratic politics. The ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible assets such as an attractive personality, culture, political values and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority” (HBS, 2004). Personal branding, and in particular the impact of CEOs’ perceived reputation on the performance of his firm, has practically been recognized as common sense in business nowadays. This fascinating connection between leaders and their organizations apparently reveals a lot about how our perceptual psychology works, our patterns of associative memory and a tendency to make judgments through the use of shortcuts in order to accommodate our limited knowledge about the world. It is quite strange to ponder that whereas the natural acceptance of a country’s leadership as a result of others’ voluntary subscription to the values it exemplifies makes a fit sub-category for soft power, the leadership of that country’s leader, in the same context and under the same conditions, is likely not.

The implications of this shift in perception on soft power can be powerful. If a leader is the soft power instead of the engineer of its effects, more public diplomacy initiatives should focus on promoting this individual to the target audiences. The president can facilitate cross-border educational and cultural exchanges through the office of his foundation, which in return will improve his image as well as that of his country in the eye of international participants. The leader can hold town hall events during his visit to a foreign country to interact with its students, entrepreneurs and members of the civil society. According to Manheim (1994), presidential visits are usually considered as a “package” of public diplomacy activities. This is because during these trips, a leader can engage with the foreign public to influence their views about particular policies of her country. An example is when US President Bill Clinton insisted on being permitted to address the Chinese people on his official visit to China, which he did by making two speeches on national television and took questions on a radio call-in show (Goldsmith & Horiuchi). In the same fashion, President Obama has used many of his foreign visits to openly address students in Vietnam, Japan, Korea, ... about a wide range of international issues. Although the

main purpose of these undertakings was to communicate with the mass domestic public on specific policy initiatives, the president was also simultaneously delivering a certain impression about the country of his origin to his listeners. Moreover, because many obstacles in transnational communication have been removed thanks to the wide spread of digital technology, the venues available for political leaders to create influence on the foreign public are not as limited as in the past. The following section will revisit different models in the political personalization literature that support the correlation between how a leader is viewed and his country's image.

POLITICAL LEADERS AND FOREIGN PUBLICS

In the media landscape, it's not an overstatement to claim that the most frequently featured unit of subject on the news is the individual. This was attributed by Gitlin (1980) to a "perpetual quest for face and voice" between different media channels aiming to dramatize the content of their coverage for readership increase. As a result of this race to sensationalism and a growing emphasis on discourses of human interest, national news starts to gravitate toward the covering of "national figures," people who play important official roles and hence take up the central place in the reporting of national activities (Gans, 1979). These officials, or political leaders are individuals that make up the highest or most prominent leadership positions of a nation, and they typically assume the titles of presidents or prime ministers. Although initially this trend was by no means limited to individuals in the political field, the dominating and monopolistic ability of these actors to exert influence through their decision-making power in almost every other field might have inevitably given them an edge in securing media attention.

Recent works have substantiated this observation that leaders are increasingly appearing at the forefront of the news. The political communication field terms this change in news reporting of politics in which the focus on an institution is diminished and that on its most salient individuals is heightened "mediated political personalization" (Downey & Stanyer,

2010; Wilke & Reinemann, 2001). Balmas and Sheaffer (2013) build on previously existing studies and explore how mediated political personalization takes place in a transnational context. They go on to discover a link between the geographic, political and cultural proximity of two countries with one's propensity to focus intensively on the other's leader and subsequently project its impression of the leader onto all members of his society. In parallel with the contact hypothesis, they account for such simplified perceptions of the other group, or in this case country, by looking at the lack of contact between members of the two groups. "We" tend to think that all members of the distant group are "all alike" because our knowledge about other members of that group is insufficient (Boldry, Gaertner, & Quinn, 2007). As digital media becomes the main platform for human consumption of the news, coverage of countries is gradually simplified to an extent whereby the individual leaders become its sole focus and personalize the countries to their own images.

Because a national leader can direct his nation's reputation abroad and hence serves as a principal agent, the personality of that leader will be critical in creating the personality of his country in the mind of foreigners. Yoo and Jin test the effect of the image of Chinese leaders on the country's reputation among Korean citizens and found that after exposure to the leaders' images, the same respondents' perception of the country's reputation drops significantly (2015). In psychology, scientists have for a long time found that human beings tend to employ heuristics, or mental shortcuts, to help ease the cognitive load required in decision-making (APA, 2017). Because individuals suffer from a limited attention span and want to economize the cognitive effort put into making policy judgments, they rely on their evaluations of the source which communicates the message as a heuristic cue in assessing the actual message that is being communicated (Lupia, 1994; Lupia & McCubbins, 1998). This reliance on the communicator to judge the validity of the message generates what is called the source cue effect in the literature.

Goldsmith and Horiuchi (2009) propose that from a public diplomacy approach, a leader's transnational efforts to swing foreign opinion can only work if the general image of her and her country are credible. Considerable evidence in cognitive psychology has pointed out that sources perceived as

trustworthy are more likely to be accepted as true than others faring worse in the credibility scale, even though they are sending the same information (e.g., Bloom and Weisberg, 2007). Goldsmith and Horiuchi expanded on this model by testing three scenarios in which the foreign public perceives a leader's image to be credible, controversial, or non-credible and how each affects her transnational communication efforts regarding her country's foreign policy during high-level visits. Their findings show that once that credibility is diminished, the leader's ability to influence the foreign public weakens and there is even a potential for negative backlash. All in all, these works emphasize the importance of national leaders' image in "high-level public diplomacy" and suggest a way to capitalize on that image that national leaders to sway foreign public opinion (Goldsmith & Horiuchi).

In the arena of public affairs, often the only time when the executive branch actively pays attention to how impactful the image of its leader can be is during election cycles. This is because between members of the same country, the presidential candidate has to sell his image to the domestic electorates. The whole campaign becomes a strategically planned and heavily invested effort, coordinated by a large group of people to shine the spotlight on this one single individual who personalizes the message and breeds life into the entire campaign. But once that individual gets elected, the focus now magnifies and shifts from the person to the broader institution in which he has successfully entered. In fact, there is still room for the president to sell his image, but this time in front of a different, broader audience. Given that elected officials tend to be considered the exemplar of their countries, selling the image of President Obama is also selling the image of America.

If the leader has "the ability to attract rather than coerce," or could combine both of these capitals as he wills to get what he and his country wants out of other states, we can say that she possesses soft or smart power. At the same time, if the link between the image of a country and its leader continues to stay rigorous, a positive reputation on the latter's part (her soft power) will definitely lead to a net gain in the former's, effectively making her image a soft power of the country. But of course, the essential characteristic that makes her a soft power resource as opposed to a skillful negotiator or diplomat in the traditional understanding of the term, is that her appeal cannot just affect other negotiating parties in the physical confine

of a conference room, it must also influence their home publics at large. Most typically, because an individual often finds out about a foreign leader via newspapers, radio, television, and other forms of digital news broadcasting, mediated international personalization naturally supports and propels this utilization of personalized soft power. Then what exact effects will the personalized soft power of political leaders have on the exercise of public diplomacy and the governing of interstate relations?

The first benefit will be that countries can be more incentivized to learn about foreign states (Dragojlovic, 2013). Promoting more knowledge of one's country, no matter in what forms and under whose leadership, should always be one of the first priorities on the national branding agenda. Previous studies have shown that people are on an average fairly uninterested in politics, and usually feel that they shouldn't devote much time to learning about political issues (Hacker, 2004). Especially with respect to the input of foreign affairs, this aversion seems more amplified when the individual is required to learn and make political judgments about a vast array of unfamiliar issues (Krosnick, 1990). Nevertheless, when people can associate and attach new pieces of information with a leader's well-known image, the input becomes "easier to organize and process" (Kinder, 1986). When the image is perceived in a positive light, which is the case for personalized soft power, the payoffs are doubled because the individual becomes self-motivated by the leader's appeal to learn more about where he comes from. The leader projects his positive image onto the country, effectively making the learning process more self-driven and simpler. The media's zooming in on foreign leaders and their policy-making decisions again piques people's interest in these other countries, leading to even more concentrated coverage on the leader.

But insofar as individuals can have the flair for interpersonal persuasion and social charm, the aforementioned reason is not in any way unique. Other individual members of a country, no matter what their occupation is, will always be able to use their personal images to influence others. Then what makes personalized soft power of political leaders different from that of societal, cultural or economic leaders?

Political leaders do not only have the representational power of their countries, they are in a narrower sense also representatives of their govern-

ments. Although the size and complexity of what constitutes a “government” depends on the domestic context, it is likely that political figures are the most salient faces of the cabinet, party, and coalition which they lead. As a result, besides creating an effect on the image of their country, these individual leaders can also better the image of their governments through their personal reputation, which is something that no other soft power resource can afford to do. For example, the positive valence of an actor can only at best spill over to her field or the cultural scene, it cannot transfer onto the government of her country. Despite being the cornerstone of American soft power, Hollywood could not save the US from taking a nose dive in its global reputation during the War on Terror. That is also the reason why in reference to an earlier point, critics in international relations often point fingers at the involvement of governments as a nullifying cause of soft power’s realization failure, no matter how attractive that country’s cultural resources can be - “China needs to get used to the idea... that outsiders make a sharp differentiation between the Chinese party/state on the one hand (which mostly they do not like very much) and the Chinese people and culture on the other” (Buzan, 2016). Ironically, the author sounds like he is implying that China’s image depends more on its party/state than other conventionally “soft” assets of culture and people.

It is an undisputed fact that a government’s image, not just that of its country, is extremely important in managing foreign relations. If the goal is to use soft power in public diplomacy to communicate better with a foreign public, countries have to first address the deficiency and skepticism characteristic of how people think about governments. And one of the most efficient ways to change this prejudice, or inherent penchant for doubting state institutions, is to make one of their most salient bodies more attractive, trustworthy and responsive to the public. To that end, personalized soft power can play a role by embracing the effect of mediated political personalization and working people’s cognitive shortcuts to its advantage. Perceptually, while both a better civil society and a better cultural icon can make a better country, only a better political leader can make a better government.

PERSONALIZED SOFT POWER AT ITS PEAK

Drawing from the corpus of political communication research, Dragojlovic (2013) finds that source cue effects can only likely work if the audience is “sufficiently familiar with the leader so as to evaluate her or his credibility.” Familiarity is an important factor due to the fact that trust is usually formed through one’s prior exposure with the source. This is in line with previous studies in social psychology which show that an individual is more likely to be persuaded by a source if he has made prior contact with it. Entman (2004) draws attention to the magnitude of communication around a specific issue in the news media and its effect on influencing public opinion through increased frequency and prominence. It is important to point out that despite placing emphasis on the same aspect of familiarity, Dragojlovic frames his argument around the individual leader while Entman chooses a specific issue as the unit of analysis.

Combining these past models in the literature, the author argues that a leader can create attitude change with the presence of two elements: the leader’s familiarity and his country’s favorability. While familiarity denotes the ‘magnitude’ and ‘frequency’ of a leader’s appearance in the media (Entman, 2004) and can correlate with perceived political awareness, favorability points to how positively, as opposed to negatively the country is viewed by the target audience. Accordingly, the two variables can result in the formation of four different scenarios, depending on how high and low countries score on each metric.

I argue that an ideal situation of high credibility for both the leader and the country can be created in the last scenario, with high favorability perceived by the foreign public of the state and high familiarity for its leader. This combination is most ideal to the framing of political leaders as the soft power resource of a country. Of course, the underlying assumption of this argument is that a country is generally always more recognizable than its

Table 1. Scenarios for personalized soft power

High favorability/ Low familiarity	<u>High favorability/ High familiarity</u>
Low favorability/ Low familiarity	Low favorability/ High familiarity

incumbents. A country's favorability rating is important in assessing how effective the leader can project his image on that country, as opposed to being affected by it. Studies have actually found that if the foreign public perceives a country and his leader unfavorably (correlation tends to be strongest in negative valence), that can generate an unintended negative consequence on the country's political communication efforts and result in pushback from the foreign audience (Goldsmith & Horiuchi). Familiarity is chosen to be more important in measuring the leader's persuasiveness because less prominent national leaders may have limited capacity to change the policy attitude of foreign publics even when their images are positively perceived (Dragojlovic, 2013). For the association with one's country to become strong, a leader first has to be recognizable. And because countries align themselves on different principles and ideologies, even when the majority does subscribe to a quasi-universal set of values, a leader can always find another country which shares with him a common definition of goods, meaning its people will likely perceive him through a favorable lens. It is this existence of bipolarity in politics and the aim at high generalizability in this paper, at least at a minimum, that confers more weight upon the familiarity factor than its favorability counterpart. As long as the undertaken actions do not result in outright violations of international norms which would cause irreparable reputational harms to that country, states to an extent can always benefit from this 'unfavorable' appeal of their political leaders. The more crucial question here is whether these individuals are prominent enough to attract attention from the foreign public.

As discussed above, the conditions most conducive to the actualization of personalized soft power are when a foreign public perceives a country's image as favorable and its leader reaches high familiarity. This is when the payoffs are at the highest level if the leader is to influence another public using his image. The next section proposes that South Korea by now has, relative to its previous presidencies, attained these two conditions and therefore, can produce personalized soft power if it wishes. The target audience chosen for analysis will be limited to the American public. The rationale for this particularization is due to the differences in culture and political ideology, the interpretation of what is favorable can vary vastly from one end to another. For example, although more people see Russia

unfavorably than favorably worldwide according to a Pew Research Survey this year, in several countries like Slovakia and Bulgaria, a large majority of 60 percent and 73 percent respectively still have a positive opinion of the country (Pew Research Center, 2020). Also, given that the difference in cultural conventions generates the need for customized political communication processes according to the international comparative analysis (Downey & Stanyer, 2010), it would be imprudent to mass-produce a universal diplomatic strategy that can apply for all countries.

Another distinction worth making is that this analysis will not be focusing on the US government's attitude toward the variables being weighed. This is because the target subject of one country's public diplomacy, or at least in this study, is the public of a foreign country and not its government. As a result, even though sharp divergences can be recorded in South Korea and the US relation and more so under the current two administrations, the topic is out of the scope of this discussion. In order to evaluate South Korea's image and Moon's familiarity in the eye of American audience, the part will make use of international news reporting and public opinion polls.


THE SOUTH KOREAN CASE

A FAVORABLE NATION

Security concerns dominate the sphere of cooperation between US and South Korea, with the issue of denuclearizing North Korea takes up a major part in their bilateral relationship. While both sides have tried to pursue rapprochement with Pyongyang and relative diplomatic success has been seen with three summits held between Kim and Trump and three others between Kim and Moon, denuclearization progress has largely stalled since 2019. This is caused by a failure to agree on the next step of the negotiation, with North Korea blaming the continuation of sanctions as a ground to resume the DPRK's missile testing moratorium (Macias, 2019). The differences in the overall political orientation of these two leaders and their parties also prevents any viable progress from being accomplished. Another issue concerns the renewal of the Special Measures Agreement.

Use of US troops against North Korea

There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using US troops in other parts of the world. Please give your opinion about some situations. Would you favor or oppose the use of US troops: (% Favor)




July 12-31, 2018 | n=1023
CHICAGO COUNCIL SURVEYS

Source: Chicago Council Surveys

Figure 1. American Public Opinion on the Use of US Troops against North Korea.

Disagreements between the two countries regarding burden sharing and how much South Korea should increase its contribution have delayed settlements, leading to an unprecedented furlough of over 4,000 US Forces Korea (USFK) Korean staff (Kim, 2020). As a consequence, these critical security deadlocks have raised questions about the sustainability of the alliance over the long haul.

In contrast to this skeptical sentiment, public opinion in the US has recorded a steady increase regarding support for the US - Korea (ROK) alliance. The Chicago Council on Global Affairs 2014 survey of American public opinion on foreign policy shows that favorability toward South Korea has surged from 44 out of 100 in 2006 to 56 out of 100 in 2014. In the same vein, the Council's 2018 survey illustrates a bipartisan support for the use of force if North Korea were to attack either South Korea or Japan. The results record an all-time high in public support for the use of US troops in defense of South Korea against North Korea's invasion with 70 percent of Republicans, 63 percent of Democrats and 61 percent of Independents favoring the option (Friedhoff, 2018). The 2019 survey again finds that Americans remain committed to South Korea and 70 percent of all Americans believe that the relationship with South Korea does more to strengthen the US' national security. A similar bipartisan support for continuing and even increasing the number of US forces stationed in South



Source: Gallup

Figure 2. Americans' Ratings of South Korea.

Korea is found, tracking a majority's favor to use troops to defend the East Asian ally.

In terms of social exchange, it is impossible to overstate the influence of Korean culture on the American public, especially the young population. The Korea Tourism Organization reports in 2019 that foreign tourists were estimated to have spent roughly \$1,007 on average to consume Kpop goods and content. Hallyu (the Korean Wave) has become more prominent in the US over the last few years, starting with BTS hitting number one on the Billboard 200 chart and more recently the Korean masterpiece Parasite making history by becoming the first foreign language film to win Best Picture in Oscar. These have long been considered the conventional sources of soft power and cultural diplomacy for South Korea and they undeniably play a great role in promoting Korean cultures in the US as well as seeking to influence the American public's perception about South Korea as a country. From a public diplomacy aspect, the Korean Wave proves extremely effective in portraying Korea's international image as charming and unique through a combination of traditional appeal including K-food and Confucian ethics, with its contemporary culture through K-pop and K-drama. After South Korea hosted the 2018 Winter Olympics Game in Pyeongchang, a Gallup poll recorded an increase in how favorably

Americans viewed South Korea, beating its previous high favorability rating in 2011 by 12 points at 77 percent (Gallup, 2018).

The Chicago Council on Global Affairs introduced a new survey item to assess South Korea's global influence in 2019. Perceived influence of South Korea reached a record high at 5.0 on a 10-point scale. This rise in the American public's perception of South Korea can be attributed to the whirlwind of diplomatic summitry during the past two years and the increasing infiltration of Korean culture, including Korean food, dramas, movies and music in the US. South Korea's image has also been greatly enhanced by its prompt and effective response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Indeed, according to the most recent Global Attitude poll conducted by the Pew Research Center, Americans give South Korea the highest rating for its coronavirus response, surpassing Germany at second place (PRC, 2020).

From the data collected, it could be argued that South Korea has reached a new height in promoting its national image not only in the US but also in other regions. This rise in the level of both recognizability and especially favorability is the result of two main factors: ramped up talks and negotiations regarding security issues surrounding the Korean peninsula and a sky-high rise in the consumption and circulation of Korean music and movies abroad.

THE FAMILIAR HEAD OF STATE

Compared to his predecessors, President Moon proves to be a very proactive actor in formulating new foreign policies and involving regional partners in South Korea's agenda with an emphasis on balanced diplomacy. A goal repeatedly pledged during his election campaign and inauguration speech demonstrated his commitment to securing two principles: peace on the Korean peninsula and South Korea's active involvement in North East Asian politics. Compared to previous administrations, Moon works frequently and closely with the US with the aim of achieving his foremost policy agenda – forging a “permanent peace regime” on the Korean peninsula (Ministry of Education). This section conjects that Moon has now attained a sufficient level of familiarity to the domestic audience of the US, and hence is capable of assuming the soft power role through his public image to increase the American people's positive valence toward South Korea.

Albeit different in their approach to handling public affairs, Moon and Trump surprisingly found a common ground in their management of the North Korea issue. Moon's continuous attempts to engage North Korea has facilitated more dialogues and diplomatic breakthroughs, although until now this process has yielded little impact. Through the call for cooperation with the international community to push forward with the dismantlement of Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program while framing the unification question in a regional context, President Moon has successfully earned high approval ratings from South Koreans and been portrayed as a "savvy diplomat" by the media (Park, 2019). For example, Moon seized on the Winter Olympics in PyeongChang as an opportunity for further engagement with North Korea. In this historic moment in the inter-Korean relation, the two countries marched together under the same united flag. His serious and persistent efforts to include all sides in the dialogue were the major precursor for Trump and Kim's subsequent summit in Singapore, and later Hanoi. Through sports diplomacy to talk-brokering between North Korea and the US, the South Korean leader's pivotal gamble on diplomacy made him the runner up for TIME's 2018 Person of the Year (Campbell, 2019).

With respect to media appearance, the news coverage of President Moon Jae In is extensive. By utilizing the search engine Newslookup, which aggregates news articles and allows users to arrange search results by geo-source of the news organization and categorization by news media type, the author was able to gather a total of over 58722 results for the keywords 'Moon Jae-In South Korea President'. The site draws news data from multiple online sources and news agencies all over the world such as the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Independent, Aljazeera... After filtering out the results to correctly reflect the number of news articles published by American media outlets, this is a sizable estimate of how frequently featured the president is. The number of news articles are also distributed consistently and equally over the span of Moon's ongoing presidency, whereby over half (32031 articles) of the total chunk are dated 2018, the year where trilateral negotiation efforts started to pick up steam. This is an enormous quantity compared to that of his predecessor, Park Geun-Hye, who according to the search engine only appeared in 17081 articles during the course of her four-year presidency since 2013.

Although there are insufficient data points on the American public's awareness of the South Korean president, internationally it is safe to predict that Moon is a fairly well-known leader. A recent survey conducted by the Korean Culture and Information Service among 8,000 people from 16 countries found that more than 70 percent of foreigners have a positive view of South Korea. What is surprising in this survey though, is that Moon surpassed K-pop supergroup BTS to lead in the category of Korean public figures, showing an unexpected high degree of familiarity (Oh & Lee, 2020). The decisive factor contributing to such an outcome is likely his continual appearance in the media, which is the result of the President's extensive role in breaking the impasse between the US and North Korea. It seems that Moon's active foreign policy approach indisputably helps inform the American public more about him as well as the issues being discussed. This gives him considerable coverage in different media outlets in the US at an unprecedented frequency for a South Korean president. In 2019, Arthur I. Cyr, the famous professor of Political Science in Carthage College published an opinion piece titled "President Moon personifies South Korea success," making a case for an attractive South Korean image that is exemplified under Moon's leadership. All in all, the media undertone shows that this could be the right timing for South Korea to exercise public diplomacy through the use of its soft power, derived directly from the president's diplomatic appeal (Cyr, 2019). Although it still takes a long time for a middle power to exert the same amount of influence on the international society that a major power does, with a vibrant culture that is sweeping across many countries and a more concrete identity mirrored after its leader, the public diplomacy potential for South Korea is both encompassing and limitless.

Most middle powers prepare for their ascent to claim regional or global dominance by presenting a prominent leader to the world. A leader is the most personalized image of a country, so in order for another country to endorse what South Korea seeks to pursue, its leader first has to build a trustworthy and credible image to gain support from the foreign public. An identifiable leader is a potential source of soft power that can give South Korea a more distinct identity internationally, and could also help communicate its foreign policy objectives to the outside world better. This

support could then be extremely helpful for the country not only in dealing with its adversaries, but also managing its alliance with the US, especially when Seoul and Washington apparently do not see eye to eye with each other on every matter.

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Korean Digital Public Diplomacy: A Case Study of the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Brazil's Facebook Page

Camila CS Carneiro

Abstract | The constant development of digital technologies influences human relations, considering internet has become an important factor in societies' daily life. It has changed the way communication is used in many fields such as diplomatic communication between countries and citizens, which can now be done on a large scale between geographically distant populations. Thus, this paper aims to better understand the use of social media by South Korea's digital public diplomacy. Specifically, a case study of the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Brazil's Facebook page was conducted using content analysis, intending to comprehend how the communication is made through posts, if dialogical communication is used and what the effects on the online users. The research shows that the communication made by the ROK'S Embassy in Brazil has satisfactory aspects from which positive effects regarding the followers' behavior result; however, it also shows improvements can be done especially regarding dialogical communication.

국문초록 | 인터넷이 사회의 일상 생활의 중요한 요소가 되었음을 고려했을 때 지속적인 디지털 기술의 발달은 인간 관계에 영향을 미친다. 이는 국가와 시민 간의 외교적 소통과 같이 다양한 분야에서 소통이 이용되는 방법을 바꾸었다. 대규모로 그리고 지리적으로 먼 인구에게까지 미칠 수 있기 때문이다. 그러므로, 이 논문은 대한민국의 디지털 공공 외교가 어떻게 소셜 미디어를 이용하는지 이해하고자 한다. 특히 게시물을 통해 어떻게 소통이 이루어지는지, 대화체의 소통이 사용되는지, 온라인 사용자들에 어떤 영향을 끼치는지 이해하기 위해 내용 분석을 이용하여 브라질 대한민국 대사관의 페이스북 계정을 사례로 연구한다. 이 연구는 브라질의 대한민국 대사관의 소통이 팔로워들의 행동에 긍정적인 영향을 미치는 만족스러운 측면이 있음을 보여준다. 하지만 특히 대화적 소통에 있어서 개선점 또한 있음을 보여준다.

INTRODUCTION

The technological advance of digital culture that marked the last decades has transformed human relations and people's daily routine, as well as the functioning of large industries and the interaction between countries. Society now has more access to items and information from distant countries; additionally, public organizations can now work online with the prospect of much greater reach, without geographical limits.

Thus, the Internet has become an important part of the daily life of many organizations and has consolidated itself as an inevitable ingredient of the contemporary social fabric and political practices. In the digital sphere, social media has become an important tool inserted in national and international political debates and has positioned itself as an indispensable means of interaction between government authorities and their citizens. In this context, most countries' foreign policy, including South Korea's, have also been adapting to this new reality. Diplomatic activity started to incorporate several online communication channels aimed at the general public, whether internal (domestic) or external (foreign).

Thus, public diplomacy is known as one of the academic fields that has to adapt to technological changes and development. As a consequence, the term digital diplomacy was created. Although its exact meaning is still under discussion, the term refers to the use of public diplomacy through digital technologies. Among the diverse forms of digital diplomacy is the use of social media. Author Martyna Tomiczek (2012) argued that based on the feedback given towards certain issues, it's possible for organizations to review policies, most particularly using feedback through Twitter and Facebook. Both platforms are relevant in this context, as they are considered the most used social networks among governments, diplomats, and institutions (Twiplomacy, 2018).

Social media is also seen as a tool to conduct diplomacy through dialogue with followers to create and maintain relationships. A satisfactory relationship with an online audience may not only facilitate the acceptance of a nation's foreign policy among foreign audiences, but also be a tool that may help increase popularity towards foreign populations. In this sense, it is important to note that according to Shiren (2013), popularity, reputation,

and identity are respectively the three different levels of goals for public diplomacy.

Accordingly, the dialogue between institutions and its followers also enables a better understanding of the needs of different audiences, as monitoring users' behavior may be helpful for the use of platforms and messages more effectively towards specific goals. Thus, it is important to understand how the communication is being done through social media, also considering the relevance of using dialogic models instead of monologic ones, to better create a long-lasting relationship with online audiences.

Studies of social media use for public diplomacy are essential considering the increasing number of online users worldwide. According to a survey conducted by We Are Social (2020), 3.96 billion people, more than half of the world population, use social media. Therefore, in order to better understand the impacts of new media on public diplomacy, this research aims to understand the use of social media from South Korea's digital public diplomacy.

Moreover, the We Are Social (2020) survey concludes that South America is the second region in the world with the highest percentage of active citizens in social media, and the one with the highest number of active users is Facebook - which was therefore the subject chosen for the analysis in this research. According to the survey, in Brazil there are reportedly more than 140 million people using social media, which represents 66% of the population - 11 million more than the previous year - and 130 million are on Facebook - the fourth-highest country in the world in terms of Facebook users. Thus, Brazil seems to be one of the most active countries not only in social media, but specifically on the Facebook platform. From this perspective and also considering the approach by South Korea to Latin American countries in recent decades (mostly based on economic ties and Official Development Assistance (ODA)), the specific South Korean organization's Facebook page chosen to be analyzed in this research was the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Brazil.

In addition to the massive use of social media by the subject country chosen to be analyzed, it is also important to highlight the recent increasing interest of Brazilians about South Korean matters, a direct effect of South Korea's soft power. The graph below shows a graph using the Google



Figure 1. Searches about South Korea on Google Trends

Trends tool that measures the number of internet searches related to the keyword “South Korea” in Brazil for the last 10 years.

The graph shows clear growing interest in South Korea demonstrated by deliberate web searches from Brazilian online users. The facts given above indicate that studies about use and influence of social media on public diplomacy can be useful, as it can bring much enlightenment on how to carry out public diplomacy in the age of new media.

The academic field lacks studies about Brazilian-Korean relations, so considering the latest growing interest by Brazilians about South Korea and the recent approach of Brazil-Korea’s bilateral diplomacy, this research field therefore should be better studied.

This research therefore aims to analyze how the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Brazil communicates through their Facebook page, in order to better understand South Korea’s digital public diplomacy under the new media environment. For this, a case study of the embassy’s official page on Facebook was conducted, using Content Analysis on the posts and also using the theory of Dialogical Communication for analysis. This paper proposes the following questions: how is the communication by the embassy made? Is dialogical communication used with followers? What are the effects of that communication on the audience involved?

Thus, this paper is divided into two parts: first, literature review approaching matters such as digital diplomacy, dialogic communication and social media; second, the presentation of the methodology and results of analysis.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND DIGITAL DIPLOMACY

The debate on digital diplomacy has gained prominence in recent years fueled by the dissemination of tools such as the Internet, which has had an impact on various aspects of international politics. The internet represents an intensification of information flows scenario, multiplying communication channels and substantially increasing the interaction of foreign organizations with national and international audiences in a more direct way. Due to this aspect of communicational approach with the public beyond the small diplomatic sphere, the literature on digital diplomacy has been recurrently linked to the concept of public diplomacy (Holmes, 2015; Cull, 2008; Khatib; Dutton;Thelwall, 2012; Lozev; Murray, 2013; Strauß, Nadine et al., 2015). Edmund Gullion, in the Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy (1965, p. 1), defined public diplomacy as an area that

deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of intercultural communications.

Thus, if public diplomacy is the diplomatic activity aimed at broader audiences through processes of circulation of information and communication, this naturally includes the use of online media. And this is where the idea of digital diplomacy comes into the discussion.

In recent years it is remarkable how government institutions' social media use has increased, as digital platforms provide an opportunity for the officials to build a direct connection with global audiences. The author Ciolek (2010) argues that social media did not essentially change the objectives of public diplomacy but are useful new tools and platforms for "facilitating engagement with audiences in an evolving information environment" (Ciolek, 2010, p. 2). Therefore, this concept suggests that

social media platforms can be helpful as it enables creation of a positive image through engagement and dialogue.

In this context, social media appears as a promising element for the development of digital diplomacy due to its informative, communicative and interactive character. Assuming that good public diplomacy cannot be based on monologues but on dialogues, authors Bjola and Jiang (2015, p. 74) believe that

Social media, with its interactive feature, has much to offer in this regard as it can generate a quasi-continuous dialogue between diplomats and foreign publics. Two-way conversations allow diplomats to readjust the focus of their agenda, reduce misinformation and enhance mutual understanding. [...] These mutually exclusive dimensions of social media impact offer a comprehensive and reliable framework for assessing the effectiveness of digital diplomacy.

All of these dimensions enable us to think about the role of social media in the more specific scope of digital diplomacy and in the broader context of public diplomacy policies. They also represent challenges to approach relatively abstract concepts with normative content. To this end, it is considered that empirical analyzes and case studies are useful to build a more detailed and practical understanding of these processes today, characterizing at least part of these phenomena in effusion. Therefore, the following topic presents a better understanding of social media use, online interactivity and dialogic communication.

SOCIAL MEDIA AND DIALOGIC COMMUNICATION

Studies related to new media are extremely relevant today, considering that the internet and social media have changed the world we live in. Nowadays, society is generally studied under the influence of social networks, mostly considering that it enables interactions on a large scale (RECUERO, 2015).

The concept of social networks, of self-explanatory name, refers to the social groupings that unite individuals, making connections and social ties.

It differs from social media as it can establish itself in offline spaces, as in communities. As an emerging phenomenon, which emerged after users appropriated social networking websites (RECUERO, 2015), social media are new communication platforms between individuals and their productions - environments where it is possible to create a personal profile or page, interact through comments and expose of participating social actors, in addition to conversation (RECUERO).

When discussing social media and conversation, it is relevant to study concepts such as those of the author Henry Jenkins (2014), who calls participatory culture the possibility of producing and sharing content in a much more participatory way. Jenkins (2014) also points out that the participatory culture already existed before the digital age, but the action was enhanced with this new technology. He explains that the participatory culture is a characteristic of a world in which users have become suppliers of material to other users, which occurs more widely in the digital age. Intrinsically to the participatory culture is online conversation on social media such as Facebook, often mediated and integrated by institutions that disseminate information and encourage discussions. Examples of this are the journalistic industry or even public organizations from diverse sectors such as those about international relations, which can nowadays spread information without geographic limitations.

This emerging format which is marked by interactivity and conversation, according to the author Elias Machado (2007) arouses public interest and participation in the most varied subjects, especially if, today, we consider smartphones as the primary platform for access to all this content, causing the facilitated process of feedback and emission of messages or responses by the public using the online network, which is typical in the case of Facebook pages used by institutions or organizations. For this reason, the use of dialogical communication in social media is considered important.

A dialogic perspective, according to the authors Michael Kent and Maureen Taylor (1998), focuses on the attitudes toward each other held by the participants in a communication transaction online. They explain that

The concept of dialogic theory is often associated with the philosopher Martin Buber. Buber viewed human communication as an intersub-

jective process in which parties come to a relationship with openness and respect. Dialogue is the basis for that relationship. Buber's conception of dialogue focuses implicitly on ethics. That is, for a dialogic relationship to exist, parties must view communicating with each other as the goal of a relationship. (p. 324)

The authors also highlight an interesting aspect of the dialogue that is, according to Jürgen Habermas's framework, concepts that examine communicative ethics. According to them, Habermas asserts that dialogue occurs when both parts agree to coordinate in good faith their plans of action. Consequently, ethical communication cannot be dominated by one party. Dialogue then inherently involves a cooperative, communicative relationship.

In that sense, Kent and Taylor (1998) reaffirm that dialogic relationships online necessarily require, mostly, dialogue, otherwise Internet public relations would be nothing more than a new monologic communication medium, as "the web provides public relations practitioners an opportunity to create dynamic and lasting relationships with publics, however, to do so requires that dialogic loops be incorporated" (KENT, TAYLOR, 1998, p. 325).

Following from this, the authors created the principles of dialogical communication, which will later be used for the analysis of this paper. Among the principles, there is first the Dialogic Loop, which essentially is the agent's response to comments, questions and messages. A dialogic loop would offer organizations the opportunity to respond to questions, concerns and problems, as it is not enough to have "information" for publics if the organization cannot provide the information that publics most need or desire. According to the authors, presence is no more important than the service provided online or the content generated. The role of this principle in Facebook pages is then emphasized, since it refers to the direct mediation between the Embassy and the audience that possibly consume contents related to South Korea.

Usefulness of Information, another principle, is related to how much the information is relevant to the audience. It is measured to indicate the extent to which government organization engage a national and international

audience; in the case of this research it is then worth analyzing whether the publications of the Embassy of The Republic of Korea in Brazil are matters that interest the local or international public, as the “content” is what should drive an effective web site (KENT, TAYLOR, 1998 , p 327).

The third principle, Generation of Return Visits, refers to methods used to draw public attention and keep them interested, creating on them the desire to return to the page again in the future. As explained by Kent and Taylor (1998, p. 329)

Contain features that make them attractive for repeat visits such as updated information, changing issues, special forums, new commentaries, on-line question and answer sessions, and online “experts” to answer questions for interested visitors. Sites that contain limited/unchanging information are no longer useful after one visit and do not encourage return visits. [...] Interactive strategies include forums, question and answer formats, and experts.

Considering these principles as essential for the use of Facebook pages by public organizations, they will be used in the analysis proposed by this research, which will be carried out in the following section. The following sections introduce first a better detail of the methodology and, later, the analysis results.

METHODOLOGY

This research aims to investigate how the embassy communication on the Facebook page is made related to its contents, whether dialogical communication is used with followers and what the effects of that communication on the audience are.

For this, the research carried out a case study based on the concept of Robert Yin (2001). According to the author, the main purpose of this procedure is to understand the significant characteristics of events, investigating a contemporary phenomenon within a real life context - a strategy for which it is necessary to answer questions such as “how” or

“why” (YIN, 2001 , p.32). The concept of this strategy is exploratory, since it aims to provide greater familiarity with the phenomena of digital public diplomacy by South Korea and then build hypotheses or improve ideas. It is intended, by studying the case of the South Korean embassy in Brazil, to understand more comprehensively the strategy of digital diplomacy of the country on social media.

This case study is done through posts by the Embassy on the Facebook page, based on the concept of Content Analysis by Lawrence Bardin (2004). This type of analysis is a way of systematically extracting meaning from texts. It is a technique that classifies and categorizes content based on the observation of similarities, aiming to infer components in the collected data. It is an approach consisting of several different techniques, both qualitative and quantitative. According to the Bardin (2004, p. 47), the analysis is

a set of techniques for analyzing communications in order to obtain, by systematic and objective procedures for describing the content of messages, indicators (quantitative or not) that allow the inference of knowledge regarding the production / reception conditions (inferred variables) of these messages.

The chosen period of publications to analyze was from July 1, 2019 to July 1, 2020. 347 posts were analyzed in total. The categories of analysis were divided into three sections. First section is related to the content of the posts, in order to understand how the embassy communicates through the publications. In this section, these are the categories: (1) Quantity of posts; (2) Use of Images; (3) Use of videos; (4) Use of hyperlinks; (5) Discursive emphasis; (6) Thematic emphasis.

The second section analyzes the reception of readers, aiming to understand the effects that the communication used by the embassy has. The categories are (1) Volume of likes; (2) Volume of comments; (3) Volume of shares; and (4) Characteristics of readers' comments.

Finally, in the third section the categories were used in order to observe and analyze the mediation of the page regarding dialogical communication, with the categories related to the concept of Kent and Taylor (1998) previously explained. The categories are (1) use of Dialogic Loop; (2) The

Usefulness of Information; (3) The Generation of Return Visits.

RESULTS

COMMUNICATION VIA FACEBOOK

This first part focuses on the content posted by the Embassy on their Facebook page, with the primary objective of learning what the posted content most focused on.

(1) Quantity of posting

The first item analyzed was the amount of posting, which refers to the chronological record of publications on the page per month. The purpose of this analysis is to understand the volume of posts, as well as the peaks or troughs of this process. The graph below shows the results.

It is noticed that the embassy does not present a strategy for the number of monthly posts since, as noted in the graph, within the analyzed period there was a great contrast between months, with the lowest number of posts




Figure 2. Quantity of posts

being 16, and the highest, 43. This can be a problem in the sense of social media algorithms, which favors accounts with a greater number of posts to appear in the feed of the profiles that follow the page. The post volume control is a monitoring strategy, considered indispensable nowadays for those who want to obtain greater visibility. The author Caio Costa (2014, p.87) points out that monitoring the page, including making regular posts, is essential as it is intended to have visibility. As he states:

posting regularly on any network helps to build audience loyalty. That interaction with the public is mandatory. Use of keywords (so-called “tags”), titles (yes, there are companies that post videos without titles), and miniature photos to promote posts are indispensable.

(2) and (3) - Use of images and videos

Use of audiovisual media are considered important factors in public disclosure, as it seeks to synthesize the purpose of the message, draw the attention of users and also influence the algorithms, since text-only posts are less privileged in appearance on the homepage feed.

Use of audiovisual media stood out in the analysis of the posts, with




Figure 3. Posts with images or videos

93.9% of them using some media. Images were found in 82.9% of the total number of posts. Among them, the largest type of image were icons, banners and posters (38%) and the second most used type were text-images (22%), which sought to illustrate the information desired, in order to bring more dynamism to the publication. 10.9% of publications used videos. Among them, the majority is related to events promotion (33.3%) and the dissemination of news and information (27.7%).

(4) Use of hyperlinks

This part analyzes whether there is a hyperlink in the message and, if so, what types of websites it points to. It allows to check what kind of other institutions are most shared.

In the case of the Embassy, 46.9% of the publications had hyperlinks, which demonstrates that the institution seeks to provide readers with a deeper understanding of the topic mentioned in the text. The large amount of hyperlinks is also explained by the majority of publications referring to events, contests, promotions, etc. Posting the links at these publications also allows interested parties to know more about the activity announced. The type of website most linked to were informative websites and newspapers (64%). The second type were websites related to events and contests (20%). The third most linked to was YouTube (15%).

(5) Discursive emphasis

The focus in this section is on the observation of the main discursive function of the posts, the direction of the discursive tone that predominates in the posts. The following sub-items were analyzed: Praise; cooperation or solidarity; congratulating; commemoration or celebration; promotion or divulgation.

In this category, 58.5% of the posts had an emphasis on promoting or divulgation something; 22.5% focused on praise; 9% celebrated; 4.2% emphasized cooperation or solidarity; 2% focused on congratulating. Initially, the research also considered observing categories such as criticism or contestation; repudiation or condemnation; worry or fear. However, during the pre-analysis, it was noticed that posts with these discursive contents were practically null, so they were removed from the categories. In




Figure 4. Discursive emphasis on posts

this sense, it shows that the vast majority of page publications by the Embassy seek to emphasize information in a positive and light way. This is a relevant factor in the production of page content to be considered for a better understanding of the image that the Embassy seeks to convey to its audience.

(6) Thematic emphasis.

The purpose of this observation is to identify the theme in which the messages can be framed. The categories related to themes are: diplomatic activities; events; informative announcements; speeches and interviews; principles and positioning; historical dates; conjuncture and public interest; interesting information about South Korea; Korean Wave; and others not categorized (when the emphasis of the post does not fit any of the options listed above).

As for the thematic emphasis, it was observed that the category most identified in the contents of the page was related to information announcements (27.4%). They sought to inform the public of activities or events in general, merely focusing on disseminating the information. In second place is the category public interest (21.3%) whose focus would be news information on current social scenarios or useful information about




Figure 5. Thematic emphasis of posts

services. Interesting information about South Korea (16.4%) was the third category most recurrent. They sought to look like “fun facts” about the country. The fourth most used theme by the Embassy is the Korean Wave (13.4%), related to culture and tourism. Posts related to historical dates such as anniversaries and commemorative dates in general are present in 6% of posts. Events such as seminars, courses and training, congresses and festivals were found in 3.6% of posts. Then, speeches and interviews (3%), whose emphasis were on excerpts or texts whose focus is bringing the speech of an authority with analyzes, interviews or speeches. Finally, diplomatic activities (2.4%), considering posts about summits, meetings and actions of the ambassador.

The ‘principles’ category, referring to posts whose focus is to demonstrate a certain view of the South Korean government on various topics, was only present in 0.6%, so this section was placed on the “others” category on the graph. However, in the following stages of the analysis this category is relevant, so it has not been completely withdrawn from the research.

HOW POSTS ARE PERCEIVED BY FOLLOWERS

(1) Volume of likes by theme

The intention here is to observe the average number of likes that posts for each topic received. This category allows to measure the feedback of the message with the users as well as the degree of support received. An average number of likes was made for each thematic emphasis of the publications.

The topic most liked by users who follow the page is related to the Korean Wave, with an average of 267 comments per post. Next up are publications on diplomatic actions, with 199 comments per post. In third place are the publications referring to interesting information related to South Korea, with an average of 131 likes per post. Historical dates follows, with an average of 113 likes per publication; then, publications that emphasize the principles and positions of South Korea have around 102 likes. The categories 'events' and 'speeches and interviews' shows a very similar level of engagement in this aspect, with an average of 100 likes in each post. Following are informative announcements, with an average of 93 comments and, finally, the least most liked theme is about public interest, with an average of 41 likes per post.

It is interesting to highlight some contrasts observed: the themes most used by the embassy on posts, related to information announcements and




Figure 6. Volume of likes by theme

public interest, are those that receive less likes from readers. It is noticed that the opposite also occurs: diplomatic activities, one of the themes less used in publications on the page, is the second-most like-receiving one. The interest in knowing more about the embassy’s diplomacy may be related to the willingness and curiosity of Brazilians interested in South Korea to learn more about actions involving Brazilian-Korean relations.

Moreover, ‘principles’ is a theme that despite its low adhesion by the embassy, has a relatively high number of average likes, being in 5th place. This can indicate that the audience wishes to know more about South Korea, including its ethics and moral philosophy in general.

Interesting information about the country is the third-highest theme in terms of average number of likes and is also the third most used by the embassy. In this sense, there is a satisfactory mediation about what arouses interest in the public and what the embassy communicates to them.

(2) Volume of shares by theme

Sharing a post on Facebook is an action that requires a more personal and bigger engagement of each individual, because when sharing the post is added to the user’s personal page and homepage feed, being visible to all




Figure 7. Graph about volume of shares

friends. Therefore, sharing indicates not only interest in the theme but also the user's willingness to show that theme to friends on the social media.

In this observation category, it should be noted that some aspects are repeated regarding the volume likes: the most published themes by the embassy (public interest and information announcements) are the least shared by readers. The number of post shares related to diplomatic activities is also high, the third-highest category shared - however, as already mentioned, it is least-used theme by the embassy in posts. The three most liked and shared topics are related to the Korean Wave, interesting facts about Korea and diplomatic activities.

(3) Volume of comments by theme

This category focuses on observing the average amount of comments that each theme receives on posts. This allows to measure the spread of the message, the interest of users in the theme, the repercussion of a given message on the social media and the level of conversation generated.

As the graph above shows, the difference between the average number of comments is large comparing Korean Wave to other themes (average of




Figure 8. Graph of volume of comments

175 comments per post about korean wave). This shows that this is the theme that users most want to talk about and give their own opinion about.

Another interesting aspect noticed is that, contrary to the results related to likes and shares, informative announcements are the second topic that receives the most engagement regarding conversation through comments, receiving an average of 15 comments per post. This may be related to the fact that users like to demonstrate their opinions to what is happening and also they tend to ask more questions about that specific current information.

(4) Characteristics of readers' comments

This category sought to observe which attitudes are most present in the comments of users who follows the embassy page, in order to better understand the effects of publications on readers. Thus the number of supportive comments was observed (which demonstrate agreement or support with what was published); negative comments (which disagree or do not support what was communicated by the embassy); and neutral (which does not show directly to be positive or negative, but seeks to talk and discuss about the topic).

As the graph shows, the majority of comments are neutral. The neutrality in the comments indicates that users rather talk rationally about the theme, pointing out aspects about the topic without really criticizing or praising it, the focus being on the conversation itself. Many of the neutral comments are the users tagging friends in the posts, showing them that




Figure 9. Graph of characteristics of readers' comments

content and then consequently generating a conversation about it, which is considered a positive result for the page.

ANALYSIS OF DIALOGIC COMMUNICATION

The third part of the analysis of the communication carried out by the embassy proposes an observation of how the mediation of the embassy is done with the public reading the page. Thus, three principles of dialogical communication were used as analysis criteria.

(1) Use of Dialogic Loop

In this first category, it was observed whether the embassy usually participates actively in a dialogue with readers based on responses to comments in the publications. Within a year, more than eight thousand comments were published by readers, which were analyzed manually. Among them, those who asked a direct question to the embassy, 77% did not receive an answer. Also during the analysis, negative comments by readers about this were observed, containing complaints for the lack of response from the embassy on comments and also e-mails.

It is therefore concluded that the Embassy does not use the dialogic loop in its communication on Facebook in a satisfactory way, whereas the dialogue does not appear to be essential in their communication strategy for the page. In this sense, it is opposite of Kent and Taylor's (1998) concept, who claim that dialogue is the basis of a relationship - that needs to fundamentally be a cooperative, communicative relationship. It is also emphasized by the authors that the dialogic loop is crucial in the creation of long-lasting relationships.

(2) The Usefulness of Information

This second criteria observed whether the Embassy's posts on Facebook were targeted and of interest to the local or international public. The analysis results showed that 78% of the publications were directed to the local public.

Thus, it was concluded that the majority of embassy publications use the principle of useful of information on the Facebook page, with relevant information for the readers - this aspect, then, is positively closer to a dialogical communication.

(3) The Generation of Return Visits

The third and final analysis criterion sought to see if the embassy publications would possibly bring a willingness on the part of readers to return to the page later. According to Kent and Taylor (1998), actions with this purpose for example could be posts with forums, question and answer formats, updated information, and experts answering questions.

Within the analyzed period a low number was observed in posts using this principle, only 8% of them. This number draws attention in a negative way because regardless of the post's content quality, it does not mean that it will make the public interested in the page to keep their interest. In this sense, it is considered that maintaining a loyal audience is important, since, recalling the concept of the author Shiren (2013), popularity is a goal for public diplomacy.

Still, regarding the generation of return visits, the analysis showed this is a pertinent principle because the only post that resembles the format 'experts answering questions' obtained massive engagement, with more than 3 thousand comments. This also highlights how dialogue is an aspect that the page's followers seek.

CONCLUSION

This paper aimed to better understand how the digital public diplomacy of South Korea is made by researching through a case study of the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Brazil's Facebook page.

Thus, the paper intended to analyze how the Embassy's communication on the Facebook page is made; how posts are received by the audience and whether dialogical communication is used with them.

The research found that the published content focuses on the dissemination of current information, with attention to the use of audiovisuals and imagery items, important aspects in social media communication, in addition to the use of redirecting hyperlinks to other pages, showing the search for providing complete information to readers. Moreover, a relevant aspect to be pointed out is the recurrent character of the posts being positive and light.

However, it is necessary to emphasize that the number of posts strategy can be improved, as it was noticed that in some months less than one post per day is made. In this sense, a strategy to improve the posts regarding their monthly volume could benefit the page, thus enabling better fidelity of the public. It also could improve the appearing of content in the followers' homepage feeds because of the algorithm that privileges pages with a higher number of publications.

Another aspect to consider would be to perform a better mediation between what the public engages the most and the thematic content that the embassy posts, considering how the posts are received by the public. As the research indicated, the most shared, liked and commented topics by the public are about diplomatic activities, Korean Wave (culture and tourism) and interesting information (about Korean society or history). However, most of these topics are rarely addressed in publications by the embassy, which indicates an aspect for improvement.

Still regarding the reception of the public, it was noticed that the negative comments by readers are very few. This may be related to the fact that the embassy's communication focuses on positive issues, as previously stated.

Finally, regarding the use of dialogical communication, the research identified that only one of the three dialogical principles (the useful of information) is effectively used by the Embassy on the Facebook page. Thus, it is possible to conclude that dialogical communication is not used satisfactorily by the embassy. It suggests that the Facebook page mediator should pay more attention to the needs of the public, especially taking into consideration using more dialogue to create a better relationship with the audience. In this sense, a bigger attention should also be given on answering followers' questions and concerns more frequently, as well as opening more opportunities in which they can express their doubts and curiosities - with, for example, question and answer online events.

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The Performance of the Fourth Industrial Revolution in South Korean Public Diplomacy: Focus on Korea-Vietnam Diplomatic Relations

Dong Thi Thu Hien

Abstract | Diplomacy has an important role in each country. In particular, in the background of the globalization era, the role of diplomacy is more central and can be a crucial chain of national development. Until now, the process of diplomacy development has been long, and traditional diplomacy has maintained an important mission, and as the 21st century a new concept of public diplomacy emerges. This is a part of traditional diplomacy and has a variety of influences on the diplomatic process of each country. Also, the 21st century is referred to as the era of the scientific revolution and the era of the 4th industrial revolution. And the purpose of paper is to examine how these elements are applied in the field of public diplomacy in Korea and what effects can have. More over this paper conducted a survey on 315 Vietnamese who are living in Vietnam, entitled 'the awareness of Korean public diplomacy policy in Vietnam and the use of the Fourth Industrial Revolution achievements in the process of implementing public diplomacy policies,' and important conclusions were presented according to the survey results.

Keywords | Fourth Industrial Revolution, Korea-Vietnam public diplomacy, application of science and technology, social media, major activities in public diplomacy

국문초록 | 외교는 각 국가에서 중요한 역할을 담당한다. 특히 세계화 시대에 외교의 역할은 더욱 중요하며 국가 개발의 핵심적인 고리가 될 수 있다. 지금까지 외교 개발의 과정은 길었으며, 전통적인 외교는 중요한 임무를 지녀왔고, 21 세기에 공공 외교라는 새로운 개념이 등장한다. 이는 전통적인 외교의 일부이며 각 국가의 외교 절차에 다양한 영향을 미쳤다. 또한, 21세기는 과학 혁명의 시대, 4차 산업 혁명의 시대로 불린다. 이 논문의 목적은 이 요소들이 어떻게 한국의 공

공 외교 분야에 적용되는지, 그리고 어떤 영향을 미치는지 살펴보는 것이다. 나아가 필자는 베트남에 거주하는 315명의 베트남인을 대상으로 ‘베트남의 한국 공공 외교 인식과 공공 외교 정책 시행 과정에서 4차 산업 혁명 업적의 사용’이라는 제목의 설문 조사를 실시했으며, 설문 조사 결과는 중요한 결론을 제시한다.

INTRODUCTION

South Korea entered into diplomatic relations with Vietnam on December 22nd, 1992, to increase cooperation in economic, political and cultural fields between the two countries. Observation of the diplomatic relationship between the two countries reveals that before 1992, relations between the two countries were strained due to the Vietnam War. The Vietnam War, which had lasted 21 years from 1954 to 1975, had the two countries fighting on opposite sides. South Korea (henceforth, ‘Korea’) had entered the war from the early 1960s until the early 1970s as an ally of the United States, which caused a strain between the two nations.

However, the needs of globalization in the latter part of the 20th century urged the two countries to close their traumatic history to look to the future together and to develop a strategic and comprehensive partnership. History cannot be changed, but we must understand it. In order to maintain a peaceful and intimate relationship, the cooperation of governments is a prerequisite, but so is the cooperation between each country’s citizens. How must this be accomplished? This is the function of public diplomacy.

If you look at the friendship between the two countries, traditional diplomacy has played an important role in significant achievements. Additionally, the efforts of public diplomacy are also great, especially in the era of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Accordingly, in this paper, the goals are to demonstrate how the Fourth Industrial Revolution in Korea’s public diplomacy has been important to Korea-Vietnam diplomatic relations.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE 4TH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

The term ‘Fourth Industrial Revolution’ was coined and widely used in the

21st century. ‘With the advent of this era, it is expected that human life will change rapidly as manufacturing processes become digitized and automated, and all things become intelligent and connected to the internet.’¹ The Fourth Industrial Revolution (or Industry 4.0) is the ongoing automation of traditional manufacturing and industrial practices, using modern smart technology. Large-scale machine to machine communication and the internet of things (IoT) are integrated for increased automation, improved communication and self-monitoring, and production of smart machines that can analyze and diagnose issues without the need for human intervention.²

The World Economic Forum (WEF) describes the Fourth Industrial Revolution as “a technological revolution that conflates the boundaries of digital, biological and physical spheres based on the Third Industrial Revolution.” Furthermore, the boundaries of physical space, digital space and bioengineering space are being redefined as a result of technology convergence. (WEF, 2016).³

Industrial revolutions have freed humanity from engaging the use of animals for industrial purposes, enabled mass production, and brought digital technology to billions of people. But the fourth industrial revolution is fundamentally different from the ones that precede it. It combines the physical, digital, and biological worlds; affects all sectors, economies, and industries; and features a variety of new technologies that even challenge ideas of what it means to be human.⁴

In the era of globalization and the Fourth Industrial Revolution, Korea faces opportunities and challenges concomitantly, and the core issue is to maximize opportunities and solve challenges agilely. The changes brought on by the fourth industrial revolution have been pertinent to this project.

The fourth industrial revolution has brought around several changes in

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- 1 Kim Na-hee, ‘4차 산업혁명에 대응하기 위한 IP 집중지원기술 창업지원 프로그램 구축 ideation: 정부의 창업에 대한 사업화 지원프로그램을 중심으로 (Establishment of IP intensive support technology start-up support program to cope with the 4th industrial revolution ideation: Focusing on the commercialization support program for government start-ups),’ Graduate School of Engineering, Korea University, Master’s Thesis, 2018, p.1.
 - 2 https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/%EC%A0%9C4%EC%B0%A8_%EC%82%B0%EC%97%85%ED%98%81%EB%AA%85 (Search date: 2020.07.02)
 - 3 Nahee Kim, *ibid*, p. 8.
 - 4 World Economic Forum site (Search date: 2020.07.02)
<https://www.weforum.org/about/the-fourth-industrial-revolution-by-klaus-schwab>

the world. The most important is internet technology. Firstly, the internet has developed rapidly, and it has also become a great tool for the country to promote its national image in a certain manner. Social media has been utilized greatly in this endeavor. The social media sector has been growing rapidly through the internet throughout the 21st Century, leading to a shortening of the geographical gap between countries, with borders becoming blurred. As many new forms of social media emerge, human beings are becoming more connected, and the exchange of knowledge has also become easier and more efficient.

Secondly, the internet delivers significant benefits in promoting the use of advanced technology facilities. In order to widely promote the image of the country, many large-scale events should be held, demonstrating Korea's strong economic power and professional development. The essential elements to achieve this are modern technology facilities. It does not require a lot of physical effort and can produce high returns by quickly processing and automating tasks.

However, the development of high-speed internet and many other modern technology facilities also entails negative consequences. In fact, while broadband connection can enhance mutual understanding between countries by offering access to authentic facts, it also makes fake news and unreliable contents go viral, which may threaten the positive images that a country has built up and conveyed.

These pros and cons should be carefully considered during the process of implementing public diplomacy policies, while being well aware of the two-sided characteristics of information communication in the current era.

OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN THE WORLD AND KOREAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN THE WORLD

In recent years, especially after the September 11 attacks,⁵ debate over

5 The September 11 terrorist attacks are a simultaneous suicide terrorist attack in the United States on September 11, 2001. This resulted in the collapse of the 110-story World Trade Center (WTC) twin towers in New York and the attack and destruction of parts of the

public diplomacy has become increasingly contentious. The US government has focused on public diplomacy in order to revive the image and political prestige of the United States worldwide. This form of diplomacy is also referred to as “soft power.”⁶ It is necessary to understand what public diplomacy is and what characteristics it has in order to explore the case of public diplomacy in Korea in further detail.

Public diplomacy is ‘unlike traditional diplomacy, it is a collective term for governmental and non-governmental diplomatic activities aimed at foreign public.’⁷ Public diplomacy is not only sending messages to other countries, but also receiving messages from other countries, conducting analysis and evaluation, and developing tools and methods to communicate the messages about one’s nation as well. That is why public diplomacy is a multicultural approach to learning from one another on the basis of dialogue (duality).

Public diplomacy is a new concept in modern international relations. The concept was first used by diplomat Edmund Gullion in 1965.⁸ Public diplomacy refers to the integration of international relations outside the framework of traditional diplomacy. It involves non-governmental organizations, foreign relations and policies, and their influence, including information processes and cultural exchanges between diplomats and foreign media. The focus of public diplomacy is information and ideas that

Pentagon, the U.S. Department of Defense in Arlington County, Virginia, killing about 2,996 people and injuring at least 6,000. This also served as an opportunity for the establishment of the US Department of Homeland Security in accordance with the Homeland Security Act initiated by George W. Bush in 2002.

- 6 Soft power is a concept contrary to hard power expressed by physical forces such as military intervention, coercive diplomacy, and economic sanctions. It is a term that refers to the power to obtain what one wants by doing it, and in the 21st century, smart power, which combines hard power and soft power, is emerging as important. (See <http://www.publicdiplomacy.go.kr/introduce/public.jsp>)
- 7 김태환 (한국 국제 교류재단 공공외교 사업부장), 『21세기한국형 ‘신공공외교 (New Public Diplomacy)’- 외교정책의 패러다임위프트와 전략적맵핑』, 국립외교원 외교안보 연구소, 2012, No.2012-35, 1면. (Tae-Hwan Kim (Director of Public Diplomacy Business Division, Korea Foundation), 『21st Century Korean ‘New Public Diplomacy’-Paradigm Shift and Strategic Mapping of Foreign Policy』, National Institute of Foreign Affairs and Communications, 2012, No. 2012- 35, p. 1).
- 8 The term public diplomacy was coined by a former US diplomat in 1965 during the Cold War and Edmund Gullion, dean of The Fletcher School at Tufts University, “Edward R. It began to be used when the Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy) was established.

transcend borders.⁹

In what sense, then, is public diplomacy different from traditional diplomacy? In particular, in the 21st century and the era of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, what are the characteristics of public diplomacy in the context of the globalization that has been unfolding since the 20th century, and how is it progressing? ① Complementarity: public diplomacy is complementary to other forms of diplomacy. ② Indirect and informal: in some countries, the focus of public diplomacy is not only to influence the policies and actions of other countries, but also to change perceptions, attitudes and feelings toward the home country and to create non-governmental relations with other countries. ③ Strategic and long-term: anything that affects other countries will certainly require preparation and must be seen in the long run. ④ Cohesion: in order for diplomacy to develop, various forms of diplomacy must be combined and mutual relations must be maintained.¹⁰

KOREAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Korean public diplomacy plays an important role in demonstrating Korea's power and influence on the world map. This section of the essay will investigate the significance of public diplomacy for Korea. First of all, the Korean government defines 'public diplomacy' as a 'diplomatic relationship by expanding consensus on our history, traditions, culture, arts, values, policies, vision, etc., through direct communication with foreign citizens and securing trust'¹¹. It refers to diplomatic activities that enhance Korea's influence on the international community by promoting and enhancing our national image and national brand. Additionally, public diplomacy is a diplomacy that captures the hearts of the foreign public, free from government-to-government diplomacy, and is a multidimensional diplomatic activity that advances the friendly and cooperative relationship

9 Vũ Lê Thái Hoàng, 『Ngoại giao Công chúng trong thế kỷ 21』, nghiencuuquocte.org, 2014. (Vu Le Thai Hoang, 『Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century』, nghiencuuquocte.org, 2014.) (<http://nghiencuuquocte.org/2014/06/18/ngoai-giao-cong-chung-trong-the-ky-21/>).

10 Vũ Lê Thái Hoàng, 『Ngoại giao Công chúng trong thế kỷ 21』, nghiencuuquocte.org, 2014. (Vu Le Thai Hoang, 『Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century』, nghiencuuquocte.org, 2014.) (<http://nghiencuuquocte.org/2014/06/18/ngoai-giao-cong-chung-trong-the-ky-21/>).

11 <http://www.publicdiplomacy.go.kr/introduce/public.jsp>.

between the two countries to the next level based on genuine communication and understanding.¹²

The core of South Korea's public diplomacy is "to win the hearts and minds of people." This consists of four elements: ① generating an attractive and impressive perception about Korean culture, ② securing understanding and support for Korean policy, ③ promoting Korea through information, and ④ maintaining good friendships through contribution and service. Therefore, in order for public diplomacy to be successful, 'individual citizens, NGO, corporations, local governments, and government agencies at various levels need to interact with each other and'¹³ their foreign counterparts in other countries. Specifically, major public diplomacy projects at diplomatic missions abroad are as follows:¹⁴ ① A project to promote Korea, introducing the overall attractiveness of Korea through various methods such as seminars, forums, exhibitions, and performances. ② Quizzes on Korea, K-food world festival, k-pop world festival, video contest, etc. ③ Local caravans that promote Korea by visiting local cities other than the capital. ④ The opening of Korea corner, a complex Korean public relations center incorporating advanced Korean IT technology into major local universities, libraries, and cultural centers. ⑤ A Korean cultural club composed of locals, a taekwondo club, and a k-lover (friendly foreigner) foundation project that encourages those who have studied or worked in Korea to voluntarily promote Korea. ⑥ A public diplomacy goodwill ambassador project that enables famous foreigners to act as Korean public relations representatives. ⑦ A project to expand the description of Korean development in foreign elementary, middle, and high school textbooks.

Until now, the Korean government has not only spread the image of Korea through public diplomacy, but has also maintained bilateral exchanges with other nations. Based on this, the next chapter examines the relations between Korea and Vietnam in public diplomacy in the era of the Fourth Industrial Revolution.

12 한충희 (외교통상부문화외교국장), 『2012 외교관계수립 기념행사 결과 보고서』, 2012, 발간사. (Choong-hee Han (Chief of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Culture and Diplomacy Bureau), 『2012 Diplomatic Relations Establishment Event Result Report』, 2012, Publisher)

13 See link: <http://www.publicdiplomacy.go.kr/introduce/public.jsp>

14 See link: <http://www.publicdiplomacy.go.kr/introduce/public.jsp>

THE PERFORMANCE OF THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN KOREAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY (FOCUS ON KOREA-VIETNAM DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS)

Korea is carrying out various public diplomacy activities to maintain friendly cooperative relations with countries around the world, and is continuing to shape a brighter diplomatic future. At present, Korea has established diplomatic relations with a total of 191 countries.¹⁵ Among them, Korea-Vietnam diplomatic relations always seem to be at the core of friendly relations between the two countries. They maintain close relationships in all aspects, from traditional diplomacy to public diplomacy, and cooperate with each other as important partners. Since 2017, Korea's public diplomacy has set specific policies and goals to further strengthen its bond with Vietnam. The Fourth Industrial Revolution has accelerated this friendship and the process of implementing these policies, helping the two countries achieve incredible results.

An online survey was conducted with 315 Vietnamese participants living in Vietnam about 'the awareness of Korean public diplomacy policy in Vietnam and the use of the Fourth Industrial Revolution achievements in the process of implementing public diplomacy policies. The contents of this paper are mainly used based on the results of this survey. First, the basic information related to the online survey is as follows:

- ① Survey period: 2020.07.15~2020.07.21. (1 week)
- ② Survey subjects: 315 Vietnamese people living in Vietnam
- ③ Survey target age: 10 years or older
- ④ Jobs to be surveyed: any

RAPID GROWTH OF PROMOTIONAL STRATEGIES THROUGH SOCIAL MEDIA

As illustrated by the survey results, the internet, AI, media, robots, etc., are the most mentioned among the achievements of the fourth industrial revolution. Among them, today's media is the fastest way to convey human

15 Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, overseas space, diplomatic relations establishment status

See link: http://www.mofa.go.kr/www/wpge/m_4181/contents.do

knowledge and information. Media becomes a means for expressing everything, such as images, voices, and emotions, in various and vivid ways. This kind of media channel, which informs all people about a wealth of information and knowledge quickly, is truly a progressive invention of humanity. This shortens the geographical gap and facilitate communication. For example, when we consider the coronavirus situation, as we are dealing with impacts around the world, we will appreciate the important role of the media more than ever. As the time we spend outside must be reduced due to the virus, our time at home is bound to increase. Accordingly, it is necessary to fully recognize that the use of media channels will increase and that the world will become more closely connected through media channels in the future.

Since 2017, as the public diplomacy policy of Korea has expanded, the use of media to promote Korea's image has been vigorously deployed in Vietnam. Social media¹⁶ (Facebook, YouTube, websites, etc.) and more traditional media channels (TV, radio, and cinema) are performing well in Vietnam through the search process. Traditional media channels have developed since the Third Industrial Revolution and have only developed more since entering the Fourth Industrial Revolution stage. Additionally, since the Korean Wave culture began to flow into Vietnam, Korea's image has been promoted through traditional media channels, so it has played an important role until now. Additionally, since social media has been widely used in Vietnam for several years, and since this period of use coincides with the time when the Korean public diplomacy policy was expanded, this paper will focus on the relationship between the implementation of public diplomacy policy and social media.

① Facebook

Facebook was founded in 2005 and opened on September 26, 2006, and it was introduced in Vietnam on the same date. In 2008, the golden age of Facebook began. Currently, the most popular social media platform in Vietnam is Facebook.

16 Social Media is divided into 4 main zones. ① Social Community: Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Instagram, etc.; ② Social Publishing: website, blog, etc.; ③ Social Commerce; ④ Social Entertainment: Online game website, social game, etc.




Figure 1. Leading countries based on Facebook audience size as of April 2020 (in millions)¹⁷

As shown in Figure 1, by April 2020, the number of Facebook users in Vietnam increased to 63 million, ranking seventh in the world. This suggests that Facebook can be used effectively to relay values about Korea to a large population of Vietnam. In fact, it is apparent that Korea has already been using Facebook to gain favor in diplomatic relations with Vietnam.

First of all, most of the Korean institutions that are associated with public diplomacy issues have Facebook pages. This provides Korea with the ability to reach the Vietnamese people and to alert them to any policies, information, and events regarding Korea. There are a total of 13 major public diplomacy sites,¹⁸ and the sites promoted through Facebook are as displayed in the following table.

Table 1 shows that most public diplomacy agencies are actively promoting their activities on Facebook. In particular, organizations that are active in

¹⁷ <https://www.statista.com/statistics/268136/top-15-countries-based-on-number-of-facebook-users/> (Search date: 2020.07.21.)

¹⁸ <http://www.publicdiplomacy.go.kr/relation/relation01.jsp>

Table 1. Facebook list of major public diplomacy institutions in Vietnam (as of 20 July 2020)

No.	Main site	Facebook link	Page likes count (persons)	Page follow count (persons)	Pages mainly targeting Vietnamese
1	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	https://www.Facebook.com/rokembassyinvietnam/	6995	7835	Yes
2	Northeast Asian history foundation	https://www.Facebook.com/nahf.or.kr/	3069	3179	No
3	K-pop contest	https://www.Facebook.com/kbskpopworld	107.767	113.243	No
4	King Sejong institute foundation	Trung tâm hàn ngữ sejong hànội 1 https://www.Facebook.com/sejonghanoi1kxhnhv/	17.483	17.763	Yes
		Trung tâm sejong hànội 2 - 하노이 2 세종학당 https://www.Facebook.com/sejonghanoi2/	27.237	27.389	Yes
		Trung tâm hàn ngữ sejong hànội 3 https://www.Facebook.com/sejonghanoi3/	6.684	6.874	Yes
		Trung tâm king sejong trụ sở chính tại việt nam. https://www.Facebook.com/vietnamkingsejonginstitute/	5.657	5.883	Yes
		Trung tâm sejong hcm 2 - đại học súp hạm tp.hcm https://www.Facebook.com/sejongdhsp/	2.417	2.517	Yes
		Trung tâm sejong hồ chí minh 3 - 호찌민 3 세종학당 https://www.Facebook.com/sejonghcm3/	2.075	2.138	Yes
		Trung tâm sejong bình dương https://www.Facebook.com/trungtamsejongbinhduong/	3.019	3.165	Yes
		Trung tâm sejong cần thơ - ctusejong hak dang https://www.Facebook.com/trungtamsejongcantho/	1.128	1.186	Yes
		Trung tâm hàn ngữ sejong hải phòng https://www.Facebook.com/cklc.huvn/	717	724	Yes

Table 1. Facebook list of major public diplomacy institutions in Vietnam (as of 20 July 2020)
(continued)

No.	Main site	Facebook link	Page likes count (persons)	Page follow count (persons)	Pages mainly targeting Vietnamese
		꾸이년세종학당 Https://www.Facebook.com/ quynhsejong/	1.109	1.154	Yes
		Hàngữsejongcảnhor _권터한국어교육원 Https://www.Facebook.com/skeducaion/	948	967	Yes
5	Community of private diplomatic organizations	None (민간외교단체커뮤니티)			
6	Korea.net	Https://www.Facebook.com/ koreaclickers/	609.389	607.206	No
7	Dokdo	Https://dokdo.mofa.go.kr/kor/			
8	Arirangtv	Https://www.Facebook.com/arirangtv/	719.951	767.091	No
9	Korea foundation (KF)	Https://www.Facebook.com/ koreafoundation	19.881	20.629	Main page
		Https://www.Facebook.com/ koreafoundationhanoioffice/	6.322	6.344	Yes
10	KOICA	Https://www.Facebook.com/ officialkoica	45.100	46.437	Main page
		Koica베트남사무소(koicavietnam office) Https://www.Facebook.com/koica. vietnam/	9.184	9.414	Yes
11	VANK (voluntary agency network of Korea)	Https://www.Facebook.com/ vankprkorea	24.969	25.312	No
12	Ministry of culture, sports and tourism	Https://www.Facebook.com/mcstkorea	213.175	215.729	No
13	Korean culture and information service (KOICIS)	Https://www.Facebook.com/kocis.go.kr/	3.028	3.273	No

Vietnam or have offices located in Vietnam are all approaching the Vietnamese people through Facebook. In other words, in addition to Korea's main Facebook page, these organizations have created a Facebook page focusing primarily on engaging Vietnamese people. By using Facebook, the social media channel most commonly used by the Vietnamese people, Korean values, policies, culture, and education are being actively promoted to the Vietnamese people, reflected in the user engagement and interactions through "like" and "follow" buttons.

Additionally, it seems that most of the institutions that use Facebook pages for the Vietnamese people are writing Facebook posts in Korean, but this fails to reach foreigners who are interested in Korea but who are not proficient in Korean. This also nullifies the objectives of public diplomacy, as the information is accessed by only a minority. Even when posts are bilingual in English and Korean, the rate of effectiveness is reduced.

Additionally, as shown in Table 1, the most active organization on Facebook in Vietnam is the King Sejong institute foundation. As the demand for Korean language education has expanded, Korean language institutes continue to open. Out of more than 100 Korean language centers in Vietnam, the King Sejong institute employs effective learning methods, so it seems that many people are interested in learning from the King Sejong institute. King Sejong institute academies are present from northern Vietnam to the central region to the southern regions. This has become an effective tool for teaching Korean to Vietnamese people. All academies vividly convey their activities and events, so it seems that they are receiving positive feedback from interested people. A total of 15 King Sejong institutes are currently active in Vietnam, of which eleven use Facebook to exchange information with interested parties. Among these, only those in Thai Nguyen and Da Nang do not use Facebook yet. Additionally, it is difficult to distinguish whether or not it is the same system of King Sejong institute due to an inconsistency in their names, profiles, and cover pictures. This can be difficult for those seeking information, as they might confuse it with other centers using the same name. Therefore, unification is needed to enhance the efficiency and offer viewers a clearer understanding.

The chart below compares seven distinct media modes in terms of their abilities to convey information to the Vietnamese people, as revealed by an




Figure 2. How Vietnamese access information about Korea (unit: %)




Figure 3. Items of Vietnamese interest in Korea (Unit:%)

online survey. In particular, with 89.2%, equivalent to 281 out of 315 surveyed people choosing the corresponding option, Facebook stood out as the most popular tool, followed by 81.3% (256/315 votes) for YouTube. Subsequently, interpersonal communication accounted for 39.7% (125/315 votes), whereas the proportion for TV shows and newspapers were 36.5% (115/315 votes) and 34.6% (109/315 votes), respectively. Meanwhile, movie theaters and official websites shared the same percentage of 14.6% (46/315 votes).

In response to questions about what kinds of information respondents were frequently looking for, the fields in descending order are movies and

dramas (261 votes), music (251 votes), food (157 votes), traditional culture (109 votes), Korean language, study in Korea (108 votes), politics and society (69 votes), and other (volunteer activities, cosmetics, science and technology, jobs, fashion, etc.).

② YouTube

YouTube is a particularly popular social media platform for Vietnamese people. As shown in Figure 2, ranking second, there was only a narrow gap between its user base and that of Facebook, the most prevalent counterpart. Additionally, as people are increasingly considering YouTubers as a job in Vietnam, everyone can participate in YouTube and yield an income, regardless of their age, gender, and background. In particular, thanks to the ubiquity of smartphones and Internet connection, YouTube has been more accessible than ever. According to statistics from Statcounter Global stats, the usage rate of YouTube has increased significantly from January to September 2020, and in particular, from February to May, the number of YouTube users rapidly increased due to the increased amount of time spent at home because of the coronavirus.

According to the above statistics, YouTube is expected to continue to gain its popularity. In the case of Vietnam, this suggests that implementing public diplomacy plans or policies through YouTube channels can be




Figure 4. Social media stats Vietnam (from July 2019 to June 2020)¹⁹

19 <https://gs.statcounter.com/social-media-stats/all/viet-nam> (Search date: 2020.07.21.)

Table 2. YouTube list of major public diplomacy institutions in Korea (as of July 21, 2020)

No.	Main site	Youtube channel link	Subscribers (persons)
1	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	https://www.youtube.com/user/mofakorea	8.74 million
2	Northeast Asian history foundation	https://www.youtube.com/user/nehistory	2.92 thousand
3	K-pop contest	https://www.youtube.com/c/kbsworldtv	13.5 million
4	King Sejong institute foundation	https://www.youtube.com/user/learnsteachkorean	4.13 million
5	Community of private diplomatic organizations	None (민간외교단체커뮤니티)	0
6	Korea.net	https://www.youtube.com/user/gatewaytokorea	11.8 million
7	Dokdo	https://dokdo.mofa.go.kr/kor/	
8	Arirangtv	https://www.youtube.com/user/arirang	390,000
9	KF	https://www.youtube.com/user/thekoreafoundation	5.75 thousand
10	KOICA	코이카 https://www.youtube.com/user/officialkoica	45.100
11	VANK	https://www.youtube.com/user/prkorea/videos	3.97 million
12	Ministry of culture, sports and tourism	https://www.youtube.com/user/mcstkorea	25,000
13	KOCIS	None	0

appropriate and highly effective. In fact, when visiting major Korean public diplomacy sites, ten out of thirteen organizations had a YouTube channel, but there was no channel for Vietnamese people.

As shown in Table 2, all channels are connected to the main site, but there are no channels primarily targeting Vietnamese people. However, after Facebook, the social media most commonly used by the Vietnamese people to search for information about Korea is Youtube. Therefore, YouTube can be indispensable when practicing public diplomacy or activities in Vietnam.

Table 3. Languages used in major public diplomacy sites in Korea

No.	Main site	Link	Language
1	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Http://www.mofa.go.kr/www/index.do	Korean, English
2	Northeast Asian history foundation	Https://www.nahf.or.kr/main.do	Korean, English, Chinese, Japanese
3	K-pop contest	Http://k-popworldfestival.kbs.co.kr/	English
4	King Sejong institute foundation	Https://www.ksif.or.kr/intro.do	Korean, English, Chinese, Spanish
5	(Community of private diplomatic organizations)	Http://www.p2pdc.or.kr/main.do	Korean (민간외교단체커뮤니티)
6	Korea.net	Http://www.korea.net/	English, Korean
7	Dokdo	Https://dokdo.mofa.go.kr/kor/	Korean, English, Arabic, Chinese, German, French, Hindi, Italian, Japanese, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish
8	Arirangtv	Http://www.arirang.co.kr/index.asp	English, Korean
9	KF	Http://www.kf.or.kr/?MenuNo=3241	Korean, English, Chinese, Japanese, German, Russian, Vietnamese
10	KOICA	Http://www.koica.go.kr/sites/koica_kr/index.do	Korean, English
11	VANK	Http://prkorea.com/	Korean, English, Japanese, Chinese, Russian, French, Spanish, German, Arabic, Thai, Vietnamese, Italian, Portuguese, Malaysia
12	Ministry of culture, sports and tourism	Https://www.mcst.go.kr/kor/main.jsp	Korean, English, Chinese, Japanese
13	KOCIS	Http://www.kocis.go.kr/	Korean, English

③ Official website

All major public diplomacy initiatives have official web sites, and they communicate with visitors in both Korean and English. Additionally, many sites have other languages installed. Sharing information in various




Figure 5. Number of Vietnamese acknowledge major public diplomacy sites (Unit: %)

languages is predicted to significantly gain the sites' accessibility. Below is an overview of the languages used in major public diplomacy sites.

As shown in Table 3, only two of the 13 sites, the KF and the VANK, provide Vietnamese people with options. The remaining sites are mainly in Korean and English. Therefore, it can be predicted that only people having good Korean and English proficiencies visit the site. Because of this, the Vietnamese people inevitably have a lower access rate through official sites, as demonstrated by Table 1. Nevertheless, when conducting an investigation to determine which of the 13 sites are known and searched by Vietnamese people, the result revealed that not only are the Vietnamese people aware of these sites, but also many other sites. Through this, it can be concluded that institutions operating in Vietnam are making remarkable progress in public relations work and that the Vietnamese people are searching for information about Korea in both Korean and English. Accordingly, official websites also play a role in public diplomacy and drawing the attention of the Vietnamese people.

As mentioned above, even if the site is not available in Vietnamese,

there are still Vietnamese visitors. This suggests that rather than whether the site is accessible in Vietnamese, the more important factor is searching and visiting sites of institutions with offices in Vietnam. Additionally, all information is being updated quickly and vividly, as the main Korean organizations with a presence in Vietnam deliver policies and information, mainly through Facebook. These factors can make public diplomacy policies and activities widely known. Also, since the official site, Facebook, and YouTube are connected to each other, visitors are offered numerous and diverse information sources, which assures an attractive and convenient experience.

The three sources mentioned above – Facebook, YouTube, and official sites – are the mostly used in Vietnam and play an important role in promoting the Korean image through public diplomacy. It becomes a bridge that connects Korean and Vietnamese citizens. As such, it is a very effective and desirable strategy applying the achievements of the Fourth Industrial Revolution to public diplomacy. In addition to Facebook, YouTube, and websites, Instagram users continue to increase. Therefore, public diplomacy needs to be agile in grasping the local situation and presenting policies and activities appropriately according to the situation. Only then will the results meet expectations.

In addition to the social media platforms mentioned above, broadcast media channels such as radio and television continue to have many viewers. Since the Korean Wave was introduced to Vietnam in the late 90s, it has remained the main forum of publicity. It has not been discussed in depth in this paper because its promotion has been constant since the time of its introduction, and it remains an important means of public relations throughout the time when foreign policy was conducted.

HOLDING LARGE-SCALE CONCERTS WITH THE AID OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Every year, many Korean events are held in Vietnam. Through this, it is possible to inform the Vietnamese people about Korean culture, history, values and travel. The main events held in Vietnam are related to food,




Figure 6. Evaluation of the influence of the Korean Wave in Vietnam (Unit: %)

music, travel and study abroad. These include inviting famous or influential people from Korean show business to Vietnam to interact with the Vietnamese people and selecting idols or actors to promote the image of Korea as ambassadors. In the more than 20 years since the Korean Wave was introduced to Vietnam, many Vietnamese people, especially young people, favor Korean show business, and a large number of fan groups have formed, which indirectly facilitate the role of public diplomacy. In other words, through these fan groups, not

only is information about favorite idols shared, but it can also accelerate communication of other information related to Korea. In response to the survey question, “Have you ever heard of the term Korean Wave,” 71.1% of the respondents said they had heard of it, and the remaining 28.9% said they had not. Those who had heard of the Korean Wave were asked to evaluate how it is affecting Vietnamese society. Specifically, the answer to this question is shown in the following chart.

As seen above, Vietnamese people are well aware of the Korean Wave and believe that it has a high impact on Vietnamese society. The most common responses were very strong and strong (77.7% of the total). Through this data, it is evident that policies of public diplomacy have had a remarkable effect in Vietnam.

However, in response to the question of whether respondents had ever participated in an event, the results came out differently from expected. Of the 315 people who participated in the survey, 135 answered that they had never participated in an event related to Korea, accounting for 42.9%. The remaining 57.1% had participated, and among them, the five most popular events were food events (30.5%), music (28.6%), study abroad (16.8%), volunteer service (16.2%), and travel (13.7%).

When the reasons for low attendance were investigated, it was revealed that they were not able to participate due to three major factors: geography, time, and finances. Although several events are held every year in Vietnam,

they are held only in large cities such as Hanoi, Da Nang, and Ho Chi Minh City, so only people from the city or people living in the surrounding areas participated in the events. They also replied that even if they lived in the city where the event was held, many people were unable to participate because they could not accommodate the event in their schedule. For example, students and freelancers can adjust their time, but it is difficult to change schedules for those who have a regular job.

Therefore, from the results of Figure 7, we find that it is necessary to give further consideration to timing when conducting an event. Additionally, 36% of respondents who did not participate indicated that they had no idea about these events, even though they were using various social media and traditional methods. Further, as mentioned, access is still limited because events were held in major large cities. Therefore, consideration of these multiple factors and detailed preparation are essential to ensure successful hosting of any event.

In other words, food and music events can attract a lot of fans by inviting influencers to major events held in Vietnam. Study abroad events are centered on parents and people who want to study abroad in Korea, and these days, as Korea offers scholarships in various forms, it has attracted the attention and interest of numerous students and parents. Most volunteers need to speak Korean or English to participate. The targets for recruitment are mainly school and college students. This presents an opportunity to work with Koreans and naturally show Korea's strong economic power and values. The Korean language and study abroad and volunteer activities will be discussed in detail in the next two sections. Food and music events held in Vietnam from 2017 to 2019, according to the public diplomacy report,²⁰




Figure 7. Reasons for not participating in the event (Unit: %)

²⁰ Global Hallyu Status in 2017 I (Asia, Oceania); Korea Foundation for International Relations: 2017, pp.175-178; 2018, pp.181~184; 2019, pp.141~147 [한국국제교류재단 2017년지구촌한류현황 I (아시아, 대양주); 2018년; 2019년]




Figure 8. Evaluation of success rate of events related to Korea (Unit: %)




Figure 9. Evaluation of modern technology facilities used in events (Unit: %)

totaled 33 events, an increase from the previous number. This is because Korea's public diplomacy policy was expanded starting in 2017. Likewise, from this time on, the number of participants has seemingly increased, in addition to investment in the events and its format. In particular, the events have successfully brought in elements from science and technology. When surveying the opinions on the effectiveness of the events, 67.5% of respondents felt that the events were successful, 18% very successful, and 14.5% usually successful. Almost no respondents felt the events were unsuccessful or completely unsuccessful. This is shown below in Figure 8.

Among the factors that made the events successful, modern science and technology facilities were important factors. In response to the question, 'What is the modern technology facility like?' 15.7% answered that the technical facilities are very modern, 68.6% answered that they were modern, 15.2% usually modern, and only 0.4% said they did not have technical facilities. This is a significant because it demonstrates that technology has been used in favor of public diplomacy.

The public relation process and the role of modern technology facilities are among the decisive factors in the success of the events. There are still many issues to consider, but the positive evaluation of the events and technological facilities show that the image of Korea is well demonstrated. This supports a conclusion that Korea's public diplomacy policy is being developed in the right direction. If the implementation of public diplomacy policies is continually adjusted and

the progressive achievements of humanity actively applied to suit them, Korea's diplomatic relations and image will correspondingly improve globally.

DIGITALIZATION OF THE FIELD OF EDUCATION

In order to understand a country, that country's language is a prerequisite. Public diplomacy, which understands the importance of this mission well, has implemented various plans and policies in Vietnam as more and more people learn Korean. This program is considered to have three core activities: Korean language instruction, scholarships, and competitions related to Korean. Among them, the achievements of the Fourth Industrial Revolution are being utilized in learning Korean, which is the focus of this part.

① Learning Korean

Learning Korean gained popularity in Vietnam beginning in the early 2000s, but since 2014, schools and Korean language academies have rapidly increased. Through these schools and academies, many people have an opportunity to learn Korean.

“Although Korean was ‘introduced’ to Vietnam much later than English, French and Chinese, it has quickly established itself as one of the most sought-after foreign languages. In Vietnam, more than 16,000 students are currently majoring in Korean (language) studies at 29 universities nationwide. Thanks to the continuous development of Korea-Vietnam relations, investment by Korean companies in Vietnam, and cultural exchanges such as Korean drama and music, this number is increasing. Currently, 15 King Sejong institutes have been opened in Vietnam, including the Korean Cultural Center in Vietnam, University of Languages and International Studies, University of Social Sciences and Humanities (Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh City), Thai Nguyen, and Hue. Keeping with the demand for Korean, the number of Korean language education institutions is expected to continue to increase. Meanwhile, the Vietnam Ministry of Education and Training developed the ‘2020 education plan,’ which adopted




Figure 10. Evaluation of interest in Korean (Unit: %)

Korean as a second foreign language subject in Vietnamese secondary schools, and pilot education was conducted in a total of eight middle and high schools in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City beginning in September 2016. The age of Korean language learners in Vietnam varies from 10 to 50. Motives for pursuing Korean language learning include the need to learn Korean for work, but many other learners are naturally keen on Korean because of their interest in Korean dramas, movies, and music. Still others are motivated by a desire to study in Korea or get a job in a

Korean company is also a major motivation for learning Korean.”²¹

After conducting a preliminary survey, it can be seen that there are many people who are interested in Korean. Among 315 participants in the survey, 55.2% expressed an interest in Korean. The remainder replied that they were not interested or did not know.

This reflects that more people are interested in learning about Korea. Since public diplomacy is a tool for better understanding this trend, various programs are being conducted in various formats. The 15 King Sejong institutes in Vietnam are highly evaluated by those who learn Korean. In addition to offline classes, online classes are also offered. This is a suitable method in an era where the internet is rapidly developing, and the experience of the coronavirus pandemic over the past half year further suggests the advantages of online lectures. Specifically, these include the following:

First, it saves travel time and opens up new opportunities. Potential students can study from remote locations, without going to the classroom directly. The 15 language instruction centers in Vietnam are mainly only in large cities, so people in other regions cannot attend the face-to-face classes. Online lectures can not only prevent disruptions due to covid-19 pandemic,

21 2019년지구촌한류현황 I (아시아, 대양주); 한국국제교류재단, 2019, 122~123면. (Global Korean Wave Status in 2019 I (Asia, Oceania); Korea Foundation for International Relations, 2019, pp. 122-123.)

but also provide people with more opportunities for learning Korean.

Second, distance learning is financially effective. Indeed, it has facilitated a reduction in overhead cost for institutions, since essential infrastructure for a casual class is no longer needed. Besides, online lectures enable learners to attend classes more than once and provide them with the flexibility to study whenever and wherever they are available and most productive. As a result, they can make the most of their material and, therefore, optimize the money they invest in education.

Of course, every coin has two sides, but the advantages of online classes are obviously many and represent a way to adapt to the changing times. Looking at the achievements of the King Sejong Institute seems to indicate that it is implementing the policy of public diplomacy well. However, as discussed previously, although King Sejong Institutes are carrying out promotional strategies through social media, limitations remain, suggesting the need for continual adaptation to Vietnam’s unique characteristics.

② Selection of scholarships and ③ Holding of contest

As the trend of learning Korean increases, the number of people seeking to study in Korea will also increase. However, as the number of people able to cover expenses for studying abroad remains relatively small, obtaining a scholarship is a priority for many, especially students with strong academic records. At present, many institutions and individuals provide scholarships in various forms. This paper only discusses statistics on scholarships from the Korean government and government-related institutions for which Vietnamese people are eligible to apply.

Table 6. Scholarship support from the Korean government and related organizations applicable to Vietnamese²²

No.	Scholarship	Support provided
1	Korean government scholarship program (KGSP) for graduate students	Round trip air fare, tuition fees, living costs of 1,000,000 won per month, research expenses of 420,000 won per year for the field of humanities and 480,000 won per year for the fields of science, and medical insurance provided.

22 Ministry of Education, National Institute of International Education (NIIED), Guidebook for International Students (Korean), 2014, pages 26-28.

Table 6. Scholarship support from the Korean government and related organizations applicable to Vietnamese (continued)

No.	Scholarship	Support provided
2	KGSP for undergraduate students	Round trip air fare, tuition fees, living costs 800,000 won per month, medical insurance provided.
3	KGSP for visiting researchers	Round trip air fare, tuition fees, living costs of 900,000 won per month and medical insurance provided.
4	Scholarship for outstanding self - financed foreign students	Living expenses: 500,000 won per month, career counseling and participation in culture experience camp
5	Scholarship for outstanding exchange students	living expenses (800,000 won per month) - reserve fund (200,000 won per month) roundtrip airfares (1,700,000 won on average) medical insurance premium
6	Art major Asian scholarship - Ministry of Culture, Sports & Tourism	18 million won per year for undergraduate and postgraduate students
7	International scholar exchange fellowship - Korea Foundation for Advanced Studies	2.2 million won research expenses, entry expenses, return airfare and insurance

The following competitions are held to create fun opportunities for those learning Korean:

Table 7. Korean language competitions held in Vietnam

No.	Competition
1	King Sejong Institute Korean speaking contest
2	Kumho Asiana cup Korean speech contest in Vietnam
3	Quiz on Korea
4	Hangeul day celebration
5	Korean speeches and students' meetings
6	King Sejong Institute Hangeul day event

APPLYING NEW TECHNOLOGY TO VOLUNTEER SUPPORT

Volunteer support is a major force in Korean public diplomacy. In particular, when comparing the economic power of Korea with that of Vietnam, Korea is developing more, so at present it is donating to Vietnam in various fields, and it supports a lot of social welfare and volunteer activities. One of the four elements of public diplomacy is making good friends through contributions and service. Contributions through volunteering in countries with developing economies forms a major component of this strategy, with the effect of not only continuing to develop bilateral friendly relations, but also demonstrating Korea's strong economic power globally. Also, volunteering delivers benefits to both volunteers and recipients. In other words, the quality of life improves for locals through the use of good facilities and increased awareness from education-related services. At the same time, Korean representatives can grasp the local environment through volunteering and recommend appropriate policies or investment plans. Additionally, while volunteering with locals, they can directly share and spread the beautiful characteristics, culture, and values of Korea. In other hand, they can also learn more about Vietnam as well. Every year, many Korean volunteers travel to Vietnam to work with local volunteers, helping people in remote and difficult locations. The most important point of these volunteer activities is that they need the assistance of science and technology.

Due to economic difficulties, living standard has not yet been improved in remote area, where local authorities often face difficulties satisfying human basic needs for residents. Korean economic power can make a contribution in this respect through utilizing developments of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. The Korean representative organization is KOICA. Through KOICA, the Korean government provided 37.3 billion won to Vietnam in the form of ODA. Therefore, Vietnam is the country that receives the most ODA from Korea among Asia-Pacific countries. Fields of support include mainly education, healthcare, public administration, agriculture, forestry and fisheries, water (technical environmental energy), energy (technical environmental energy), transportation (technical environmental energy), science (technical environmental energy), the environment (general fields), and gender equality (cross-disciplinary).




Figure 10. KOICA's ODA support status (Asia-Pacific region)²³

Therefore, it can be seen that the relationship between Korea and Vietnam is not merely a diplomatic relationship but a strategic cooperative partnership.

There are various fields of support, and the aid of science and technology is applied across all of these fields. In the case of Vietnam, KOICA provides 400 volunteers working in education, health care, and public administration, who work in 26 provinces in Vietnam. According to their fields of expertise, volunteers work for Vietnam government agencies, such as vocational technical colleges (Vocational technical colleges Vietnam Industry NgheAn province), the Vietnam-Korea friendship clinic (Hanoi), and cultural sports tourism centers in NgheAn and Ca Mau province.

Another representative example is the case of the Vietnam-Korea friendship information technology college. This is a public vocational college responsible for creating experts and technicians with advanced knowledge in their field. These people contribute to the development of Vietnam by sharing Korea's advanced scientific and technological capabilities and achievements. Additionally, Korea provided 11 million USD as ODA to invest in building lecture rooms, laboratory buildings, libraries, administrative offices, and technical facilities, as well as by building educational content.²⁴

23 http://www.oda.go.kr/opo/koin/mainInfoPage.do?P_SCRIN_ID=OPOA202060S01 (Search Date: 2020.07.24.)

24 https://vi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tr%C6%B0%E1%BB%9Dng_%C4%90%E1%BA%A1i_

In January 2010, a general hospital was constructed in Quang Nam province. The project has a total budget of 45 million USD, of which 35 million USD is Korean ODA support.²⁵

Through the aforementioned examples, the Korean government has supported numerous projects in Vietnam. This volunteer support is very important and has huge significance for the development of Vietnam. In particular, it is not only economic support, but also facilitates technology transfer through visits by experts, and the image of Korea improves among the Vietnamese people. Through this process, not only does the relationship between the two governments become stronger and closer, but Korea also establishes a beautiful relationship with the Vietnamese people. This will be a very important bridge on which to continue and expand the policy of public diplomacy, while utilizing achievements from the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Therefore, the connection between public diplomacy and the Fourth Industrial Revolution will continue to become stronger.

CONCLUSION

Korea's public diplomacy policy is being actively implemented in Vietnam. This has several causes. ① Cultural similarities. When the Vietnamese people embrace Korean culture, they are not affected much by cultural shock, and Korean culture can easily harmonize with Vietnamese culture with little apparent conflict. ② common Vietnamese personality traits are kindness, open-mindedness and gentleness. Therefore, the Vietnamese people can adapt quickly not only to Korean culture but also to all foreign cultures. ③ Economically, Vietnam is still developing in comparison to Korea. Therefore, Korea can effectively implement public diplomacy policies through volunteer activities or policies supported through ODA. ④ The Korean and the Vietnamese governments share a strategic partnership.

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25 <https://baodanang.vn/channel/5425/201001/khoi-cong-xay-dung-benh-vien-da-khoa-trung-uong-quang-nam-1994207/> (Search Date: 2020.07.24.)

Korea and Vietnam established diplomatic relations in 1992, almost 30 years ago. The two countries are making a remarkable effort to create a bright future by moving on from the painful history. Thanks to this, relations between Korea and Vietnam are close and friendly, and not only traditional diplomacy, but also public diplomacy and all fields are actively in cooperation and achieving great results. In order to achieve these results, Korean public diplomatic institutions have an important role in adjusting foreign policy while reflecting the changes of the times. In other words, the progressive achievements of science and technology are used as much as possible in the process of implementing public diplomacy policies. In the future, in order to practice public diplomacy policy more successfully in Vietnam, it is necessary to make tailored use of advanced science and technology, in which advantages are optimized while disadvantages are overshadowed. The Fourth Industrial Revolution is characterized by fast and rapid information delivery. Taking advantage of these benefits will lead to successful promotion of the image of Korea. On the other hand, incorrect information can also be rapidly distributed. In particular, since public diplomacy plays the role of spreading a positive image of Korea to the people of other countries, the use of progressive technology merits caution.

This paper has examined how to apply the progressive science and technology achievements of the era of the Fourth Industrial Revolution to Korea's public diplomacy policy, centering on the case study of Vietnam. In fact, the concept of public diplomacy is still a relatively new concept, and it is still unfamiliar to many Vietnamese people among those who conducted the survey, 139/315 (44.1%) revealed that they had never heard of the concept of public diplomacy and that 110 (34.9%) had heard of it, but did not understand it. On the one hand, this raises question marks over the mutuality and equity of the current approach, in which enhancing public awareness of diplomacy activities must be taken into consideration, so that it can avoid any notoriety as a manipulation rather than a pure diplomatic strategy. However, on the other hand, in the history of the Vietnamese people diplomacy, "people-to-people relations" existed for a long time. People's diplomacy has played an important role in Vietnam's diplomatic history, and especially during the wartime period (1945-1975), in which it

played an indispensable role in the national liberation project by combining with Ho Chi Minh ideology. This concept has apparent similarities with the public diplomacy that originated in the United States. This identity suggests that the strategy Korea diploma applies in Vietnam, which is closely tied with basic principle of inter-citizen integration, can be easily adopted, provided that it is transparent enough. Beside, as we enter the present era, Vietnam's diplomacy is showing its original spirit, and it is engaged in various activities in line with the changing times. Likewise, the successful implementation of Korean public diplomacy in Vietnam will be a great example for Vietnamese public diplomacy, which offers a lesson of harnessing state-of-the-art technologies to connect individuals.

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Korean Public Diplomacy toward Africa: Scoping the Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid in the Age of COVID-19 Crisis

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Abstract | In the age of globalization, a nation's identity and political culture play a significant role in that nation's behavior in any given international dealing. Economic interests, international cooperation, norms and values play central role and states can reconstruct them by interacting with other nations. From this perspective, the core point of this paper is to analyze the modern states' assistance and cooperation to under-developed and developing states amid the COVID-19 crisis. This paper explores Korea's dynamic role as a middle power, its norms of compassion, cooperation, and aid to Africa during the outbreak of the pandemic as a form of public diplomacy through state and non-state actors. It examines how Korea has been helping the population of poorer continent and building its positive image around the world. It provides the theoretical lens to understand the effectiveness of Korea's public diplomacy policy towards Africa. Finally, the present study also offers suggestive ideas for global cooperation to deal with the spread of coronavirus and collaboration with other states by conducting public diplomacy.

국문초록 | 세계화 시대에 한 국가의 정체성과 정치 문화는 특정 국제 정세를 이해하는 데 중요한 역할을 한다. 경제적 이해관계, 상호협력, 규범, 가치들은 중심적 역할을 하며 정부들은 다른 국가들과 상호 작용하는 과정에서 그것들을 재(再)건설 할 수 있다. 이러한 관점에서 핵심은 코로나19 사태 중 현대 국가들이 후진국과 개발도상국들에 보낸 원조와 협력을 분석하는 것이다. 이 논문은 미들 파워로서 한국의 활발한 역할, 정부와 비정부 참여자들을 통한 공공 외교의 한 형태로 전염병이 발발하는 동안 아프리카에 보낸 원조, 협력, 동정심의 규범을 탐구한다. 이 글은 그동안 한국이 어떻게 가난한 대륙을 도우며 세계적으로 긍정적인 이미지를 쌓아왔는지 알아보고, 대(對)아프리카 공공 외교 정책의 효과성을 이해하기 위한 이론적 렌즈를 제공한다. 마지막으로, 이 연구는 또한 코로나19의

확산에 대처하기 위한 국제적 협조와 공공 외교 실행을 통한 다른 정부들과의 협력에 관한 아이디어를 제안한다.

INTRODUCTION

The state's identity and political culture play pivotal roles in understanding the global situation. A powerful state will abstain from merciless power politics by playing by the regulations and acting through cooperation, significantly shaping its own identity in the process. Understandings and beliefs can change by people-to-people contact abroad. Initially, countries may organize their institutions around economic interests, but through continual engagement with foreign publics' views, may eventually revise their original intentions, norms, and values. From a constructivist standpoint, it is important to see how the Corona Virus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic changes or strengthens the understandings and beliefs which countries support and cooperate on regarding globalization (Rausch, 2020). From the constructivist perspective, Korea's norms of empathy, cooperation and financial support to Africa amid the outbreak of COVID-19 through humanitarian aid and assistance reflect the spirit of its cooperation, as a form of public diplomacy. Korea's aid to African states is a manifestation of the standards to save the lives of needy people and presents a positive impact across the world.

The continuous movement of people in a globalized world makes a pandemic a particularly difficult menace to resist. Cheng and Zhang (2020) note the initial place for the outbreak of coronavirus and first reported infected people as being Wuhan, China (Osler, 2020; Family, 2020). Initially, it affected countries including Japan, the Republic of Korea, France, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand, the U.S, and Australia (Wick, 2020, p.3). On January 20, 2020, South Korea's Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC) reported its first new coronavirus case in a Chinese female visitor who flew from Wuhan to Incheon airport (Lee, 2020). This first confirmed case has been regarded as the beginning of South Korea's first wave of the virus. The second wave started with massive spread of infection with a religious group (BBC News, 2020). Korea's comprehensive

COVID-19 response shows how information and communication technologies for testing, contact tracing, text alerts, dissemination of data, social distancing and support from communities enables a flattening of the curve without the imposition of restrictions on citizens' movement or lockdown of cities (Woodward, 2020). In late March, experts scrutinized Korea as a model for other states to fighting the coronavirus. Loembe, et al. (2020) note, after emerging reports of COVID-19 from Wuhan in December 2019, Africa began to prepare for its inevitable first cases which would soon grow due to its close links to China, a key trade partner and host to some 80,000 African students. Statistics showed based on travel records from China that Egypt, Algeria, and South Africa at risk of developing cases and spreading them out to other areas of Africa. The outbreak of the novel virus is devastating lives, health care systems, and economies in the region. The already vulnerable populations of the continent will require more global cooperation and humanitarian assistance amid the pandemic.

Due to the importance of mutual relations, Korea's determination and dedication to support Africa is a form of public diplomacy in the times of COVID-19 pandemic. This study seeks to provide comprehensive examination of Korea's initiative by state, non-state actors and civil society to help the vulnerable population of Africa, particularly Ethiopia, Madagascar, South Sudan, and Kenya with explicit types of its public diplomacy practices. As part of the in-depth study, a theoretical lens will be applied to understand the effectiveness of Korea public diplomacy policy towards Africa amid the current global pandemic; the present research also provides suggestions and recommendations for global collaboration to tackle the ongoing pandemic and cooperate with other nations through public diplomacy. The present study analyzes the following questions:

1. What are the actors and tools of public diplomacy?
2. Which efforts have been made by Korean state and non-state actors to support and cooperate with Africa through humanitarian aid to elevate its public diplomacy amid the COVID-19 crisis?
3. How has Korea's assistance been helping the vulnerable populations in Africa and what is the effectiveness of cooperation and humanitarian aid during the current global pandemic?

Brooks (2020) notes some catastrophes such as cyclones and earthquakes can bring people into cooperation but history records that pandemics normally estrange them. During the times of pandemics, social distancing is the norm. Fear erodes normal human capacities for care and togetherness. Wang (2020) argues public diplomacy in every shape and form provides a bringing-together of human hearts and minds at different societal levels and is essential to enhancing the extents of our collective affinity. Lee Geun, Korea Foundation President underscored Korea is more developed across the globe than Korean people expect and in terms of its public diplomacy should stress this. In dealing with the current pandemic, Korea has been more successful in comparison to Europe and other states (Whan-woo, 2020). Korea's capacity to tackle the pandemic at home and its humanitarian aid to Africa is a commendable step for collaboration to fight against the coronavirus.

EXPLORATION OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND OUTBREAK OF CORONAVIRUS

In 1965, Edward Gullion, dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, coined the term "public diplomacy" (Hayden, 2011, p. 147). Since then, the term "public diplomacy" has been in use, but it became much more familiar in 1990, when Joseph Nye coined the term "soft power." Since the September 11 events, the latter term has gained more popularity (Ahyun, 2017, p.15). Nye formulates, "soft power is both an asset to cultivate and a tool to use, a kind of public opinion capital that has raised the profile of communication-centric foreign policies such as public diplomacy, international broadcasting, and other forms of strategic communication" (Hayden, 2011, p.1). Cull describes that "public diplomacy is an international actor's attempt to manage the international environment through engagement with a foreign public" (Cull, 2009, p. 12). The definition of public diplomacy presented by Paul Sharp is probably the most concise, which he defines as "the process by which direct relations with people in a country are pursued to advance the interests and extend the values of those being represented" (Melissen, 2005, p.11; Golan et al. 2015,

p. 53). Public diplomacy aims to achieve a favorable image from foreign peoples and uses the public as a tool to attain the required objectives.

In our stormy, interconnected and interdependent world, one citizen's safety affects the others, and one citizen's health or poor health can influence others. The current world economy ties the prosperity of states together in dealing with issues such as unforeseen food crisis, energy, and financial crises and of course pandemics. These "crises of interdependence" have significant public health implications (Fairman et al. 2012, p.23). In reference to COVID-19, scientist have detailed the ways in which Coronavirus are in fact constitutes many viruses which are found both in human beings and animals. "The virus that causes COVID-19 is designated severe acute respiratory syndrome corona virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2); previously referred to as 2019-nCoV" (Joseph & Ashkan, 2020, p.1). The spread of COVID-19 in China brought the virus into the focus of attention anew, and Wuhan bore the brunt of this spread. By the end of December 2019, cases of pneumonia-like virus were appearing in Wuhan. Since that time, the virus not only affected the other areas of China but spread its poison across neighboring states (Wick, 2020, p.3) and around the world. Due to its rapid person-to-person transmission, the World Health Organization (WHO) designated it as a Public Health Emergency of International Concern on January 31, 2020 (Zhou et al. 2020, p.3). On March 11, the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a global pandemic. According to the World Meters Information on September 10, "COVID-19 is affecting 213 states across the globe and 2 international conveyances" (Worldometers, 2020). Tedros Adhanom, the head of the World Health Organization urged "states to apply the lessons learned from Korea and elsewhere" (Fisher & Sang-Hun, 2020). Jee Young-Mee, a member of the WHO COVID-19 Emergency Committee and Korea Foundation special representative for health diplomacy underlines "The COVID-19 pandemic has turned from disaster to opportunity for Korean Public diplomacy" (Whan-woo, 2020). Korea's swift actions to handle the novel virus in the early stages make it possible to help other nations by sharing its experience, medical equipment and humanitarian assistance.

ACTORS AND TOOLS OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Public diplomacy basically deals with the “management of communication” among actors. State and non-state actors have particular informational or motivational goals with regards to reaching the foreign audience using different networks of communication to promote national interests. Most importantly, in New Public Diplomacy, “the focus has shifted from conventional diplomatic means and goals for promotion to relationship cultivation with key foreign public” (Golan et al. 2015, p. 2; Zaharna, 2010).

As ranked by social level, actors of institutional features of public diplomacy are identified at macro level, micro level, and meso level. Firstly, the state is the main actor in public diplomacy and carries out its activities through government agents and is an aggregate of all communications received from state and non-state actors. Secondly, scholars, politicians, artists, and citizens perform their organizational role. Thirdly, organizations play their role as a form of public diplomacy. All these actors form parts of diverse social subsystems from political sphere and military to academia and may have disagreements in their desired manifestations of public diplomacy practices and their search for public diplomacy strategies (Auer and Alice, 2013. pp. 12-14). Berridge (2015) advocates that new actors in diplomacy especially international NGOs are neither new nor involved entirely in diplomacy (p. 267).

Melissen (2006) describes the instruments of public diplomacy as: the media, internet, events and projects, celebrities and publications (p. 96). Ruge (2011) describes how even Facebook is an online tool of public diplomacy efforts. An embassy can utilize these web tools in significant ways to gauge their host public's dispositions. He includes PAO, Adobe Co.Nx, Flickr, Youtube, Blogs, X.life, Short Messenger Services (SMS) among other instruments. Online-based instruments such as Twitter and Facebook are popular platforms for discussion of local issues (p. 145). A significant role in public diplomacy is also played by lectures, conferences, exhibitions and outside events, (Whan-woo, 2020) face to face discussion, cultural performances, and language programs. Edward R. Murrow has defined the face-to-face discussion “the last three feet” which cannot be

replaced (Rugh, 2011, p. 172). Public diplomacy is a communication function by state and non-state actors to design the practices for their diplomacy programs.

ANALYSIS OF KOREA'S STATE ACTORS' AND NON-STATE ACTORS' EFFORTS IN AFRICA THROUGH PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Conventional constructivists are fascinated in recognizing the actor's inclination. According to constructivist approach, actors and systems can change shape over time. In this context, constructivists are not afraid of extended periods of lockdown, as this gives them time to adapt and assess factors of risk moving forward (Asmar, 2020). History reveals the unanticipated twists and turns of global crisis, virus epidemics or pandemics across the world. Amid the current COVID-19 pandemic, millions of human beings are in threat, needing prompt and dynamic response and humanitarian aid. In this scenario, Korean public diplomacy policies and programs implemented in Africa have and are helping the people and building beneficial partnership with the continent.

According to Nye, there are three different aspects of public diplomacy... "Different relevant proportions of direct government information and long-term cultural relationships": Communication style, timeframes, and posture orientations are the three facets to accomplishing these purposes (Snow & Taylor, 2009, pp.73-74; Nye, 2004). Among all these three aspects, each aspect has a significant role to building a favorable image of a state and to achieving its wanted results. In the last two decades, Korea's interest in Africa has grown due to its natural sources and huge market for manufactured products. But, amid the ongoing COVID-19 crisis, Korea's focus has been providing immediate humanitarian aid and cooperation through public diplomacy. Korea's support to beneficiary-communities of Africa is one such manifestation of its public diplomacy.

The capacity or incapability of global actors and multilateral cooperation could be seen by their actions to making the situation better or worse amid the current pandemic. In all this, Korea has been seen as a model across the world. Whan-woo (2020) notes, before COVID-19, public health did not

have much place in public diplomacy, but the novel virus will provide opportunity to raise Korea's diplomatic prospects. This attests to Korea's engagements and concerns that Korea is acting in the same way that any country in the world would to exercise more power through public diplomacy especially those in the poor states of Africa. The first initiative of Korean-African cooperation in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic was the G-20 Extraordinary Leader Summit. On March 26, the summit convened to discuss the global responses to the epidemic. President Moon Jae-in and G20 members held a video conference. They discussed enhancing support to less developed states, plans to deal the pandemic, minimization of tariffs and trade hurdles, and sanctions in the pandemic era (Yonhap, 2020a). President Moon spoke to G20 member states, sharing the Korean clinical data and information from the quarantine phase to help fight against COVID-19, and to aid in the cooperative development of therapeutics and vaccines (Yonhap, 2020b). He asserted that it would be important to keep the flow of economic exchanges open in order to mitigate far-reaching impacts to the world economy during the pandemic (Yonhap, 2020c).

By mid-March, out of 54 African countries some 30 had confirmed the coronavirus cases (Anna & Magome, 2020). Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and South African President Cyril Ramaphosa appraised the extensive impacts of corona across the continent. In the next few days following the summit, President Moon discussed with Abiy the potential impacts the pandemic could have on Ethiopia. Both concurred on the significance of G20 countries giving assistance to Africa after showing concern regarding their ability to tackle the current developments of the pandemic (Bone and Kim, 2020). The G-20 concurred to inject \$5 trillion into world economy and said the 'serious risks posed to Africa' are the result of poorly-funded healthcare facilities, and so the G20 placed particularly focused on Africa (Marks, 2020).

Out of the Second Seoul Dialogue on Africa (MOFA, 2019) emerged President Moon's first key initiative for the continent. COVID-19 crisis has brought good opportunity for cooperation between Korea and Africa. Korea is already providing support to Africa and started swift and immediate financial support to continent after the summit. This time, the government leadership has focused on mutually beneficial partnership, moving Korean

nationals out of Africa while providing support to individual African countries that needed it (Bone and Kim, 2020).

Government's investment in public diplomacy is evaluated by the demonstration of returns by the actions of state and non-state actors. Evaluation is discerned as pivotal to many public diplomacy functions, including 'program planning, providing evidence for the impact of public diplomacy on informing and influencing foreign publics, and, ultimately showing support for strategic goal attainment in foreign affairs' (Buhmann & Sommerfeldt, 2020, p.9). Kyung-sik, (2020) notes, President Moon is curious about promoting friendly ties with Ethiopia, who was the sole African state to dispatch ground troops to South Korea and shed blood alongside South Korean allies in the Korean War (1950-3). Korea and Ethiopia have maintained close cooperative relations in the fields of politics, trade, economy, and international relations based on bilateral trust and friendship.

Berridge (2010) identifies Telephone Diplomacy as a more suitable tool in some circumstances and in some relations (p. 195). Its silver-lining is especially apparent amid the fast-changing circumstances and current global crisis, by making less face-to-face contact with others, and by orchestrating others response. Chi-dong (2020) notes President Moon used phone diplomacy to share Korea's experience with COVID-19. He received many calls from international leadership. He said, "Behind the frequent telephone summits were a demand for global solidarity in response to COVID-19, a desire to share South Korea's quarantine experience and acquire its test kits and other medical devices." On March 30, Korean President promised to increase international support for Africa in curbing the novel virus during his phone talks with Prime Minister Abiy (Kyung-sik, 2020). Before the COVID-19 outbreak, African states Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Sudan were already facing the cumulative impacts of the stressful situation of dire food insecurity. On March 20, it was reported that the novel virus is anticipated to aggravate ongoing issues (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2020, p.11). Korea provided 16 thousand tons of rice this year as food assistance. On May 13, Ethiopia received medical devices including hand sanitizers, masks, and diagnostic kits from Korea. The first humanitarian aid (worth \$470 thousand) was supported by the Korea

government in collaboration with Korean NGOs. On July 24, the second relief effort was made through the African Union. The Korean Embassy in Ethiopia donated 2 million masks to the African Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDCP). The African Union (AU) expects that the donation will enhance the Africa's capacity in combating the novel virus (Senbit, 2020). In July, the Ethiopian government and the Export-Import Bank of Korea signed a loan agreement (\$70 million), which will help its efforts to deal with the Medical Equipment Provision Project (\$ 30 million) and COVID-19 Emergency Response Budget Support Program (\$ 40 million) (Ethiopian Monitor, 2020). The permanent representatives of Korea to AU, Amb Hoomin Lim expressed kind remarks about the crucial role in combating novel virus through systematic and organized Pan African policies (African Union, 2020).

On April 6, Tedros invited the Korean President Keynote speaker to share his country's experience to containing the virus in teleconference taking place in May. He urged Korea to provide assistance with testing kits and other medical equipment to sub-Saharan African states (Yeon-cheol, 2020a). On May 18, President Moon addressed in teleconference World Health Assembly. He expressed "the power of the three principles of openness, transparency, and democracy was demonstrated, thanks to the members of the public who became agents of disease prevention as they practiced the spirit of liberty for everyone with a strong sense of civic consciousness" (Yeon-cheol, 2020b). In regard to supporting the most affected states by pandemic, the government of Korea has provided humanitarian aid (\$4 million) to 14 states—Yemen and 8 states in Southwest Asia, East Africa, and 5 states in West Africa. The donation was made through the World Food Program and the Food and Agriculture Organization. (MOFA, 2020d). Starting from July 21, Korea provided 2 million face masks as humanitarian aid to Africa. The donation was made to 28 states of sub-Saharan-Africa for medical staff on urgent basis through the African CDC. On the request of 42 African states, Korea is also providing quarantine support (\$ 26 million) (KBS World, 2020).

In order to implement the containment measures, many African states, notably Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Namibia, and South Africa imposed travel restrictions, closing their borders and airports for international flights by the

2nd or 3rd week of March. (Salcedo & Chereus, 2020). Moroccan and Korean top diplomats talked on the phone to arrange the special plane bring home about 105 Korean citizens including the volunteers from the state aid agency (KOICA) and transport medical devices to Morocco (Yonhap, 2020d). Korea made efforts to bring home the Korean tourists and expatriates in Africa via chartered planes arranged through multilateral cooperation. Some 66 Korean citizens in Madagascar and Cameroon were evacuated by joint arrangement from diplomatic missions of the US, Japan, Germany, and Britain (Sun, 2020). On 31 March, some 26 Korean nationals evacuated from Madagascar via a civilian chartered flight shared with citizens of the US, Japan, German, UK, Australia and Norway. The plane was organized by the Korean Embassy. According to the Korean Embassy in Cameroon, some 40 Korean citizens, tourists and KOICA volunteers in Cameroon came together with 56 Japan International Cooperation Agency members. A similar civilian chartered flight to Ethiopia was organized by the Embassy (Kim, 2020). Korea provided 5,000 diagnostic kits, medical equipment, and mobile x-ray equipped van to Madagascar to treat the novel virus patients. On June 2, Korea donated medical supplies (worth \$ 630,000) to Madagascar (Yonhap News Agency, 2020b). On April 16, eleven Korean entrepreneurs returned home from Mali with the help of foreign states, especially Belgium. Due to the suspension of flights in the region and unavailability of Korean diplomatic services in Mali, Korean officials had asked for help from its foreign partners in Senegal (Seung-yeon, 2020). On May 21, sixty South Korean citizens evacuated across Africa on a chartered plane, among those 36 in Ghana, 13 in Kenya, 10 in Ethiopia and one in Sudan (Yonhap News Agency, 2020a).

Since June, by considering the urgent needs of foreign aid from developing states across the world; Korea secured an additional budget (\$21 million) for humanitarian aid to 65 states. Among others 34 beneficiary states with poor health care services including the Africa, and the Middle East. The government of Korea has decided that it will carry on its support through humanitarian aid as needed to fight against the COVID-19 (Joo-yon, 2020). Korea has also honored requests from African nations to provide them therapeutic equipment. At the request of South Sudan, the Korean defense ministry provided about 10,000 test kits and 20,000 face

masks to handle the health crisis (Seok-min, 2020b). On June 25, Korean Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Lee Taeho attended the Sudan Partnership Conference, a tele-conference. He assured Korea will keep up support to Sudan for a stable political system, and development through humanitarian aid and collaboration. He made an announcement for assistance (\$7.5 million) for the year 2020 (MOFA, 2020c).

At the request of Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Kenya, Ms. Raychelle Omamo, Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang, Kyung-wha had phone talks with her on June 15, to share views on tackling the current pandemic. Minister Kang maintained that Korea will support Kenya and other African states to curb novel virus, including by donation and humanitarian aid and exchanging its experience via webinars on “K-quarantine” (MOFA, 2020a). On June 24, Kenya received donation of 10,000 tons of Korean rice to help refugee camps. It was donated by Korean MAFRA in collaboration with WFP Kenya (MOFA, 2020b).

Regional municipalities and civil society have been engaging in public diplomacy practices, but the central government is the main actor to public diplomacy in Korea. Korean embassies in Africa lead the cultural exchange diplomacy with cultural programs like taekwondo competitions, the screening of Korean films, and promotion of Korean food (the Taste of Korea program) (Chang, 2020, p. 142). On May 6, the Korean Embassy in Antananarivo made an announcement of upcoming release of a short film series on its Facebook page *Ndao hitsidika an'i Korea* (Let's Visit Korea) to discover Korea with Lim Sang-woo, the Korean Ambassador to Madagascar. It was hoped that the series would entertain the people amid the global coronavirus crisis. The great interest of followers was evident through their immediate responses on the post, receiving 500 reactions within an hour and most liked post. Korean Ambassador has also shared videos regarding Madagascar and the embassy's activities via his channel on You Tube named *마다가스카르이야기* (Ramanoelina, 2020).

Amid the global COVID-19 pandemic, BTS Army South Africa, a fan group of South Korean boyband Bangtan Boys (BTS) donated canned foods to support underprivileged families. *Ladles of Love* is a large-scale community-based project which is dedicated to feeding the poor. It provides food to homeless people of Cape Town on a weekly basis. It also supplies

food to struggling schools, students and people. Since its foundation in 2017, it has been organizing many charitable events (Shumba, 2020). *Ladles of Love* was selected by the administrators of the twitter fanpage due to their extensive work with schools and underprivileged people. BTS has also more contributed to Korean food drives and soup kitchens during the current pandemic (Court, 2020). With the support of local BTS fans, these events have successfully provided assistance amid the pandemic.

Besides the Korean government, secular and religious nonprofits are also playing their pivotal role to tackle the pandemic in Africa. Warmth Day, a Korean NGO in Ethiopia, serves to support veterans of the Korean War and their families. Recently, it has started to supply masks and other medical goods to recipients. The Korean Christian community and Christian NGO named Anyang Global Methodist Church and another Korean NGO Africa Freedom Foundation have donated 10 ambulances to Madagascar (Bone and Kim, 2020). Korea University Medicine donated a cutting-edge virtual dissection simulator to Madagascar with Nanoori Medical Foundation. University of Antananarivo utilizes it for primary medical education of students and doctors training. KU Medicine supported 2 negative pressures, an automated stainer and sealer amid the current pandemic for the establishment of a diagnostic center (<http://www.kumc.or.kr>). Ramanoelina (2020) corroborates, on May 4, a Korean NGO the Good Neighbors also arrived in Antananarivo to help those infected with COVID-19. Ferrier and Hwang (2020) identify Korean firms are also donating test kits to building the state's positive image during the pandemic crisis. Samsung Heavy Industries Nigeria has secured 5,000 diagnostic kits from Korean government to help with the local people.

EXAMINATION OF KOREA PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFECTIVENESS

Diplomacy is born out of acting on bilateral issues to global challenges and it has effects on all nations and every territory worldwide. In this respect, a growing inclination towards multilateral cooperation could be expected in a post 9/11 world in dealing with issues such as terrorism, world economic crises, pandemics and climate change. Hence, this new perspective to

diplomacy would setup public-networks, nongovernmental and corporate actors with particular skill suited to key issues. Public diplomacy is identified as ways of keeping the distinct images of, and cooperation between, organizations with various goals, but who work for alike objectives (Pamment, 2016, p. 65; Hayden, 2011.). The Korean government accomplishes the aim of elevating the state's persona worldwide through public diplomacy. As demonstrated through state and non-state actors, the effectiveness of Korea's cooperation in all forms of diplomacy highlights the importance of its engagements with Africa. Korea's vigorous and swift actions to help Africa during the current pandemic have been seen as a positive impact and favorable image on the continent and across the globe.

Golan et al. (2015) note the two normative moral theories Deontology and Utilitarianism pertinent to public diplomacy practices. Deontology puts the stress on "duty, respect for others, rationality, moral obligations of human beings. On the other side, utilitarianism emphasizes our mutual interdependence (p. 172). Since the beginning of 21st century, South Korea has expanded its relations with Africa and continues its efforts to forge mutual beneficial ties through cooperation. Wang (2020) argues that public diplomacy lays out collective links between national self-interest and global common public interest. Though, Korea's focus and interests are easily apparent, as Africa is a resource rich continent and a huge market for Korean manufacturers. But, due to development of novel virus emergency, Korea's focus has shifted to supporting Africa and adapting its public diplomacy practices accordingly. By shedding light on the effectiveness of Korean public diplomacy, the considerable role played by state, non-state actors, NGOs and non-profitable organizations amid the pandemic become evident.

Gates (2020) says leaders have two key responsibilities in the times of any crisis: find a solution to immediate problems and prevent them from recurring in the future (p.1677). The current pandemic is one such immediate problem in which human lives need to be saved. The spread of the virus is forcing a reformation of worldwide priorities, policies and programs. Within that framework, president Moon Jae-in's endeavor is a shove to raise his nation's brand through the Public Diplomacy Campaign (Attias, 2020). President Moon's phone diplomacy is regarded as a

‘diplomatic boon’ for Korea (Chi-dong, 2020) regarding the public health and economic crisis. His crisis management has boosted Korea’s international image and reputation in a sarcastic manner.

Since the outbreak of COVID-19, the government of Korea’s prompt reaction is worthy of note. It was due to learning from past experiences in tackling the spread of related disease, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) in 2015 (Bickenbach & Liu, 2020, p.5). The containment of COVID-19 is closely associated with the capability of the health care facilities to flatten the current pandemic and recession curve (Baldwin & Mauro, 2020, p.51). Many scholars tend to concur that humanitarian diplomacy encompasses all negotiation activities taken on by the different actors with “governments, (para) military organizations, or public figures” in tandem to intercede on behalf of human beings in danger (Balzacq et al 2020, p. 254). As a key contributor, Korea has been supportive of Africa by enhancing humanitarian aid, the health care services and medical capacity.

The Korean government considers the African CDC as a ‘priority partner’ in fighting against coronavirus and to achieve that, it has provided humanitarian aid and shared experience. Korean Ambassador Lim’s indicated that Ethiopia is a top priority by Korean government. Korea is well-connected to Africa, and failure to handle the virus in Ethiopia, Africa’s second most-populated state, would hamper the efforts of developed countries and severely affect the pandemic management efforts of the continent. Senbit (2020) notes the Korean commitments to its seven decades of friendly terms which are reflected by the Ethiopian Monitor’s remarks; Ethiopia is the first African state to receive the Economic Development Cooperation fund concessional loans by Korea Exim Bank for emergency response to curb the coronavirus. The financial assistance will help to alleviate the effects of the COVID-19 on Ethiopia. Based on medical equipment and the emergency response budget, Korea’s funds to Ethiopia have been helping to provide health care facilities. Korea’s continual food assistance to Ethiopia helps to provide humanitarian aid to its affected people. Restriction during the current pandemic crisis, integrated with Africa’s economic decline, floods and decline in incomes has conducted a huge humanitarian aid requires across the continent. Korea aims to further collaborate with other states in the spirit of solidarity by continuing the

opportune and considerable ODA projects for Africa. During the Sudan Partnership Conference, the government of Korea urged the participants to support Sudan through foreign aid and development cooperation initiatives. Multilateral cooperation regarding plane pooling is a good example of collective efforts to evacuating Korean and other nationals.

In the context of New Public Diplomacy, it is also worth examining digital diplomacy; it has spread out around the world. Social media platforms have been said to be instrumental in attracting public engagement in Korea” (Bjola & Holmes, 2015, p.74). The internet provides inexpensive and useful ways for bridging relationships between all public diplomacy actors, both state and non-state (Melissen, 2005, p.183). Amid the current pandemic, cultural activities such as the release of *Ndao hitsidika an'iKorea* provided information about the size of Korea and Madagascar, population, food, and Taekwondo. Malagasy viewers expressed their feeling of love for Korea by saying *Annyonghaseo* and *Khamsahamnidaon* facebook. *마다가스카르 이야기* channel shows the keen interest stoked in Korean public diplomacy through the activities of the Korean embassy.

NGOs are much effective in humanitarian missions while having no obligation to transnational corporations and not being beholden to the political agendas of state actors. They are well-equipped to adapt their endeavors according to specific situational urgencies. Occasionally, NGOs associate with local leaders and groups to make sure aid reaches the intended recipients (Snow & Tylor, 2009, p.160). The role of Korean NGO Warmth Day, Good Neighbors, Anyang Global Methodist Church and Africa Freedom Foundation, and BTS donation through food drives are commendable. Korea University Medicine's donation illustrates the prompt response to tackle the difficult situation during the pandemic. It is helping in anatomy and dissection education for doctors and specialists' training in Madagascar.

The World Economic Forum notes 85% global population belongs to developing states, where effects of COVID-19 will be worst due to the lack of infrastructure and poor health care services (Arirang News, 2020). World Data Lab reports that 42 African states are in poverty and 16 among them have a rising poverty rate (Compassion International Inc., 2020). On September 1, 2020, Korea's MOFA announced a 5% increase in the 2021

ODA budget. As stated by MOFA, its 2021 ODA budget will increase by US\$ 38 million, from US\$ 766 in 2020 to US\$804 million in 2021. MOFA aims to enhance its strategic and humanitarian ODA in 2021 to help its partner states that are endangered by infectious diseases such as COVID-19 (Donor Tracker, 2020). Africa will also get benefits from the humanitarian ODA. Mcclory (2019, p.40) describes the 2019 Soft Power Index, in which Korea ranked 19th among nations, higher than its score in previous years.

The global community is much more connected now when compared to the times of Great Depression. Though social distancing to prevent the spread of infection to others has kept us apart, we are connected in important ways thanks to our tech-defused world. Scientists and researchers are collaborating on research, tests, vaccination, and diagnostic tools. The interconnectedness makes it possible to cooperate in a creative way at a new stage (Knorr et al, 2020, p.204). Ferrier and Hwang (2020) advance, during the era of global tragedy and unpredictability, Korean public and private sectors are further enabling prompt and dynamic response across the world. In the future, this will be more beneficial than any profit gained by the diagnostic kits alone. Overall, Korea's support to Africa represents a new window of opportunity for more people-to-people contact, potentially saving lives through outreach to millions of people by exercising various tools of public diplomacy.

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATION

All of society will change owing to the impacts of COVID-19. The current pandemic has suddenly and severely affected all nations and business across the world. Through public diplomacy, international and regional cooperation are key instruments during a pandemic era and after the coronavirus crisis. Korea's swift and sharp response to tackling the novel virus is a model and its cooperation with other states is exemplary. Humanitarian assistance to Africa has been remained an important factor in the advancement of Korea to foreign audience. To further demonstrate the positive effects of Korea's humanitarian aid through public diplomacy, African beneficiary states have been benefiting from medical equipment, health care services, and financial

assistance. Current health challenges and economic consequences show us how the survival of society comes down to taking care of one another and being cooperative. Korea is playing its role through state and non-state actors of public diplomacy.

Culture and socio-economic circumstances of each country are reflected in their individual approaches to alleviation, isolation, social distancing, health care system, and quarantine to tackle the pandemic. Korea has been measured as exemplary by overseas in coping with the coronavirus outbreak. Media in Europe also described the success of Korean programs and policies for pandemic management. The onset of novel virus significantly has been affecting and presenting a considerable menace around the world particularly for the poor nations. Korea has been quite successful in making viable efforts in Africa by helping them in the times of pandemic.

Countries have economic and trade relations with high population density. Therefore, failure to control the novel virus would hinder the efforts of those states which have been containing the virus (Breevoort et al., 2020). A State's inability to tackle a pandemic locally can result in faster-growing outbreaks increasing the world mortality from the virus. The COVID-19 pandemic poses a significant threat to global health and is a big challenge for all countries. Developed countries like the US, China and Korea have close trade ties with Africa. It is anticipated that international trade, tourism industry and people-to-people contacts have been stagnant due to fast-moving and uncertain times. If Africa cannot control the spread of COVID-19, it will severely affect African economies and influence to sustainability of the global economy.

Public diplomacy strategist Ali Fisher defines public diplomacy objectives as "Public diplomacy is not necessarily merely about persuading people to adopt your goals. It is about achieving your goals through helping others achieve theirs. Effectively, it is about realizing that an organization is part of wider community" (Zaharna, 2010, p.168). Korea's response to Africa has been to view as a public good to halt the global pandemic there. In the post COVID-19 era, it is anticipated that Korea will see less of an impact on their economy, owing to immediate response and cooperation from citizens to control the pandemic. By considering its score improvement in recent years, Korea hopes at a higher score on the Soft Power Index in the post

coronavirus crisis. It illustrates how soft power can help to overcome borders and barriers, bringing Korea closer to the world through a variety of forms of public diplomacy.

POLICY SUGGESTIONS

In these times, the success of any state's public diplomacy will rely heavily on its cooperation with the global community through humanitarian aid and medical technology. It is suggested for states to gain experience from other states to finding swift and sharp solutions for epidemic prevention. Effects of the current global pandemic are unpredictable, so test reliability and therapeutic solutions are suggested to slow down the spread. Moreover, multilateral cooperation and collective engagement play pivotal role in providing technical assistance as a form of public diplomacy. It is expected that medical scientists will be successful in finding a solution and vaccine through exchange diplomacy to treat the COVID-19.

International and regional collaboration is necessary to fight against the pandemic. It is suggested for countries to follow Korea and other states for the containment to sporadic cluster of infections. Korea has been tackling the novel virus through inexpensive tools as face masks, rubber gloves, and swabs. Cooperation from people is also a key factor to its success. It is suggested that people should avoid unnecessary movements and maintain social distancing to avoid the locking down of cities. States' capacity to tackling the pandemic can help to secure an economic and business environment for entrepreneurs, foreign investors, establishment of favorable repute, and provision for a place for business in the future through public diplomacy.

Considering past experiences of colossal challenges, global crises and pandemic, there is need to establish a Global Fund by advanced countries to respond rapidly changing circumstances like pandemics. Unity, solidarity, collective engagement, and prompt actions by all nations are suggested to drive this point home through public diplomacy. COVID-19 presents different opportunities for remote work and business in an innovative form. Balance between digital and person-to-person interaction can be useful

through the instruments of public diplomacy in the post COVID-19 era. By considering the rapid and effective output of online work from home, businessmen can plan their strategies and transfer their work onto an online platform by maintaining their people-to-people contacts with limited meetings physically. Work from home or remote work will reduce the carbon emissions, due to reduction in means of transportation. It is possible that we could handle global warming and climate change as part of our ongoing response to current health crisis.

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South Korean New Deal and the Role of Eco-Diplomacy

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Abstract | This study explores sustainable development goals as part of the future of diplomacy, analyzing the Korean New Deal as part of a digital diplomacy movement for future practices, and discussing the role of an Eco-Diplomacy in developing nations, with South Korea playing an active role in expanding this approach. With the development of the Korean New Deal, the adaptation of eco-diplomacy, involving an extensive group of international non-state actors from technical and academic communities abroad, could allow embassies and consulates to use their networks to develop small, focused centers to lead the way for Korea to reach an important role as a leading nation towards innovation and sustainable development.

Keywords | Public Diplomacy, Korean New Deal, Eco-Diplomacy, South Korea

국문초록 | 이 연구에서는 미래 관행을 위한 디지털 외교 움직임의 일환으로 한국판 뉴딜(Korean New Deal)을 분석하고, 한국이 개발도상국에서 확장을 적극적으로 돕고 있는 환경 외교의 역할을 논의하며, 미래 외교의 일부로 지속 가능한 개발 목표를 살펴보았다.

한국판 뉴딜의 개발과 더불어, 국제 기술 커뮤니티와 학계의 방대한 비정부 참여자 집단을 포함한 환경 외교의 이용은 대사관과 영사관들이 한국이 혁신과 지속 가능한 개발을 이끄는 국가로서 중요한 역할을 담당하고, 그들의 네트워크를 이용해 작은 중점 중심지를 발달시킬 수 있도록 해줄 것이다.

OVERVIEW OF SOUTH KOREAN' DIPLOMACY

The launch of the Korean New Deal has created a lot of public discussion in all segments of society; the public, academia, and officials have been

debating the effectiveness of the ambitious plan. The New Deal was presented to the public by President Moon Jae-in's ruling party during the parliamentary election in April and officially launched in July 2020. The plan consists of a set of impressive goals, including net-zero emissions by 2050, the end of overseas coal plants support, and the introduction of a carbon tax. It has ignited a lot of domestic debate, but it has also brought a bigger spotlight to South Korea as a leading nation that not only has effectively fought to flatten the curve of COVID-19 infections, but also that already had a plan for the creation of new jobs with sustainable growth.

According to Lee (2012), South Korea could be characterized as a middle power nation with middle power diplomacy. The country is located in a region with constant diplomatic conflicts. The Korean Peninsula is the stage of tensions between the North and South as well as the two great powers, China and the United States, who are continuously competing through their political and economic relations with both Koreas. This U.S.-China power competition, plus the security threat from North Korea, end up creating a barrier to South Korea's efforts to pursue its middle power diplomacy. This reality prompted Korean foreign affairs to come up with new diplomatic alternatives to create an overall positive impact on the global community. These new strategies exploit nonconventional channels to develop the relations between governmental actors and allow Korea to strengthen its influence on other nations. An example is the Korean "hallyu" wave, which correlates with rising support for policy objectives to improve cultural and public diplomacy along with improving Korean national image and brand. The Korean Government has been seeking to take advantage of the popularity of the Korean wave to promote national interests in the world. The 2020 Budget Plan (Ministry of Economy and Finance, 2019), had included an estimated investment of KRW 8 trillion into the development of Culture, Sports and Tourism, representing an increase of 9.9 percent compared to the 2019 budget, and an allocative resource of KRW 5.5 trillion to Diplomacy and Unification, an increase of 9.5 percent compared with the previous year. Moreover, in an effort to develop its technology and innovation, the budget established an increase of 27.5 percent of public spending on Industry and Energy, and an increase of 17.3 percent in R&D compared with 2019.

With 5G launched and commercialized in 2019, the Korean government has been increasing its investments not only to grow its role as a leading nation in technology initiatives but also now in eco-diplomacy with the Korean New Deal. The practice of advancing ecological protection by conducting diplomacy that influences and sets examples of conserving natural resources, sustainable operations, and effective environmental management are tasks that South Korea has taken upon itself to develop more sustainable practices. Even though the concretization of this project is still under discussion and will require a lot of investment and commitment from Korean society, the public sector, and the private one, in an era of imminent global climate change, those who adapt quickly may have substantial diplomatic advantages over those that are living in the past. According to President Moon Jae-In, it is expected that the New Deal is South Korea's announcement of its transition from a country that has struggled to a country that leads the way, from a carbon-dependent economy to a low-carbon economy, and from an unequal society to an inclusive society with more green and digital technologies (Lee, 2020). This movement demonstrates the government's purpose to make South Korea a worldwide leader.

Diplomacy has been recognized as multi-faceted expertise for a long time, extending far beyond politics and economics. Culture, for example, is widely recognized as a vital part of effective diplomatic initiatives. South Korea is attracting interest through its approach that treats diplomacy as more than political and economic agreements, and that shows its willingness to adapt to innovations and new technologies. This shift in the diplomatic landscape creates a new set of challenges and questions about future relationships among countries. For example, what challenges does South Korea face to adapt to the future of diplomacy? What is the role of the visionary New Deal in the diplomatic environment? and how can South Korea actively display its Eco-Diplomacy in developing nations? Thus, the South Korean case could provide some insight for other nations, helping them to comprehend alternative diplomatic practices that focus on sustainability.

To answer these questions, this study starts exploring sustainable development goals as part of the future of diplomacy. Then it analyzes the

New Deal as part of a digital diplomacy movement for future practices. After that, it discusses the role of an Eco-Diplomacy in developing nations with South Korea being an active part of its development. It concludes by analyzing how Korea can keep developing more sustainable diplomacy in the future.

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS PERSPECTIVES

Looking to define a sustainable development agenda for the world and to protect the planet from the harmful effects of climate change, The United Nations has established Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which requires a process of negotiation and implementation of sustainable development policies and practices. The adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals has brought to the international community a renewed global commitment to sustainable development and set the ambitious vision for a wide variety of goals to be achieved in the SDGs context. The establishment of the international agreement on a range of SDGs was an important diplomatic accomplishment, but its implementation is an even bigger challenge. The achievement of the SDGs requires diverse agreements regarding policy applications, strategies, and actions at all levels nationwide and worldwide, and the consideration of the society and its various sectors. Moomaw et al., (2017) considered Sustainable Development Diplomacy (SDD) as the process of negotiating and fulfilling the SDGs at all ranges. This also translates into a great challenge for sustainable development governance due to the complexity of the subjects and the development of diplomatic processes required to adopt the linkage throughout key areas.

According to Srivastava (2015), the sustainable development goals have been the topic of discussion at several forums on climate change, international trade, environment protection, conflict prevention, and other relevant subjects, all contributing in some degree to sustainable development. The use of multilateral diplomacy has been taking place in several fields—mutual economic interests, natural resource limitations, and specific sector development—with variable levels of success. A more sustainable diplomacy environment allows multilateral approaches and recognizes these methods

as being significant for maintaining attention on subjects that were ignored in the past. As the SDG agenda advances, it will be essential to comprehend the history of environmental governance to guarantee that the social and economic dimensions of sustainability can be reached in an integrated manner.

The set of diplomatic tools that foreign policymakers have can help to overcome some of the challenges that SDG implementation can face, especially in fragile states. Diplomats might contribute by supporting sustainable actions and developing cooperation between nations, considering in what way domestic and international efforts that achieve sustainable policies could impact countries' foreign relations. Public diplomacy and foreign policy can improve cooperation even in delicate contexts and can effectively overcome geopolitical obstacles to the SDGs fulfillment. When looking to the purpose of SDG 16 - peace, justice, and strong institutions- and SDG 17 - global partnerships - their main ideas is to provide essential political affairs and diplomatic relations to make foreign policy a proper driver of policy integration and to improve sustainable development in fragile states (Carius et al., 2018).

As nations worldwide prepare for the employment of SDGs, there is no doubt that the world's geopolitical dynamic is changing. With the fast progress of new technologies, there is already alteration related to resources that are considered necessary as the green natural gas, how to develop it, and how these demands can be accomplished, bringing a new format of political power redistribution. South Korea with the New Deal and the purpose to change from fossil fuels to a low-carbon economy is an example of the development of new policy arrangements. Though, it ought to consider that other countries that similarly want to proceed with these changes, even the small change, should conduct it with cautious diplomacy to guarantee that future modifications do not create eventual threats to stability.

According to Carius et al., (2018) efforts to implement sustainable policies require a proactive, foreign-policy driven attitude to avoid negative effects on external policy. Consequently, nations need to foresee the geopolitical repercussions of a sustainable transformation. The diplomatic tools, such as the initiation or arbitration of global relations, available in

foreign affairs, can develop a substantial part in guaranteeing that the transformative changes do not damage fragile nations. Notably, public diplomacy should take into account how the local and international efforts to achieve the SDGs could impact countries' external relations with other nations and the stability of their geopolitical alignments.

Strategic responses and effective achievement of more sustainable diplomacy require acknowledgment of geopolitics, politics, economics, and possible sustainable actions that could be reached. The 2030 Agenda has extensive economic and geopolitical implications; hence, it is important to have a better comprehension of international policy consequences from the SDGs to shape a committed Sustainable Foreign Policy (Carius et al., 2018).

SOUTH KOREAN DIPLOMACY UNDER THE NEW DEAL

The South Korean government's understanding of public diplomacy not based simply on marketing terms is a recent movement that the country has been adapting since The Public Diplomacy Act reflecting a contemporary address to the new public diplomacy (Ayhan, 2016; Ayhan 2017). From economic factors to social changes that led to the Korean wave spread throughout the world, nowadays Korean representatives have been expressing an understanding that public diplomacy is more about involving and winning over the domestic public rather than connecting or persuading foreign audiences (Robertson, 2018).

Looking for a way to overcome even faster the COVID-19 crisis in the country, President Moon Jae-In anticipated the launch of the Korean New Deal, named after The United States in the 1930's New Deal, coined by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, a program to fight the Great Depression that started after the stock market crash in 1929. And now, almost 90 years later with the advance of technologies and a different perspective on sustainable growth, South Korea decided to invest heavily in technology and green energy to create sustainable growth of its economy until 2050.

The Korean New Deal is divided into two constituents: The Digital New Deal and Green New Deal. To initiate the plan, the government has established 10 major projects. For the Digital New Deal, there is the

development of smart medical infrastructure, the intelligent government, and the Data Dam (collection of data from public and private sources to later standardize the data so it can be analyzed). And for the Green New Deal, with green-friendly mobilities, green energy, and ecological remodeling. The remaining four projects are the convergences of digital and green initiatives with green smart schools, digital twin, digitalization of infrastructure including public safety, and the inclusion of smart green manufacturing complexes. South Korea will invest KRW 160 trillion by 2025 to support the projects that are expected to create 1.9 million jobs in a way that will overcome the COVID-19 crisis and allow a faster economic recovery. The pandemic is leading to a great impact on energy systems around the world, limiting investments and threatening to impede the development of main clean energy innovations (IEA, 2020c). According to the IEA (2020b) the global investment in Energy has already declined 20 percent compared with 2019.

Korea is aiming to establish a foundation for competitiveness in an ecological and digital field for the future. The country was already the first nation to implement and commercialize 5G, and it is helping broaden world coverage. Under the New Deal, the government hopes to continue to shape its lead. In 2019 the country had already announced an AI national strategy to encourage the expansion of AI domestically. Thus, while most of the stimulus plans around the world have concentrated on helping firms to survive the COVID-19 downturn, the Korean New Deal represents a long-term investment in the South Korean economy. It is evident that the nation is worried not only about controlling COVID-19 infections, but also about the future of the country and the international community.

The success of the Korean New Deal depends on its government and the way that it will carry out the planning, implementation, and evaluation of this project since it carries an ambitious economic development plan requiring a lot of public spending. This depends upon a strong commitment by all public and private officials involved in the project. And since the project aims to create a base where the country can lead the world on green energy initiatives, both nationwide efforts and contributions by global actors are necessary. This includes active participation in diplomatic affairs from South Korea and other developed and developing nations.

According to Kim (2016), the concept of Korea been considered middle power diplomacy has been discussed in different spheres from policymakers to experts and scholars. However, the concept and policy objectives related to the term have some variations, leading to analytical confusion towards South Korea's actual role as a middle power. Krasnyak (2018) also argues that the shaping of South Korea's reputation as among the most innovative developed countries will not only increase commercial benefits, but also help address the existing security impasse, form future geopolitical outcomes in a multi-polar world, and accelerate Korea's participation in emergent scientific activities such as space exploration – such as the launch of South Korea's first military satellite on July 2020 (Malik, 2020).

The New Deal is a challenge not only economic due to the necessarily high investments but to the state's competency to achieve its goals. It should be taken into consideration that 2020 has brought a lot of worries back to the international community due to the pandemic crisis, leading other nations to prioritize solving their own domestic problems in the first moment, to later be able to focus on their foreign policies. Consequently, the way of conducting international affairs has also changed, going more virtually than in person. In the first half of 2020, the World Bank (2020) launched its economic outlook with a base forecast predicting a 5.2 percent contraction in global GDP in 2020. Considering that many nations were hit hard and are still adapting to the new way of conducting diplomatic relations. This allows South Korea a certain advantage due to the technology at its disposal, which enables the creation of a synergy of its technology with other nations. This environment can create a path for South Korea to be able to develop its still not fully developed middle power to a well-developed one.

SOUTH KOREA ECO-DIPLOMACY ROLE AND DEVELOPING NATIONS

Economic and military capabilities are still an important matter for diplomacy usage in present-day foreign affairs. However, with the continuous transformation of new technologies, the expertise in I&CT must be

understood in relational terms, disaggregated into its several magnitudes, and viewed within specific geographic and historical backgrounds. South Korea had created diplomatic ties with different developing countries, throughout the improvement of economic and political alliances. Though, even with the increasing presence of Korean industries in these regions, it does not mean that these partners have achieved a comprehensive or strategic relationship.

With the SDGs and the continuous effort of South Korea to embrace the creation of Smart Cities and sustainable buildings such as the governmental complex in Sejong City, it is entirely likely that soon more cities will begin to switch into a more synergetic design with the world around them. Evolution not only occurs in the top cities around the world, to reach sustainable development growth, but all levels of society can and should be also considered. The achievement of more eco-friendly designs has been transitioned not only to the most powerful economies but also to different countries around the world.

The 2030 Sustainable Agenda fulfillment should be comprehended beyond the developed nations' power over developing nations. The economic influence, synergy opportunities, and free trade agreements in developing nations can benefit South Korea as the share of knowledge, capital transferences, and labor force prospects, and in return, South Korea can help other foreign partners to develop a more technological and sustainable nation. Even though South Korea has already proven that it has one of the most technological economies with the commercialization of 5G in 2019, the New Deal launch in 2020, and the announcement of the 6G commercialization for 2027 (Jung, 2020; Watanabe, 2020), the country is yet considered a middle diplomatic country due to the constant conflicts that the Korean peninsula still keep facing, and with its wealth, resources, and geographic location constrain its ability to grow beyond a certain point, requiring a major effort from the Korean government to establish itself as a significant diplomatic country. Hence more recently, there was a more active diplomatic promotion to a Global Korea and to build the bridges between rich and poor countries with Official Development Assistance initiatives.

This self-identification initiated in the administration of former President

Lee Myung-Bak, between 2008 and 2013 (Kim, 2016). Since that time the country had faced impeachment in the government of former president Park Geun-Hye and currently is under the administration of President Moon Jae-In, who has been since the beginning of his administration focused on more image-oriented diplomacy (MOFA, 2020b). The rethinking of new diplomatic communication and finding a common diplomatic approach amongst other OECD countries is not an easy task; it is an important step for global governance and effective multilateralism which could bring a stronger policy consistency.

With these sets of future projects to be implanted with the New Deal, South Korea also looks to become a significant power around the world, which not only involves economic and political matters but also its ability in promoting a sustainable development model, new technology transference, trade integration, and the national capacity to produce soft power from public diplomacy (Krasnyak, 2018). Through the ability to influence others by different actions - not only by the power of coercion and money transference – the country can adopt a more Eco-diplomatic approach looking for a more ecologically and environmentally-orientated communication between the national and foreign community to reach a Sustainable Public Diplomacy.

When looking to the efforts already made by the government to create strong relations with developing countries, one of the most used throughout was the Official Development Assistance (ODA) initiative in which the government tries to promote the economic development and welfare of emerging countries, with the provision of grants, loans and technical assistance (ODA, 2017). The ODA structure was implemented in 2010 in Korea and with the success of the plan, it was launched the Second Mid-Term Strategy for Development Cooperation (2016-2020) to evaluate the first period (2011-2015) of Korea's ODA, and incorporate the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development into its ODA strategy. Soon the government began the ODA expansion with a 2016-2020 strategy direction of expansion focuses and its financial operation proposal. At the end of 2016, the Korean government completed the development of the second phase of the Country Partnership Strategy for 24 priority countries as a consolidated strategy for loans and grants. And a new government strategy for humanitarian

assistance and multilateral cooperation was also applied. Thus, since the results of ODA with the public are essential because ODA is funded by taxpayers, it was exceptionally important to build public support towards Korean public diplomacy policy to rapidly reach the 0.2% ODA/GNI target by 2020. (ODA, 2017, pp. 178).

When looking to the Multilateral Environment Diplomacy, South Korea has led the establishment of the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) as part of its efforts to scatter the green growth program and to contribute to the international community's collaboration regarding a green economy (MOFA, 2020a). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) launched the Green Round Table at the end of 2016 to debate forms to reinforce cooperation between international organizations and domestic agencies related to climate change, the environment, and green economic development. The idea behind the Green Round Table is to provide more opportunities for students to join environmental projects throughout the forum while fostering collaboration among national governments, public-private organizations, and private initiatives specializing in the green economy (MOFA, 2020a).

In order to meet its goals on Climate change and Energy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has established the Basic Plan for Climate Change Response (2016), the Road Map to Achieve National Greenhouse Gas Reduction Goals (2016), and the Global Energy Cooperation Center (GECC) in January 2012. These initiatives help the distribution of information on foreign energy and natural resources markets to national energy corporations, organizations, and associations. The challenge of leading a new format of communication under an Eco-Diplomacy oriented approach will make South Korea rethink its foreign affairs in a way that will establish to strong relations with developing countries using technology cooperation and green initiatives as a link to cooperate with these nations to reach the SDGs in a more cooperative and efficient way. Even though these ideas present difficult tasks, as developing countries' initiatives under green technologies are lagging compared with developed countries, leading the way to sustainable cooperation with green energy initiatives can shape South Korea's reputation as a technologically advanced power. Trying a Sustainable Foreign Policy as an additional part of or a possible extension

of President Moon Jae-In administration's innovative growth agenda might contribute to its successful outcomes.

In order to build an adequate environment to create a more sustainable Foreign Policy and develop an Eco-diplomacy with the global community, the government should design its national and international reputation by shaping an image of a self-sufficient country and a digital and green innovator nation. More than the image, it is needed an additional work to make the country more self-sufficient and more innovative in terms of sustainability, which the Korean New Deal takes place as a socio-economic and political strategy that should be consolidated. Accomplishing that could be possible through (i) implementing an effective Eco-Diplomacy, (ii) allowing the participation of non-state actors to help develop the Sustainable Foreign Policy as a whole, and (iii) building centers of eco-diplomacy using the network and know-how of embassies, consulates and high commissions overseas to create strong international cooperation. These goals can be accomplished if participating nation and non-state actors agree upon a legal framework.

THE FUTURE CHALLENGES FOR SOUTH KOREA DIPLOMACY

The COVID-19 pandemic has brought a rapid move towards digitally oriented jobs, agreements, and diplomatic relations for South Korea and the world. As the quarantine has become a part of everyday life, there is a need for remote services with remote working considered business as usual. The outdated diplomatic practices were confronted with digital practices change since it allows the latest technological advance to impulse alteration of the former practices. Permitting a more active use of digital technologies, I&CT, software engineering, and big data.

With the pandemic's impact, more countries were challenged to work in a more socially-distanced way, creating online-distant diplomatic relations, denoting an acceleration to digital diplomacy. The countries have been fighting to recover their economies, but how the world will be after the strong blow dealt by COVID-19 remains to be seen. Governments are looking to restructure their employment, reorganize their economies, and

maintain a more sustainable development and these alternatives will become more and more present in diplomatic discussions. Sustainability policy is a strategy for expansion, it is a form of relation, contracts, and when there are contracts there are incentives present in these transactions (Laffon & Martimort, 2002).

The government should be able to think about the delegation of actions with well-instructed agents. Not only public officials but academics that have been working in related areas should be able to rationally analyze the possible external factors that building relations outside the national level might mean to the shape of sustainable public diplomacy. When facing complex problems, such as building relations with low-income countries or with nations in a conflict war zone, foreign policymakers should pursue key sector-specific activities, being able to analyze each nation by its history, cultural, social policies, and economic development. Every nation is different and knowing how to communicate with each one as a distinguished agent is a factor that might allow strong cooperation towards more innovative areas. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, we have seen the accelerated need for tech-based communication solutions, in a way of overcoming old practice and break barriers to help the countries to straight mutual relation to benefit pandemic-related forces.

South Korea has embraced a distinct role in its foreign policy compared with other states, because the Korean representatives pay a lot of attention to domestic opinion first. Citizens' opinions are a big part of diplomatic alliances with other nations, meaning that domestic support counts also as a factor for a Sustainable Foreign Policy. According to Robertson (2018), South Korea still remains notably behind in the use of digital media. However, there is a clear distinction between the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) online account, when using Korean and English language. The digital diplomacy metrics comparison shows that South Korea is significantly more advanced in the utilization of social media to connect and involve with Korean speakers than with foreign publics. This trend had become even stronger in President Moon Jae-In's administration, with officials expressing support for public diplomacy as a link to engage with the domestic audience rather than appealing or influencing foreign audiences (Robertson, 2018). But to improve the Korean image in the

international community it is necessary that the government make an effort to show its commitment not only nationwide but also worldwide regarding its foreign policy.

When thinking about the development of Eco-diplomacy centers, they should function under the administration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and incorporated into already existing embassies and consulates. Diplomats should be able to conduct eco-diplomacy when necessary and make modifications depending on the nation and the project. The focus on eco-diplomacy should include: (i) Broad implementation of the New Deal policies as a national endeavor; (ii) Allow the participation of outside academia-related non-state actors into diplomatic relationships; (iii) Using the know-how of embassies and consulates abroad to disseminate the eco-diplomacy. These initiatives might increase the effectiveness of Korean diplomacy, enhance sustainable cooperation, and allow Korea to build its future as a significant geopolitical actor.

Korea needs to emphasize its capabilities to pursue cooperation in an increasingly complex diplomatic environment. To be able to reach its goal, it should embrace areas beyond current diplomacy practices. Existing public diplomacy approaches are capable, but they can be greatly improved (Krasnyak, 2018). Korea has effectively developed its soft power through cultural diplomacy (Korean Wave), though the impact of this area is still limited. The country should work on building its strengths as a middle power to maintain its image as an innovative nation, an effort that the Eco-diplomacy can greatly contribute to.

Another important step for Korea would be to increase participation in intergovernmental eco-friendly organizations, green initiatives, digital initiatives, and projects that further global sustainable development and use its high technology to address global challenges. With the development of the Korean New Deal, the adaptation of eco-diplomacy, involving an extensive group of international non-state actors from technical and academic communities abroad, foreign academics living and working in Korea, and allowing embassies and consulates to use their networks to develop small focused center, Korea can play an important role as a leader in innovation and sustainable development.

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Moon Jae-In's Strategy Amid Covid-19 Pandemic: Reviving the Green in the Korean New Deal

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Abstract | The year 2020 has been a conjunctural episode untenable for many countries around the world, due to the numerous challenges that the COVID-19 pandemic has brought; from restraining the disease to facing economic repercussions. Nevertheless; Korea has been one of the countries that have caught the attention of being able to demonstrate its leadership in combating the disease and becoming an example for others. Amid this context, the administration of Moon Jae-In has boosted the Korean New Deal (KND), a triple edge strategy to cope with the impacts that originated the pandemic, in economic, environmental, and social aspects. This paper aims to provide an analysis of the potential of South Korea in acting on the climate change issue, through the development of the green economy. The KND is an instrument that can enhance Korea's green public diplomacy and, reaffirm its leadership as a developing country and middle power, in coping with global issues, such as climate change.

국문초록 | 코로나19 전염병이 불러온 수많은 장애물 탓에 2020년은 전염병을 제지하는 것부터 경제적 영향을 마주하는 것까지 전세계의 많은 국가들이 방어할 수 없었던 위급 사태였다. 그럼에도 불구하고 대한민국은 코로나19를 이겨내고 다른 국가들의 모범이 되는 리더십을 보여주어 주의를 끌어 모은 국가들 중 하나였다. 이러한 문맥에서 문재인 정부는 전염병의 영향을 경제적, 환경적, 사회적으로 대처하기 위한 삼면 전략인 한국판 뉴딜(Korean New Deal, KND)을 신장시켰다. 이 논문은 녹색 경제 개발을 통해 기후 변화 이슈에 대응하는 데 있어 대한민국의 잠재력을 분석하고자 한다. 한국 뉴딜(KND)은 한국의 녹색 공공 외교를 강화하고 기후 변화와 같은 글로벌 이슈에 대응하는 데 있어 개발 도상국이자 미들 파워(중견국)로서의 리더십을 재확인하는 도구이다.

INTRODUCTION

The 2^{1st}-century demands solutions to major issues that affect not just the states in a separate way, but internationally. Among these series of issues that have been affecting the world and need solutions, it is climate change. The World Economic Forum (2020) has cataloged it as one of the major global risks of the next decade, which threatens the human subsistence in the future ahead with increased probabilities of disturbances to economic development and national security of countries around the world. Despite the different international efforts to contain the damage, the measures have not been enough, and uncertainty remains. Besides, 2020 has added another challenge: the pandemic of COVID-19. The coronavirus not only has claimed the lives of thousands of people but has also provoked other repercussions in each country around the world, especially in the economic aspect.

In the middle of this context, Korea¹ has caught the eye of the world, mainly because of its ability to contain the virus quickly, without a mandatory nationwide lockdown through testing as the principal strategy, in addition to tracing, treating, and the implementation of foreign entry controls. Nevertheless, Korea's economy has been affected too, as an export-oriented economy. Today, an economic crisis looming in the wake of COVID-19 and the growing issues of climate change question the capacity of response of the world's governments.

This paper aims to provide an analysis of the potential of South Korea in acting on the climate change issue through the Korean New Deal in the development of the green economy. Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, President Moon Jae-In has championed this as a triple edge strategy to cope with the factors that caused the disease, including the economic factors. Korea has demonstrated its potential as a developing country and middle power in not only combating the disease but also in coping with global issues. This New Deal presents an instrument that can enhance Korea's green public diplomacy.

1 This paper covers only the Republic of Korea, so references to the abbreviation of 'Korea' allude merely to the Republic of Korea.

In the first section, the concept of public diplomacy will be discussed and its changes in the context of the 21st century. Additionally, the characteristics of a middle power will be analyzed, as well as how Korea has been identified as one. In the second section, there will be a review of the different concepts that have been involved in Korea's green policy such as green growth, green economy, sustainable development, and the Green New Deal. The third segment of the paper aims to provide a background on the economic efforts of the Lee and Park administrations related to mitigate climate change and increase Korea's responsibility and leadership in the international arena. Fourth, there will be a recompilation of the actual administration policy towards the environment. The fifth segment examines the most recent proposal of the Moon administration (The Korean New Deal) which claims to address the economic crisis and the climate change issue; and finally, the conclusion.

A MIDDLE POWER PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

In the globalized world, we cannot escape from the interconnection that exists between one country and another. At some point, it seems the borders have disappeared due to the development of Information and Communication Technology (ICT), the interaction among people has increased, and in consequence the creation of networks between businesses, governments, and societies. These social connections influence the way one country perceives itself, its surroundings, and wants to be portrayed by the world. That is the main reason why public diplomacy's significance has strengthened over the last years.

Originally, public diplomacy was understood as "a government's process of communication with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation's ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and policies" (Tuch, 1990: 3). This realist vision was state-centric, meaning that the only recognized and most important actor in international relations was the State itself.

Nonetheless, over time public diplomacy has evolved since ICT has advanced and more actors are involved. Now it can be said that public

diplomacy is “the attempt of an international actor to manage the international environment through engagement with a foreign public” (Cull, 2009: 57). In this regard, this paper is going to consider the use of public diplomacy to promote an idea that an actor considers important in its foreign policy, such as Korea concerning climate change.

South Korea has been recognized by the international community as a middle power. Although there is not a consensus about the definition of a middle power, due to its changing according to time and context, it has caused a debate among different author's perspectives (see Robertson, 2017 & Kríž, et. al., 2019). In general, a middle power can be defined by its interests, influences, and considerable capabilities recognized by other countries. Middle power countries pursue their national interest and align it to the international spheres. Nowadays, the increasing global importance and influence of middle powers in solving global issues is well-known, since these countries can have different roles from the catalyst that takes the lead on an initiative; the facilitator who engages in coalition-building activities; to the manager that emphasizes the creation of formal norms and institutions (Ikenberry & Mo, 2013: 4-7).

In this sense, South Korea's 2008 diplomatic agenda revealed great interest in numerous global issues, from international economic cooperation, global security, development cooperation, etc. Korea has emerged as a middle power because of its actual position in the global economy, its strengths in high technology and education, and the progressive development and prominence of its cultural industries. The geographical position and historical experience of Korea have allowed it to maintain a relationship with major powers and act as a non-threatening bridge facilitator capable of pursuing cooperation and interest in a specific issue through institutions or policy frameworks, between the Global North and South, as well as, between the West and the East (Ikenberry & Mo, 2013: 6-13; Snyder, 2013).

AMID GREENS: GREEN GROWTH, GREEN ECONOMY, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND *GREEN NEW DEAL*

In the face of environmental deterioration, new approaches have emerged to

combat the impacts on the Earth, such as sustainable development, green growth, green economy, and the Global Green New Deal. Since 1992, sustainable development has become the ultimate goal of the international community in the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). The United Nations define it as the “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (The Sustainable Development Agenda, n. d.).

Nevertheless, from the sustainable development concept have emerged new and interrelated terms, such as green growth, low carbon development, sustainable economy, among others; but have been under scrutiny because of a lack on an agreed definition or universal principles that go in accordance with the main one (UNDESA, 2012: 5). Thus, there has been a series of misconceptions and misuses of the terms. In this sense, International Organizations had tried to address the problem by demystifying and clarifying, but difficulties persist.

At the regional level, in 2005 the term green growth was proposed and encouraged in Asia during the Fifth Ministerial Conference on Environment and Development held in Seoul, Korea. In this conference, green growth or environmentally sustainable economic growth was defined as a “strategy of sustaining economic growth and job creation necessary to reduce poverty in the face of worsening resource constraints and climate crisis” (UN ESCAP, n. d.). Hence, green growth became an option for sustainable development that each country itself could manage to foster low carbon emissions, resource efficiency, and social inclusion (UN ESCAP, n. d.).

In the case of the green economy, UNDESA (2012: 9) found there is no international consensus upon its definition. For example, UNEP (2011) defines it as “one that results in improved human well-being and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities. It is a low carbon, resource-efficient, and socially inclusive.” Whilst, the Green Economy Coalition defines it as a “resilient economy that provides a better quality of life for all within the ecological limits of the planet.” Nonetheless, during the Rio+20 Summit in 2012, the international community motivated the transition to a green economy. In this sense, green growth became the “prerequisite for building a green economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty reduction” (UN ESCAP, n.

d.).

Criticism has continued among these different terms due to its use in an interchangeable way and blurred definitions. Notwithstanding, the efforts of both to include and to make coexist the environment and the development aspect have been identified, in the economic decision making, strategies, policy, and planning of the governments around the globe (UNDESA, 2012: 60-61), which should be noted and not misplaced one from another.

The Global Green New Deal (GGND) was promoted in 2009 by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), to face the financial and economic crisis of 2008. The initiative was made as an allusion of the New Deal implemented by the president of the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt, in order to face the Great Depression through the stimulation of the economy by providing jobs, social security, reform tax policies, etc. In this regard, the GGND followed the same approach and has the idea of creating, through public investment, jobs that promote sustainable development, in accordance with a series of national conjunctural measures designed to mitigate the consequences of the global crisis of 2008. At the same time, the idea of a GGND searched a change to a new economic model sustainable, including investment in low-emission technologies, energy sanitation of buildings, sustainable transport infrastructure, among others (UNEP, 2009).

In 2015, the member states of the United Nations committed to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. This agenda sought to encompass 17 universal, transformative, inclusive, and integrated goals to promote prosperity while protecting the planet. Those goals “recognize that ending poverty must go hand-in-hand with strategies that build economic growth and address a range of social needs including education, health, social protection, and job opportunities while tackling climate change and environmental protection” (Sustainable Development Goals, n. d.).

Finally, it should be highlighted that UNCTAD (2019) urged –once again– the implementation and funding of the GGND so it could be compliant with the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030 and promote equal distribution of income as well as reverse decades of environmental degradation.

FROM LEE TO MOON: THE ROAD OF SOUTH KOREA'S GREEN

After the climate change conferences in Copenhagen 2009, green growth was seen as a new development paradigm for developing nations that would not compromise development and the environment and would help to decrease the gap between the Global North and South. However, President Lee Myung-Bak (2008-2013) had already announced the 'Low Carbon-Green Growth' (LCGG) as his core initiative for the nation's long-term development and his aspiration of becoming in a global green pioneer (Han, 2015: 734-735).

In face of the financial-economic crisis of 2008, Lee assigned economic funds to the development and efficient use of resources such as freshwater, waste, renewable energies, energy-efficient buildings, low-carbon vehicles, and the improvement of the high-speed rail network. Furthermore, in 2010 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs specified in a Diplomatic White Paper the "Low Carbon-Green Growth" as the "nation's new vision" (Watson & Pandey, 2014: 80-82).

Kalinowski (2020: 3) identifies the establishment of the Presidential Committee on Green Growth (PCGG); the National Strategy for Green Growth (2009–2050); the First Five-Year Plan for Green Growth (2009–2013); and the Framework Act on Low Carbon and Green Growth (2010) as the foundation for South Korea's institutional environmental policies. Amid these elements, it is the last one that ought to be recognized for becoming the basis for the development of the national economy through green growth. The PCGG (2009: 9-10) defined three main objectives regarding green growth: (1) to deal with climate change and attain energy independence, (2) to create new engines for economic growth, and (3) to improve the quality of life for Koreans and to enhance the contributions to the international community through advocacy.

Thus, it was during the presidency of Lee that Korea showed commitment to the climate change issue in light of the international community and the world recognized the government's efforts, including the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (see Shin, 2011). Lee built the cornerstone that connected Korea's public diplomacy with the

green facet since showed its attempt and aspiration to cope with climate change through the economic aspect.

This recognition among the international community was part of the president's policy labeled as Global Korea. The Global Korea policy was the banner policy of the Lee administration; it wanted to emphasize that the success in the economy and democracy of the country not only gave global reach but also the responsibility to address global issues and the opportunity to become a leader (Snyder, 2018: 145). This was accentuated during the speech of president Lee (2009) in the 64th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations:

“(...) Korea will embark on a path of actively contributing to the world and all of humanity. This is the very goal that Global Korea aims for. (...) Korea, while not included in Annex I of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), plans to make a voluntary announcement before the end of this year, its midterm target emissions cut by the year 2020. Korea has proposed to establish a Registry of Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) of developing countries at the Secretariat of the UNFCCC, with a view to inviting developing countries to voluntarily participate in mitigation actions and providing the international support that they need.”

Lastly, worthy of mention that during Lee's tenure there was the establishment of two international institutions to show Korea's responsibility with the global community; the installation in Incheon of the secretariat of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) as an instrument that acts to promote in undeveloped countries investments in renewable energies and climate change mitigation; and the relaunch of the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) in 2010, a think tank that aims to promote green growth as a global issue, providing aid and strategies to the agenda of developing countries. The GGGI also tried to promote the principle of the Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMA) that encourages the creation of voluntary emissions targets by each country depending on its means and capabilities (Han, 2015: 740-741).

Despite the efforts, during the 2012 Korean elections, the green growth aspect was laid aside, since it was believed it had a direct relation with the Lee administration. Thereafter, it came under scrutiny because of the Four Major Rivers Restoration Project (FMRRP), for allegations on corruption, deterioration in ecology, and damage to local communities. After all, Lee's legacy within the green growth policy became a grand failure because it exacerbated water pollution. President Lee was criticized for spending more than 22 trillion KRW (Jung, 2020: 413); accused of collusion in the bidding process for the project, bribery to secure contracts, with evidence suggesting "favoritism to acquaintances and nepotism because his administration awarded construction projects to businesses close to his aides and family" (Kalinowski, 2016: 11); but also, for non-democratic decision-making procedures since there was considerable opposition from ordinary citizens and environmental NGOs (Park, 2011: 3-4).

When Park Geun-Hye (2013-2017) became president, she displaced the green growth and instead promoted a 'creative economy' which was in accordance with her desire of creating a 'Second Miracle on the Han River'. This sought to transform the economic strategy and relied on science technology and innovation, just as it was stated during the 18th Presidential Inauguration Speech (Park, 2013):

"The convergence of science and technology with industry, the fusion of culture with industry and the blossoming of creativity made possible by the breaking down of barriers between industries together define a creative economy. It is about creating new markets and new jobs by building on the bedrock of convergence, going beyond simply expanding existing markets. At the very heart of a creative economy lie science, technology and the IT industry, areas that I have earmarked as key priorities."

Although a second Five Year Plan for green growth was established (2014-2018) its status was downgraded (Yun & Lah, 2020: 440), for the reasons already mentioned. Conversely, she decided to encourage sustainable development as a national goal and saw green growth as a mere tool and part of the creative economy. However, the Park administration decided to

close the PCGG, erased the 'green' word from the names of official bureaus, and abolished the ambassador for green growth (Shin, 2013). These actions dealt a setback to green public diplomacy in comparison with the previous administration.

Despite these concerns, President Park Geun-Hye decided to continue mitigating climate change within the creative economy framework. At the international level, she continued supporting the GGGI (GGGI, 2013) and the GCF. Furthermore, she created the Green Technology Center Korea; and partnered with UNESCO to implement the new 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, as well as continue with the development and the adoption of green technologies (UNESCO, 2015). Additionally, for the UN Conference on Climate Change (COP21) in Paris 2015, Korea committed to reducing greenhouse emissions by 38% from the business-as-usual levels predicted by 2030, as its contribution to the Paris Agreement (Yonhap News, 2016).

Overall, there were no significant changes in the climate change issue and the development of green policies in the economic aspect. Besides, there was a perception of an environmental policy less transformative in both levels, national and international; despite the initiatives and the potential of the country to address climate change, shown by the previous administration. In 2016 concerns were raised when President Park became involved in a political scandal that would finish in her impeachment for abuse of power, extortion, bribery, and cronyism (Jung, 2020: 415). Moreover, in the same year, Korea was classified as one of the climate villains for the chosen path towards a zero-emission society and the low emissions reduction targets which have been cataloged as mediocre under the Paris Agreement framework (Watts, 2020).

MOON JAE IN'S POLICY TOWARDS ENVIRONMENT

After the impeachment of Park Geun-Hye in March of 2017, climate change became a topic of minor importance during the presidential elections campaign. However, Moon Jae-In promised to tackle fine dust and close old coal-fired plants. Later, on his 100 policy tasks, he stipulated the commitment of Korea to the implementation of the Paris Agreement on

Climate Change (The Government of the Republic of Korea, 2017). Hence since he arrived in the presidency there have been high expectations on a new or renewed stage of environmental policy for the country.

Yun and Lah (2020: 440-441) previewed three important changes in the following years of the Moon administration:

1. A shift from green growth to sustainable development, since there has been a misconception and exaltation on the first concept. When the OECD (2011: 5) has clarified that green growth should be viewed as a sub-agenda of sustainable development. It is expected the Moon administration could clarify the misconception through institutional frameworks such as the Framework Law on Sustainable Development, the Presidential Committee on Sustainable Development, etc.
2. A major status and role of the Ministry of Environment (MOE) to enhance the environmental policies related to sustainable development, climate change, and renewable energies. In addition, a proactive and leading role of the MOE in the Presidential Committee on Sustainable Development.
3. The implementation of more specific policies related to environmental issues such as the incremental increase of the national share of renewable energy generation from 4.8% to 20% by 2030; the improvement of chemical management; the evaluation of the Four Rivers Project to examine the possibility of restoration; the control and reduction of the atmospheric particulates by limiting the operation of coal power plants and diesel vehicles; and, the reduction of the nuclear power generation from 30% to 17.8% by 2030, with the ultimate goal of a nuclear-zero society.

Up to now, during his term President Moon has firmly maintained Korea's compromise with international institutions and cooperation, proof of which being the celebration of the 48th session of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in Incheon; the emphasis of the MOE to fulfill the Paris Agreement obligations; being one of the initial members of the Partnering for Green Growth and the Global Goals 2030 (P4G) and the attendance of the president to the first P4G summit, where he praised the

necessity of international cooperation and 'inclusive growth'. Additionally, he has provided support to the GGGI and the GCF; and has launched the National Council on Climate and Air Quality (Pacheco & et al., 2019: 21-23).

Nevertheless, in 2018 Korea was the seventh-largest emitter of CO₂, despite the international compromises and status acquired. Consequently, the society has condemned the government for the nation's climate-change law that fails to set defined and effective targets to combat climate change (see Climate Analytics, 2020; Mathiesen, 2016; OECD, 2018; Lee, 2020a; Watts, 2020). Hence, it has been crucial for Korea, as a middle power, and in the climate change problem, to demonstrate through its performance its ability to coordinate domestic policies with the way this question is addressed in the international system, and demonstrate it is a nation with responsible global citizens and in consequence recover credibility (Ikenberry & Mo, 2013: 6-13; Pandey & Watson, 2014: 1-2).

THE GREEN IN THE KOREAN NEW DEAL AMID COVID-19 PANDEMIC

As stated at the beginning of this paper, 2020 has brought challenges to the world resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. In the economic aspect, the World Bank (2020) has foreseen a 5.2% contraction in the global GDP and has ranked this crisis as one of the deepest global recessions in decades. In East Asia and the Pacific, the GDP is expected to fall to 0.5%, down from 5.9% in 2019, the lowest rate since 1967. In the case of South Korea, there has been a weakness in foreign demand and disruptions in the global chains causing unemployment, particularly in wholesale and retail trade, accommodation, and food; along with temporary and daily workers and small business owners (OECD, 2020).

Owing to this, economic recovery has been crucial for all the countries; the UN stressed the SDGs as the framework for the world's recovery and the necessity of a different economy (Guterres, 2020). Hence, some countries have used the crisis as an opportunity to promote policies related to sustainable development; for example, the European Union announced a

COVID-19 recovery package that places climate change in the center, this has been cataloged as the largest green stimulus program in history (Hoon, 2020).

On March 2020, the Liberal Party – the current ruling political party– announced a manifesto in favor of a comprehensive Green New Deal in response to the ongoing global climate crisis, and in order to achieve a carbon zero society by 2050, this was made part of their platform in the following general elections (Greenpeace International, 2020). Korea became the first country in East Asia to propose an institutional framework of this type amid the COVID-19 pandemic.

On July 14th, 2020 president Moon presented the Korean New Deal Initiative as a strategy that has the objective to implement economic, environmental, and social reforms amid the COVID-19 juncture impacts. In his speech he recognized how Korea has acted in a successful way to contain the virus (Moon, 2020):

“Korea is overcoming the COVID-19 crisis in an exemplary manner. We have successfully implemented efficient infectious disease prevention and control without closing any borders or stopping the economy (...) Korea’s response to COVID-19 has become a global model. Thanks to our success, we have minimized the economic impact (...) The Korean New Deal is a declaration of the Republic of Korea’s great transition into a leading nation. It is the Government’s strong commitment to fundamentally transform the Republic of Korea – from a fast follower-type economy into a pace-setting one; from a carbon-dependent economy into a low-carbon one; and from an unequal society into an inclusive one.”

According to official documents published by The Government of the Republic of Korea (2020: 4), this deal is a national development strategy that acts “to support the country’s recovery from the pandemic crisis and lead the global action against structural changes.” The Korean New Deal is divided into three main policies: The Digital New Deal, The Green New Deal, and the Stronger Safety Net; in which the government plans to invest a total of 160 trillion won and create 1,901,000 jobs by 2025.

The Deal has three main objectives: (1) to minimize the effects of the crisis by creating jobs that also support the structural transition towards a digital and green economy; (2) to return to the normal growth path by building the necessary infrastructure for a digital and green economy; and, (3) to be a referent and leader among the global community in the post COVID-19 era. The deal also contemplates the establishment of a universal employment insurance system and sets a path towards net-zero emissions (The Government of the Republic of Korea, 2020: 4). The focus of this paper has been the potential of the green part.

In the Green New Deal, the Moon administration plans to invest 73.4 trillion won including 42.7 trillion won from the treasury by 2025 and create 659,000 jobs. It encompasses three focus areas (The Government of the Republic of Korea, 2020: 25-31):

1. Green transition of infrastructures: move to create a green-friendly environment where humans and nature coexist, through zero-energy buildings; restoration of the terrestrial, marine, and urban ecosystems; and management for clean and safe water.
2. Low-carbon and decentralized energy: promote the use of sustainable and renewable energy in all the country through the active investment in research and development; for example, the expansion of the supply of electric and hydrogen vehicles.
3. Innovation in the green industry: stimulate areas of opportunity within the green economy that contemplate environmental issues like, technological development and green financing.

Hoon (2020) has identified the Deal as an opportunity to make the post-COVID-19 economic recovery a green one and depending on the success play a leading role in supporting other countries to cooperate, exchange policy ideas, and help each other, as has been done to combat the disease, which has transformed Korea into an international role model. President Moon has pointed out the difference between his proposal and previous ones, declaring that the Green New Deal is an updated version adapted to the needs of the new era and has more weight on sustainability (Lee, 2020b).

According to Moon's administration, it is expected that this Deal will transform Korea into a smart country that leads future services and innovative public services; a green country that engages and addresses the global discussions on the climate change issue; and a safe country that combats unemployment and social disparities (The Government of the Republic of Korea, 2020: 39). So far, the OECD has celebrated the Korean initiative and expects that it fosters economic revival and increases job creation (see Stangarone, 2020).

President Moon has been praised for his strategy and the priority of his administration in the containment of the virus. The Korean New Deal has come in just the right moment to boost the Korean strategy, but this time against economic damages and climate change. Only time will tell its effectiveness, yet it is undeniable that the initiative itself shows the resolve of the country and the aspirations of becoming a true referent and leader, through sustainable development.

CONCLUSION

In recent years, South Korea has caught the world's attention not only for its image projected through the Hallyu wave but by its active performance as a middle power in several different international initiatives, including climate change as seen in the previous discussion. Lately, Korea has been recognized as one of the best countries in containing the coronavirus pandemic; amid these circumstances, the Korean government has presented 'The Korean New Deal,' the Green part of it acting to contain climate change through various measures, including decrement of the dependency on fossil fuels and creation of jobs, among others; in order to become a leader—among developing countries— in resolving the actual climate change and economic crisis.

Nowadays, climate change is an undeniable threat that has questioned the capacity of response and interest of all countries around the globe. Successive Korean governments have captivated the attention of the international community by employing compromise and having a disposition of cooperation. Nevertheless, Moon Jae-In and the presidents

ahead need to continue enhancing the public diplomacy on climate change done by its predecessors and overcome the faults made.

In some ways, it seems the Korean New Deal incorporates both strategies of the previous administrations; the green growth framework of Lee Myung-Bak and the creative economy policy of Park Geun-Hye; with Moon's own essence of inclusive growth. Despite the stumbles of the previous administrations, it has to be said that without its efforts on dynamic narratives, Korea would not project its present image of active middle power on addressing climate change within sustainable development. However, President Moon still needs to coordinate its international ambitions with its actions at the domestic level, so it can strengthen and solidify its responsibility in face of the international community.

South Korean narratives and initiatives on sustainable development demonstrate the capacity of developing countries to coordinate and not separate the environment from the development aspect. As a considerable economy with advanced technology, Korea has the potential to become a model creator of products that enhance the coexistence of the humans and the planet, since it is the second most innovative economy of the world (Statista, 2020).

Another agent that has played an important role is the gradual increase of Koreans environmental consciousness; according to the Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Survey, the Koreans showed a higher degree of awareness and concern about climate change (Poushter & Huang, 2020). This fact could improve the pressure of citizens with its government to induce politicians to make decisions and demand for effective actions toward the environment.

Although the Green New Deal has been criticized by several civil organizations and doubts about its efficiency remain among the general public, this new initiative presented under the Moon administration shows how South Korea –still– has the resolve to contain and confront the damages that have been caused to the environment over the previous decades. President Moon is challenged with showing the world that Korea has a compromise with the international community and the future ahead.

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South Korea on the Forefront of Fifth Generation (5G) Technology: Public Diplomacy 2.0

Mark Joseph V. Montera

Abstract | Inspired by Retno Marsudi's statement on the purpose of digital technologies in the diplomatic field, we consider the research and development (R&D) of more advanced technologies as a new characteristic of the diplomatic paradigm. In this study, we analyze the role of 5G technology leadership on the international audience's stand towards the image of South Korea, a major implication for future diplomatic undertakings.

Keywords | digital diplomacy, 5G technology, public diplomacy, Internet, Huawei, United States, 5G+ Strategy, Artificial Intelligence (AI)

국문초록 | 외교 분야 내 디지털 기술의 목적에 대한 Retno Marsudi의 서술에서 영감을 받아, 우리는 더욱 발전된 기술의 연구개발(R&D)을 외교 패러다임의 새로운 특징으로 바라본다. 이 연구에서 우리는 5G 기술 리더십이 한국의 이미지에 대한 세계 대중의 태도에 어떤 영향을 끼치는지 분석하였다.

INTRODUCTION

Despite being categorized as one of the Four Asian Dragons, South Korea, diplomatically, had a global position of using passive and noncreative policies in the East Asian region compared with the active and aggressive policies of powerful nations (Cho, 2012). A country that was once united by an ancient kingdom in the Korean Peninsula, torn by a war caused by supporting two contradicting ideologies, has proved to the international community that such progress can be attained in such a small amount of time. Being the home of big company names in electronic and automotive

industries such as Samsung, LG, Hyundai, KIA, and Daewoo, this small nation of about 50 million individuals is gradually introducing their locality overseas. According to Korea Foundation's president Lee Geun, "we have caught up very quickly" (2019) when he enumerated the non-state actors (electronic giants, Samsung and LG, as well as the South Korean entertainment industry) that greatly contributed to the success of the country's public diplomacy. What is their secret? Excellent public diplomacy by its state and non-state actors through different platforms. Why public diplomacy is the secret? Diplomacy serves as the greatest factor in achieving recognition outside any nation's borders.

Diplomacy, in its broadest sense, is the main function of international relations in which the diplomats are the main actors. The diplomatic practice is performed by state actors representing a government or global organization to accomplish their goals of preserving the interests of those institutions. The diplomat, scholar, and politician, Sir Harold George Nicholson argued that the greatest antidote diplomats must preserve is the loyalty to the government of their original country (1942: 129).

Public diplomacy, a more common term for diplomacy, is the method a nation relays their foreign policy and promote their image by attracting a legitimate nation-branding from the general public outside its territorial borders. Legitimate nation-branding should be defined as the honest perception of a foreign individual towards a country's foreign policies. We say honest perception in the terms that it could result in a negative or positive image of a country and it depends on how a respective nation will handle their diplomatic actions. The University of Southern California (USC) Center of Public Diplomacy defines public diplomacy as "the public, interactive dimension of diplomacy which is not only global in nature but also involves a multitude of actors and networks, a mechanism to build a secure global environment" (n.d.). Public diplomacy, in its prompt meaning, involves the public of the respective nation, not just the individuals representing a seat in the government to target the interest of the foreign citizens on the former's policies and traditions. Public diplomacy should help in constructing a positive image, sustainable relation, and understanding and clarification of the policies that a respective nation carried out to another nation (Cho, 2012). According to Cho (2012), a sustainable

relationship is also pursued through interactive communication between the individuals involved in a diplomatic agenda by utilizing such media as the social network services (SNS) and the World Wide Web.

Public diplomacy is divided into two categories: hard power and soft power. The term “soft power” is first introduced by the diplomat, professor, and scholar of American origin, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. According to Nye (2004, pp. 5-11), Soft power diplomacy is the communication process of one nation to another nation to convince the latter’s citizens of a positive point-of-view to the diplomatic objectives that “hard power” diplomacy could have not been done. Nye argues that hard power diplomacy is the traditional diplomacy in which only the state actors, the diplomats, can perform and is more prone to secrecy and allegations from the general public.

Digital diplomacy is the implementation of diplomatic objectives through the use of digital technologies, such as the Internet and communication technologies, to order and promptly attract interest from the foreign public. Communication forms in the environment have been always the greatest factor for diplomacy. In a world where globalization is a gradual change in the society, relating to it the advanced developments of science and technology, connecting more audiences at unprecedented rates that helped policy leaders and government representatives to successfully share messages and implement political agendas in the way they planned it to be accepted. Digital diplomacy promptly clarifies adequate information from official sources eliminating the widespread nature of incorrect information, online and offline.

The developments of information technologies intensified the non-state actors’ ability to access information and show their perception of foreign policy (Cho, 2012). The openness of the information in the world wide web provides additional freedom to the general public and in return, the governments can take note of the perceptions of the public in the future implementation of their foreign policy goals. In this paper, we propose that leading the digital innovation is a vital advantage in promoting a nation’s diplomatic objectives and improving its image to the international scene. We argue that public diplomacy is the utilization and innovation of the diverse means of communication, such as digital technologies, aimed at attracting interests and eliminating racial differences through mutual

understanding of each other's policies. Our argument is inspired by the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Retno Marsudi, in which he made a statement on a digital diplomacy regional conference involving the Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) countries, and several Asian and Oceania countries:

If we can't keep up to date with technology, we'll be left behind. This affects diplomacy, too. If we can't adjust to rapid transformations [in the tech world], diplomacy will be rendered irrelevant. Diplomacy has to go hand-in-hand with digital innovation (2019).

Marsudi understands that diplomacy has to adapt to the changes in the communication technologies in the environment and any nation who will be left behind will have a huge disadvantage in promoting their foreign policy and improving their nation-branding in the years to come. We argue that the leadership of South Korea in the electronics and information technology (IT) industry, take into specific the initial commercialization of fifth-generation (5G) technology, should improve their nation-branding and be leading for their foreign policy goals to be more accepted in the future. For the reader to understand the basis of this assumption, we constructed this paper in the following manner. First, we focus on the concept of digital diplomacy through various context(s) and its history. Second, we analyze the digital diplomacy of South Korea by enumerating its domestic and international movements in the digital sphere. Third, we discuss how the South Korean government implements and maintains the leadership on 5G technology, taking into consideration the global issues and competition on that specific digital innovation, the method used in this study. Lastly, we offer the concluding remarks and some recommendations for the future South Korean take on digital public diplomacy.

DIGITAL DIPLOMACY IN CONTEXT(S)

The history of the term “digital diplomacy” takes back even to the 19th century. In the 1850s, the foreign secretary and prime minister of British

origin, Lord Palmerston, made a statement upon receiving the first telegraph message: “My God, this is the end of diplomacy!” (DiploFoundation, 2020). Palmerston implied the term “diplomacy” as the traditional and “hard power” diplomacy that is only performed by state actors in a closed-door setting. According to DiploFoundation (2020), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) held the first online participation session in multilateral diplomacy in the year 1963. Online participation is a vital tool for global policy processes which is a collection of resources that promotes openness and inclusiveness by involving even the remote participants, from civil society to business representatives in a conference room without being present in the room physically. The invention of new digital technologies signaled the start of “soft power” diplomacy, a contactless and open-door communication between citizens around the world. In just less than a century, the digital sphere has seen a rapid increase in digital technologies brought by its endless development through engineering and computer science. From the telephone which historically breached its 100-millionth user about 75 years before its first commercial use to mobile phones and its applications, the nature of diplomacy gradually changed to adapt to the present forms of communication.

The terms “e-diplomacy,” “cyber-diplomacy,” “public diplomacy 2.0,” “contactless diplomacy,” and many more as scholars use more often, were created as innovations of the term “digital diplomacy.” James K. Glassman, a Washington D.C think-tank, made a speech entitled *Public diplomacy 2.0: A New Approach to Global Engagement* and defined public diplomacy 2.0 as a “new approach but not a new technology” (2008). He argued that digital diplomacy is just an innovation of public diplomacy and not a new form of diplomacy. The developments of information technologies intensified the non-state actors’ ability to access information and show their perception of foreign policy (Cho, 2012). Digital technologies gave more eagerness and power to the general public to demand transparency on a specific government’s policies and objectives and contribute to improving the image of their nation in return. According to Chun (2006), and Yoon & Jung (2009), promoting a respective nation’s policies and ideologies through the years has relied increasingly on public information to persuade public opinions worldwide.

State actors, such as the diplomats and government officials, are vital propagators of improving nation-branding and promoting foreign policies. According to Manor and Segev (2015), two levels exist for digital diplomacy: that of the foreign ministry and that of the embassies around the world. A nation's foreign policy and image can result in acceptance in the way they aim to promote by operating on these two levels. Furthermore, digital diplomacy has eight policy goals: knowledge management; public diplomacy; information management; consular communications and response; disaster response; internet freedom; external resources; and policy planning (Hanson, 2012). Diplomats slowly put more attention to using social networking services such as Facebook, Twitter, blog posts, and other social media on the Internet as official tools of public diplomacy (Atsushi, 2017). Moreover, according to Atsushi, "approaches to public diplomacy must change" (2017). A single successful tweet can instantly change other nation's public opinion towards positivism on the image of the respective nation. A tweet of diplomat John Roos, U.S. Ambassador to Japan, after the March 2011 northern Japan earthquake (also famous as the 3/11 Japan earthquake)¹¹ contributed to the disaster recovery effort by asking where to deploy U.S. military forces. By the end of December 2012, the ambassador's followers increased to over 50,000. Such online platforms can provide additional accurate information on whether such policies are accepted by the general public of another nation that the traditional diplomatic approach could not provide as feedback.

Additionally, the Communication and Information Technology Minister of Indonesia, Rudiantara, believed that:

Nowadays, you can't call yourself a diplomat if you don't have a social media account. State officials use Instagram to communicate with the public. We need to know how to maximize the way we use social media and other technologies (2019).

¹¹ Happened on March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake struck the northeastern region of Japan creating a tsunami with waves that even reached the western coastlines of South America after about 21 hours. Casualties amounted to about 18,000 individuals and damaged a nuclear power plant.

Public diplomacy has its benefits and regrets and so the digitalized form. Millennials, as what the individuals born during the 1990s onwards, are the present major goal of public diplomacy efforts. Thus, digital diplomacy is the key as the current youth are more focused on what everything online, easy to access, low-cost, and up-to-date. Social media is a major sigh of relief to embassies that are faced with budget cuts and increased demand for improved promotion of foreign policies and nation-branding (Adesina, 2017). Social networking services, such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, have a huge percentage of the youth population. An increasing number of embassies are building and creating their accounts via these online platforms to greatly enhance their diplomatic tactics. Digital diplomacy is more interactive: foreign audiences understand more the country's policies and culture through multimedia forms such as images and videos. Embassies conduct online contests and events to attract more individuals on reaching their content.

The presence of advantages always connects to the presence of disadvantages. Digital public diplomacy is prone to various manipulations from private individuals. The greatest threat of digital diplomacy is hacking. Hacking is the secret and uncontrolled manipulation of an institution's online platforms such as websites and SNS accounts. Such crime can be a future tool of warfare and conflicts as both sides can hire hackers to target each other's database and spy. It is also prone to inviting a negative image to a country if hackers breached and uploaded incorrect and fake content for the sake of degrading a nation. Probably one of the greatest hacking incidents in the last several years, the 2016 US Presidential Elections, in which the personal email account of John Podesta, the chairman of Hillary Clinton's presidential campaign, was breached and leaked over 20,000 emails in its content, ultimately leading to their loss. Another risk of digital diplomacy is the presence of users hiding using the identity of others. Using fake accounts is also a tactic used by some digital diplomacy advocates and practitioners for their advantage. An incorrect and contradicting statement by a diplomat uploaded to the social media can inflict damage even to the government represented. For example, a tweet by the Swedish foreign minister, Carl Bildt, moments before the 2012 World Economic Forum dinner in Davos, stated that "Leaving Stockholm and heading for Davos.

Looking forward to World Food Program dinner tonight. Global hunger is an urgent issue! #davos.” Such a message contains contradicting statements of promoting to solve global hunger while being boastful about going to a prestigious dinner. It is in such a manner to talk about how South Korea performed its public diplomacy through the digital sphere and the feedback it received. In the following section, we analyze the platforms used by the South Korean state and non-state actors for promoting their foreign policies and building a positive image of their nation.

LAND OF THE MORNING CALM'S DIPLOMACY THROUGH DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES

The current general public is increasingly gaining more curiosity about anything related to South Korea: culture, politics, entertainment, etc. Such curiosity should be transformed into positive perceptions of the image of South Korea (Cho, 2012). Korean Wave, translated into the Korean language as “Hallyu,” is the major propagator of such increasing attention towards South Korea. According to Cho (2012), South Korea should strictly select and propagate which universal and inclusive policies to promote on the Internet. Cho argued that the geopolitical, physical, and demographic classifications of each region should be carefully considered in applying specific foreign policies. Various policies and methods are to be applied considering the difference of each nationality and race.

According to the 2019 edition of the yearly journal published by the collaboration between Portland, a strategic communications consultancy, and the USC Center on Public Diplomacy, entitled “The Soft Power 30,” South Korea ranked 19th on the soft power index, their highest ranking on the yearly index since it started last 2015. Increasing improvement on the government sub-index, overflowing of tourists arriving in South Korea mainly because of Korean Wave influence, and the historic Trump-Kim Summit and Inter-Korean Summit boosted their ranking on the soft power index. South Korea ranked their highest in the digital sub-index, proving its competence as the leader on digital infrastructures, relating to it their improving e-participation index as more citizens are allowed to attain

government support through digital services provided and funded by the government (Portland, 2019). In 2016, the Korean government passed the “Public Diplomacy Act,” in the goals of improving and maintaining a positive “Korean image and prestige” perception among the domestic and international audience (Park S., Chung, & Park H., 2018). One of the by-products of the said act is the creation of a PD committee that presented a comprehensive PD plan through the year 2017-2021 for conducting and coordinating activities related to public diplomacy.

South Korea is considered a giant in terms of cutting-edge IT. The internet connectivity speed is overwhelming and very futuristic, as the result of being the most internet-wired country in the world, even reaching a penetration rate greater than 100% on wireless broadband access (Osborne, 2012). Mobile phone users outnumber the population and social media traffic is very high, losing cellular phone reception is unheard of throughout the country. Such wide community interactions through social media is a vital tool for public diplomacy, information is subject to openness, more inclusive, and relayed in real time. An amount of 11.3 billion KRW is to be allocated on the digitalization of cultural assets through the use of virtual reality (VR) technologies, a major plan of the Ministry of Culture, Science, and Technology.

The upshot of Korean Wave via dramas, show programs, and K-Pop idols, thanks to improved digital technologies, gave light to South Korea which is long lingering on the shadows of its superpower neighbors, Japan and China (Cho, 2012). We argue that the government should increase collaboration with the private sector on promoting the country’s image and policies towards the foreign public. Government agencies are now utilizing social networking services. Recently, an online contest was held by MOFA, seeking for an appropriate and engaging name for their SNS accounts. The contest garnered an overwhelming number of suggestions from all over the world, proving that the general public is increasingly expressing their curiosity about helping the South Korean government on improving their diplomatic agendas. The winning entry, “KoreAZ,” which means everything about Korea from A to Z, is now the official SNS accounts name for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In the wake of the CoronaVirus Disease-19 (COVID-19) pandemic, South Korea became one of the first nations where viral breakout took place

and also the nation that became the role model of pandemic control. Infected individuals reached over 10,000 in just a month but contained this number through strict implementation of their 3Ts: tracing, testing, and treatment. The MOFA established a campaign plan on the post-COVID19 environment. One of the objectives of the plan is to “promote interactive digital public diplomacy” (MOFA, 2020). As society tends on utilizing contactless technologies to avoid being infected by COVID-19, the government is focusing more on interacting with the audience through online platforms. According to Stangarone (2020), one of the proposed projects of Moon administration for the recovery from the effects of economic recession brought by COVID-19 is the “Korean New Deal” which comprised two pillars: “Green New Deal” and “Digital New Deal.” The Digital New Deal will focus on improving digital innovation and technologies as one of the allocations of the proposed 76 trillion won (\$62 billion) project.

South Korea is a deeply digitalized society, thanks to its overflowing patents mainly concerning technological infrastructures, proving its existence as a rising giant in terms of digital public diplomacy. As one of the leaders of internet connectivity and speed, smartphone users, digital technology patents, South Korea should be a great soft power in this highly-technological age, but it's not (Robertson, 2017). There are three broad reasons for this failure:

First, South Korea has no strategic plan for digital public diplomacy. In 2016, South Korea enacted legislation to support coordination, management, reporting, and oversight of public diplomacy. The legislation requires the lead agency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to establish a Master Plan for public diplomacy. Second, the strategic rationale for digital public diplomacy is misunderstood. Despite recognizing its importance, South Korea's understanding of public diplomacy is still evolving. In particular, the South Korean conceptualization of public diplomacy conceives of a ‘borderless world,’ in which the state seeks to persuade both external and internal audiences. Third, the Moon administration has failed to enunciate its strategic narrative. The administration is taking a longer-term

approach to Korean Peninsula peace – a multidimensional, open-ended, confidence-building approach that aims to remove North Korea's rationale for seeking and maintaining nuclear and missile programs (Robertson, 2017).

Government officials do not utilize social media extensively: usually have no personal SNS accounts as a result of personal decisions to maintain flexibility in carrying the core objectives of public diplomacy. International cultural relations and public diplomacy are in constant competition of each other, MOFA and MCST prioritize digital technologies at its lowest level in light of visible and underlying risks of digital public diplomacy (Melissen & Kim, 2018). In the next section, we discuss the sense of 5G technology, the present stand of South Korea as the leader of 5G technology commercialization, and the global competition, the method used in this paper.

SOUTH KOREA: THE ROLE MODEL OF 5G TECHNOLOGY

5G Technology is an innovation in this rapid-evolving digital sphere, enabling industries to perform faster and more interactive through the use of more advanced technologies. 5G Technologies is still on the initial phase of commercialization and several countries are taking their initial step on being the pioneers of embracing this technology, resulting in global competition and issues.

5G TECHNOLOGY IN ITS SENSE

As the general public is more curious about embracing a futuristic way of life, digital innovations are patented to provide more contactless and wireless forms of technologies. An example is a 5G technology that could meet the increasing demands of industries in the coming 2020s decade and beyond. According to the Agence France-Presse (2019), such a generation of technology could power up capabilities of a wide range of daily technologies, from toasters to telephones, from electric cars to power grids, making them

more wirelessly operated. Through the commercialization of fifth-generation technology, citizens are more instantaneously connected, making it more focused on public diplomacy objectives. Cultural contents could be made more realistic and interactive, providing the foreign audience a way to feel the essence of such history. 5G technology is 20 times faster than its predecessor, the 4G technology, enabling to download an entire movie in just a second (Agence France-Presse, 2019). The utilization of such technology could bring about \$565 billion of global economic benefits by the year 2034. The economy minister of South Korea, Hong Nam-Ki, once commented, "If 5G is fully implemented, it will greatly improve people's lives." (2019).


5G technology utilizes shorter wavelengths (millimeter waves), an ideal factor for faster internet speeds containing a higher amount of data. Data could be transferred at about 700 megabits/second, way times faster than the 30 to 50 megabits/second capability of 4G technology (Kang, 2020). These millimeter-sized wavelengths, however, couldn't penetrate through building foliage and walls, requiring the installation of miniature base stations inside structures. On the other side, these base stations are fortunately more low-cost than traditional cell towers and could accommodate a higher number of antennas, miniature ones, allowing more users to be connected to a single base station.

In this sense, every newly-invented technology is a hot topic for the pros and cons enthusiasts. 5G technology also, as it has some advantages and disadvantages. As enumerated by Ramage (2019), 5G technology could offer out-of-this-world internet speeds, fewer tower congestion, and new technology options. When it comes to internet speeds, users can experience downloading an entire episode of HD programs in a matter of seconds. Cell tower congestion is the situation in which a single cell tower is full of users simultaneously demanding for signal reception reaching its capacity. With 5G technology, tower congestion is a thing of the past. Unfortunately, 5G frequencies are only available to a smaller coverage area, prone to inducing battery heat/drain, and low upload speeds compared to its download speeds (Ramage, 2019). Users are complaining to fast battery drain and hot phone temperatures when using 5G reception. In this sense, advancement in battery technology is a must to adapt to 5G development.

SOUTH KOREA'S LEADERSHIP IN 5G COMMERCIALIZATION

Ranked in the top places in terms of internet connectivity and speed and digitalization, South Korea further improved its status on being the first country to commercialize the use of 5G technology. April 3, 2019, is a historic day for the digital sphere as the first 5G-capable phones and networks are laid out in the South Korean market, hours before the US made their move. Samsung Electronics released its first-ever 5G-capable smartphone, called Galaxy S10, hours ahead before its US counterpart, Motorola's MotoZ3, was released (Ferrier, 2019). Such movement could result in more attention to the capabilities of South Korea as a highly-digitalized nation, a good opportunity for diplomats to better their foreign policies and nation-branding in the future. As noted by Ferrier (2019), 5G is thought to be fully implemented by the year 2023.

As of May 2020, the number of 5G connected subscribers amount to about 6.9 million, roughly about 10% of the total estimated 69 million mobile phone users in South Korea, according to the data of the South Korean ICT ministry. An average 5G subscriber in South Korea uses about 2.6 times higher data than a regular 4G LTE user, substantial evidence of the wide capabilities of the 5G technology. The industry tracker, OpenSignal, measured that among the subscribers of the three major telecommunication networks in South Korea (SK Telecom, LG UPlus, and KT Corp.), 5G connection is only used about 15% of the time. Download speeds are currently reaching a maximum of about 200 megabytes/second (MBps).



Note: The brackets indicate confidence intervals. (OpenSignal, 2020)

Figure 1. Comparison of the 5G Download Speed Among the Big 3 South Korean Telecom Networks

According to Dyton (2020), the capabilities of 5G technology is starting to be very visible in South Korea, from live streaming of sports with a 360-degree view to augmented reality (AR) smartphone applications that could display a large cat while visiting a park. The increasing curiosity of probably one of the most demanded futuristic machines, a self-driving autonomous car, is one of the reasons for massive research and development on improving internet technology. In Hwaseong, a 360,000 square meters test site for self-driving cars was built, equipped with 5G base stations planted on highways, city outskirts, and construction sites, making it the world's first testbed for autonomous cars (Paulo & Alshahab, 2019). Proof of South Korea's leadership on the digital sphere is further built by a comment of Stephen Myers, principal analyst of Omdia:

The global market is steadily gearing up for 5G deployment, but right now South Korea is leading the way – although markets like Switzerland have also made steady progress (Myers, 2019).


The increasing demands for 5G technology have made the Moon administration to make a move on sustaining and supporting the 5G industry. The comprehensive plan called “5G+ Strategy” will focus on five core services (immerse content, autonomous vehicles, smart manufacturing, smart cities, and digital healthcare) and ten core industries (next-generation smartphones, network equipment, information security, edge computing, vehicle-to-everything communication, robots, drones, intelligent CCTV, wearable devices, and virtual and augmented reality headsets), that will be a vital foundation for the path that will be taken by the South Korean 5G industry (Gillispie, 2020).

GLOBAL COMPETITION

Despite the leadership of South Korea in commercializing the 5G technology, several economic nation-giants are also claiming of them being the pioneers. The US telecom carrier, Verizon, claims they are the first firm in the world to deploy the 5G network, in Chicago and Minneapolis, and soon


in more cities in the US. According to Verizon’s chairman and chief executive officer, Hans Vestberg, Verizon is the first firm in the world to have the power of 5G in their hands. Their rival counterpart, the US telecom AT&T, deployed their “5G E-network” in 12 cities and several cities soon to follow, with speeds greater than that of 4G networks. As proudly commented by AT&T Labs president, Andre Fuetsch, they are the fastest wireless network nationwide. Reach is the major problem of the US in commercializing the 5G network despite them having the fastest 5G internet speed across all countries due to spectrum challenges. South Korea installed “mid-band” 5G spectrums across 85 cities nationwide offering a good balance of speed and connectivity.

5G networks in South Korea is currently offered in non-standalone mode, a digital situation in which a user tends to switch each time between two network generations, 4G and 5G for example. South Korea currently uses the 3.5 gigahertz (GHz) band speed which made the mobile industry demanding on the R&D and immediate deployment of the 28 GHz band speed to experience lower latency and complete real 5G speeds, a nature of 5G that the digital sphere is envisioned. The US already commercialized the 28 GHz band and Japan is soon to follow tempting Kwon Kyoung-In, the chief technology officer of Ericsson-LG, to comment, “South Korea needs to show the leadership it has maintained” (2020).



(OpenSignal, 2020)

Figure 2. Download Speeds of Top Ten 5G Telecom Networks Worldwide



Note: Maximum download speeds in four countries now exceeds over 1 Gigabit per second. (OpenSignal, 2019)

Figure 3. Maximum Download Speeds Experienced by 5G Users in Several Countries

South Korea is at the forefront of 5G deployment but they lack in the AI sector. Ranking only in the 26th place in terms of training and supporting AI researchers, they lack in competitiveness compared to countries such as the United States (Stangarone, 2020). The challenges in the AI sector prompted the South Korean government to spend about 1 trillion won (\$820 million) in the span of 10 years to support the AI semiconductor industry. As noted by Stangarone (2020), the KT-led AI team targets to nurture and produce about 1,500 AI specialists by 2022.

In this sense that South Korean international relations will be a both-sided result. When it comes to the 5G industry, the United States is an avid supporter of the strategic interests of South Korea. The two countries alone could account for roughly 75% of all 5G subscribers worldwide by the year 2020 and Korean vendors such as Samsung is in a favorable state in the American market due to bilateral trade relations (O'Halloran & Segan, 2020). Reducing barriers to 5G deployment is a focus of regional partners, in the vision to build smart cities and produce autonomous vehicles. A potential challenge to South Korea's long-term growth in the 5G industry is the heated debate on the role of the Chinese company, Huawei, in 5G development that even the US imposed sanctions on the movements of Huawei products inside the US market. Since then, US allies are tempted to

impose similar sanctions against Huawei products, Japan and Australia for example, making South Korea in the midst of conflict between economic interests and international relations. However, United Kingdom strongly opposes applying restrictive measures against the Chinese company. The inviting and democratic policies of South Korea makes it a vital option as a digital powerhouse,

Its inclusion in the D10 and the United Kingdom's consideration of Samsung as a replacement for Huawei raises South Korea's profile in the wider 5G ICT supply chain debate, something that the Blue House has, until now, sought to avoid for two reasons. First, this ICT "decoupling" is driving a wedge between technology supply chains, which are deeply integrated for South Korean companies. The growing bifurcation between the PRC and the United States in this new "technology cold war" puts South Korea squarely between its main security provider and its main trading partner: an unsustainable position over the long run. Second, while Samsung is itself a competitor of Huawei—particularly in the space of 5G patents and equipment—many South Korean companies still wish to collaborate with Huawei and other leading Chinese technology firms who will resist the growing pressure to decouple in ICT (Gillispie, 2020).

Huawei and several South Korean electronics firms are vital trade partners through the years, making the global debate on Huawei's presence a major issue on the South Korean government. Samsung supplies electronic memory chips to Huawei and in return, LG UPlus is a major customer of 5G-related equipment of Huawei. A result of the diminishing presence of Huawei in the electronics industry is an advantage to the world-class South Korean electronics industry but could damage bilateral trade relations between China and South Korea. A vital proof of such consequence is that,

This long-term trend became even more pronounced after the 2017 THAAD crisis showed how vulnerable Seoul was to Beijing's economic coercion. Shortly thereafter, Samsung started to downsize

its Chinese manufacturing presence, closing the Shenzhen production line in May 2018, followed by its Tianjin factory in December. As the trade war between the United States and China began to heat up, South Korean firms continued their exodus from China, going to replacements such as Vietnam, where South Korean FDI (\$1.97 billion in the first half of 2018) exceeded FDI into China (Gillispie, 2020).

The visible and balanced leadership of South Korea and the issues surrounding 5G development is a considerable factor in the future out-takings of digital public diplomacy.

CONCLUSION

As digital public diplomacy becomes a great focus of diplomatic researches, traditional public diplomacy should be still in great consideration as the two matters could not succeed without a clear strategic narrative. Digital public diplomacy should be South Korea's priority; the PD Act enacted in 2016 might help in solving and guiding the path of international relations of South Korea. The current government proposed expenditures on the advancement of technologies should prosper the foreign public's stand in South Korea's role on the digital sphere.

By sharing its know-how on being a technological powerhouse and even a health-conscious nation, South Korea could be a nation that other nations want to emulate, partner with, and be a long-lasting ally. South Korea should instill a positive and engaging image in developing and under-developed countries such as a major contributor to great historical breakthroughs of solving problems overseas, in all aspects of society.

Therefore, we have argued that the leadership of South Korea in deploying 5G technology is a situation of bilateral consequences. In doing so, private non-state actors such as the electronics industry proved its essence on being a vital factor in the success of diplomatic objectives. The international issues surrounding the 5G commercialization is a major impact on the diplomatic field in which South Korea should take into serious

considerations. More extensive online/offline research undertakings are to be needed, but we can take from this immersion is South Korea's performance in the 5G industry from a descriptive viewpoint. Being active on the nature of globalization, such as being an economic powerhouse, is also a form of public diplomacy in that they can prove their existence as a self-governing nation, with cultural, political, and social viewpoints as foundations of diplomatic success.

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Role of Korean Public Diplomacy in Addressing Global Issues: South Korea Middlemanship and Public Diplomacy

Mathew Yeo Jie Sheng

Abstract | Despite being in the world where “hard” power still predominates (Mor, 2006), “soft” power, as espoused by public diplomacy, is slowly gaining traction. In full anticipation of this shift, South Korea started developing its public diplomacy a decade ago and has developed a niche in the conduct of public diplomacy. By first critically examining the historical and theoretical conceptualisation of public diplomacy, this paper concluded that South Korea’s practice of public diplomacy intersects with the functional aspect of middle power theory. Its many functional linkages between the two seemingly suggest that the conduct of public diplomacy is an extension and a major policy tool of a state in its conduct of middlepowermanship. As such, Korea’s public diplomacy role in the conduct of global affairs can be said to be subsumed and utilised accordingly within the conduct of Korea’s middlepowermanship.

국문초록 | 이 세계는 여전히 “하드” 파워가 지배하지만(Mor, 2006), 공공 외교가 지지하는 “소프트” 파워가 서서히 인기를 끌고 있다. 이러한 전환을 예측하여 대한민국은 십여 년 전 공공 외교를 발달시키기 시작했고 공공 외교 수행의 틈새를 개발했다. 공공 외교의 역사적, 이론적 개념을 먼저 비판적으로 분석함으로써 이 논문은 대한민국의 공공 외교 관행이 미들 파워 이론의 기능적인 측면과 교차한다고 결론짓는다. 이 둘 사이의 많은 기능적 연결고리들은 공공 외교 관행이 미들파워맨십(중간자) 수행의 연장이자 주요한 정책 도구라는 것을 보여준다. 국제 외교 수행에서 한국 공공 외교의 역할은 한국의 미들파워맨십 수행에 포함되며 그에 맞춰 활용된다고 할 수 있다.

INTRODUCTION

Having served as the United States Secretary of State and National Security Advisor under the Nixon and Ford administrations, Henry Kissinger detailed his acute interpretation of realpolitik issues and diplomatic experiences in perhaps his most iconic book titled 'Diplomacy'. In brief, this classic work denotes that for perpetual peace to be enduring, the mastery of the art of diplomacy is quintessential – acknowledging and understanding interstates differences, differing bargaining positions, and geopolitics and strategic considerations (Kissinger, 2014). Only by doing so can states discover commonality of interests which will facilitate cooperation and increase the cost of conflict, thereby mitigating the propensity of conflict. Going by this logic, given that states are the main actors and decision makers, diplomacy ought to be conducted through official government-to-government mediums. Indeed, as Wriston (1997) commented, diplomats of the past were the sole interlocutors between countries.

Ironically, despite discussing at great lengths the true notion and spirit of diplomacy, the concept of 'Public Diplomacy' was not discussed in the entire 'Diplomacy' book. To be fair, 'Public Diplomacy' is a relatively newly coined form of diplomacy that has always been practised before. Public diplomacy goes beyond mere propaganda or being a simple public relations campaign (Nye, 2008). Certainly, as President Lee (undated) of the South Korean Foundation surmised, 'Public Diplomacy' is still a term that has yet to be properly defined. These are the fundamental questions: What exactly is Public Diplomacy? How does it function? Why would a state adopt public diplomacy? What is the role of South Korea's public diplomacy efforts? These questions will form the crux of this paper. While present literature has overwhelmingly focused on how states conduct public diplomacy, few studies have been conducted to provide an explanation as to why states chose to undertake them. As such, this paper will attempt to address this literature gap by delving deeper to achieve a more comprehensive understanding as to why public diplomacy is conducted and advocated.

Thus, this paper will adopt an explanatory approach toward this end. Relying on existing but fragmented interpretations of 'Public Diplomacy' by different scholars, this paper will first construct a broad overview of this

abstract concept and conceptualise the meaning of Public Diplomacy. Next, having established a theoretical underpinning for this paper, the paper will attempt to utilise it to comprehend the basis of South Korea's public diplomacy efforts.

South Korea is chosen as a case study for learning more about public diplomacy as the country has placed a strong emphasis on public diplomacy among its diplomatic dealings. South Korea is one of the few countries that possess an institutionalised 'Public Diplomacy Act' along with an enforcement degree of this act. The institutionalised nature of this form of diplomacy, along with clearly defined strategies and goals, indicates that public diplomacy as an entity has relatively matured in South Korea. Hence, South Korea presents itself as one of the leading states in the conduct of public diplomacy; ergo the study of a leading and prominent actor can provide exciting revelations as to why states choose to conduct public diplomacy.

This paper concludes that South Korea's strong emphasis and niche in the conduct of public diplomacy, among its repertoire of diplomatic tools, is an extension of its middle power status. Adopting the functionalist approach in understanding middle power, this paper argues that South Korea developed a niche in public diplomacy, which in turn is melded into the grand narrative of Korea as a middle power improving its international standing. This shed light on the huge potentiality of public diplomacy, an often-eclipsed form of diplomacy, as an important policy tool for a middle power state to conduct its foreign affairs while elevating its international standing. In addition, this provides indication that the role of South Korea's public diplomacy in addressing global issues is an advancement of its current policies: an undertaking in its conduct of middlepowermanship.

CONCEPTUALISATION

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF 'PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Following the end of the Franco-Prussian war, which ended in French defeat, the French government attempted to repair and rebuild its national image by promoting its language and literature through the Alliance Francaise (Winkler & Nye, 2005). The propagation of French literal arts

soon became integral in French diplomacy (Pells, 1997). Following the French, other European states soon establish offices to cultivate favourable perception and images of one's state. The importance of having a favourable perception globally was underscored when the Roosevelt Administration stated that the US security depended on its ability to communicate and win the support of people in other countries (Pells 1997). This statement was followed US partaking in an aggressive cultural offensive globally to cultivate a positive perception of the US. The Office of Wartime Information (OWI) was tasked with the provision of accurate information while the Office of Strategic Service did the otherwise by disseminating disinformation and propaganda. At this juncture, states around the world were practising public diplomacy unknowingly as the term public diplomacy was only conceptualised in the 1960s by Edmund Gullion (Cull, 2008).

According to the Centre on Public Diplomacy of the University of South California (2017), the former US diplomat coined this term in the mid-1960s to differentiate the provision of information about a foreign country from actual propaganda. During the cold war, to maintain domestic stability and to avoid a repeat of McCarthyism while the US and Soviet Union were engaged in a fierce ideological battle internationally, it was integral for the domestic public to have the correct perception of the west. Hence, to achieve that, the term 'propaganda,' which had a negative connotation, was distanced, and replaced with public diplomacy. Public diplomacy in this aspect meant the provision of information regarding one's government for its domestic audience. However, as the Cold War intensified and the US and Soviet Union continued to vie for spheres of influences within the international arena, there was a need for overseas audiences to develop a favourable perspective on US's foreign policies. Indeed, as what Nye (2008) surmises, during the cold war, a new international arena where a battle 'over hearts and minds' are formed. In this new setup, power no longer necessitates material power but of positive perceptions of the state. In this regard, making an impression or forming a favourable perception became an integral part of policy planning (Mor, 2006).

On that note, public diplomacy underwent a transformation and could be defined as a mean by which state A interacts with the domestic audience in state B to create a favourable environment to advance state A's policies,

particularly that of foreign policies. This was seen when President Ronald Reagan ordered an intensification of the US's public diplomacy and psychological warfare efforts to counter the Soviet's efforts to undermine the western alliance (Scott-Smith, 2008). Undoubtedly, public diplomacy became a tool utilised by the US to generate positive perception of the US while countering Soviet's attempts of misperception (Scott-Smith, 2008). As Nye (2008) affirmed, effective usage of public diplomacy was integral in US victory in the cold war. In short, public diplomacy seeks to convince the foreign elites and its domestic audience that the values, policies, and actions of the state deserve their support both from the elite and grassroots level (Mor 2006)

As Public Diplomacy does not exist in a vacuum and is shaped primarily by external events, the end of the Cold War drastically reduced the need for public diplomacy (Cull, 2015). The US emerged as the sole superpower after the Cold War and there were no other contending powers that presented a serious challenge, both materially and perceptually, like the Soviet Union. As such, public diplomacy efforts were scaled back. The U.S. Information Agency (USIA), a former autonomous agency in charge of US's public diplomacy, faced budget cuts and was ultimately reorganised into various department of state offices (Frensley & Michaud, 2006). Such pompous and complacent behaviour towards Public diplomacy would soon change when the US experienced the September 11 attacks in 2001. Having to garner international support for its efforts against terrorism, the US would soon re-utilise public diplomacy (Mor, 2007; Frensley & Michaud, 2006). The significance of public diplomacy was underscored in the U.S. Advisory Commission report in 2002 when it denotes that US foreign policy has been weakened by its systemic failures to include public diplomacy within policymaking (US advisory commission 2002)

Hence, Public diplomacy experienced a resurgence since the September 11th attacks (Mor, 2007; Frensley & Michaud, 2006). In fact, recognising that the disregard for foreign public opinion has been a key factor in US foreign policy failures, Public Diplomacy has since been accorded a high status in diplomatic exchanges (Nye 2004). To be sure, the promotion of positive images and perception of one's country is now a staple in a state's diplomatic endeavours. However, public diplomacy faces new challenges in

the information age (Nye, 2008). Nye (2008) discussed how the highly globalised nature of the world, along with technological advances, has led to a major overhaul of how the world receives and spreads information. The increasing ease and drastic reduction in costs of processing and transmitting information meant that Information is aplenty and readily available. This abundance of information inadvertently increases clutter and results in a scarcity of attention. As such, in the conduct of public diplomacy, states have to maintain consistency and credibility in their actions and signals to continually propagate a favourable reputation internationally.

UNDERSTANDING/ THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM

Symbolic interactionism came to prominence in the early 20th century (Forte 2003). LaRossa & Reitzes (2008) defines it as a creation of identity as a result of individuals and groups' interactions. During the interactions, meanings and perceptions can emerge from the interpretation, and often, the self-perceived identity reflects other people's assessments (Cooley 1902). In other words, this meant that through effective usage of symbols and signals, the other agents can have a similar assessment or appraisal as the one the principal-agent is trying to convey or portray. As such, symbolic interactionism can be applied to the field of public relations and public diplomacy (Zhang, 2006). Given that symbolic interactionism involves the interpretation of symbols and signals amidst the interactions to form meanings and identity, a state, with its interaction with the international community, can use symbols or signals to construct an identity among the international community. This identity that the state is trying to portray will be similar to the identity that others perceive to a large degree. As such, a state can use public diplomatic symbols, signs, and action to generate a perceived positive identity in the international arena. Working on this premise, Zhang (2006) furthers this by arguing that in the process of conducting public interactions, symbols are used to cultivate national identity and advance the state policy agenda. Such deductions followed from the basis that

symbolism is inherently entwined with diplomacy. During the conduct of public diplomacy, symbols function as signals in which the meanings of the signals are picked up and interpreted by the international community through constant interactions. The interpreted meaning will then translate into affirmative identity creation and advancement of the state's policy. Indeed, one of the key functionalities of public diplomacy is to build, maintain and improve national identity (Serajnik-Sraka 1999). Thus, a state, in its symbolic interactions with the international community, can use signals or symbols to generate positive perceptions of themselves and their policies to the international community.

PROVISION OF POLITICAL INFORMATION AND ADVANCING CULTURAL COMMUNICATION

Signitzer (2013) conceptualises public diplomacy on two dimensions: political information and cultural communication. Adopting Tuch's (1990) definition of public diplomacy, Signitzer simplified public diplomacy as the provision of political information aimed at explaining and defending specific policies of one's government. These explanations are often temporal and aimed at persuasion, which functions as political advocacy for one's society. Conversely, cultural communication can be further differentiated into two terms: cultural diplomacy and cultural relations. Cultural diplomacy refers to the negotiation and conduct of cultural agreements, which will ensure a favourable cultural relation between the states involved (Mitchell 1986). These relations will produce positive attitudes and perceptions which may contribute to successful diplomatic exchanges. Cultural relations, on the other hand, entails open exchanges to broaden the understanding and cooperation among states on many other fronts. Once combined, cultural communication can be interpreted to mean the long-term presentation and introduction of one's society with the aim of attaining mutual understanding. Cultural communication extends beyond mutual understanding as it includes the aspect of forming favourable perception by the other society as well. The two dimensions – political information and cultural communication - function in a continuum where the government can oscillate between the two. However, Signitzer was careful in conveying that the endpoints of the continuum are undefined. In other words, this meant that whenever a

government decides to partake in public diplomacy activities, both dimensions will be factored in, albeit to varying degrees. Hence, public diplomacy can be conceptualised as a concept that carries the properties of political information and cultural communication.

SOFT POWER

In the article titled “Public diplomacy and soft power”, Nye (2008), as the title suggests, delineates a relationship between soft power and public diplomacy. The principal argument is that public diplomacy is a tool to enhance a state’s soft power. A state displaying formidable soft power can entice, attract, influence, or compel an outcome through co-opts rather than coercion. Nye argues that soft power is dependent on 3 vital resources: culture, political values, and its foreign policies. Specifically, soft power is generated when 1) a state’s culture elucidates its inherent values that draw interest and attention; 2) a state can express its political values; 3) a state’s foreign policy is viewed as legitimate and morally right. On this basis, public diplomacy is viewed as a means to achieve soft power as a state can utilise the attractive values of these 3 aspects to communicate with and gain the favour of the public of the other countries. Hence, through broadcasting, subsidizing of cultural exports, exchanges etc, a state is not only able to project a favourable image, but it can establish long term relations which are instrumental in creating an enabling and supportive environment or governmental policies (Nye 2008). Therefore, public diplomacy is conceptualised as a repertoire of building soft power for a state.

CONVERGENCE OF THE THE THREE POINTS

Various theoretical understanding of public diplomacy were explored here. Public diplomacy was first viewed through a symbol interactionist perspective, which argues that symbols and signals are interpreted by other parties to form an interpretation. It is then aggregated to the international level, where a state can utilise symbols, signal, and actions in a bid to generate a favourable perspective of it by other states. This favourable perception can then facilitate and garner support for its policies. Next, Signitzer’s two dimensions of public diplomacy were examined. The conduct of public diplomacy espouses elements of political advocacy and

formation of favourable perception through cultural diffusion. Both dimensions supplement one other and exist within a single continuum. Particularly, during the conduct of public diplomacy, a state will simultaneously persuade and convince its policies, while forging cultural relations to establish relations and form a deep-rooted positive perception of the state. Lastly, public diplomacy is viewed as an extension of soft power. A state with soft power can influence an outcome to its favour through its latent allure and appeal to other parties. Public diplomacy then functions as an instrument in creating a situation that makes the aforementioned scenario more permissible.

Public diplomacy can be conceptualised in various ways. However, the different concepts converge in its outcome. A state, through effective public diplomacy, is able to generate positive and lasting perceptions of it, which in turn facilitates and encourages endorsement of its policies.

SOUTH KOREA AND GLOBAL KOREA

SOUTH KOREA AS A MIDDLE POWER

To gain insight as to how South Korea conducts and became an exemplification of effective public diplomacy, a more comprehensive understanding of South Korea's international role is required. This paper will first establish the premise that South Korea is a middle power internationally. As what Teo et al., 2016 espouses, the concept of middle power has often been approached in three ways: 1) hierarchical approach, 2) functionalist approach, 3) behavioural approach.

The hierarchical approach maintains that a state material power and its development is able to determine one resulting influence in a hierarchical fashion. An aspect to demarcate great, middle, and small power will be through Ping's (2017) comprehensive matrix. Based on his matrix, 9 indicators¹ are examined before deducing the appropriate strata of influence that a state ought to belong to in the international arena.

¹ The 9 indicators are population, geographic area, military expenditure, GDP, GDP real growth, value of exports, gross national income per capita, trade as percentage of GDP, and life expectancy at birth

Secondly, the functionalist approach denotes that a middle power will adopt a functional role internationally. Recognising that its resources and influence globally are limited vis-à-vis great powers, middle powers are unable to wield influence across the whole policy spectrum (Teo et al., 2016). As such, middle powers have to exercise caution and be selective in elucidating their functions (Cooper, 1997). In other words, middle powers have to discover a niche or exclusive area where they can exert their limited influence on.

Thirdly, a behavioural approach defines a middle power by its behavioural tendency to partake in middlepowermanship. In the conduct of middlepowermanship, a middle power will actively promote and participate in multilateral institutions to manage and regulate international affairs (Shin, 2016). Its penchant to rely on multilateralism is a result of its inability to unilaterally affect or induce international developments (Jordaan, 2003). Utilising multilateralism will allow a coalition of similar interests, thereby presenting a larger global voice to project their concerns. In addition, in the advancement of multilateralism, middle power typically functions as intermediaries between nations.

As it is beyond the scope of this paper to prove South Korea's status as a middle power, this paper will turn to existing literature on South Korea as a middle power. Evidently, a multitude of scholars has already affirmed South Korea's status as a middle power (Emmers & Teo, 2015; John, 2014; Karim, 2018; S.-M. Kim, 2016; W. Kim, 2015; Mo, 2016; Robertson, 2007; Shin, 2016). This provides the necessary basis for this paper to proceed with the understanding that South Korea is a middle power.

MIDDLE POWER AND GLOBAL KOREA

Since South Korea's independence in 1987, South Korea's foreign policy trajectory has often been confined within the North-East Asia region. Geopolitical considerations such as the quagmire of North Korea; the entrenchment of the US-ROK alliance; the rise of communist China and its subsequent rivalry with the US and the historical animosity between Japan and South Korea resulted in a foreign policy generally gravitating towards its immediate region. This changed during the Lee Myung Bak administration when South Korea took a more outward-looking approach in its

foreign policy. Lee attempted to increase South Korea's international branding by enhancing its network and conveying power globally (S.-M. Kim, 2016). This was attained under the campaign of 'Global South Korea,' in which South Korea utilised its middle power diplomacy to achieve such aims.

Under the Global South Korea policy, Lee adopted a global conceptual focus to solidify South Korea status as a responsible and contributing global citizen, who has made salient contributions to the global common good (Korean Herald, 2012). Specifically, South Korea has contributed meaningfully and acted proactively in multilateral organisations such as G20, OECD, nuclear security summit, and engaged in more peacekeeping activities (Snyder, 2009). Viewed from all three approaches, South Korea has functioned as a middle power to increase its global outreach and extend its influence within its rights. Indeed, the impact of 'Global South Korea' was summarised by Professor Hwang as having a tremendous impact on elevating South Korea's international profile (Korean Herald, 2012). To be sure, South Korea's standing as a middle power solidified due to Global South Korea, but what was the factor that compelled South Korea to possess such capacity? Viewing through a functionalist lens, this paper argues that South Korea, particularly since the Lee administration, has successfully assimilated and developed public diplomacy as a niche area to functionally increase South Korea's international standing.

DEVELOPMENT OF A SOUTH KOREAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND ITS INTERACTION WITH SOUTH KOREA'S MIDDLE POWER STATUS

As one of the 3 key diplomatic approaches adopted by the South Korean government, public diplomacy and its resulting efforts have been gaining traction since 2010 (South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). The rationale, as stated by the ministry, indicated that public diplomacy aimed to promote diplomatic relations via direct communication with foreign nationals. In brief, public diplomacy is conducted by sharing South Korean culture, history, values, arts, policies, and vision to cultivate and enhance the image of South Korea. This will, in turn, increase South Korea's global influence and magnify South Korea's international stature. To achieve the aim of 'fascinating the world with South Korea's charm,' South Korea's public diplomacy is further broken down into 3 different tracks: Cultural Diplomacy,

Table 1. Public Diplomacy, with information taken from Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs (n.d.)

	Public Diplomacy		
	Cultural Diplomacy	Knowledge-Oriented Diplomacy	Public Diplomacy on policy
Aims	Spread cultural attraction Increase national stature via cultural assets Enhance communication via cultural exchange	Increase knowledge of South Korea Support the teaching of South Korean language overseas and South Korean studies Support cooperation in education	Increase foreign nationals trust and understanding of South Korean policies to create a favourable environment for the attainment of South Korea's diplomatic goals Increase understanding of South Korea policy by studying diversify Promotes exchanges and interactions with foreign students and residents in South Korea
Objective	Establish goodwill and cultivate good relations	Increase awareness of South Korea	Generation of a favourable perception of South Korea
Examples	Exhibitions at overseas mission	Promotion of South Korea-related content in foreign textbooks	Public diplomacy forum

Knowledge-Oriented Diplomacy, and Public Diplomacy on policy (South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). Table 1 provides a condensed version of the 3 different public diplomacies. It is critical to note that the objectives of the different tracks are derived from the author's own personal interpretations.

The three different tracks work in conjunction with one another. When relations and goodwill with foreign nationals are enhanced, together with a greater awareness of South Korea and its related policy goals, a favourable perception of South Korea can be formed. This, in turn, will generate a positive environment for South Korea to conduct its diplomacy and attain its diplomatic goal. Such depictions work in tandem with South Korea's middlepowermanship, as the attainment of its diplomatic goals will enhance South Korea's international standing. Moreover, its constant interaction with foreign nationals also unwittingly affirms South Korea's international position.

To highlight South Korea's resolute commitment to the conduct of

public diplomacy, the Public Diplomacy Act, accompanied with the Enforcement Decree of the Public Diplomacy Act, was passed in 2016 (South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). Not only did this move affirm the importance of public diplomacy, but it also provided new impetus and direction to the conduct of diplomacy. More importantly, the passing of the acts formally institutionalised South Korean public diplomacy, thereby ensuring policy consistency.

Thus, equipped with elaborate aims and strategies, along with the institutionalised nature of public diplomacy, South Korea presents itself as a relatively mature practitioner of effective public diplomacy. Its proficiency in the conduct of diplomacy serves as an excellent precedent for other states to emulate. Hence, these undoubtedly highlight South Korea’s niche in the conduct of public diplomacy. Viewed in this vein, South Korea, with its decade long venture undertaking of public diplomacy, solidified its status as the forefront of public diplomacy. More importantly, its achievements, as a result of effective public diplomacy, formed favourable perceptions of South Korea policies. This inadvertently laid a critical and enduring foundation for the conduct of South Korean middlepowermanship.

Such dynamics could be represented with a Venn diagram, as seen




Figure 1. Interactions between Public Diplomacy and Korea Middle power status.

above. Viewed generally, South Korea sought to use its middle power status to elicit more international influence. One aspect of doing so, as discussed earlier, was to develop a niche area that could attract and gain following and support from other states. South Korea was able to develop and institutionalise its public diplomacy, and in the process of doing so, set a precedent on good public diplomacy for the world. This results in the construction of a niche area in diplomacy, thereby fulfilling its middle power objective. On the other hand, the key goals of South Korea's public diplomacy are centred around positive and favourable image creation of South Korea, which coincides circumlocutorily with its wishes of elevating its international standing. Attaining a positive perception overseas will greatly enhance South Korea's influence projection globally, thereby fulfilling South Korea's middle power diplomacy. Through this diagram, it reflects public diplomacy being an extension of the grand narrative of South Korea conduct of middlepowermanship. In other words, the role of South Korea's public diplomacy and its subsequent conduct of global affairs is an extension of its middlepowermanship.

CONCLUSION

Public diplomacy is a relatively recent theoretical concept, yet its practice predates its conceptualisation. This resulted in a plethora of different perceptions and conceptualisations of public diplomacy. As such, to provide a better and more concise understanding of 'Public Diplomacy,' this paper adopted an explanatory approach by comprehensively examining both the historical and theoretical understanding of 'Public Diplomacy.'

In the theoretical conceptualisation of public diplomacy, 3 different variants of concepts are examined - symbol interactionism, provision of political information and advancement of cultural communication, and soft power. The different forms of conceptualisations hinges upon one general idea: The generation of a positive and favourable image or perception of a state through foreign nationals of another state is essential in facilitating the state's interests and policies.

Next, having established what is and how does public diplomacy

function, the paper examined South Korea's international role/ position in a bid to understand the interactions between South Korea's international position and public diplomacy. 3 approaches – hierarchical approach, functionalist approach, and behavioural approach – were examined and together with an abundance of the present literature, South Korea's international position of a middle power is established. The paper then introduces President Lee Myung Bak's Global Korea initiative as a potential genesis of Korean public diplomacy.

Consequently, the paper critically investigated South Korea's public diplomatic efforts. It found out that South Korea possesses a highly functional and institutionalised public diplomatic machine. Its maturity in the conduct of public diplomacy presents itself at the forefront of public diplomacy. In other words, South Korea has developed a niche in the conduct of public diplomacy. This critical development directly insinuates that South Korea has fulfilled the functionalist aspect of a middle power. Based on this trajectory, the paper discovered linkages between a middle power and its conduct of public diplomacy. In brief, given that public diplomacy aims to form a favourable perception of a state via foreign nationals, it directly contributes to the aim of a middle power – increasing influence and its international standing. This suggests that public diplomacy is an important policy tool that a middle power can utilise. In terms of Korea, it can be concluded that since public diplomacy function as a tool for the state to utilise, its role in managing global issues is subsumed under its conduct of middlepowermanship.

IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE STUDIES

This paper is important on three grounds. Firstly, by rearranging and providing a historical overview and a theoretical understanding of public diplomacy, policymakers will be able to apprehend the workings of public diplomacy. The newfound appreciation of public diplomacy may prompt a re-evaluation and subsequent adoption of diplomatic measures by policymakers/ diplomats. Doing so may usher in a new era of favourable interstate relations. Secondly, a proper re-classification of public diplomacy literature is necessary amongst the clutter that exists. This may present academics or budding scholars a simplified understanding of public

diplomacy, thereby facilitating new research which may provide exciting revelations in the field of diplomacy. Lastly, understanding the dynamics between middle power and public diplomacy not only provides information on its plausibility, as the case of South Korea has depicted, it also highlights that states, in their own right, can conduct its form of public diplomacy. Recognising the success or perhaps even utilising South Korea as a precedent case in its conduct of public diplomacy, states, be it small, medium, or major powers, can learn to utilise public diplomacy to conduct its foreign affairs. This presents policymakers/ diplomats with an additional useful diplomatic tool in its conduct of interstate relations.

While these findings uncover the huge potential of public diplomacy for middle powers, it is regrettable that only one country – South Korea – has been examined. Based on Ping's (2005) matrix, 14 states in Asia Pacific region were identified as middle powers (Lee, 2012). As such, future studies can examine the remaining 13 states in Asia Pacific to provide a more holistic and robust understanding of middle powers and their conduct of public diplomacy.

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The Role of Korean Public Diplomacy in Addressing Global Issues

Pavlina Svobodova

Abstract | This paper aims to contribute to the existing literature of South Korean public diplomacy by discussing two examples of global issues in which South Korea has engaged in its public diplomacy in order to address these issues under its own terms and conditions, and consequently boosts its international blueprint. This paper is divided into two sections. The first section is theoretical and consists of discussing and defining: a) global issues; b) soft power; c) public diplomacy. The second section discusses how South Korea addresses global climate change and terrorism through the use of public diplomacy, and what outcomes it has brought for South Korean global prestige. Finally, the paper will provide recommendations on how and in what directions should South Korea utilise public diplomacy in order to address global issues and increase its international position.

Keywords | South Korea, Public Diplomacy, Soft Power, Global Issues, Climate Change, Terrorism

국문초록 | 이 논문은 대한민국이 글로벌 이슈를 해결하기 위해 자신만의 방식으로 공공 외교를 펼치고, 그에 따라 국제적인 청사진을 신장시키는 두 예시를 논의함으로써 현존하는 대한민국 공공 외교 문헌에 기여하고자 한다. 이 글은 두 부분으로 나뉘어져 있다. 첫 부분은 이론적이며 글로벌 이슈, 소프트 파워, 공공 외교를 논의하고 정의한다. 두번째는 대한민국이 어떻게 공공 외교를 이용해 세계 기후 변화와 테러리즘을 다루었는지, 대한민국의 국제적 명성에 어떤 결과를 가져왔는지 논의한다. 마지막으로, 이 글은 대한민국이 글로벌 이슈에 대처하고 국제적 지위를 상승시키기 위해 어떻게 그리고 어떤 방향으로 공공 외교를 사용해야 하는지에 대해 제안한다.

INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, a state's power and dominance in the international arena was closely linked to its army and military capabilities. However, nowadays, the state with the best story to tell or the best international image claim the winner's spot. The rise of soft power has been significant and forms an important element in the international arena and global diplomacy.

Public diplomacy has been a widely used strategy to maximise one's soft power capabilities. The existing literature on public diplomacy is vast, yet primarily focuses on the US and Israeli public diplomacy. South Korean public diplomacy literature is limited despite South Korea being a huge investor in its public diplomacy efforts. The existing literature of South Korean public diplomacy mostly focuses on comparing the Japanese or Chinese conduct of public diplomacy to the South Korean model, and eventually draws recommendations for South Korea to accommodate more effective public diplomacy approaches. Yet, the literature fails to provide South Korea with some directions in terms of which topics or issues South Korea should concentrate its public diplomacy efforts on.

The realm of global issues offers an opportunity for South Korea to contribute to the world order on its own terms. Global issues require global cooperation. Cooperation is mostly built on soft power rather than hard power, thus, utilisation of public diplomacy in this domain could potentially increase South Korean global prestige.

This paper aims to contribute to the existing literature of South Korean public diplomacy by discussing two examples of global issues in which South Korea has engaged in its public diplomacy in order to address these issues under its own terms and conditions and consequently boosts its international blueprint. This paper is divided into two sections. The first section is theoretical and consists of discussing and defining: a) global issues; b) soft power; c) public diplomacy. The second section discusses how South Korea addresses global climate change and terrorism through the use of public diplomacy and what outcomes it has brought for South Korean global prestige. Finally, the paper will provide recommendations on how and in what directions South Korea should utilise public diplomacy in order to address global issues and increase its international position.

Climate change is an example of a global issue that poses serious security implications. Yet, this threat is being either ignored or not taken seriously by many states. Leaving more powerful states or superpowers to lead the global agenda of tackling climate change turned out to be naive and irresponsible of the international community. For example, the US is still the world's largest superpower, yet the Trump administration withdrew from international climate change treaties like the Paris Agreement. Additionally, small states usually lack the power to influence the *big players* or the majority of the international community to embark on the politics of green policies. However, South Korea has the potential to be the state that leads the international community towards a greener future. Thus, this paper will explain how South Korea should utilise, among other resources, public diplomacy in order to address climate change on the global level.

Terrorism is another global threat that requires international cooperation. Public diplomacy has been a widely used weapon in counter-terrorism campaigns, especially by the US. The South Korean opportunity for addressing terrorism lies in an implicit approach through state-capacity and institutional-capacity building in areas where terrorism thrives due to state failure. Exporting South Korean know-how of political and institutional conduct creates an environment for South Korea to maximise its influence in the international arena. Similarly, in the case of climate change, South Korea should focus its soft power initiatives on weak, failed or developing states.

GLOBAL ISSUES

Understanding global issues is crucial in order to address them accordingly. Moreover, due to globalisation and internationalisation, global issues are more visible and as the term global issues suggests, the response to these issues requires a global effort as global issues have direct or indirect impact on us all. Traditionally and historically, the most visible global threats have been armed violent conflicts. The experience and aftermath of World War I and more importantly World War II, has led to the establishment of global organisations aiming to coordinate the international efforts to address and

mitigate such global issues. The United Nations (UN) is the primary actor for maintaining global peace and stability. As the UN was established due to the WWII., originally the organisation set its mission to maintain peace and prevent re-occurrence of violent conflicts similar to WWII. The UN mission has expanded since its beginnings in 1946. Now, the UN in addition to preserving international peace and security also aims to protect human rights, deliver humanitarian aid, promote sustainable development and uphold international law (UN 2020a).

Richard Ullman in *Redefining Security* (1983) outlined two concepts of security traditional threats, defined in narrow military terms, and non-traditional or extended security threats such as climate change, terrorism, financial instability and health security. He also argued that defining security, thus global issues, in strictly narrow military terms gives a false image of reality (Ullman 1983: 129). Non-military threats from outside of one's borders can undermine stability and security just like military threats. Moreover, climate change or infectious diseases do not respect any borders and their consequences are non-negotiable. Despite the confusion in the early 1990s regarding the definition of global issues, the UN eventually recognised the threat of non-military global issues and its 1994 Human Development Report opened saying that:

behind the blaring headlines of the world's many conflicts and emergencies, there lies a silent crisis—a crisis of underdevelopment, of global poverty, of ever-mounting population pressures, of thoughtless degradation of environment. This is not a crisis that will respond to emergency relief. Or to fitful policy interventions. It requires a long, quiet process of sustainable human development. (UN Human Development Report 1994: iii).

Orienting the international attention to non-military global issues was a turning point. The end of the Cold War has resulted in shedding light on other global issues that were previously overshadowed by ideology-driven agendas. The importance of these global issues is twofold. Firstly, threats like climate change or overpopulation have devastating consequences for all of us. Secondly, poverty or underdevelopment are significant layers in

modern intra-state conflicts and terrorism. Therefore, addressing these global threats is crucial for the overall international stability and peace in addition to being a moral imperative.

Nowadays the international community recognises problems such as climate change, infectious diseases, terrorism, poverty and development, ageing populations, gender inequality, migration and others (United Nations 2020: Global Issues Overview). Thus, contemporary global issues require a global response due to the fact that these security threats cannot be resolved unilaterally without far-reaching international cooperation. Yet, what we lack is a global governance organisation for addressing global threats. The UN fails in this regard. The UN serves as a platform for discussion as the UN does not have a binding legal power enforcing its charters. Thus, tackling global issues is up to sovereign states and their abilities to influence other states and actors to comply with their foreign policies. Here comes into play what Joseph Nye coined as the craft of *soft power*.

SOFT POWER

Power is an important aspect of politics. Traditionally, *hard power* was the ability to forcefully exercise authority domestically but also, and more importantly, internationally. Hard power is prescribed to military and economic abilities of a state to coerce or threaten other states to comply with one's objectives. These days hard power still holds its importance and relevance, yet the Cold War and its aftermath meant a shift in the context of power. The prominence of soft power has been rising. Soft power, thus, is another addition to the concept of power. Power per se can be described as an ability to influence or coerce someone else or, in the context of world politics, another state. As being said, hard power is associated with coercion while soft power rests on the ability to persuade by attraction. According to Nye (cited in Byrne & Hall 2013: 422) one country's culture and both foreign and domestic policy ideas establish the main tenets of exportable attractiveness. These days the winner is not necessarily the one with the strongest army, but the one who can win 'hearts and minds'. Unlike hard power whose results can be seen soon and with straightforward results, soft

power is more difficult. Firstly, it might take years to see any viable results and secondly, soft power heavily rests on the acceptance of the foreign publics (Nye 2004). Although soft power requires patience and careful coordination, the importance of soft power cannot be underestimated as the US learnt in Vietnam, Iraq or the 9/11 wars despite being militarily superior to its counterparts.

Soft power per se is not a new concept. There are many examples when governments were using soft power to achieve their objectives by exporting their culture and values to foreign countries before the Cold War. However, as the end of the Cold War brought a series of authoritarian regimes collapses, foreign publics were no longer restricted from getting access to uncensored information (Nye 2004). Moreover, the technology advancements made it easier to access any information in real-time.

Today, demonstrating power rests on the means of soft power rather than narrowly projecting military might (Metzl cited in Sarvestani, Ameli & Izadi 2018: 184). Surely, hard power cannot be dismissed as we still face threats from rogue states or non-state violent actors that require military interventions. However, the so-called information age we live in makes it easier for governments to project their soft power. Due to the globalisation of media coverage, one government message or statement has an international dimension. It is no more possible to speak solely to one country's citizens without the world knowing the state of domestic affairs and domestic policy efforts as well (Sheafer & Shenhav 2009: 278).

Traditionally, it was mostly governments that engaged in exporting ideas, cultures or ideologies but these day non-state actors contribute to creating a state's image as well. It is not only attractive political ideologies or likeable foreign policies, but economic strength is an important stimulating factor as well. Privatisation of industries under the tenets of capitalism and neoliberalism makes business corporations other players in shaping the national image. Universities and the education sector, in general, are major soft power makers as well. Firstly, one state's elite education institutions attract thousands of students worldwide. This is re-enforced by both state and private sector advertising education establishments worldwide and participating in exchange student programs. Secondly, exchange and international students 'absorb' the culture and

political or social ideas in a given country and then help to export these to their home countries.

The struggle for power domination in Asia is partly given by the lack of regional integration in the region. Northeastern and Southeastern Asia consist of dominant players with different ideologies and political establishments, strong and dynamic economies and rich cultures. Relative peace worldwide and in the region gave rise to pursuing non-violent means of power domination and soft power has become the driving force of the regional competition. China, which is very proactive and relatively aggressive in demonstrating itself as both a regional as well as global superpower, has been particularly active in its efforts to dominate the region and beyond (Hall & Smith 2013: 1). China has opened hundreds of Confucius Institutes abroad aiming to spread Chinese culture and language. This move opens up many opportunities to attract foreign publics in order to make China more accessible to both the general public and potential investors. However, the reason for such heavy investment in soft power also bears a political reason. Bringing Chinese culture closer to the foreign publics and presenting China in the best light possible aims to counter some negative attitudes foreign publics could have against China (Hall and Smith 2013: 4). In turn, foreign publics are more likely to be assertive and even supportive of Chinese foreign policies. If China manages to positively influence the foreign attitude towards China, this significantly enables China to pursue its normative power onto the international arena. Apart from Confucius Institutes, China has established its Public Diplomacy Office in order to maximise its soft power potential, and the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative project is also a significant soft power move that bears normative political implications for the participating states.

While other regional states do not have to worry about countering negative perceptions as China does, their main common motive is boosting their international influence and eventually normative power. It was not until recently that other East Asian states started to be rule-makers rather than rule-takers. This is particularly true for South Korea.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The rise of soft power also means a rise in public diplomacy. These two go hand in hand as public diplomacy serves as a means of soft power. Yet the term *public diplomacy* did not escape being a contested and blurry term both in academia and real-world politics. As academics cannot unconditionally agree on the definition of public diplomacy, Sarvestani, Ameli & Izadi (2018: 183) put together different aspects and elements of what public diplomacy entails. Their suggested definition is built on other academics and their perceptions of what public diplomacy is:

Public diplomacy is a kind of policy advocacy by state, sub-state and non-state actors (Anholt, 2008; Nye, 2004) to influence foreign publics (Frederick, 1993; Hoffman, Edward, & Murrow Center of Public, 1968; Malone, 1988) to extend interests and represent values (Nye, 2011; Sharp, 2005), to impact foreign affairs, to gain prominence in the world for small states, and to correct disturbing stereotypical images and perceptions (Melissen, 2005). (Sarvestani, Ameli & Izadi 2018: 183)

This definition consisting of the main objectives of public diplomacy captures well the overall essence and purpose of this concept. Small as well as powerful states engage in public diplomacy to either expend their international influence or preserve it. Depending on the state's already established international prestige, the state chooses its objectives accordingly. Moreover, an important defining feature of public diplomacy is the way it is conducted. Thus, a critical feature of public diplomacy that differentiates that from sheer propaganda is a two-way communication channel between the recipient audience and the 'addresser' (Sarvestani, Ameli & Izadi 2018: 184). In this case, the 'addresser' is interested in the feedback from the recipients. The feedback is valuable as it helps to adjust foreign policies to make them more appealing and attractive to the foreign publics (Cho 2012: 276). Moreover, the widespread use of the internet made it significantly easier to reach foreign publics and communicate the message. Information in the age of globalisation, facilitated by internet access combined with the

lack of censorship, is not scarce. Therefore, reinforcing the credibility of foreign policy is nowadays possible outside of one nation's borders. Thus, communicating such policies through the means of public diplomacy is a clever way to strengthen one's soft power objectives. Support for foreign policy objectives is important both at home and abroad and public diplomacy delivers well on this premise as it builds relations between the addressing and recipient parties.

Although literature and research mostly focus on the American and Israeli public diplomacy efforts, South Korea is no stranger to public diplomacy. South Korea has been for a long time a battlefield of global superpowers over their influence in South Korea. However, as nowadays South Korea is one of the most dynamic states in the world with a strong economy and stable political institutions, South Korea has managed to transform itself into a creator of its own public diplomacy expanding its soft power abroad. South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) defines Korean public diplomacy as:

promoting diplomatic relations by sharing our country's history, traditions, culture, arts, values, policies, and vision through direct communication with foreign nationals. By doing so, we enhance our diplomatic relations and national image by gaining the trust of the international community and increasing our country's global influence. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Korean 2020a).

The definition explicitly says the aims of public diplomacy efforts. MOFA lists five main goals they hope to achieve; these are: share Korean culture, deepen understanding on Korea, gain global support for Korean policies, strengthen public diplomacy capacity and promote public-private partnership (MOFA 2020a).

So far the narrative of South Korean public diplomacy motivations has been underlined by both realism as well as liberalism. Realism describes the international arena as a state of anarchy where states *fight* for domination and survival. As there is no higher institution that would set the rules of international politics for sovereign states, each state is free to use its capabilities to survive there. Moreover, the absence of a global governance

institution leaves states to compete for international domination and normative power. Realism has been heavily associated with the use of hard power. Yet, as already was explained hard power is no longer the sole guarantor of state's survival and military capabilities no longer equate to superiority. Despite the central idea that realism is power, there are other ways to project power such as 'power to influence,' a manifestation of soft power. Soft power is an important element in liberalism. Unlike realism that describes states as solo players, liberalism encourages states to form alliances, foster cooperation and create interdependence which in consequence decrease the chances of a violent conflict outbreak. Thus, political as well as economic ties between states should be created to preserve international peace. Although liberalism is not about a hierarchy and superiority of states, naturally the stronger and more powerful states set the rules in the formed alliances. Their normative power is strongly reinforced by soft power without which an alliance would be hard to form and more particularly maintain in the long-run. Modern international politics requires both realism as well as liberalism. These theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and thus can be used simultaneously. Liberalism brings a sense of interdependence into the anarchical order of the international arena. Yet, foreign policy solely based on liberalism would be naive. However, lack of liberalism and narrow adherence to realism would be detrimental to the international order as there would be little to no links of interdependency and mutually agreed obligations that liberalism brings. South Korea aims to preserve and ideally increase its influence and power in the international arena and insure its survival there. The chosen methods to do so correspond with liberalism rather than realism.

By definition, soft power uses the country's best assets to attract foreign publics. In the case of South Korea, the country has invested and keeps investing in cultural and educational exchanges. Prominent projects include the Global Korea project or establishing the King Sejong Institutes abroad. Global Korea is a project that focuses on educational and student exchanges. Through this project, South Korea distributes scholarship to foreign students wishing to study in South Korea. Education is a reliable soft power enhancer. Foreign students studying in South Korea get to know the culture, traditions, language and other socio-political aspects of Korea.

Every year under the Global Korea Scholarship students over the world get a fully-funded scholarship to study at South Korean universities with the premise to learn Korean before enrolling into their studies. In theory, the project aims to build relationships with other nations and deepen mutual cooperation and understanding. After all, national image determines the nation's international status that is important for shaping and influencing global affairs (Cho 2012: 284). The King Sejong Institutes aim to appeal to a different group of peoples and thus reach the widest range of people possible to familiarise them with Korean culture and South Korea. These institutes are located abroad and they are centres of teaching the Korean language and history. Thus, South Korea utilises its cultural heritage as a soft power maker. As in the Chinese case, South Korea aims to counter some eventual negative perceptions foreign publics could have against South Korea and create an environment where South Korean normative power and international influence is more welcomed.

Despite the relatively widespread use of public diplomacy across different regions and countries, researchers have doubts about the effectiveness of public diplomacy. For example, Hall and Smith (2013: 6) argue that '... there appears to be little if any positive correlation between...public diplomacy and how foreigners elsewhere in the region tend to perceive them'. Traditional diplomacy conducted strictly behind the closed doors is no longer sufficient enough due to the development of technology, mass-media and democratisation. Therefore, an additional element was needed to add to the tool-box of diplomacy, and public diplomacy emerged as a necessity for modern decision-making in international politics underlined by the principles of soft power. It cannot be said that public diplomacy does not bear any benefits whatsoever but is public diplomacy really a secret weapon for winning minds and hearts, therefore making one's foreign policy objectives more likely to be accomplished? Particularly the collapse of the USSR and the democratisation of Europe are seen as a success of American foreign policy and soft power that were supported using public diplomacy. East Asian countries recognise their considerable soft power resources and their policy-makers do not hesitate to invest in public diplomacy in order to maximise their bids in the international arena (Hall & Smith 2013: 10). The struggle to stir international affairs and their outcomes in one's favour is a

complex task. While many academics, researchers and politicians agree that the nation's image in the international arena matters to assert one's objectives, the use of public diplomacy through the means like student exchanges, international press events and conferences, international broadcasting like the BBC, Korean Arirang or the Chinese English-speaking channels, and others do not deliver the results politicians investing in public diplomacy hope to see.

Despite research suggesting that there is a weak link between public diplomacy and winning over the foreign publics, the use of public diplomacy is not declining in the East Asian region, particularly among the major regional players like China, India, Japan and South Korea. Studies point out that the relative failure of public diplomacy is due to insufficient strategies. For example, Proedrou and Frangonikolopoulos (2012: 733) argue that one of the significant shortcomings of public diplomacy is that it mainly focuses on selling one's national image in terms of education, culture and identity. Proedrou and Frangonikolopoulos (2012), on the contrary, suggest that states should focus on global issues that are relevant for all. However, finding an issue that is relevant for all is in itself a complicated task given the fact that different states have different concerns and objectives. Therefore, it all comes down to states that aim to stir the international community in accordance with what issues they find relevant for their current situation. Nevertheless, global issues have in common that they either directly or indirectly have an impact on all or at least most of us. Furthermore, they require international cooperation to successfully tackle these issues. In regard to global issues, public diplomacy could be a useful ally.

Global issues cannot be addressed or solved unilaterally. Domestic and international politics have very blurry lines and often overlap. Yet, the international political agendas are formed on the premises of elected candidates in the national elections. Here, influencing the foreign publics matters. For example, climate change is a global issue directly impacting everyone. Yet, this global issue is far from being taken seriously by the majority of the world's governments. If a country manages to choose and conduct public diplomacy effectively, the chances of influencing a foreign public to elect a government that deems climate change as an issue worth

being taken into account are significantly higher. Thus, one's public diplomacy to some extent achieves at least three things: 1) creates a positive image of the given country, 2) increases a favourable competitive advantage in the international arena in regard to influencing others, 3) manages or helps to provide *the greater good for all* by addressing a global issue.

SOUTH KOREAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND THE CLIMATE CHANGE

The challenge of climate change has great implications for states from both moral as well as pragmatic point of view. The narrative of moral duty to preserve the planet as we know it for the next generations is not however a strong incentive for states to act. Firstly, addressing climate change requires vast global cooperation usually in a form of an alliance or international coalition. That is a challenge in itself. The bigger a coalition is, the harder it is to stick to original principles and apply them as member of such coalitions are likely to disagree (Watson & Pandey 2014). For example, deforestation might be a subject of dispute. While morally we can agree that mass deforestation is wrong and potentially dangerous, when we apply the economic factor some states are likely to remove mass deforestation from the green policy list. However, one's neglect of the environment might mean a security threat to the other. A direct result of climate change is a loss of territory or resources that carry a detrimental impact on the security, stability and health of the population (Watson & Pandey 2014: 77).

South Korea is the regional champion of green security as it took the leading and proactive role of environmental diplomacy in North-East Asia (Yoon 2006: 75). South Korean orientations towards green policies are linked to the experience of rapid industrialisation and relative lack of regional leadership in Asia. Firstly, the success of South Korean economic miracle when the country transformed itself from one of the poorest to one of the most dynamic and powerful economies in the world came at the expense of the environment. The race of economic domination in the region also highlighted that South Korean environmental security is closely linked to its regional neighbours as the threat of cross-boundary pollution became

more eminent. Therefore, domestic as well as regional environmental factors gave South Korea the incentive to 'actively engaged' in efforts to tackle climate change' (MOFA 2020b). Secondly, due to the regional lack of environmental coordination, South Korea positioned itself to lead the regional environmental efforts to fill the vacuum (Yoon 2006).

There is another factor that South Korea played to its advantage especially in the global arena regarding climate change. Generally, there are tensions between developed and developing countries over the climate issue. Like the South Korean case, industrialisation has a detrimental impact on the environment. Due to the status of either 'developed' or 'developing,' countries have different priorities and concerns when it comes to economic and environmental considerations. Despite the great economic success, South Korea is not straightforwardly labelled as a 'developed' country, yet the 'developing' label is not exactly accurate either. South Korea is thus referred to as a so-called 'bridge' or 'middle' power. Being situated as a middle power gives South Korea an advantage to influence the regional as well as global agendas of the environment politics. Firstly, South Korea, which is also an important hi-tech country, has the know-how and first-hand experience climbing the competitive economic ladder in the world of powerful and developed states. South Korea's great soft power potential lies in producing and selling the image of a country that can offer the helping hand to developing countries and share the knowledge and expertise when it comes to finding the middle ground between environment and economy. Since the end of the Korean War, South Korea has been a relatively invisible state whose relevance came to the spotlight only due to the inter-Korean tensions. Moreover, South Korea was a battleground of major foreign powers lacking any potential to stir the international order. Yet, in combination with its economic miracle and status as a technological powerhouse, South Korea can now utilise its soft power and, for a change, be an important stakeholder in the international arena. The South Korean story is an attractive one especially to developing nations. In other words, the South Korean *developing* story provides a promising opportunity to shape international environmental politics, particularly in other developing countries. Moreover, being capable of accumulating other soft power capabilities, South Korea has the potential to mediate the climate-talk

tensions between developed and developing nations, thus maximising its international blueprint.

South Korea has succeeded in selling the image of a credible middle power capable of helping developing countries to develop green policies. But to what extent public did diplomacy contribute to increasing South Korea's international image and global blueprint? The Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) constitutes an important role in taking South Korea global and improving South Korea's image in the international arena. The GGGI was established by the South Korean government; now being an inter-governmental organisation that works primarily on a governmental level (Global Green Growth Institute 2020). Currently, the goal of the GGGI is 'supporting and promoting strong, inclusive and sustainable economic growth in developing countries and emerging economies' (GGGI 2020). The GGGI, having as of now 37 members, has dedicated projects for each member state aiming to support their economies while mitigating the side effects of industrialisation on the environment. Thanks to organisations like GGGI South Korea can increase its international blueprint and strengthen external relations with other nations while addressing its own security as well as global security concern regarding climate change and environment. Though there has been a limited amount of general public engagement in tackling the climate change issue, their actions are usually seen as micro-ecology with relatively limited results. If climate change ought to be addressed effectively, the efforts must be characterised by a top-down approach (Han 2015: 732). As public diplomacy aims to extend one's interests and values, influencing other states to follow a path of eco-friendly growth is a win-win situation for all, but particularly for South Korea.

South Korean efforts to engage in shaping the world climate change paradigm have been influenced by various reasons. The most important ones constitute South Korean ambitions to strengthen international relations, visibility and reputation. By definition, public diplomacy aims to communicate with foreign publics. What and who the *foreign publics* are, however, seem not well defined and therefore the communication flow can be established between the government, non-state organisations (NGOs) and civil society. South Korean public diplomacy regarding climate change is oriented towards foreign governments. After all, directing the communica-

tion flow towards the civil society to rearrange its attitudes towards environment would be an impossible task regardless of how attractive South Korean culture and history is. The climate change threat requires states to cooperate and enforce well-developed policies that create a balance between economic growth and environment. South Korean efforts to become the global leader in green growth are re-enforced by the South Korean economic and environmental past. After all, South Korea used to be one of the poorest countries of the 20th century and on top of that one of the worst world polluters (Han 2015: 736). Nevertheless, despite these hard beginnings that South Korea has emerged from, the country managed to become the 12th largest economy in the world and follow an eco-friendly path of economic growth (World Bank 2020).

SOUTH KOREAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND THE WAR ON TERROR

South Korea has its own first-hand experience of terrorist attacks. Most terrorist attacks have been perpetrated by North Korea, but after the 1990s South Koreans have been also victims of transnational terrorism (Wang, Choi & Arnold 2003: 140). As North Korean terrorism declined and the threat of transnational terrorism perpetrated by international terrorist organisations increased, South Korea had to respond to the changing nature of terrorism. The new form of terrorism that David Rapoport (2004) coined as the fourth wave or the religious wave of terrorism is characterised by its international manifestation and indiscriminate large-scale casualties. Unlike the previous waves of terrorism that typically lacked the transnational element, the fourth wave of terrorism has a global outreach and due to globalisation and advances in technology, the attacks can be coordinated from abroad. The 9/11 terrorist attacks shocked the world and unfolded before the world a new age of warfare. The reaction to the attacks was a formation of a US-led military operation against terrorism, known as the War on Terror (WOT) (Kattelman 2016: 803).

As terrorism became a global threat, it was apparent that the response to terrorism must be global as well. In other words, unilateral efforts are not sufficient or effective to eliminate terrorism. Thus, fighting terrorism

requires a strong and well-coordinated international cooperation. The cooperation can be manifested in various ways from military and intelligence support to imposing economic sanctions on sponsors of terrorism and thus preventing these actors from funding terrorist activities (Kim 2001: 12). Firstly, however, states should agree on what terrorism is. The definition of terrorism remains an opened chapter as states fail to agree. The debate of 'one's terrorist is another's freedom fighter underlines the international debate over the definition. South Korea adopted the framework of Anti-Terrorism Act that defines terrorism as:

an act conducted for the purpose of interfering with the State, a local government or a foreign government...in exercising its authority or forcing it to perform a non-obligatory act, or threatening the public... (law.go.kr 2020).

Joining the WOT was a manifestation of solidarity with the US as well as political and security calculation of the other states. 9/11 showed that even the most powerful country, the US, can be heavily inflicted by a non-state actor whose size or capabilities do not match the US military or economic might. Alliances such as this in the WOT is according to Byman (2006: 768) 'a vital part of the war on terrorism' as transnational terrorism is too complex to be addressed by the US solely. Thus, due to the threat that international terrorism poses, states that have the same interests and objectives put together their efforts to mitigate terrorism. Besides solidarity, South Korea is in a long-standing partnership alliance with the US since the Korean War. Nowadays, the alliance is defined mostly alongside military cooperation on the Korean peninsula. The 9/11 attacks allowed South Korea to be proactive in the alliance that otherwise seems as relatively asymmetric (Jeon 2010: 407). Therefore, South Korea was presented with a chance to decrease the power asymmetry in the alliance and boost its global presence and prestige through the WOT and peace-building operations after the 9/11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The South Korean role in the WOT was limited and as Byman (2006: 797) argues South Korea is 'less important for the struggle against Al Qaeda' as South Korean 'capabilities against Al Qaeda are limited,

particularly with regard to intelligence and influence in the Muslim world'. That does not mean, however, that South Korea had no role to play in the WOT. Especially in the South Korean context, economic power is a strong weapon in the realm of international relations. Economics can be used both as hard and soft power. If economics is used as hard power, countries opt for sanctions and embargoes. On the other hand, a strong economy is a great soft power incentive. Firstly, if economics is coercively applied and sanctions are imposed, terrorist organisations can be weakened as the flow of money for their activities is disrupted. Imposing sanctions on the state-sponsors of terrorism is a widely used method to pressure these rogue states to refrain from supporting or harbouring terrorists. The list of nations in the so-called 'Axis of Evil,' states which support terrorism, made these states a subject of the UN framework of sanctions. As South Korea is a responsible actor in the international arena, the country followed the UN sanctions framework. The effectiveness of sanctions is often called into question by academics. Moreover, imposing sanctions may in fact backfire. Choi and Luo (2013: 221) point out that 'leaders in sanctioned countries have every incentive to shift the blame for deteriorating economic conditions onto the sanctioning countries,' thus encouraging its citizens to engage in international terrorism. Although the use of sanctions might have potential drawbacks, in the context of the WOT siding did matter. It was important for South Korean international integrity, image and prestige as well as upholding good relations with the US to show solidarity and manifest their support for the US in practice.

Secondly, utilising the soft power of economics was a smart move for South Korea both in the context of demonstrating support for the US as well as increasing its own international blueprint and influence. South Korea utilised its economic power in a form of assistance and aid to boost its international image and fight terrorism. It is often thought that states that cannot or are not able to provide for its citizens economically, and where the level of poverty and inequality is high, are more prone to terrorism. The idea rests on an assumption that humanitarian and financial help would elevate the standard of living, decrease inequality and reduce poverty which in consequence would prevent people from joining terrorist organisations. However, the hypothesis of terrorism rooted in poverty has several flaws

and the latest research indicates that links between poverty and terrorism are insignificant (Piazza 2006; Abadie 2006; Krueger & Maleckova 2003). For example, Piazza's (2006:170) research shows 'none of the economic indicators are significant predictors of either terrorist incidents or casualties, contrary to the expectations necessary to validate the "rooted-in-poverty" hypothesis'.

Research, however, found correlations between terrorism and failed states (Choi and Luo 2013: 217), particularly in the context of the fourth wave of terrorism. Failed states are fertile and safe ground for terrorist organisations as the state does not have the capability to enforce the rule of law. Thus, failed states serve as a safe-haven for terrorist organisations that tend to carry out terrorist attacks abroad (Newman 2007: 483). According to Newman (2007: 484) the emergence of a failed state is not the primary trigger that is responsible for terrorism per se. He argues (Newman 2007: 484) that failed states only provide a suitable environment for terrorists, and terrorism per se is rather linked to a range of inequalities and politically underlined motivations. For example, Al Qaeda's objectives were political and forwarded to deter the US foreign policy towards the Middle East. But Al Qaeda did not emerge due to state failure. A failed state with a lack of institutional authority only provided Al Qaeda with a place to operate in.

As research suggests there is a weak correlation between poverty and terrorism, thus, economic soft power is not a suitable strategy for fighting terrorism. Economic aid to a failed state is not the right answer to transnational terrorism. However, capacity-building, strengthening state structures and institutions, as well as helping to situate a failed state into a financially competitive world with gearing it with business opportunities have a significant potential for reducing the threat of transnational terrorism. Therefore, counter-terrorism efforts should focus on state reconstruction and institutional capacity building. There are, however, limits to this as terrorist motivations have various reasons and there is no 'one-size-fits-all' when it comes to counter-terrorism. Failed states are failed due to many overlapping issues from weak institutions to unfavourable economic and living conditions.

States' capacity building and development assistance can address some of the underlying conditions that a failed state suffers from. In this regard,

international development cooperation can provide a failed state with at least some level of 'know-how' and capital for reconstructing the state institutions. South Korea is an international donor state that facilitates assistance and aid under the Official Development Assistance (ODA). ODA is motivated by 'humanitarian, political and economic considerations' that aim 'to promote the economic development and to improve the quality of life in developing countries' (ODA Korea 2020). Although ODA is not primarily a counter-terrorism project, it touches on a range of issues that are associated with causes of terrorism such as poverty and inequality. Moreover, if we look into the selected countries where South Korea delivers assistance through ODA, governance and administration capacity building are among the targets that South Korea aims to address. Thus, the ODA efforts provide a political realm to operate in. In this realm, South Korea can export its policies and culture to and gain a level of influence. Moreover, as ODA touches on the issues associated with transnational terrorism it helps to bring international recognition and influence for South Korea.

In the context of terrorism, public diplomacy is conducted mainly on the governmental level. The ODA funding comes from the government, and the decision to impose sanctions is one of the South Korean government's. Communicating with foreign civil society is however important for choosing the appropriate strategies for state-capacity building and the overall state and institutions' reconstruction. Public diplomacy enables communication with the target foreign societies which in consequence should lead to a) effective ODA mechanism and measures, b) introduction to South Korea and its culture, tradition and politics to the foreign publics, thus facilitating the extension of South Korea's interests and making an impact that is structured and tailored according to South Korea's objectives.

CONCLUSION

This paper discussed the role of Korean public diplomacy as a tool of soft power in the context of global issues. The concept of public diplomacy itself is a complicated one as the definition of public diplomacy is broad and vague. This makes public diplomacy a contested concept that often lacks

credibility due to limited results. Despite that, public diplomacy is a widely used strategy to increase one's nation's image and prestige. The struggle for soft power is rising in its importance and the Asian region and South Korea is no exception to this. Although the craft of public diplomacy tends to be in theory almost romanticised, in reality, public diplomacy is a form of power and influence. After all, states do not have friends, states have interests.

Based on the existing literature and discussion of the two examples of global issues in the South Korean public diplomacy context, this paper concluded that South Korea must firmly establish and agree on what mechanism it should engage in in order to achieve any tangible results. The two discussed examples highlighted that South Korea should continue to deal with its public diplomacy and global issues on the governmental level as it brings a high level of efficiency. South Korea should define which actors it wants to communicate with and with whom to engage in appropriate channels of communication. Global issues are dealt with on the governmental level through coalitions, alliances and signing binding international treaties. Contemporary global issues require a top-down approach as civil society initiatives have very limited results. Public diplomacy can however introduce foreign publics into issues that do not directly touch them and broaden their point of view. However, the role of public diplomacy should not be overestimated and politicians should have a solid idea what public diplomacy can achieve and to what extent, and where the limits are. Based on the two selected examples, public diplomacy is only an addition to the existing model of modern diplomacy. Any significant results that South Korea has achieved were through diplomacy conducted on the governmental level either between another government or non-governmental organisation.

South Korean soft power capabilities are built on solid foundations. Given the history of the country and its current level of development, South Korea is well equipped to project its image to the world. When it comes to influencing other states, South Korea should focus on developing states. These should be the primary recipients of South Korean influence. South Korean presence in the international arena should not be neglected and South Korea should maintain and strengthen its bilateral or multilateral obligations within international organisations. Being actively engaged in international organisations and being a proactive and responsible member of

the international arena brings a high level of integrity and prestige. As strengthening international relations is followed by a higher degree of information and migration exchanges, South Korea in its efforts to go global should prepare its citizens for a higher level of internationalisation of the country. Also, based on the US experience as the global superpower and its involvement in the reconstruction of failed states after the 9/11 wars, South Korea should recognise that international engagement requires taking responsibility for the outcomes.

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Democracy Promotion through ODA: The Future of Korean Public Diplomacy?

Simon Bruns

Abstract | This paper investigates a potential future strategy for South Korean public diplomacy regarding its Official Development Assistance (ODA) policy. Korea should make democratic capacity building with a focus on civil society inclusion an integral part of its ODA policy. Despite the impressive pace of Korea's democratic development, it is usually sidelined by the country's economic success story. This is also reflected in ODA policy, which is predominantly technocratic and does not consider Korea's democratic experience to be worth sharing. Korea is more likely than most countries to be successful with an integration of democracy promotion into its ODA policy because of its unique development experience and lack of colonial baggage. This paper uses a case study of German political party foundations to highlight how Korea could promote democracy. The merits of such a strategy for Korea's public diplomacy span from expanding soft power to securing Korea's middle power status. There are also a range of potential caveats to such a strategy, including reputational problems of the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) and general sensitivities associated with politically conditional aid. These can be reconciled through a more flexible and selective aid policy. Such a policy should meet the demand for democratic capacity building while functioning as a tool to deepen diplomatic relations with certain partner countries that are prioritized due to systemic similarity.

국문초록 | 이 논문은 공적개발원조(Official Development Assistance, ODA)와 관련해 대한민국 공공 외교의 잠재적 미래 전략을 연구한다. 한국은 시민 사회의 참여에 초점을 둔 민주적 역량 건설을 국가 공적개발원조 정책의 핵심적인 부분으로 다루어야 한다. 한국의 인상적인 민주화 속도에도 불구하고, 민주화는 한국의 경제 성공 이야기에 묻혀 있다. 대체로 기술 집약적이며 민주화 경험을 공유할 만한 가치가 있는 것으로 고려하지 않는 한국의 공적개발원조 정책이 이를 나타낸다. 한국은 독특한 개발 경험을 가졌으며, 식민 시대의 잔재가

없는 덕에 다른 대부분의 국가들보다 공적개발원조 정책에 민주주의 홍보를 성공적으로 통합시킬 가능성이 높다. 이 논문은 한국이 어떻게 민주주의를 고취시킬 수 있었는지 보여주기 위해 독일의 정당 기반을 사례 연구로 이용한다. 이러한 한국 공공 외교 전략의 장점은 소프트 파워를 확장하는 것부터 한국의 미들 파워(중견국) 지위를 공고히 하는 것까지 다양하다. 이러한 전략에는 또한 한국 국제협력단(Korea International Cooperation Agency, KOICA)의 평판 문제, 그리고 정치적으로 조건부인 원조에 관한 전반적 민감성 등을 포함한 다양한 잠재적 문제들이 있다. 이러한 문제들은 좀더 유연하고 선택적인 원조 정책을 통해 해결될 수 있다. 이와 같은 정책은 구조적인 유사성 때문에 우선시 되는 특정 우방 국가들과의 외교 관계를 심화시키는 도구로 작용함과 동시에 민주적 역량 건설을 위한 요구에 부응해야 한다.

INTRODUCTION

On the 15th of April 2020, South Korea (hereafter Korea) demonstrated a first, the holding of parliamentary elections within the midst of the global coronavirus pandemic. Not only did the elections run smoothly, but they exhibited the highest voter turnout in 28 years (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2020). The election success demonstrated more than the achievements of Korea's globally admired coronavirus strategy. It was a testament to Korea's impressive democratic development, further confirming that it has indeed become a mature democracy, capable of successfully operating even under abnormal circumstances. It was also a glimmer of hope at a time when the only solution to containing the virus appeared to be coming from authoritarian systems, which through a combination of faster response times, central planning, and stronger control over the media narrative, capitalized on the opportunity to stage the perceived advantages of their system. The Korean case highlighted that democratic institutions, backed by the trust of the people, are an asset to the containment of COVID-19.

Despite this success, Korean democracy is usually handled as a footnote within the context of the third wave of democratization. Korea's rapid economic development is something that the country is admired for globally, and it sees this experience as an asset that it can share with the world. This is reflected in Korea's ODA policy so far, which prioritizes a technocratic approach to development. The impressive and rapid scale of

Korea's democratization since 1987, on the other hand, is presented more as an inevitable consequence of its modernization, rather than an asset that is worth sharing. It is in this context that this paper aims to investigate the question of what the future of Korean public diplomacy should look like regarding its Official Development Assistance (ODA) policy. The paper will argue that Korea should make democratic capacity building an integral part of its ODA policy by sharing its own experiences with other countries. Democracy features weakly at best among the multiple foci of Korean ODA policy. The organization that is best in place to share Korea's unique democratic experience, KOICA, limits democracy to a buzzword and has not made this an integral focus of its overall strategy. This paper aims to investigate a potential future strategy for Korea based on public and civil society sector involvement in democratic capacity building abroad. The paper will investigate the German system of political party foundations to highlight a possible model for Korea to follow. This is because the German approach to ODA is more inclusive of the non-governmental sector, yet it is able to integrate all actors into the larger framework of German public diplomacy. Korea is more likely than most countries to be successful with an integration of democracy promotion into its ODA because of its unique development experience and its lack of colonial baggage. The merits of such a strategy for Korea's public diplomacy are immense, as democratic experience could serve as an element of soft power, if branded properly. Making this a focus of ODA policy would solidify Korea's status as a middle power in the long run by giving it a stronger role in shaping the realm of political ideas and ideals. This paper also considers the caveats of such a strategy, including problems arising from the reputation of KOICA as an arm of Korean industry and the general sensitivities associated with political conditionality in aid. This is then contextualized within the larger global debate on the implications behind the export of democracy and its effectiveness. Finally, the paper will consider how to overcome these caveats, notably through the need for a more flexible and selective aid policy and focusing on countries where there is a demand for democratic capacity building, which is particularly the case in Sub-Saharan Africa.

THE CURRENT STATE OF KOREAN ODA: DEMOCRACY IS NOTABLY ABSENT

Korea is a relative newcomer to the ODA scene, recently transforming itself from a recipient to a donor. The net ODA grant equivalent for Korea sits at 2,686.14 million USD for 2019, representing 0.15% of GNI. This is still well below the 0.3% of GNI average for all Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member countries (OECD, 2019). The DAC has also recommended in its latest peer review that Korea should target allocating 0.3% of GNI as ODA by 2030 (OECD, 2018, p. 18). In Korea, ODA is jointly regulated and coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Strategy and Finance. Policies are then respectively implemented by the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) in the form of grants and the Korea Eximbank in the form of loans (ODA Korea, N. D.). Since Korea's joining of DAC in 2010, this structure has undergone a degree of scrutiny. Partner countries have criticized the fragmented nature of ODA disbursements and the strong preference given to loans. Since then, Korea has committed to gradually untying its aid, as well as investing more in emergency relief efforts. However, this is an ongoing process, and reform is not popular within business and political circles (Chatham House, 2014).

KOICA is a relatively small organization, but it implements projects across the globe and within a wide policy scope. One of the key areas of implementation is in what has been broadly defined as "Governance." The overall goal of this is to increase the accountability and effectiveness of political institutions to foster sustainable development. This is to be achieved with three strategic foci, notably: 1. Enhancing Administrative Service 2. Enhancing Accountability of the Political and Administrative system 3. Enhancing inclusivity within the legal/institutional system (KOICA, 2020). Democracy is not mentioned at all on this webpage, even though all three are important factors that are enhanced by democratic institutions. There have been cases where KOICA has collaborated with other actors, notably the UN, on projects with a democratic focus, but these have been limited to individual cases. For example, in 2015 KOICA helped with a UNDP project to support democratic governance in Nigeria. These projects remain the exception, however, with the UNDP project conducted

with a host of partners including the European Commission, DFID, and CIDA (UNDP, 2015).

A particular focus of Korean ODA has been Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), which is strategically important for Korea because of its natural resource wealth and large market potential. Overall, the Korean government's approach to ODA policy in SSA has been based on three policy objectives: Achieving food and energy security, establishing new markets for Korean goods, and the enhancement of its credentials as a global power. The latter is a Cold War legacy, particularly to counter the actions of North Korea. This remains relevant because North Korea still wields a degree of diplomatic influence in many African states, despite its limited resources. This new focus has also gone in Africa's favor, as the continent seeks to diversify its diplomatic and economic portfolio (Darracq Neville, 2014).

Another area of focus with geopolitical dimensions was recently unveiled by the Moon administration, namely the New Southern Strategy. While it is primarily a geostrategic initiative, it has had implications on the disbursement of ODA funds as well as their focus areas. The new approach is much more in line with older Korean initiatives, where ODA is included within the larger framework of trade policy. The approach is primarily economic and focuses on Korean companies being able to gain a stronger foothold in South and Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia is particularly of interest because countries there have received the bulk of Korean ODA in the past. Even here, the larger focus has been on developing economic and trade capacities, through the financing of infrastructure projects and advising on new trade regulations (Lee et al., 2018).

Korea's current approach towards ODA policy is, of course, characteristic of the country's own development experience. The approach is technocratic and implies that all that is needed for economic growth are strong and capable institutions, but not necessarily democratic ones. This technocratic approach mainly focuses on infrastructure and expansion of trade capabilities and does not integrate democratic values into the overall strategy. While this approach has been taken because it frames the process of development in a way that does not cause conflict with countries where this view might not be accepted, it does send the wrong message. The promotion of a solely technocratic model of development mirrors South

Korea's own experiences, where the case seems to support the need for economic development followed by a process of democratization. In this way democracy is presented as an end goal, rather than a means to an end. As valid as this may be given Korea's own experience, it is an approach born out of and linked to an authoritarian development state. In this sense, it indirectly reaffirms China's authoritarian approach to development, namely that democracy is neither needed nor worthy of aspiration. Kalinowski and Park refer to what has occurred in the Korean context, as "institutional retreat." This describes the situation in which institutions are no longer functional in their established areas and shift their focus to other policy fields to retain relevance. In the case of the developmental state institutions in Korea, this has meant a continued focus on expanding industries and promoting investment, but with a shift from the domestic to the international context. This highlights the continued survival and prioritization of the technocratic approach to development (Kalinowski and Park, 2016, 62). Korea should be sharing its practical democratic experiences by focusing on the elements of its political development that allowed it to democratize. Korea needs to recognize that its democratic experience is impressive and unique, and that this is an asset that can be shared with other countries.

CASE STUDY: GERMAN SYSTEM OF POLITICAL PARTY FOUNDATIONS AND WHAT KOREA CAN LEARN

The German case highlights a potential model that Korea could adopt to integrate democracy promotion into its ODA strategy. Germany boasts a system of political party foundations, which are state funded and affiliated with a political party that is in the German parliament. While these foundations have affiliations with their respective political parties, they do not form an integral part of them. They are independent of their parties in terms of funding, which they receive directly from the federal government. Despite the state funding, they are able to act independently and implement projects as they see fit. Bartsch argues that this hybrid system makes it difficult to classify them within the current framework of international

actors due to their ambivalent nature, thus classifying them as “international actors sui generis” (Bartsch, 2007, p.280). The state funds these organizations because their work is believed to be serving the public interest in a way that the state would not be able to, and not necessarily because the state wants to use them to exert its influence. The notion of political foundations is nothing unique to Germany, but their degree of independence is something that exists in no other Western country. Domestically, they play the role of civic educators for all citizens with the goal of increasing political participation as well as serving as an interlocutor between the scientific community, economic actors, and the state.

The two largest and oldest foundations currently are the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS) of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). The main emphasis of each foundation varies, depending on the political values of the party that it is affiliated with. For example, FES focuses on social matters, such as dialogue between trade unions and the state, and how to equally distribute the benefits of globalization. KAS, on the other hand, focuses on civic education for freedom and democracy as well as a focus on the German model of a social market economy.

In the twenty-first century, the German government has also increasingly relied on these foundations as foreign policy assets. The foundations have offices in many foreign countries, with the goal of engaging in democratic capacity building and supporting local civil society. They also aid governments in the strengthening of governing institutions and political actors ranging from parliaments to political parties. They receive their funding for these projects from the Federal Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). Despite this, they are considered to be independent actors in terms of their decision-making and are classified as NGOs (Massing, 2015). The advantage of such a system is that the foundations are able to directly engage with relevant actors, which would generally be considered off limits to specific government institutions, like the German diplomatic corps. This direct actor-to-actor approach is more targeted and efficient, while simultaneously being able to approach a larger variety of topics than a traditional government agency could (BPB, 2013, p. 2). These foundations serve as an

outlet of German public diplomacy, through soft power initiatives in developing countries such as the promotion of German democratic values or through their granting of scholarships for students to study in Germany. This is part of a larger and more focused approach with the goal *Demokratieförderung* (~ Democracy promotion) launched by the BMZ and being implemented by the Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the German counterpart to KOICA, as well as these foundations. In this strategy, democracy is not presented as an end goal to development, but as an essential and integral part of it (BMZ, 2020).

Germany's approach highlights the advantage of a polyilateral approach to diplomacy through ODA in the context of the sharing of political values and experiences. Polyilateralism is introduced by Wiseman as a way of diversifying the rather rigid international relations approach to international actors, by introducing a theoretical basis to discuss the relationship between "official state-based entities" and "unofficial non-state entities." This does not imply a recognition of equivalence, but an expectation of mutual exchange in the form of a systematic relationship between both actors (Wiseman, 2010, p. 24). Wiseman argues that polyilateral diplomacy is particularly attractive to small- and middle-sized states as they do not have the same resources available as major states, meaning that they have to be much more creative in their approaches to diplomacy. This leads to a natural tendency for smaller state actors to cooperate with transnational civil society (Wiseman, 2010, p. 31).

Germany's use of polyilateral diplomacy therefore presents a potential strategy that Korea could take to promote democracy abroad based on Korean terms and experiences. Especially KOICA could move on from their current technocratic approach to development and integrate the Korean democratic experience into their foreign aid strategies. This does not imply that Korea should copy the German model one to one. One contextual feature that is particular to Germany is its long history of political parties, which all exhibit a strong degree of continuity. The same cannot be said for Korea, as politics is generally more a matter of personality, hence party affiliations play a lesser role. This in turn negatively affects their ability to be stable and continuous. Despite these differences, it does not mean that there is nothing that can be learned from this. As in the German case, Korea

could choose to focus on the strengths that developed out of its specific political context. Experiences relating to the active role of civil society in spearheading Korea's democratic transformation and still strongly shaping Korean politics to date are something that should be integrated into such an aid strategy. Another lesson that should be taken from the German case is the idea of a "democratic" approach to democratic capacity building abroad. Notably, that such a strategy is much more successful if all societal actors are involved. The combination of different actors in the form of government, NGOs, and private sector, offers a much more well-rounded approach that highlights that democracy is in everyone's interest. This also has the potential to dispel general suspicions relating to foreign aid with political dimensions, because by offering a variety of actors, it strengthens the agency of the recipients and respects their sovereignty. The other advantage of involving civil society in foreign aid is that it is in the citizens' interest. They can serve the double function of implementing aid projects, while auditing government projects to ensure that funds are spent appropriately. While there has been a move in this direction with the creation of the Development Alliance Korea (DAK), this has been generally limited to approaches to humanitarian issues as well as monetary and management matters (KOICA, 2020). While these types of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are a step in the right direction, they remain limited in scope and size. The majority of high profile PPP cases have also been in the realm of State-*Chaebol* cooperation, rather than State-Civil Society cooperation.

KOREA'S DEMOCRATIC ASSETS

There are many unique aspects of Korea's democratic development that would make it worthy of emulation in other countries. First, despite its relatively short existence, democracy in Korea has matured and on a strong footing. The impeachment of President Park Geun-hye in March 2017 was a first for Korean democracy and a test of its foundation. While it was not the first impeachment of a chief executive in Korea, it was the first successful one. Just like the first smooth transition of power highlights a test for democracy, so does the successful impeachment of a leader. It shows that

the checks and balances embedded into the system are functional, especially in the case of a presidential system like Korea, where the executive plays a strong role.

A more unique aspect of the Korean democratic experience is the strong involvement of the people and civil society. Shin and Moon argue that protest-led reform had always been an integral part of Korea's modern political culture. This includes the stepping down of Rhee Syngman in 1960, the Gwangju Uprising in 1980, and Korea's democratic transition in 1987. In continuation of this legacy, it was a widespread popular movement in 2016-2017 that instigated the impeachment of President Park. The difference is that in this case, the movement was composed of a much more diverse cross section of society. The strong involvement of citizens and civil society in political dialogue has in most cases been a necessary factor. Historically, it was needed because Korea was not a democracy and the citizens had limited options for political participation. This legacy has been sustained to this day, in part because of the weak nature of the political party system in Korea, as well as parties' ineffectiveness at delivering on public expectations. One potential challenge of this might be the emergence of an "over politicized" society, where every decision becomes a matter of public plebiscite (Shin and Moon, 2017, p. 130). However, these events do not represent an attack on the institutions of democracy per se as some commentators have suggested, but it is more the expression of anger by the people that the ruling elite had violated the institutions of democracy (Shin and Moon, 2017, p. 118). The proper functioning of all political organs from accusation to trial to conviction are a sign of democratic deepening and the maturing of institutions.

All this is not to argue that Korea is the perfect democracy, as it does face challenges similar to those faced by other democracies around the world, relating to a larger pattern of democratic malaise. Shin argues that from the perspective of 2020, there have been some controversial events in regards to democratic process in Korea. This specifically refers to the "war on fake news," as well a slide towards zero-sum politics. The former refers to a 2018 push by the Moon government for state agencies to report misleading news accounts they found online, and the latter refers to a rigid polarization between the views of the ruling party and their opposition

(Shin, 2020, p.101). Despite this, the discussions that are conducted around these topics indicate that democracy in Korea has matured, regardless of the indicators of backsliding that Shin evokes. It is undeniable that some of the causes are internal, but this ignores the global picture. The stumbling of democracy is a global phenomenon because the challenges to democracy are global in nature. Dissatisfaction with globalization and the resulting inequality are a global phenomenon that have challenged democracies all over the world, as it is beyond the scope of individual governments to completely solve these issues on a local level. On the other hand, discussions and disagreements relating to freedom of speech and the role of the government in being an arbiter of the truth are signs of a healthy democracy, as this presents an issue that would otherwise not have been a matter of public discussion. The latter is also an issue that is a constant back and forth in most advanced democracies and is not unique to Korea. The important takeaway from such a discussion is that it is happening in the first place. Notably, that there is a genuine interest from people who wish to voice their opinions on the role that the government should be taking in moderating the “truth.”

Another practical advantage that Korea has for implanting democracy promotion, which does not emerge out of its democratic development, is its perceived neutrality. Unlike most Western countries that engage democracy promotion globally, Korea does not have a history of colonial expansion or global interference. In fact, Korea’s own colonial history and its recent development experience allow the country to brand any type of development aid as genuine South-South cooperation. Additionally, Korea does not garner the same suspicions as China, for example. Because of its size, Korea is not in a position to pose a large threat to the sovereignty of any country (Howe, 2015). These factors combine to support a narrative that Korea is on an equal footing and working to implement policy at an eye-to-eye level. Simply by virtue of its size and historical development, Korea is already in a much stronger position to engage in much more controversial forms of ODA, such as democratic capacity building.

MERITS OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION FOR KOREA

Given the strengths of Korean democracy and the asset that this would be for aid recipients due to a more extensive ODA policy, there must also be a consideration of the benefits of this strategy for Korea. There are variety of merits that democracy promotion in ODA would have for Korea as an extension of its public diplomacy efforts. The main benefit that would come out of such an initiative would be to solidify Korea's grounding as a middle power. Korea would show the world that it has more to offer than a successful approach to economic development and that through the sharing of its democratic experience it can provide shortcuts to other countries. It can convince potential recipient countries of this through stronger branding, with a specific focus on Korea as an alternative to both the West and China. Korea already uses this branding based on South-South cooperation and win-win rhetoric for current implementation of development aid projects. This can easily be extended to an ODA strategy with a much stronger democratic focus.

Another potential benefit that could be reaped from such a project would be impetus for the opening of new channels of cooperation that do not have to just be limited to the provision of ODA. This could serve Korean geostrategic interests as many of the countries that Korean foreign policy has identified as important are either outright democratic or tending towards democracy. This includes important global and regional actors such as the United States, the European Union, Japan, India, and Nigeria. Korea would therefore have the opportunity to work together with other democratic countries on the basis of common political systems and a shared political culture. This cooperative element would not just provide a boost to Korean diplomacy, but it will also increase the leverage that Korea has as a smaller actor in the international system. A coalition of democracies would also be a more effective way of targeting Chinese influence in developing countries. In offering a more structured and thereby resource intensive approach to ODA provision, democratic countries would have increased clout in comparison to non-democratic actors.

Finally, a perhaps more optimistic and idealistic proposal is that a stronger focus on democratic elements in ODA could open an avenue for

closer East Asian cooperation. This would be particularly useful with regards to opportunities to cooperate and improve relations with Japan. Both countries are mature democracies and have much to offer regarding experiences in a non-western context. Japan and Korea also have shared foreign policy objectives in their dependence on global stability for their export-oriented economies. Additionally, the focal points and implementation of their development aid strategies are similar so far in that they have a strong technical focus. Stronger cooperation in terms of ODA policy would therefore offer itself as beneficial in any case, regardless of whether this has a stronger democratic focus or not. A united approach promoting democratic values would also place both countries in a stronger position regarding China. Given that neither country alone could muster the same resources, a united approach would place both in a much stronger position. In 2012 the Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo even proposed a “democratic security diamond” as part of a new Japanese diplomacy espousing a stronger focus on democracy (Ichihara, 2019, p. 8). This was met with lackluster responses by all participants, given the strong ties with China that all entertained at the time. Things were further complicated by the general ebb and flow of Japanese-Korean relations. This is unfortunately once again the case today, with Japanese-Korean relations at a low point. As a result of this, a democratic alliance between the two, or at least closer cooperation in democracy promotion through ODA, seems an unlikely scenario for the near future. However, another potential option would be stronger cooperation with Taiwan, another East Asian democracy that shares a history of rapid economic development with Korea. Given the precarious nature of the Taiwan issue, this type of cooperation would have to proceed cautiously at first. However, it would represent a first step in East Asian democratic cooperation. Taiwan would also be willing to engage in such cooperation because it would be a way of strengthening its diplomatic prestige and engaging China’s global promotion strategy of its own system.

POTENTIAL CAVEATS OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

A variety of caveats could emerge as a result of a stronger focus on

democracy in Korean ODA. The first issue is the limited size and extensive range of strategic foci of KOICA. Korea's spending on aid is below OECD average and KOICA is only one outlet of government spending on ODA. While the majority of ODA funding is presented in the form of grants, and therefore through KOICA, this remains a fraction of a small overall budget. Another issue with KOICA is that it is overstretched in terms of the policy areas it is working in, given the current funding and size of the organization. According to the latest numbers available, in 2018 KOICA was operating in 125 countries with a budget of USD 683,745 million (KOICA, 2018, p. 57). KOICA has a huge program focus from PPPs, to civil society involvement programs, to humanitarian and technical aid. Additionally, KOICA also has an extensive list of policy foci including education, health, governance, agriculture and rural development, water, energy, transportation, climate change response, gender equality, and a category broadly labelled as "Science, Technology, and Innovation" (KOICA, 2020). Given the current budget and extent of policy foci, KOICA would not have the capacity to include a democratic component in its aid and capacity building programs. Even if it were to be included, it would be nowhere near the scale where it would be effective. An addition of this would therefore require either a reduction of foci and partner countries or a significant increase in the organization's budget.

Another problem are public relations issues, especially relating to blunders by Korean industry. The former specifically refer to the Korea National Oil Corporation (KNOC) deal in Nigeria and Daewoo's land lease scandal in Madagascar. The KNOC case involved a government imposed moratorium on drilling in 2009, after the successor government found the bidding process to be full of irregularities. This was followed by a multi-year legal battle, which KNOC eventually won in 2017 after a supreme court ruling (Business Day, 2017). Much more damaging in terms of reputation, on the other hand, was Daewoo's ninety-nine year lease on massive tracts of land in Madagascar. The opacity of the deal and the ignoring of customs relating to land ownership led to international backlash. The resulting protests ousted the existing government, and their replacement nullified the deal. These older examples primarily represented Korean inexperience in operating in the complicated business environment that is

SSA. However, especially the Daewoo case left lasting damage to the public image of Korea in Madagascar and SSA at large (Darracq Neville, 2015, p.14).

Relating to the above is the reputation of KOICA especially in regards to its close relationship with the *chaebol*. There has been a strong preference in Korean aid to prioritize PPPs, with the logic of taking advantage of the synergies between the means of the state and the efficiency of the market. Additionally, the involvement of the private sector is simply cheaper for the state. This is characteristic of a larger trend, which is not unique to Korea, which has seen the increased privatization of development aid efforts worldwide. This can be primarily attributed to the preference for and hegemony of neoliberal ideas in economic development discourses. Korea's neoliberal transformation came after IMF restructuring, following the 1997 financial crisis. Schwak argues that the fallout from this crisis, as well as the election of Lee Myung-bak, meant that there was once again increased cooperation between the State and *chaebol*. In this relationship, the state was the harbinger of economic development, with the *chaebol* at the center. Naturally, such a synergetic relationship between the state and the private sector eliminates the boundary between private and state interests in the global market (Schwak, 2018, p. 121). For example, *Chaebol* considerations are taken into account in the making of policy decisions. This becomes apparent when regarding the choice of partner countries, where a priority is placed on middle-income countries, which provide a higher degree of economic opportunity (Schwak, 2018, p. 111).

The reputation aspect that Korean industry plays, as well as the strong private involvement in KOICA projects and decision-making, are both factors that could hinder the efficacy of ODA with a democratic focus. Primarily, this jeopardizes Korea's "clean slate" position, in which it brands itself on eye-level cooperation and being free of vested interests. The Daewoo case is particularly sensitive due to the colonial allusions that emerge from an opaque land lease deal. Especially when it comes to aid, issues of public perception carry high relevance if this aid is to be accepted by the recipient country. This is even more relevant in the case of democratic capacity building, as the sharing of values is politically much more sensitive. Therefore, in order for such an initiative to be successful,

Korea needs to maintain its moral high ground, at the very least rhetorically. If democratic capacity building is regarded as a conflation of state and *chaebol* interests, then there is even more reason to assume that ODA represents a neocolonial means of domination.

A domestic factor that could limit the expansion of ODA into areas of democratic governance is based on the Korean public's perception towards ODA. Something that is particularly interesting in the case of Korea is Koreans' perception of the state of development within their own country. In the year 2014, around 37% of the Korean public saw Korea as a developed country (Kim et al., 2017, p.15). The results of this poll varied with age group and education level, but the overall results do highlight that the majority of the Korean public do not see Korea as a developed country. This perception in turn has an effect on an individual's support for Korean ODA, as those who think Korea is developed were more inclined to support ODA (Kim et al., 2017, p.16). The 2018 DAC peer review also raised the point that Korea could do more to partner with civil society to increase public awareness of and support for ODA (OECD, 2018, p. 22). While it is not really the case that ODA faces stiff resistance from the public, it is the public's lack of awareness of the policies and effectiveness of Korea's ODA that present a potential barrier to increasing the ODA budget and policy scopes. In general, attitudes towards ODA are quite positive in Korea among both the general public and elites, with 86.5% and 99.5% respectively in support of ODA spending (Kim et al., 2017, p.19). While Kim et al., mainly focus on elite attitudes, it showed that the majority of elite respondents favored humanitarian and economic policy foci as well as the betterment of relations between Korea and other countries as the main reason for providing ODA. When asked what the general rationale for countries providing ODA was, only 1% selected "Democratic and political development of underdeveloped countries" (Kim et al., 2017, p. 26). This rather low number indicates that the Korean public does not believe that political development features highly as a general reason for providing ODA.

Another domestic factor could be the Korean public's perceptions of the state of democracy in Korea. This has to be considered because if the Korean public is unsatisfied with its democracy then it is unlikely to think

of this as an asset that could be shared with other countries. Hence, there would be no popular support for the government to promote the Korean democratic experience abroad. A 2019 Pew Research Center survey found that overall, 55% of Koreans are satisfied with the state of their democracy, with Koreans aged 18-29 70% satisfied with the state of their democracy. However, this was a decrease from 2018, as general pessimism towards democracy and democratic institutions rose in 2019, with 68% of respondents reporting pessimism about the functions of their political system. However, 81% felt that voting gave them a say in how the government made decisions (Cha, 2020). This result also has to be contextualized within larger trends affecting democracies during this time, as pessimism and dissatisfaction with democracy were on the rise all over the globe (Wike and Schumacher, 2020). While not yet factored in, the strong voter turnout for the 2020 legislative elections highlights that the democratic process remains important and that the public has faith in voting as a means of political participation. This is despite the uncertainty of the coronavirus pandemic and the special circumstances that this entailed.

Another factor that has to be considered is the debate surrounding the acceptability of democracy promotion. Democracy promotion saw its apex in the 1990s, where the triumphal mood at the end of the Cold War seemed to have demonstrated the superiority and inevitability of democracy. Sobriety followed relatively soon. The backlash against democracy promotion has been strong in recent years, usually under the criticism of foreign meddling in sovereign countries' affairs. Countries such as Russia and China have introduced new laws significantly curtailing the operating scope of NGOs, which includes political actors (OHCHR, 2016). In combination with this much more assertive authoritarianism, there has been the democratic backsliding and democratic fatigue in existing democracies. Problems emerge for both promoters and recipients. On the side of the promoters, there has been a focus on more tangible policies in support of economic and political stability, rather than democratic governance. This is because there is a need to remain competitive, particularly with the expansion of Chinese aid offerings. On the receiving side, there has been a renewed skepticism and a strong pushback against democracy promotion (Pope et al., 2018, p. 3).

This also raises the question over whether democracy promotion actually works. A publication by the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation, reflecting on twenty years of democracy promotion in East and Southeastern Europe, as well as the Caucasus, claims mixed results. It argues that it is difficult to make a general statement because of the host of different contextual factors that affected post-socialist transformation in these countries and by extension their degree of democratization. These in turn affect the reception of democracy building measures. Two contrasting examples include the case of Russia and the Balkans. On the one hand, there is a regime that actively opposes democratic reforms, making democracy promotion efforts of limited value. On the other hand, there are a host of countries that hope to ascend to EU membership someday. This creates a much stronger impetus for implementing democratic reforms, thereby making these countries more receptive to outside initiatives. Additionally, democratization does not exist in a vacuum, as it is dependent on other factors. For example, if a country is plagued by political instability and economic dislocation, then there is a much weaker platform on which to aid in democratization (Djazić-Weber, 2010, 8). There is a particular stress on the importance of civil society in promoting democratization, by increasing political mobilization through niches that the state is not able to enter. Part of the difficulty of democratization in these post-socialist countries, is their weak civil society basis, which is a socialist legacy. Hence, the creation and support of civil society structures should be seen as a long term investment to enhance the democratization process and the efficacy of aid (Beichelt and Schimmelfennig, 2010, p. 23).

THE SYNTHESIS: RECONCILING THE MERITS AND THE CAVEATS

The complicated nature of this debate raises the question of how the benefits and the caveats can be reconciled. It helps that many of the caveats are either in the process of being addressed or rather easy to address. The case of the reputational damage done to Korea through culturally insensitive and morally objectionable business practices in SSA has remained a one-off example. The Korean public perception of ODA is already rather positive and as the OECD and authors such as Kim et al. highlight in their studies,

the government needs to increase public awareness of the role of ODA and the type of projects supported by this structure. The public would be much more enthusiastic about experimental approaches, such as a stronger democratic focus of ODA, if they were more aware of how the process operates. The involvement of civil society as aid partners combined with a stronger government effort to promote awareness also have the potential to increase public support for increased ODA spending. This would mean approaching the 0.3% target promoted by the DAC, thereby increasing the budget of KOICA and allowing for an increase in policy foci. Finally, as for the Korean perception of their democracy, while this took a dip in 2019, this was part of an overall global decline. The strong voter turnout in the 2020 parliamentary elections indicates that while there does seem to be an overall level of pessimism towards democracy, there is still enough trust in democratic practices to effect change.

The largest public relations roadblock, however, will be the close relationship between the state and industry in the implementation of ODA. This will also be the hardest to change, as this is tangent to a much larger pattern in Korean politics. Given the economic history of Korea, the state and the *chaebol* have always been close, and the distinction between private and public interests has been difficult to make. The return of the *chaebol* following the 1997 crisis has further cemented this relationship. This is not to argue that private actors should play no role in the implementation of development projects; on the contrary, private enterprise does have practical advantages to offer in certain topic areas. However, there needs to be a strong degree of transparency and accountability for this type of cooperation. The reasons for this are twofold: 1. Since public money is being used, the Korean public needs to be assured that these funds are spent efficiently on projects with high yields 2. If the public in ODA receiving countries is to trust Korean democracy promotion efforts, then they should also be assured that this is not a front to disguise neocolonial corporate interests. The best way to ensure this is once again to give civil society a larger role in the implementation of aid projects. This way they act as a neutral third party and can ensure that public money is spent wisely and that it is not just being spent in the name of corporate interests.

As for the debate surrounding democracy promotion, it is usually framed

from the perspective of the promoter. This is investigated both from the perspective of the benefits that the promoter would derive from it, as well as in the benefit for the receiving country. The latter particularly refers to improvements in the country's relationship with the promoter and the potential rewards of such a relationship. Given the nature of the power relationship between developed and developing states, this perspective is generally a fair assessment of the situation. However, it ignores the agency of the receiving countries. ODA is not a one-sided affair, as projects and policy scope have to be approved by receiving countries as well. The missing focus on recipient agency therefore ignores that there is also a demand for Korea to share its developmental experiences, which could easily be expanded to a case of democracy promotion. This is particularly relevant in Africa, where despite general dissatisfaction with the state of democracy and the supply of it, there continues to be a genuine demand for democracy. The yearly Afrobarometer poll for 2019 shows that despite the general pessimism seen towards democracy in Europe and the Americas, Africans have remained committed to it overall (Mattes, 2019, p. 1). Of course, the picture is not quite as simple as that, with diverging results based on countries, regions, and socio-economic standing, as well as lower levels of commitment when asked about more specific democratic indicators (Mattes, 2019, p. 1). Overall, Mattes describes the state of commitment to democracy in Africa as "wide but shallow" (Mattes, 2019, p. 25). Given this general attitude, Korea is likely to face much less resistance if it were to begin democracy promotion as part of its ODA. This is because it would be in line with current attitudes as well as building capacity in political areas that Africans consider important and pay great attention to. Korea's clean slate reputation, particularly with regards to Africa, would further help the situation. Thus, Korea has the opportunity to not just brand itself as a neutral partner, but justify this commitment by arguing that it is simply meeting the demand for a sharing of its own experiences.

Given the sensitive nature of political aspects in ODA, Korea will have to work on an ODA strategy that considers these sensitivities. Regardless of the branding of such a strategy, there will always be a group of countries that are not democratic, which will outright refuse a democratic dimension to ODA. Therefore, Korea needs to develop a realistic and flexible aid

strategy that considers these political factors. This flexible aid policy should be modeled after that of most Western countries, which already have different policy foci depending on the country they are operating in. For example, it is not surprising that GIZ in China only focuses on legal cooperation and urbanization programs within its “Governance and Democracy” policy objective (GIZ, 2019). Korea will have to take a similar approach to maintain its public image and avoid conflict. However, this would not require so much modification of Korea’s current strategy, which limits cooperation to areas within the economic sphere and somewhat ignores political issues and the notion of values.

The problem with such a flexible strategy is that it might weaken the overall effectiveness of a stronger focus on democratic principles. This is because there is no incentive to conduct democratic reforms, when non-democratic countries still receive aid without these conditions attached. There are two potential solutions to this predicament. The easier option would be that Korea promotes democratization along the lines of the demand and supply model of democracy mentioned earlier. This would entail only engaging in experience sharing if this is asked for by partner countries or agreed upon during negotiations on project implementation. The second option would entail a larger diplomatic initiative, akin to the democratic alliance mentioned earlier in the paper. This would mean an aid strategy that is not just flexible, but also selective. Korea could still cooperate with non-democratic countries, but it could significantly deepen its cooperation with democratic ones. This would give democratic countries a competitive edge over non-democratic countries when it comes to the amount of resources provided through ODA, while also improving their diplomatic standing with Korea.

While the idea of a flexible and selective aid policy may seem divisive, it fits into the greater framework of international relations in 2020 and presumably the years following that. The idea of systemic rivalry, though not nearly as profound as in the past, is regaining traction in regards to perspectives on political and economic systems and the best system of development. This systemic friction is noticeable, especially since the abolition of the Western monopoly on aid provision, because of the entry of China and the enormous resources that it has made available. The West is no

longer the sole provider of large-scale aid, meaning that developing countries have much more agency over where to receive their assistance from. In many countries, Chinese investment has been welcomed because of their perceived lack of conditionality. This is an illusion that some countries are waking up from. The case of Pakistan and the long hiatus of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor as a result of the reinvestigation of projects, accusations of corruption, and worries over the sustainability of Pakistan's debt to China, is just one case (Shahid, 2020).

CONCLUSION

This paper sought to investigate the potential future of Korean public diplomacy in the realm of democracy promotion through its ODA policy. The paper has argued that Korea stands in a unique position to offer a third way in the realm of democracy promotion through ODA. This approach would be based on transparency guaranteed by strong civil society involvement, combined with the sharing of Korea's own historical experiences as a former developing country and as a former colony. It would have to be a flexible and selective strategy. This means that such projects are only implemented in countries that are willing to accept them, but that these countries become priority partners, which in turn incentivizes democratization. This strategy would benefit Korea by offering new means of cooperation with democracies across the world in the context of the return of systemic competition. This, in combination with the promotion of Korean values through the export of its political culture, would enhance Korea's position as a middle power.

Korea has progressed rapidly in the scope and efficacy of its ODA policy, considering that it is such a new donor. However, there are still improvements to be made, to ensure that Korea does not end up with the same tainted reputation that the Chinese and some Western donors have. This namely refers to the close and opaque links between the *chaebol* and the state in ODA decision making. Given that this is something that has emerged out of the context of Korea's own development experience, this will be difficult to reverse. However, a strong civil society sector is also a

product of Korea's specific historical experiences. Through its involvement and the accompanying assurances of transparency, Korea has significant potential to deliver on its rhetoric of South-South cooperation. Given the global demand for democracy, Korea stands in a unique position to fill this gap in a way that would be agreeable to developing countries in a way that grants them agency and assures them of their sovereignty.

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Promoting New Southern Policy in Southeast Asia: Killing Two Birds With One Stone

Swe Yone Nandy

Abstract | In recent years, there has been an influx of Korean popular culture (Korean wave) throughout the world, including the Southeast Asia region. While the engagement of the Republic of Korea (ROK) with Southeast Asia has spanned over decades, the strategic importance of ASEAN was yet to become a priority in Seoul's foreign policies. The New Southern Policy (NSP) was initiated by President Moon Jae-in in 2017 to enhance the ROK-ASEAN relations to a whole new level, embracing economic, socio-cultural as well as strategic dimensions. The main focus of the paper is to examine the nexus of the NSP and public diplomacy of South Korea. In particular, this paper will explore the essence of the NSP in the context of public diplomacy; how it will bring impact to the political and policy implications of Korean diplomatic directives to Southeast Asia while bringing prosperity to ASEAN countries. It will further explain the necessity for the successful implementation of the NSP in the region, highlighting the past approaches of Seoul and the contemporary global issues. Finally, the paper will present a conclusion, suggesting ideas for South Korea in pursuing its NSP in ASEAN looking holistically at the role of the NSP in ASEAN amidst the other existing policy initiatives in the region.

국문초록 | 최근 들어, 동남아시아 지역을 포함해 세계적으로 한국 대중문화(한류 파도)가 밀려들었다. 대한민국과 동남아시아의 관계는 수십년 간 지속되어 왔지만 아세안의 전략적 중요성은 아직 서울 외교 정책의 우선순위가 아니었다. 2017년 문재인 대통령은 경제적, 사회문화적, 전략적 관점을 포괄하여 대한민국과 아세안의 관계를 완전히 새로운 차원으로 강화시키기 위해 신남방정책(New Southern Policy, NSP)을 시작했다. 이 논문의 초점은 신남방정책과 대한민국 공공 외교의 연결점을 연구이다. 이 글은 특히 공공 외교 문맥에서 신남방정책의 본질과 그것이 아세안 국가들에 번영을 가져다줌과 동시에 어떻게 한국의 외교 지시의 정치적이며 정책적인 결과에 영향을 끼칠 것인지 모색할 것이다. 이 글은 나아가 과거 서울의 접근법과 현재 세계적인 사안을 강조하며 아세안 지역에서

신남방정책의 성공적인 시행이 필요함을 설명할 것이다. 마지막으로, 이 논문은 아세안에서 대한민국이 다른 다양한 정치 사업들 사이에서 어떻게 신남방정책의 역할을 차별화할 수 있는지 제안한다.

INTRODUCTION

President Moon Jae In's administration is striving towards the New Northern Policy (NNP) and New Southern Policy (NSP) where the latter emphasized consolidating economic partnerships with South Korea and the countries to its north: Russia, Mongolia, and Central Asian states and the former intend to promote relations with countries to its south: those are in the Southeast Asian region and India in addition to the existing policies such as 'Permanent Peace in the Korean Peninsula' and the 'New Economic Map of Korean Peninsula.' Specifically, the NSP is an established diplomatic effort of the Moon government as a broader spectrum of its 'Northeast Asia Plus Community for Responsibility' (NAPCOR).

According to the Asan Institute of Policy Studies, President Moon first introduced the Northeast Asia Plus Community (NEAPC) during his electoral campaign. He spoke in his campaign about the importance of maintaining reliable relations with its four key partner countries: the United States (US), China and Japan and bringing the ASEAN and India on the same pedestal as the four major partners under the scope of NEAPC. (Lee, 2020) When he was elected as the President, the NSP became one of Korea's foreign policy priorities in addition to Northern Policy and Northeast Asia Policy. It is also known as "New Sudpolitik" and also known as the continuation of the previous President Park Geun Hye's policy of 'Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative' (NAPCI).

Alongside this background, this paper will attempt to explain the nexus between Public Diplomacy and the NSP by exploring the following questions:

1. Why is the better quality and longevity of the NSP crucial for South Korea in the context of Public Diplomacy?
2. Where should South Korea be pouring its resources in the ASEAN

region to best serve the ambitious goals of the NSP?

This study is based on a qualitative analysis of primary and secondary sources relevant to South Korea's public diplomacy and its ongoing infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia. The included primary sources are state-level public statements, official publications, and press releases from relevant government agencies of both Korea and the ASEAN countries. Secondary resources contain studies that focus on previous approaches of public diplomacy of South Korea, South Korea's soft power, and South Korea-ASEAN relations.

The paper is composed of three sections. The first section provides the concepts and strategies under the NSP and the developing nature of public diplomacy in South Korea. The following section explains the linkage between the NSP and the public diplomacy objectives of South Korea. The next section explores the investment gap in Southeast Asia that the NSP could fill up as an alternative. Finally, a few concluding remarks are included over this recent breakthrough of Korea's foreign policy in the ASEAN and its implementation over the region.

THE ORIGIN OF THE NEW SOUTHERN POLICY

The New Southern Policy (NSP) is a foreign policy initiative by President Moon, which was first announced during his state visit to Indonesia in November 2017. In addition to its purpose of promoting cooperation with its major four diplomatic partners: The United States, China, Japan, and Russia, this policy attempts to enhance strategic ties of Korea with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its member states and India. Three main policy agendas are established under the vision of the "People-centric community of peace and prosperity"; which are 3Ps: people, prosperity, and peace.

The first policy is to build "a community of people" with greater mutual understanding which is to reach "15 million mutual visitors by 2020 annually." Through expanding two-way cultural exchanges and HR capacity building workshops, nearly 11.5 million mutual visitors between ASEAN

and Korea in 2018 indicated that the policy has a promising start. With the quest to create a foundation of mutually beneficial and future-oriented economic cooperation, the second policy of “a community of prosperity was started with a target to reach US\$ 200 billion by 2020. Provided that the trade value in 2018 was US\$160 billion, which exceeded US\$114 billion in 2017, more ambitious targets can be expected for both Korea and ASEAN for the post-pandemic years. The final policy of the NSP is “a community of Peace” which is to build a peaceful and safe environment in the region. The projects under this policy aim to strengthen the collective response toward anti-terrorism, cyber threats, and maritime security as well as effective cooperation for a prosperous Korean Peninsula.

Promotion strategies are furthermore announced after the first plenary meeting of the Presidential Committee on the NSP in November 2018 with 16 strategic tasks and 32 main projects. To date the recent achievements, a total of 19 strategic initiatives and 92 key projects were determined by the Committee. ASEAN-Korea Financial Cooperation Center was also established in Indonesia to elevate the presence of financial accessibility. It will provide support to help Korean financial institutes participate in the NSP countries' local markets and encourage collaboration between intra-ASEAN and Korean companies in local development projects.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN FOREIGN POLICY OF SOUTH KOREA

The term ‘public diplomacy’ has various understandings. Nonetheless, all of them can be summed up as public diplomacy being an attempt to communicate with the foreign public. Sharp (2005) defines that public diplomacy is “the process of direct relations with people in a country pursued to advance the interest and extend the values of those represented.” It is also suggested to be white propaganda by Berridge (2015) which is mainly applied by state actors to influence other states by winning the heart of its people. Rana (2011) defines public diplomacy as “activities through governments, working with non-state agencies, reaching out to publics and nonofficial actors abroad, covering information, culture, education and the

country image.” What distinguishes public diplomacy from traditional diplomacy is that the former extends its emphasis to the relationship with the foreign public in addition to the main focus of the latter: maintaining friendship between governments.

Till recent times, public diplomacy was applied by South Korea as a mere tool of marketing; used in promoting the charm of Korea. Indeed, creating a positive image of Korea is very much essential as this brand marketing strategy was successful with the influx of ‘Korean Wave’ throughout the world. Intriguingly, the recent discourse in the field witnessed some changes together with the establishment of the Public Diplomacy Act in 2016. This indicated not only the acknowledgment of the significance of public diplomacy by the Korean government but also proved that Public Diplomacy is no longer just a tool of a mere nation-branding.

The act also led to the foundation of the Public Diplomacy Committee under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is involved by respective stakeholders from local and national administrations, individuals from the private sectors, and academics. Therefore, the South Korean Government is now utilizing the whole-government-approach in integrating public diplomacy as major diplomatic themes, without necessarily denoting the term “public diplomacy.” The first meeting of the Committee resulted in Korea’s First Basic Plan on Public Diplomacy (2017-2021) that will provide instruction for the Moon Jae In administration.

Under the vision of “Attractive Korea Communicating with the World Together with Citizens,” the plan contains four goals: to promote Korea’s status and image through rich cultural resources, to distribute accurate information about Korea, to build a friendly and strategically favorable surrounding for Korea and to empower public diplomacy agents and promote intra-collaboration. The strategies are identified under these goals in which ‘cultural diplomacy’ aims to utilize Korea’s cultural assets; ‘knowledge-oriented diplomacy’ to elevate accurate knowledge and information about Korea and to support Korean studies in academic cooperation, and ‘public diplomacy on policy’ to expand understanding of Korea’s policies by the general foreign public and to create a favorable environment for Korea’s major diplomatic goals. Therefore, the core values of the NSP which promote its vision of 3Ps through two-way culture

exchanges; through enhancing cooperation in the defense industry to contribute peace across Asia, and through better reciprocal economic cooperation are essentially contributing to the efficacy of the modernized public diplomacy strategies of Korea.

NEW SOUTHERN POLICY THROUGH THE LENS OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

South Korea is indeed generally well-loved by the people of the ASEAN region. It is one of the leading trade partners of most of the ASEAN countries. ASEAN member states are charmed by South Korea's soft power through the manifestation of the massive "Korean Wave" in the forms of K-drama, pop music, Korean Cuisine, or Korean traditional medicine. So, why does Korea need to promote the NSP in the ASEAN under the spectrum of public diplomacy? Although the country begins to occupy an increasingly influential position with the ASEAN, public diplomacy with only the basis of soft power resources is not adequate to transform the bilateral relations into a stronger political-diplomatic partnership between South Korea and the Region.

Since the establishment of sectoral dialogue relations between ASEAN and Korea in November 1989, the past 30 years of relationships have experienced various crucial improvements in every bilateral aspect. Bilateral trade volume has grown 17-fold as a substantial expansion of Korean investments in the ASEAN economies. With frequent mutual visits and student exchanges, the socio-cultural facet of bilateral relations has made considerable progress. As regional multilateral integration in Asia continues, more opportunities for this partnership to flourish and grow closer to open discussions on issues of common interest are also prevailing.

Paradoxically to these impressive bilateral records, policy initiatives of the Blue House towards ASEAN have frequent up-and-downs where some skepticisms in the region occur to the sustainability of the engagement activities led by South Korea. Despite the official statement of bilateral ties in 1989, the real beginning of cooperation between ASEAN and South Korea started in the late 1990s under the administration of President Kim

Dae Jung. This development was based on his personal knowledge and interests in the ASEAN as friendship with some Southeast Asian leaders, Aung San Suu Kyi of Myanmar, and the Philippines President Corazon Aquino and also due to the foundation of the ASEAN+3 initiative as a way to overcome the Asian Financial Crisis of 1998, which subsequently brought South Korea closer to ASEAN and its members. Since Korea began to cooperate under the institutional frameworks of ASEAN+3 and East Asia Summit (EAS), the increasing momentum of regional integration laid the basis of growing economic interactions between ASEAN countries and Korea.

Although the basis of the strong potential partnership has been laid, the three administrations after President Kim appeared to weaken their commitment towards the ASEAN-Korea tie. President Roh Moo Hyun altered his regional policy focus back to Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula which was clarified by his initiative “Korea, Northeast Asia Hub Country,” where he put effort to obtain distinctive changes in the Korean Peninsula situation. The Lee Myung Bak administration had its approach called the “New Asia Initiative,” but very much brought the regional focus on the entire Asian region. It was accused by some critics as South Korea became mercantilist and that the ASEAN region was viewed as a market area for South Korea under this context. Then under President Park Geun Hye, the policy shifted back to Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula, as “Korean Peninsula Trustpolitik” and included ASEAN as a mere observer in “Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative” (NAPCI).

Resulting from such inconsistencies of Korea’s policies toward ASEAN, the presence of South Korea in the region was observed to be declining prior to President Moon Jae In’s administration. The more frequent omissions of ASEAN from Korean regional foreign policy regardless of merely considering its position, the lesser the confidence of the ASEAN leaders or the ASEAN citizens on South Korea when it comes to new foreign policy initiatives, despite the huge success of Korea’s cultural diplomacy in the region.

Even the launch of the NSP in 2017 generated various responses and even skepticism from the Korean public as well as from the Southeast Asia region, questioning the commitment of the Korean government as the void

in the further improvement of ASEAN-Korea relations originated from the commercially-oriented, inconsistent and unpredictable approaches of the past administrations. Therefore, through committing more significant progress in executing the NSP initiative of President Moon, it will not only be advantageous for both Korea and the ASEAN in term of economics, socio-cultural aspect, and strategically development under current geopolitical uncertainties, but also can foster the values of public diplomacy of South Korea in the region, thus delivering Korea's policies more effectively and efficiently in the present era.

The NSP displays distinct features apart from the previous approaches of the Blue House to the ASEAN in taking initiatives, setting diplomatic procedures, and achieving policy connectivity. For instance, the NSP copes with security and diplomatic aspects in addition to economic and socio-cultural cooperation, where former South Korea's ASEAN policy agendas placed emphasis only on the latter ones. Furthermore, the NSP focused on construction and preservation of existing ties with the NSP partners by showing its solemnity with President Moon Jae In's state visits to India and all ASEAN members after the announcement of the policy in 2017. Highlighting the ASEAN-ROK commemorative summit and the first Mekong-ROK summit of November 2017, these events evoked the 30 years of Korea-ASEAN dialogue partnership while enthusiastically declaring to build a new wave of shared prosperity for the next 30 years.

Relating to the ASEAN, the NSP directs its functional focus towards cooperating with its ASEAN members in infrastructure building to ride the waves of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. South Korea has been striving to spur its growth in innovative industries in terms of artificial intelligence, 5G network, digital commerce, automotive technology, and bio healthcare systems, taking a leadership role in the region. On the other hand, ASEAN is eager to connect the advanced ICT technologies with its abundance of resources in manufacturing, agriculture and service sectors. Together, they both realize their complementary role on how to play their parts successfully and effectively in the era of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Thus, South Korea will gain access to the yet to be explored human capital of the ASEAN for the future industries, while the ASEAN local firms will have access to competent technologies, skills and training from South Korea.

In addition, South Korea anticipates establishing a strong and trusted partnership for peace with the ASEAN. Witnessing the prevailing superpower rivalry that deteriorates the efficacy of the regional order that so far has been beneficial to peace and prosperity in Asia, cooperation and collaboration for peace between Korea and the ASEAN will surely contribute in restoring multilateralism in Asia and help in reducing tensions and reestablishing confidence for a stable regional order. After all, ASEAN has served as a major regional organization in Southeast Asia, providing necessary platforms for a better integration and warmer understanding among Asian nations. The South Korean government needs to exert its utmost effort in strengthening the core values of ASEAN: ASEAN centrality, inclusiveness and respect for international norms and national integrity, while carrying out its strategies of the NSP. Through assisting the ASEAN community building and helping in addressing the challenges of the ASEAN, if successfully implemented, the NSP is sure to win the heart of the ‘ASEAN citizens’ and will be making another milestone as a role model in carrying out public diplomacy initiatives.

FINDING A GAP: THE INVESTMENTS OF THE ASEAN FOR THE NSP

Another reason why the successful implementation of the NSP in Southeast Asia needs to be more conceivable is that the ASEAN and Korea shared similar strategic dilemma and similar interests than in past years. The desire for South Korea to restructure and expand mutually benefited economic portfolios in ASEAN and the ASEAN member states, partly came from Seoul’s strategic need to leverage its dependency on the US-South Korea military alliance for its security, against the potential threats and provocations from North Korea and to reduce external vulnerability coming from its concentrated trade relations with China, as Beijing is the largest trading partner of Seoul. A case such as China’s informal economic retaliation over South Korea right after its deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in mid-2016, made many Koreans realize the absolute necessity to diversify economic relations with its geographically adjacent regions.

Southeast Asia is not new to such super-power competitions. As the

rivalry gets stronger, the ASEAN inevitably becomes the center of attention for the US and China since the region encompasses the countries that have the closest partnerships with both Beijing and Washington. Although China can contribute to development of the ASEAN member states, there remains a severe trust deficit in relations with China. The scaling back of global security guarantees and unpromising behaviors of the present US administration make the Southeast Asia countries more difficult to find a balance between raging and intensifying rivalry.

Now, both ASEAN and Korea are walking on a tight rope amidst the contradicting pressures as strategic competition between the US and China deepens. They both are seeking diplomatic leverage to expand their autonomous capacity in the region and a strategic dialogue and profitable cooperation with substantial mutual trust are likely to bring ASEAN and Korea to a middle ground amidst the superpower rivalry. Seldom can an individual small or middle regional power country exert a great impact on such strategic competition. In unity and collectively, those countries can yield a reliable safety or security and protect the interests of small and medium powers from any potential fallout of a super-power rivalry or conflict.

Despite global uncertainties, the ASEAN region as a whole is experiencing a significant economic development and substantial population growth in recent years – with expected GDP to reach US\$4.7 trillion by 2025. This has led to the ASEAN countries demanding more reliable infrastructure investments in order to reach the targeted goal. According to the report of the Asia Development Bank in 2017, the infrastructure needed in the ASEAN will increase from US\$2.8 trillion (baseline estimate) to US\$3.1 trillion (climate-adjusted estimate).

Indeed, the ASEAN countries have certain plans to supply the specific infrastructure developments such as the Socio-Economic Development Plan of Vietnam (US\$61.5 billion), the National Medium-Term Development Plan of Indonesia (US\$460 billion), the 'Build, Build, Build' Development Plan of Philippines (US\$71.8 billion), and the Transport Infrastructure Development Plan of Thailand (US\$76 billion). Likewise, major sources of FDI inflows in the ASEAN: the European Union (EU), Japan, the US and China are contributing to the need for large-scale infrastructure development,

covering projects including transportation and energy, oil and gas infrastructure and construction.

While the term ‘infrastructure’ has become a popular foreign economic policy term in Southeast Asia, into which sectors of ASEAN exactly should South Korea put its money in order to serve as a support for the existing large-scale projects?

The field of digital startups in Southeast Asia also seems to be promising. From the developed economies such as Singapore and Malaysia to the emerging industries such as Thailand and Myanmar, these ASEAN countries are now undoubtedly transforming to a new area of competition for technology (tech) entrepreneurs. The launch of innovative startups, tech companies and e-commerce businesses generating impressive profits, have become more frequent since the region began to focus its interest in developing the digital economy which is going to worth nearly US\$300 billion by 2025.

There are indeed joint development initiatives under the NSP, based on the different phases of economic and industrial advancement among the ASEAN countries. The high-tech industries of South Korea, particularly in the fields of AI, robotics and ICT, make it an appealing partnership for ASEAN. Korean companies can expect an upper-hand in engaging in ASEAN’s telecommunications infrastructure, as it will be perceived as a viable alternative for ASEAN at a time when its members are very much worried of getting caught up in the present technological rivalry between the US and China, especially in introducing 5G.

Korean tech giant Samsung Electronics has its largest smartphone manufacturer in Southeast Asia, which is based in Hanoi, Vietnam, since 2009, supplying many of the smartphones and accessories to global markets. LG Electronics, another Korean tech titan, produces television screens at a US\$1.5 billion factory in Haiphong, a port city of Vietnam. The city has also acted as a major manufacturing center for televisions, cell phones, washing machines, and air conditioners. Moreover, Indonesia is now gaining attention as one of the leading automobile markets in the ASEAN by automakers, with its status as the fourth highest population and annual economic growth of more than 5%. In June 2019, in partnership with taxi and ride-sharing firms, Hyundai Motor has signed an agreement with

ComfortDelGro, the largest land transport firm of Singapore, to supply 2,000 Ioniq Hybrid vehicles by 2020, expanding its eco-friendly car models in the country. Again, as for Korea's largest steelmaker, Posco has production plants in Indonesia, Vietnam, and Myanmar.¹ The Southeast Asian startups also welcome the influx of South Korean venture projects not only because of their massive capital but also for the advanced technologies and approaches they will be bringing in.

As a follow-up, a new southern business branch was launched by the state-run Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) in May 2019 with the aim to help in customizing the Korean firms that would meet the expectation of the ASEAN partners. Consultation will be provided by Korean companies facing problems in the areas of labor, trade, law, and finance in respected ASEAN countries, according to KOTRA.² Moreover, the Presidential Committee of NSP has promised to support the Korean companies in infrastructure projects in the NSP target countries to build an international innovation platform as a joint response to the Fourth Industrial Revolution under the NSP pillar of Prosperity. Therefore, adding to the existing cooperation in small cities and tech sectors, the NSP of South Korea can have comparative advantage by promoting the Prosperity pillar-oriented activities in the ASEAN and achieving technology-driven economic development.

What is interesting is that the infrastructure initiatives of Seoul will not be contradicting with massive infrastructural projects of Beijing, or with long-lasting record of infrastructure partnerships of Tokyo in the ASEAN member states. In fact, the focus and direction of the NSP in the technological sector and smart city projects will be creating more opportunities for collaboration with the existing major players, where South Korea can provide detailed technical modifications for specific countries in support of grand undertakings of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or to provide technical expertise which is included as criteria of Japan's Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (PQI). This indicates that the investments in the abovementioned sectors can offer higher potential for the

1 (Asia News Network, 2019)

2 (Herald, 2019)

NSP that could represent South Korea as a supportive comrade for China and Japan, rather than as a strategic rivalry for them.

CONCLUSION

This paper has so far argued that the New Southern Policy of the President Moon Jae In has an innovative beginning towards creating a newer, brighter and better era or future between ASEAN and South Korea. It is truly a considerate and practical policy to achieve goals that have been incompletely and inadequately carried out under the previous Korean foreign policy initiatives towards Southeast Asia. First, this study analyzed the connection between objectives of public diplomacy and strategies of the New Southern Policy in general, highlighting the quest for more potent commitment in this present attempt, by providing the policy inconsistencies of the previous administrations towards ASEAN.

Carrying substantial geopolitical potential and prospects, the establishment of the NSP certainly offers new opportunities for South Korea and the ASEAN to expand their cooperation to mitigate their vulnerabilities in their partnerships with major powers, or to dodge the complications resulting from US-China competition. So as to complement the existing major players in the ASEAN, various infrastructure initiatives of the NSP in the niche areas of Korea are vastly welcomed by the ASEAN and its members. However, there are challenges to be considered in order to win confidence for the NSP. Firstly, the ASEAN countries are looking forward to the continuation of the policy initiatives advocated strongly in the current five-year presidency and into the next administration. At present, there is an increasing optimism from both sides on ASEAN-Korea relations, as the cooperation and collaboration increase with shared benefits and converging strategic outlooks on regional community building, etc. And yet, time alone will tell. Credibility of the NSP will likely be questioned should a crisis occur on the Korea Peninsula that South Korea would become distracted and follow the same patterns of its previous policies. Thus, in order to preserve a sustained and purposeful foothold in the ASEAN's infrastructure development, both ASEAN and South Korea should remain dedicated and

constructive enough to cooperate in infrastructure projects with their inherent strategic commonalities and previous oversights at heart. After all, true care, sincerity, generosity and goodwill to the region, and real sharing of prosperity with the people are crucial for the success of any regional policy.

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A Causality Analysis of the Impact of Korean Public Diplomacy Strategies on Human Capital and National Capacity Development in Nigeria

Temitayo Shenkoya

Abstract | This research focused on determining the effects of the public diplomacy strategies of the Korean government in Nigeria and its effects on human and national capital development. Within this study, factors such as Official Development Assistance (ODA), Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Technology transfer (TT), Global Korea Scholarship, and the Technical Assistance of Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) – were considered. The Theory of Change -which is based on a causality analysis - was used to examine the information collected during this study. The methodology used was a mixed - which involved a systematic literature review as well as a quantitative analysis of secondary data. The results show that the benefits of the public diplomacy strategies of the Korean government are leading to positive changes in the development of human and national capacities in Nigeria and is bolstering the development of the economy in Nigeria. Also, it has a positive effect on the public perception of people in Nigeria towards Korea, improves bilateral relations between Korea and Nigeria, and has a positive effect on trade, relations between Korea and Nigeria. In-line with this, recommendations on how to - improve the diplomatic efforts of the Korean government, tailor its approach / strategies to improve efficiency, and on how to improve foreign diplomacy in Nigeria - were identified.

Keywords | Public diplomacy, Official Development Assistance, Foreign Direct Investment, Technology Transfer, Bilateral relations

국문초록 | 이 연구는 한국 정부가 나이지리아에서 펼치는 공공 외교 전략의 효과와 이것이 인적 자원과 국가 자원의 개발에 갖는 효과를 판단하는 데 초점을 맞춘다. 이 연구에서는 공적개발원조(Official Development Assistance, ODA),

해외직접투자(Foreign Direct Investment, FDI), 기술 이전(Technology Transfer, TT), 글로벌 코리아 장학금(Global Korea Scholarship), 한국국제협력단(Korea International Cooperation Agency, KOICA)의 기술 지원과 같은 요소들이 고려되었다. 연구 중 수집된 정보를 조사하기 위해 인과관계 분석을 기반으로 한 변화 이론(Theory of Change)이 사용되었다. 이 연구의 결과는 한국 정부의 공공 외교 전략의 혜택이 나이지리아의 인적 자원과 국가 자원 개발에 긍정적인 변화를 이끌어내고 있으며 나이지리아의 경제 발전을 촉진시키고 있음을 보여준다. 이는 또한 한국에 대한 나이지리아 사람들의 대중 인식에 긍정적인 효과가 있고, 한국과 나이지리아의 양자 관계를 향상시키며, 양국 간 무역에 긍정적인 영향을 준다. 이와 같은 맥락에서 어떻게 한국 정부의 외교 노력을 개선시키고, 효율성을 높이기 위해 접근법과 전략을 조정하며, 나이지리아에서의 외교를 개선시킬 수 있을지 제안한다.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the influence of Korea has been on the increase in Africa (most especially in Nigeria). This is largely because of the need for the Korean government to expand trade, development, investment, and research cooperation with their African counterparts. On the other hand, the Korean government is currently using its foreign aid to increase its soft power in Africa (Hwang, 2014). This is because, these efforts improve favorable public perspective towards Korea and strengthens the ability of the Korean government to influence policies in Africa. This influence is often referred to as Soft power. According to Lee (2009), soft power entails the use of soft resources to influence others. Soft power has been used by various countries to influence other countries to support their cause, most notable in war time situations (Nye, 2008). A tool for propagating soft power is the use of public diplomacy. Public diplomacy is the effort of a foreign government to influence the perception of an international audience towards achieving a certain objective (Pamment, 2018).

But why has the Korean government adopted the use of public diplomacy in Nigeria? The importance of Nigeria in Africa based on the availability of economic opportunities and a large consumer base, makes it a target of world powers seeking to increase their influence in Africa. Several countries have been competing to gain supremacy of influencing policies in

Africa – using public diplomacy; these include – China, India, US, and Korea (Wu & Yang, 2017; Taylor, 2015; Ochieng & Kim, 2020; Lomer, 2017). A key benefit of public diplomacy is the strengthening of relationships between countries for bilateral partnerships. According to Sevin (2017), the impact of public diplomacy can be divided into 3 - namely, public opinion, relationship dynamics, and public debates. Public Diplomacy influences public opinion – for instance, the Turkish government is using its narrative on the Syrian refugee crisis to shape international perspective of Turkey as a country with high standards in protecting human rights (Akşak, 2019). On the other hand, a study of the development of a hydropower station in Myanmar, shows that the use of public diplomacy was effective in improving foreign relations between China and Myanmar (Mogensen, 2017). While public diplomacy improves foreign relations, it also affects and influences public debates and is essential to the content of news, in-addition to developments in the public sphere (Helmers, 2016).

Traditionally the relationship between Korea and Nigeria has been fluid, but in recent time, the increase in the presence of the activities of the Korean government in Nigeria is changing the status quo. The presence of the Korean government and investors is evidence in the collaboration on the development of the first government innovation cluster in Nigeria and the activities of the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) in Nigeria (Shenkoya & Kim, 2018). While there are various factors used in public diplomacy, in this study, the following factors were examined in the study of the influence of Korean public diplomacy strategies on the human capital and national capacity development in Nigeria. These include – the use of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Official Development Assistance, Technology Transfer, Global Korea Scholarship, and the Technical Assistance provided by KOICA. The methodology that was used to achieve this was the use of a systematic literature review, as well as the quantitative analysis of secondary data. This study presents itself as the first study to examine the impact of Korean diplomacy in Nigeria. Also, the theoretical framework developed and adopted herein is also been used for the first time to examine the subject matter. In line with this, this research seeks to provide answers to the following questions:

R₁: What are the benefits of the public diplomacy strategies of the Korean government on the development of human and national capacity in Nigeria?

R₂: How has the efforts of the Korean government affected public perception of Korea in Nigeria?

R₃: What is the Korean government currently doing right and what needs to be done to improve the efforts of the Korean government's diplomacy in Nigeria?

R₄: What are the immediate benefits as well as the long-term benefits for the Korean government?

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In this research, the Theory of Change (which is based on causality analysis using the results chain framework) will be used to examine the effects of Korean public diplomacy in Nigeria. According to Organizational Research Services (2004), the Theory of Change (TOC) identifies the methodology that will be used to create a certain change. In this study, the change that will be examined is the human capital and national capacity development, as a result of the Korean government's diplomacy in Nigeria. On the other hand, the results chain is a logical flow of how strategies align to deliver results. According to Ferretti (2003), results chains are frameworks that show how policies are turned into specific results. This framework is a decentralized network of steps that shows how inputs, and activities deliver results (output, outcomes, and impacts) of an intervention. This was done while considering each step using a causality relationship in a logical flow of events. According to MacKenzie (2013), a causality relationship is also known as a cause and effect relationship. In these relationships, the results at each level are as a direct result of activities that takes place in the lower level. As such, in this study, the strategies used by the Korean government in its public diplomacy strategies in Nigeria will be examined using the TOC (See Figure 1- for more details).

The five levels in the results chain that will be considered are the 'Input,' 'Activities,' 'Output,' 'Outcomes' and 'Impact' stages. In the 'Input' stage, the inputs used by the Korean government will be considered. Herein, it is assumed that the inputs of the Korean government's diplomacy in Nigeria




Figure 1. Theoretical foundation

can be classified into financial, and technical Aids intervention and they influence the second stage. This means because of the inputs mentioned, the next stage - which is the 'Activity' stage is established. In this study, activities will be classified into 2 - namely, Branding diplomacy, and Cultural diplomacy. Branding diplomacy focuses on creating a national brand (for a country) in another country - to improve its perception, while cultural diplomacy develops a broad understanding of cultural practices (of a country) through the use of cultural tools that projects its national culture (Dubinsky, 2019; Hurn, 2016).

A summation of the effects of these two forms of diplomacy, leads to the next level – the 'Output' level. In this level, the Korean government uses policy tools such as Official Development Assistance (ODA), Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Technology transfer (TT), Global Korea Scholarship, and the Technical Assistance provided by KOICA. The results

from this level gives rise to the next level - which is the 'Outcome' level. In this level, it is believed that the results from the 'Output' level will lead to an improvement in human capital and national capacity development in Nigeria. Finally, the added value of the 'Outcome' level is responsible for the 'Impact' level. This means, as the human capacity and national capacity of a country improves, multilateral cooperation is strengthened between Korea and Nigeria. This study presents itself as one of the earliest studies to use the TOC in studies relating to foreign / public diplomacy. Hence, within this study the results chain concept as described above.

METHODOLOGY

The methodology adopted in this study is a mixed method - which comprises of a systematic literature review and a statistical analysis of secondary data relating to the subject matter. The factors that will be examined include - Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Official Development Assistance, Technical Assistance, Technology Transfer, Global Korea Scholarship, and the Technical assistance provided by KOICA. The reason for the choice of these variables relate to the public diplomacy strategies of the Korean government in Nigeria. In this study – based on the theoretical model examined herein - the following assumptions will be made:

H₁: The Official Development Assistant of the Korean government has a positive influence on the development of human capacity and national capacity in Nigeria.

H₂: The Foreign Direct Investment of the Korean government has a positive influence on the development of human capacity and national capacity in Nigeria.

H₃: The Technical Aid of KOICA has a positive influence on the development of human capacity and national capacity in Nigeria.

H₄: The transfer of technology by the Korean government has a positive influence on the development of human capacity and national capacity in Nigeria.

H₅: The implementation of the Global Korea Scholarship of the

Korean government has a positive influence on the development of human capacity and national capacity in Nigeria.

It is important to that research in this field in Nigeria is still in its infancy, hence there is a paucity of literature on the subject matter. To ensure that this did not have a negative result on the results obtained herein, a mixed methodology was adopted.

ANALYTICAL RESULTS

DETERMINING THE IMPACT OF ODA IN NIGERIA

The analysis in this study will be divided into 4 sections - based on the hypothesis made in this research. In the first section, the first hypothesis will be examined. According to OECD (2020), Official Development Assistance (ODA) is an economic tool used to enhance economic development of developing / under-developed countries; these include - aids, soft loans and provision of technical assistance. It is important to note that while some developed countries deliver ODAs by themselves, other deliver them through multi-lateral development agencies like the United Nations or the World Bank. In this research, special consideration is given to ODA aid delivered directly through the Korean government to the Nigerian government. While the United Nations (UN) has a target that seeks to see that developed countries give 0.7% of their Gross National Income (GNI) to ODA (OECD, 2020), the ODA profile of Korea shows that Korea's contribution to ODA support is lower and the top 10 recipients are Iraq, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Indonesia, China, Vietnam, Yemen, Cambodia, Kenya, and Laos (OECD, 2008).

However, Sungil (2015) deduced from his research that key priority recipients of ODA from Korea to Africa - are Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Uganda. In-line with this, the aim of this examination is to determine the relationship between ODA and human capital and national capacity development. The results of a systematic literature review carried out is presented in Table 1. The results show that while the Korean government

Table 1. Evaluation of the effects of Korean ODA in Nigeria

Author	Year	Journal	Research scope	Main findings
Lumsdaine & Schopf	2007	The Pacific Review	How efficient is the Korean government's ODA?	This study shows that while the Korean government's ODA is increasing, it is little compared to that of other developed countries. Hence, the impact of the ODA (relating to public diplomacy and poverty alleviation) is less
Yoon & Moon	2014	Journal of East Asian Studies	The impact of Korean ODA in Africa	The results of the study show that the Korean government's ODA initiative has been essential in the improvement of the welfare in Nigeria and in ensuring that public perception of Korean remains positive. The study further shows that the ODA of the Korean government to Africa from 2003 to 2011 has been increasing
Darracq & Neville	2014	Chatham House	The influence of South Korea in Sub-Saharan Africa	The purpose of the Korean government's ODA can be classified into 3, namely - to improve food and energy security, establish new markets, and counter the influence of North Korea, while strengthening public diplomacy in Sub-Saharan countries
Park	2014	Journal of East Asian Affairs	Understanding the ODA strategies of the Korean government in Africa	The use of ODA by the Korean government is to ensure the development of Nigeria and to foster the economic development of Korea in Africa
Chung	2016	Asian Education and Development Studies	Determining the strategy of the Korean government's ODA	The strategy of the Korean government's ODA is the use of education as a tool for development
Kim	2017	African and Asian Studies	Understanding South Korea's Aid to Africa	The ODA support of Korea is focused on alleviating poverty in Africa while improving public diplomacy


Table 1. Evaluation of the effects of Korean ODA in Nigeria (continued)

Author	Year	Journal	Research scope	Main findings
Hwang et al.	2018	Sustainability	How efficient is the Korean government's ODA?	This study shows that while the Korean government's ODA is increasing, it is little compared to that of other developed countries. Hence, the impact of the ODA (relating to public diplomacy and poverty alleviation) is less.
Jung et al.	2018	Pacific Focus	A study of the impact of ODA on foreign cooperation	The main aim of the Korean government in giving ODAs to developing / underdeveloped countries is to strengthen international cooperation
YoungSoog	2018	The Association of North-east Asian Cultures	An examination of the Korean government's Multimedia-based Education Program for Nigerian Primary and Secondary School Teachers	This project is improving the use of ICT and electronic media in Nigeria and it is envisaged that the long-term impact will be the development of the most robust electronic facility in Africa.
Kim	2020	Journal of Convergence for Information Technology	An examination of the Korean e-Government ODA Project in Nigeria	The ODA support from the Korean government has a positive impact in the development of governance in Nigeria. However, more needs to be done to improve the speed of development / change.

has been increasing its ODA to Nigeria, the main strategy of the Korean government is to alleviate poverty in the country. This Korean government does through the use of projects in Nigeria. These projects seek to foster development within various sectors and strengthening the education sector in Nigeria.

Investigation on the effects of Foreign Direct Invest in Nigeria

According to OECD (2020), Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is a class of overseas investment in an economy which seeks to establish a long-term interest in securing a degree of authority over the economy in the




Source: OECD (2020)

Figure 2. Korean Foreign Direct Investment in Africa

benefitting country. Based on this definition, it is clear that - one of the key reasons why countries give FDI is for public diplomacy. However, there are 2 types of FDIs: namely inflow and outflow. FDI inflow represents the value of investment coming in from a transcontinental source - which consists of company loans, capital, and investments, while FDI outflow is the value of investment going out from a foreign source - which consists of company loans, capital, and investments (UN, 2017). In this study, only the FDI outflow from Korea to Nigeria will be considered. This is because the focus of this study is to examine the effect of Korean FDI in Nigeria. An examination of data collected from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2020) - shows that the Korean government's FDI in Nigeria has varied over the years (See Figure 2 - for more details). While there was a sharp decline from 2006 to 2009, 2010 to 2012 showed a steady rise. According to Ugochukwu et al. (2013), FDI plays a very important part in the development of Nigeria and is a source of resources for development. As such, the profile of countries with high outflows of FDIs to Nigeria is relatively held high in the public. In essence, FDI is a useful tool for public policy and development in Nigeria.

While Nigeria receives FDI from different countries, countries in Europe and the United Kingdom offer more compared to other continents, including - Asia (See Figure 3- for more information). As a result, European countries



Source: UNCTAD/DITE/WID

Figure 3. FDI flows abroad, by geographical destination, 1990-1998 (Millions of Naira)

and countries within the United Kingdom have more influence on policies in Nigeria and a better relationship with the country. This is evident in the fact that Nigeria already has bilateral treaties to promote investment, and treaties to avoid double taxation with France, and the United Kingdom while other countries have one or none of the treaties (UNCTAD/DITE/WID, 2020). Korea, particularly, only has a treaty to avoid double taxation in Nigeria but is yet to sign a treaty that promotes investment between the 2 countries. This represents a fundamental challenge to the quest of Korea to increase its public and foreign diplomacy in Nigeria. Based on the review of literatures carried out, no correlation was established between the FDI of the Korean government to Nigeria and human capital and national capacity development.

Analysis of the activities of KOICA in Nigeria

Studies that focus on examining the activities of KOICA in Nigeria are few, hence there is a paucity of resources relating to the subject. However, in this research, most of the available information regarding the subject was examined. According to the International Disability Alliance (2020), KOICA was established by the Korean government in April 1991 and is

Table 2. An examination of the activities of KOICA in Nigeria

Author	Year	Journal	Research scope	Main findings
Ojo et al.	2007	UNU-IIST Technical Report 371	Examining South-South cooperation in the development of software technology	The efforts of the Korean government to improve South - South and triangular cooperation in Nigeria - is delivered by KOICA - through the development / implementation of the master plan of the Nigerian government, capacity development, e-Learning, computerization of government offices, and Software Technology / human resource development
Tsafe	2013	Scientific Journal of Pure and Applied Sciences	An analysis of universal basic education in Nigeria	KOICA has been involved in the development of the education sector in Nigeria, particularly in the development of classrooms in Kogi, Katsina, Gombe and Adamawa States
Jonathan et al.	2014	Asia-Pacific World Congress on Computer Science and Engineering	Examining bilateral relations between Korea and Nigeria	The Nigeria government engaged the services of KOICA in enhancing e-governance in Nigeria. The results of these partnerships show that the Nigerian government is learned through the Korean experience
Abdullahi	2015	African Journal of Political Science and International Relations	The efforts of the Korean government to promote credible elections in Nigeria	The Korean government has been contributing to Democratic Governance for Development (DGD) project through KOICA and so far, it has contributed \$230,000 from 2012 -2015
Park et al.	2015	International Journal of Educational Development	A study on the approach of the Korean government in delivering education projects	The Korean government through KOICA is implementing various programs in education focused on children-centered integrated community development approach
Magatakarda and Ibrahim	2017	Journal of Arts & Science	Understanding the role of KOICA in the development of Technical Vocational Education and Training in Nigeria (TVET)	The role of KOICA in the development of TVET in Nigeria has been critical to the successes recorded within the education sector in Nigeria

saddled with the responsibility of maximizing Korean grants to foreign countries. The commitments of KOICA include to - eliminate stigma and discrimination, improve inclusive education, provide viable routes to economic empowerment, harnessing technology and innovation, ensure data disaggregation, and empowering women and girls with disabilities - in conflict and humanitarian contexts (International Disability Alliance, 2020). However, in this study, only the activities of KOICA relating to inclusive education will be considered because the scope of this study is to investigate the effects of the activities of KOICA on capacity building. In this study, all available documents and research paper were reviewed, and the results presented in the Table 2. The results from the evaluation shows that the activities of KOICA in Nigeria has been to actively support the development of the education sector in Nigeria – through funding and various projects that seek to develop the education infrastructure all over Nigeria.

On the other hand, an analysis of the investment of the Korean government through KOICA show no steady trend. In Figure 4, it can be seen that the highest investment was recorded in 2017 but declined in 2018. However, the most important fact from the review of literatures shows that the Korean government has presence in Nigeria and is actively supporting human capital and national capacity development in the country.

Transfer of technology from Korea to Nigeria. In this section, two projects (on-going projects) that involve technology transfer from Korea to Nigeria - will be considered. This is because these are the only known cases of technology transfer between the Korean and Nigerian government. EU (2020) – defines Technology Transfer (TT) as a way of transferring scientific and technological research - along with associated skills / procedures - to a specific market or society. This transition may be carried out on a bilateral level, national level or amongst the components of the national innovation system. The stages involved in a technology transfer can be classified as – discovery, disclosure, evaluation, intellectual property protection, marketing, licensing, project development, and public use / financial returns (EU, 2020). In this study, however, technology transfer through project development was considered. Previous studies have shown a correlation between Technology Transfer and public diplomacy in various countries. For instance, Cho & Shenkoya (2019) - in their research on the factors that




Figure 4. Trend in KOICA's investment in Nigeria

influence technology transfer between transferor and transferee – concluded that public perception - in each country involved in a technology transfer - determines the choice of partner in a partnership or collaboration.

The first project that will be considered involves a partnership between the African Development Bank and the Busan Metropolitan City and the Busan Techno Park - to enhance Technology transfer in Africa. One of the strategies adopted by this project is the use of Korean government's funding - for the development of Innovation Clusters in Africa. Even though, many instances of the development of innovation clusters exist in Nigeria, none has been completed. A notable example of a project that is benefitting (directly or indirectly) from this partnership is the Abuja Technology Village Science Park. According to Shenkoya & Kim (2018). This project is still receiving ongoing technical and financial support from the Korean government, and the Korean government - through the Ministry of Science and ICT is partnering on the project and has successfully developed the Master plan for the science park (Shenkoya & Kim, 2019). On the other hand, the Korean government is involved in the development of the ICT infrastructure in the Science Park (Shenkoya & Kim, 2018). This partnership strengthens bilateral trade and development. This is because the ICT infrastructure as well as some of the technical skills required for the project are from Korea.

The second project to be considered herein - involves a two-year Masters' degree program in Information Technology. This program provides an


integrated course focused on the IT technologies and Korean business strategies (Financial Nigeria, 2019). While Nigerians are benefitting from the project, the statistic on the number of beneficiaries is not available, at the time of completing this study. However, the President of the African Development Bank (Akinwumi Adesina) noted that - this partnership will improve technology transfer from Korea to Africa, as well as improve capacity development in Africa (Financial Nigeria, 2019). The underlining aim of these partnerships is to strengthen the Korean government's public diplomacy in Nigeria while improving the capacity of the people.

Global Korea Scholarship and benefits to Nigeria. The Global Korea Scholarship is a program of the Korean government that seeks to improve the capacity building of students all around the world, in Bachelors, Masters, Doctoral and Post Doc levels. This program, which is fully funded, provides students most especially from developing countries, with quality education. In 2020, the scholarship granted 1,276 international students from 153 countries (OFA, 2020). Since the start of the program in 1967, many Nigerians have benefitted from the program. This program has gone through many changes, the most recent is the integration of various related scholarship programs of the Korean government into the Global Korea Scholarship in 2009 (Bader, 2017). Since 2010, over 11 graduates and about 4 undergraduate students benefit from the program yearly – in Nigeria. These students, at the end of the program, return to Nigeria and create positive change – by using the knowledge they gained from Korea. On the other hand, during this program, Nigeria students are exposed to Korean culture as well as lifestyle. This exposure creates a favorable perception of Korea - that will be useful in the future in public and foreign diplomacy. This is because, according to Abimbola et al. (2015), Australia uses education scholarships to strengthen its foreign diplomacy in Africa. In-line with this, China is also using its education aid to strengthen relations in Africa (Tingting, 2014). On the other hand, some of the successful Nigerian graduates from the Global Korea Scholarship Program - are full time lectures at various institutions in Nigeria, while others are gainfully employed in the public or private sector (Shenkoya & Kim, 2018). A decent amount was able to start their own enterprise. The exact statistics relating to this is not available at this time, but in future this limitation will be resolved. The

results from this analysis shows that indeed the activities of KOICA in Nigeria strengthen human and national capacity development.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This study started off by examining the impact of the Korean government's public diplomacy strategies on the development of human and national capacity in Nigeria. In-order to achieve this, a theoretical approach that focuses on causality analysis of various strategies (using the results chain) was used. Based on this theoretical model, 5 hypotheses were made and studied. The first hypothesis (H_1) assumed that the ODA of the Korean government to Nigeria has a positive impact on the development of human capital and national capacity in Nigeria. In-line with the systematic review of literature and the analysis of secondary data carried out, the results show that this hypothesis is indeed true. This is because the strategy of the Korean government in delivering its ODA in Nigeria focused on strengthening the education system in the country and building the state of the art infrastructure to enhance innovation – which will drive economic growth in the long run. According to Dahlman & Nelson (1995), the development of educational system leads to progress in the social absorption in the National Innovation System (NIS) of a country - which will improve economic development. A NIS is a framework of key players within an economic system that enhance innovation through sharing - information, and resources (human, capital and financial) through a partnership. This partnership leads to developments within the economy. As, human resources represents a key component of the NIS, enhancing the capacity of these components has a direct influence on strengthening the system. Hence, the contribution of the Korean government, creates positive change in Nigeria. However, it is important to note that the results obtained in this study shows that the ODA of the Korean government is little compared to its competitor like China in the region. As such, China enjoys better policy influence in Nigeria, compared to Korea, and has more trade partnerships. China's strategic partnership (most especially in trade) in Africa has been on the rise over the years (Regissahui, 2019). On the other hand, an examination of the trade export from Korea to



Source: IMF (2020)

Figure 5. Volume of Export from Korea to Nigeria

Nigeria from 2006 to 2018 shows that the trend has been fluctuating and has been reducing since 2017 (See Figure 5 - for more information).

In-order for Korea to increase its public diplomacy in Nigeria, it is important that the Korean government continues to implement its strategy to focus its ODA on education, but must also seek to increase its presence and commitment to Nigeria – through improved funding. Another approach to improve the impact of ODAs will be to diversify its use. A notable way of doing this is to use ODA to develop social media and other mediums of communications - to advocate the interest of Korea in the country. In a study on the use of social media in public diplomacy in Turkey, Zaharna & Uysal (2006) concluded that social media is an effective way of building strong partnerships, managing relationships, and public diplomacy. However, this may present a problem for the Korean government unless it is willing to overcome the language barrier between the country. China has been able to overcome this using bi-directional language cooperation in Africa (Kathina et al., 2018).

Even though the UN recommends that developed countries should have an ODA bench mark (to developing countries) of 0.7% of their Gross National Income (GNI), the share of the gross national income of Korea that is dedicated to ODA is still less than 0.2% (OECD, 2008). As such, the Korean government's contribution to ODA must change to improve its

efforts of public diplomacy all over the world and in Nigeria as well. According to (OECD, 2018) - after a review carried out on the ODA of Korea in foreign countries - the following recommendations were made to improve the impacts of the Korean governments ODA;

- I. The Committee for International Development Cooperation (CIDC) should be reformed through imbibing the concept of strategic planning and programming - in its delivery of ODA.
- II. All agencies involved in delivering Korean ODAs must use - a result-based management system, better risk management, improved project finance, and must learn from experience - to improve the delivery of results.
- III. The Korean government should set out a timeframe and targets for allocating 0.3% of its national income as ODA by 2030.
- IV. Korean embassies and country offices must be active participants in supporting the government's ODA interventions.
- V. The process of selecting projects for ODA intervention must be robust and inclusive (both partnering countries and benefitting countries should be involved).

The second hypothesis (H_2) considered herein – assumes that the FDI (outflow) of the Korean government to Nigeria has a positive impact on the development of human and national capacities. The results herein show that while records of FDI from Korea to Nigeria exist, in recent times it continues to reduce compared to other countries. On the other hand, there exists no link between the FDI of the Korean government on the development of human capacity in Nigeria. However, the results show that the Korean government's FDI has been useful in building public infrastructure. This result does not support the assumption that FDI is used by the Korean government in its public diplomacy efforts in Nigeria rather it shows that the Korean government uses its FDI to alleviate poverty in Nigeria. In-relation to this, there are many evidences to prove that FDI are effective tools for economic development (Buzdugan & Tuselmann, 2018, Abdouli & Hammami, 2020). However, the approach of the Korean government's FDI support in Nigeria is not effective as previously discussed. In-order to

improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Korean governments FDI, the FDI to Nigeria should improve. According to Abekah & Nwaba (2018), the Chinese government's approach to FDI in Africa is to ensure a steady outflow to Africa – which is responsible for the influence of China in Africa. According to Marchick & Slaughter (2008), for FDI to be effective, they must meet 4 criteria which include:

- I. FDI should be focused on enhancing national security in the recipient country,
- II. FDI should be regular and time bound, and the review process of the effects of FDI must be confidential with no information sent to beneficiaries, and
- III. FDI should be based on tackling a certain issue rather than having a sectoral focus.

The third hypothesis (H_3) considered in this study sort to determine if the activities of KOICA in Nigeria had a positive effect on human capital and national capacity development. The results obtained herein show that the activities of KOICA indeed has a positive effect on building human and national capacities in Nigeria. This is because most of the activities of KOICA in Nigeria focused on technical capacity building. Most especially, KOICA carries out its duties through the implementation of education projects focused on helping the Nigeria government develop education systems in the country and human capacity in Nigeria. Also, the impact of KOICA in developing human capital of Nigerians can be seen in the increase in the number of students going to study in Korea. According to ICEF (2018), the number of international students from Africa in Korea is on the rise and most of these students are from Nigeria. However, it is important to note that they are many prevailing problems in Nigeria – such as, hunger, poverty, lack of potable water, poor health care and education, insecurity, climate change and sanitation issues, and other issues (Idemudia, 2016; Ogbuabor & Onwujekwe, 2019). Some of the most severe and pressing issues are hunger, lack of potable water, insecurity, and health care. In-line with this, the activities of KOICA need to include other sectors and should be based on the criticality of the problems in the sector. It is recom-

mended that the Korean government adopt a similar model used by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Nigeria. The USAID just like KOICA engages in activities to develop the education system in Nigeria but is also actively managing interventions focused on climate change, gender, and nutrition (Thomas et al., 2017; Wunti, 2014). Other ways KOICA can improve its activities and impact in Nigeria; include – developing and implementing Active Labor Market Programs (ALMP), designing and implementing career guidance programs, and engaging in informal sector training (Sangbaek, 2014).

The fourth hypothesis (H_4) examined - focused on whether the transfer of technology from Korea to Nigeria had an impact on developing human and national capacity. The results obtained in this study shows that indeed the transfer of technology from Korea to Nigeria was building human and national capacity – through foreign exchange of experts, trainings, and the movement of technologies - to Nigeria from Korea. The Korean government is actively involved in the development of ICT infrastructures in Nigeria and is actively trying to improve the use of updated e-platforms in governance in Nigeria. However, the use of technology transfer by the Korean government in Nigeria is limited and in most cases in its infancy. Nevertheless, if the impact of the activities of the Korean government must increase, it is important that the Korean government seeks to take an active role rather than a passive role.

A notable hindrance in Technology Transfer between Korea and Nigeria, is the cost of Korean technology compared to their Chinese counterpart. According to Byung-Wook (2020), Chinese technologies are cheaper compared to their Korean counterpart thereby negating the market share of Korean technology globally. This is evident in the fact that China is in the top 10 trading partners of Nigeria in terms of export, while Korea is not (Workman, 2020). According to Lee & Kim (2013), the following measures will help the Korean government improve its technology transfer efforts; these include-

- I. The Korean governments R&D efforts should be transformed into R&BD (a more focused research based on the needs presented within global economies).

- II. The organizations and agencies responsible for technology transfer must be independent.
- III. Within the university systems, sections which aims are to attract investment must be established.
- IV. The laws, regulation, and policies relating to TT must be revised, improved, and reformed.
- V. Monitoring and databases of TT should be updated.

The final hypothesis (H_5) considered, sort to check the impact of the Global Korea Scholarship Program on human and national capacity development. The results show that this program has contributed to the development of Nigerians. This is because the program allows students from poor and disadvantaged families to have access to world class education for free. This would have been impossible for them without the generous support of the Korean government. Furthermore, the process of selection is highly competitive and promotes hard work and excellence. The results show that most of the graduates from the scholarship, return to Nigeria to contribute their quota using the knowledge gained. This in turn leads to economic growth. However, the Global Korea Scholarship needs to overcome certain problems. Some of these problems; include – growing cultural issues faced by beneficiaries, student exchange issues, and stress faced by students during the program (Badar, 2016). These problems need to be addressed to improve and attract more students - internationally.

Conclusively, this research has been able to answer the 4 key questions in which it seeks to provide answers to. Firstly, the benefits of the public diplomacy strategies of the Korean government is leading to positive changes in the development of human and national capacities to drive economic development in Nigeria. Secondly, the public diplomacy efforts of the Korean govern is yielding positive effects in the public perception in Nigeria and strengthens the bilateral relations between Korea and Nigeria. Thirdly, the Korean government needs to increase its ODA in Nigeria, diversify its approach to FDI, subsidize the cost of Korean technology to Nigeria and continue its scholarship program. Fourthly, the long term benefits of the public diplomacy of the Korean government can be seen in increased trade, public perception and partnership between the 2 governments. Conversely,

like every study, this research has its limitations. A notable limitation of this study is the paucity of research and the effects of limited data collection of public data in Nigeria. However, this does not affect the results of this study because a mixed method (a systematic literature review and an evaluation of secondary data) was used. Future studies will need to overcome this issue by including a survey.

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Humanitarian Aid and Public Diplomacy: How Helping Developing Countries Combat COVID-19 is a Win-Win for South Korea and the World

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Abstract | The COVID-19 pandemic has been particularly difficult for developing countries which have seen their healthcare infrastructure overwhelmed and vital aid and assistance programs disrupted. South Korea, one of the first countries to be affected by the outbreak, has successfully avoided many of the harsh containment measures implemented elsewhere thanks to an organized and innovative response which allowed it to return to a tentative sense of normalcy. This paper argues that South Korea's successes in dealing with COVID-19, coupled with its status as a nexus of international development, present an opportunity for a win-win scenario for Korean public diplomacy through the implementation of aid programs designed to combat COVID-19 and the societal issues it creates in developing countries. In addition to reviewing the applicability of existing Korean aid programs, such as those conducted by KOICA, KOFIH, and others, for combating COVID-19, this paper concludes with policy recommendations which serve to work in alleviating the challenges the developing world faces during the pandemic, namely: procuring medical supplies, food insecurity, and promoting health literacy.

국문초록 | 코로나19는 의료서비스 기반시설이 압도되고 필수적인 지원과 원조 프로그램이 저해된 개발도상국에게 특히나 어려웠다. 전염병 발발에 가장 처음으로 영향을 받은 나라 중 하나인 대한민국은 체계적이고 혁신적인 대응 덕분에 다른 곳에서 시행된 가혹한 봉쇄 조치를 성공적으로 피했고 잠정적인 정상감을 찾을 수 있었다. 이 논문은 국제 개발의 연결점이라는 지위와 더불어 대한민국의 성공적인 코로나19 대처가 한국의 공공 외교에 윈-윈 시나리오의 기회를 제시하며, 이는 개발 도상국에서 코로나19와 그와 관련된 다른 사회적 문제에 맞서 싸우기 위해 고안된 원조 프로그램의 시행을 통해 가능하다고 주장한다. 이 논문

은 한국국제협력단(KOICA), 한국국제보건의료단(KOFIH) 등 현존하는 한국의 원조 프로그램이 코로나19와의 싸움에 적용 가능한지 검토하고, 이 전염병이 도는 동안 의료 물자 수급, 식량 불안정, 보건 지식 교육 등 개발도상국이 마주하는 어려움을 완화시키는 데 도움이 될 수 있는 정책 조언으로 마무리한다.

INTRODUCTION

South Korea was one of the first countries to be affected by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, and due to organized and innovative containment measures was among the first to control the spread of the virus within its borders, thereby avoiding many of the more harsh quarantine protocols seen elsewhere around the world (You, 2020). While South Korea has returned to a tentative sense of normalcy, COVID-19 remains a serious crisis globally and has disrupted the normal workings of the World-system in ways not seen since the Second World War. Looking for similar successes in their own countries, many are now turning to the South Korean model of testing, tracing, and containment in an effort to fight the pandemic. (Cunningham, 2020; Maresca, 2020; Hendrie, 2020).

Discrepancies between the capabilities of the developed and developing world to cope with a major health crisis have been highlighted since the pandemic began to spread outside of its epicenter in East Asia during the first quarter of 2020. The healthcare and aid infrastructure in the latter was quickly overwhelmed by the virus; containment measures to slow the spread of COVID-19 in the developing world have had limited impact outside of draconian lock-downs which have been found to be only marginally successful, and in some cases, have been shown to have serious unintended consequences such as increases in rates of starvation and increased likelihood of physical and sexual abuse in vulnerable populations (Dettmer, 2020). The pandemic has also had serious economic repercussions for the developing world whose populations often work in informal occupations with no social safety net, compounding aforementioned problems along with a host of other issues which self-perpetuate once the fragile balance of society is disrupted (Letzing, 2020).

South Korea has become an international development nexus due to its

history as a recipient of aid and its present status as an international coordinator of development and assistance (Baker, 2017). Focusing on medical assistance, humanitarian aid, and development assistance, this paper will argue that South Korea's domestic containment policy successes during the pandemic and renowned medical expertise, in tandem with its network of aid organizations, gives it a unique opportunity to help the developing world combat COVID-19 through a combination of existing programs and new initiatives. This also presents an opportunity for South Korea's public diplomacy, wherein the positive image projected by this aid during an international crisis will reinforce the relationships South Korea has forged with the developing world and raise the international prestige of South Korea as a partner of those in need. This win-win scenario will help stem the tide of COVID-19 across the globe as well as promote the South Korean model for international cooperation during the pandemic (Morin-Gelinas, 2016).

This paper will first briefly outline South Korea's pre-pandemic humanitarian and medical aid to the developing world. Following this are sections on the unique problems the developing world faces during the pandemic and ways in which existing South Korean aid programs and aid infrastructure can be used to help alleviate the impact of many of these issues. This is followed by a look into how South Korea's humanitarian and medical aid to developing nations during the COVID-19 pandemic serves as a successful policy for public diplomacy and as well as examines its secondary benefits. Finally, a conclusion will close the paper with policy recommendations.

SOUTH KOREAN MEDICAL AND HUMANITARIAN AID TO THE DEVELOPING WORLD

South Korea holds a unique position in the history of modern global development, having advanced from acute underdevelopment and poverty after the Korean War to becoming one of the most powerful and developed economies in the world within a matter of decades. It was able to achieve this astounding turn-around through receiving international assistance

totaling \$12 billion USD over a number of decades from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), a forum within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and has now become one of the largest donors of Official Development Assistance (ODA), helping others in similar positions it was in itself less than a lifetime ago (WHO, Republic of Korea-Who Country Cooperation Strategy 2019-2023, 2019).

The resources, training, and other medical aid that South Korea received during its years as an ODA recipient were key factors in developing the world class healthcare infrastructure Korean citizens enjoy today. According to the South Korean Ministry of Health and Welfare, this experience is at the core of their philanthropic assistance goals of helping developing partner countries “in the hope of elevating the overall wellness of world citizens” (MOHW, 2020). This assistance takes form in multiple programs with participants and recipients in dozens of countries around the world, with the majority being located in Asia and Africa (Kim, Ha, & Kwon, 2015). The humanitarian aid to South Korea during its time as an ODA recipient helped bring the country out of endemic poverty through donations of food, equipment, and expert advisement. Now, as a donor, South Korea now sends similarly needed resources to developing countries alongside its unique experiences of transitioning across the spectrum of development. Of the many aid organizations originating in South Korea, two in particular stand out for their impact in the developing world, the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) and the Korea Foundation for International Healthcare (KOFIH).

KOICA has been a cornerstone of South Korea's international development assistance since its foundation in 1991 and works in partnership with many ODA projects and strategies. KOICA's health program has three strategic health objectives: enhancing water/sanitation access and access to comprehensive nutritional services; ensuring access to essential health services such as reproductive, maternal, child, and adolescent; and preventing diseases and ensuring treatment. Focusing on the subject matter of this paper, KOICA's programs regarding disease prevention and treatment have centered on performing vital services such as diagnostics, strengthening national laboratory systems, public education programs, creating professional exchange programs, and many others (KOICA, 2020).

KOFIH has also played a major role in South Korea's international medical aid. Working in 20 partner countries across Africa, Asia, and South America, KOFIH's projects center on access to healthcare for women and adolescents, strengthening the quality of local healthcare services, and preventing communicable diseases in local populations. KOFIH states on their website that their mission is to "aggressively respond to the many diseases that pose a threat to the security of humankind for future generations" (KOFIH, 2020). Many of their projects include training local medical professionals and providing modern medical equipment in remote and impoverished areas with the goal of establishing local medical self-sufficiency. The medical supplies (medicines, machinery, and products) that KOFIH donates to recipients must meet stringent guidelines, such as medicines having expiration dates at least one year from the date of donation and equipment donated having expected lifespans of at least three years after technical inspection and repair to ensure that resources donated throughout their programs provide acceptable benefits. Alongside its projects around the world, KOFIH also works to provide healthcare assistance to North Korea and has seen several successes including training North Korean healthcare workers (2007-09 & 2015), supporting the manufacturing of pharmaceuticals (2007-09), and vaccinating North Korean children against hepatitis B (2010-12) (KOFIH, 2020).

THE DEVELOPING WORLD AND COVID-19: CHALLENGES

Communicable diseases are an ever-present threat in the developing world. Poor sanitation infrastructure, underfunded or absent healthcare systems, and little to no public education in health and hygiene synergize into recurring outbreaks of diseases and viruses which claim untold scores of lives yearly. Now COVID-19 joins a host of other ailments such as cholera, tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, measles, and pertussis which the developing world is unable to effectively combat with the resources at hand (Stevens, 2004). Already many localities in the developing world have seen their healthcare systems collapse under the burden of this new and highly contagious threat leaving their populations with nowhere to turn for help. Below are three of

the primary challenges the developing world faces during the COVID-19 pandemic: a shortage of medical supplies, a disruption in subsistence aid, and chronically low rates of health literacy. These are not issues unique to the time frame of the pandemic; they have been persistent challenges to the developing world for generations, now they serve to exacerbate what would be a health crisis even under ideal conditions.

One of the problems national healthcare systems in the developing world have faced since the beginning of the pandemic has been a global shortage in personal protective equipment (PPE) and other hygienic resources which are needed to effectively protect healthcare workers from becoming infected by those they are treating with COVID-19, as well as prevent patient to patient spread within healthcare facilities (McMahon, Peters, Ivers, & Freeman, 2020). While the developed world has been able to manufacture its way out of the critical PPE shortage after months of high demand, many nations in the developing world have little to no existing industry which is capable of producing either the quantity of PPE necessary for a pandemic nor the quality of PPE which can reliably inhibit the spread of COVID-19 from patient to caretaker. Alongside the shortage of PPE and hygienic resources, the specialized equipment used in caring for patients in critical condition, such as ventilators for assisted breathing, are equally scarce, as the developed world stems the supply chain of such products to meet their own urgently rising demands (Setipa, 2020). While some developed nations and NGOs have donated critical goods to countries experiencing these extreme shortages, the amounts can hardly mitigate the extreme want that the developing world faces for quality medical goods during the global crisis. A New York Times investigation in April 2020 showed that there were fewer than 2000 working ventilators across 41 African countries, creating such grim ratios as one working machine for every 1,266,440 persons in Nigeria or even more shockingly, one working machine for every 20,356,053 persons living in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. (Maclean & Marks, 2020). As the pandemic spreads in the developing world, the inadequacy of medical supplies will become more apparent and serve as a catalyst for widespread infection and under-care (El-Erian, 2020).

The lack of healthcare resources in developing countries to combat

COVID-19 has led to national lockdowns as ‘hail Mary’ measures in order to relieve pressure on healthcare infrastructure. But as India discovered soon after its own national lockdown, the unintended consequences of such actions can cripple economies where many rely on informal employment and market sales as a sole source of family income (Fliegau, 2020). During the first quarter of the 2020-2021 fiscal year when the national lockdown began, the Indian economy contracted by 23.9%, the worst quarterly performance since records began in 1996, leaving millions of people questioning how they will meet the most basic of human needs in the near future as the pandemic remains far from contained (Frayer, 2020). The World Bank has projected that the economic fallout from COVID-19 will hit those at the lowest tiers of society hardest as the World-system grinds to a crawl; a large share of the population in low income countries will retract into extreme poverty, and those already in extreme poverty will descend into destitution, reversing decades of development and assistance. The same World Bank report also warns that malnutrition in the most vulnerable populations will become exacerbated as a halt in food aid programs, such as those which supply education systems, shut down, and supply chains from agricultural areas become stretched or cut-off as governments lock-down affected areas with no way to ensure an adequate and safe distribution of food (World Bank, 2020). The World Food Programme (WFP) issued a warning for a potentially massive spike in food insecurity in developing regions as a direct result of the pandemic, with East African nations and the Horn of Africa being particularly hit. WFP spokesperson Elisabeth Byers has said that the number of food insecure people in this region is likely to increase “to 34 million up to 41 million people in the next three months due to the social-economic impact of COVID-19” (Kaizer, 2020).

A significant factor in the spread of communicable illnesses in the developing world, such as COVID-19, is the low rate of health literacy among significant portions of society. Health literacy, as defined by the WHO, is the “level of knowledge, personal skills and confidence to take action to improve personal and community health by changing personal lifestyles and living conditions” and is integral in promoting the general welfare of society (WHO, Health Promotion Glossary, 1998). Low health literacy leads to individuals who are unable to manage their own health and

the health of their family effectively and often coincides with an individual's functional literacy and conceptual literacy (Kanj & Mitic, 2009). A study by (Schrauben & Wiebe, 2017) conducted in Zambia found that six in ten respondents had low health literacy, with especially high rates among women (married and widowed/divorced) and younger respondents, and a higher instance of low health literacy among those more likely to be disadvantaged, such as those living in rural areas and without access to education (Schrauben & Wiebe, 2017). In the current pandemic, low health literacy can hasten the spread of COVID-19 with individuals inadvertently promoting transmission through bad hygienic practices and misunderstanding the nature and severity of symptoms. Low health literacy can also cause individuals to misinterpret or reject recommendations or regulations designed to impede the spread of the virus such as social distancing and quarantine measures (Paakkari & Okan, 2020).

USING EXISTING SOUTH KOREAN AID INFRASTRUCTURE TO FIGHT COVID-19 IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

South Korea is in a prime position to assist the developing world during the COVID-19 pandemic due to its existing aid infrastructure and its good standing with its partner countries. As stated above, three key issues the developing world faces during this crisis are a lack of medical supplies, a disruption in subsistence aid, and chronically low rates of health literacy. Below demonstrates how the South Korean government, aid organizations, and private businesses have already begun to assist those in need as well as how these entities' existing networks and infrastructures can be used to effectively distribute aid.

Beginning with medical supplies, South Korea is well known globally for the quality medical products it produces, ranging from high-end devices such as MRI devices and CT systems to PPE products such as masks and gowns for medical workers (International Trade Administration, 2019). Since the COVID-19 pandemic began, South Korea has become one of the largest international producers of PPE products with manufactures receiving orders from countries which are unable to fill the growing demand for PPE

with domestic production. One manufacturer alone received an order for 2,000,000 PPE kits from the Indian Union Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, which cited the company's production capacity as a key factor in its decision (Chaudhury, 2020). While some countries are able to pay to keep up with the ever-increasing demand for medical supplies during the pandemic, many who were already struggling economically are unable to pay the costs associated with purchases off of the international medical supply market and must rely on assistance.

South Korea is a leading donor to nations which have experienced shortages in PPE and medical equipment during the pandemic, with both the public and private sector making substantial donations of these desperately needed supplies. In early April 2020 in Indonesia saw KOICA implement the donation and shipment of much needed COVID-19 test kits and sanitizing sprayers to the capital Jakarta. Indonesia also received generous donations from some of South Korea's most iconic conglomerates, with LG Group donating 50,000 test kits and Hyundai Motor Manufacturing pledging 50,000 full PPE equipment sets (Prasidya, 2020). The South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has played a role in ensuring that aid is distributed at the state level to those most in need through utilizing its extensive network of international partners. On June 6, 2020 the South Korean embassy in Uganda, in partnership with the government of South Sudan and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, oversaw the donation of testing kits with the capacity to test 10,000 patients as well as supplying 20,000 face masks (MOFA, 2020). MOFA has also worked to assist South Korean companies contributing to the global COVID-19 response by holding web seminars and video conferences with leading international organizations to coordinate relief and donations as well as providing consular support where needed. The Director of Development Cooperation for MOFA, Cho Young-Moo said he expects Korean companies to contribute to the promotion of global help by "supplying excellent domestic diagnostic devices and medicines to the international community through cooperation with the global fund."¹ (MOFA, 2020)

The direct donation of medical supplies however is not the only way to

1 Translated from Korean, found on (MOFA, 2020)

alleviate a shortage. With many developing nations having little in the means of liquid assets at the governmental level to purchase supplies, an injection of funds for the purpose of financing public health projects and buying supplies on the open market can be just as effective. On June 26, 2020 South Korea's Finance Ministry announced the approval of \$75.5 million in aid to 13 developing nations, part of a larger plan to ultimately provide \$400 million in loans and grants to help the fund health projects in the developing world with the goal of containing COVID-19 (Yonhap, 2020). Existing aid programs, such as the Healthcare Resources Support program run by KOFIH have the expertise to ensure the proper dispensation of monetary aid and to ensure a high standard of oversight in the purchase of medical supplies from the global market with the allocated funding (KOFIH, 2020).

The economic disruption caused by COVID-19 has most affected those who were already facing extreme hardships. The closure of borders and the selective lockdown of provinces and regions stagnates the normal flow of agricultural goods around the world as workers are unable to migrate during harvest seasons, supply chains are unable to ship products, and markets are shuttered in quarantine. Many who had been living a hand-to-mouth existence prior to the pandemic are now finding themselves unable to fulfill basic human needs. Several South Korean aid organizations are primed to meet the food insecurity which has already begun to surface in developing areas. An example of this ability to provide subsistence aid during the pandemic can be found no closer than North Korea which in August 2020 became the recipient of \$10 million in aid from the Inter-Korean fund. These funds will be used to buy 9,000 tons of fortified food for pregnant women, nursing mothers, and young children, as well as 3,600 tons of food products including corn, soy, and cooking oil (Zwirko, 2020). This donation comes from the partnership between the WFP and South Korea, a relationship which has helped millions around the globe through both monetary assistance and food donations.

Other recent programs in partnership with the WFP highlight South Korea's ability to successfully provide aid to the developing world in situations involving displaced peoples, a group which is particularly vulnerable to the effects of the pandemic and whose numbers are likely to

rise as the fallout from economic disruptions brought about by COVID-19 reverberate throughout the developing world (OECD, 2020). In February 2020 a South Korean contribution to the WFP for internally displaced peoples in Iraq was able to fulfill the food needs of 53,400 people through a cash-based transfer program which allowed displaced families to purchase local food, giving them the freedom to make their own dietary choices as well as pay into the local economy (WFP, 2020). A similar e-voucher program in Gaza and the West Bank provided funding which was able to support more than 38,000 food insecure people, the economic impact of this program was called by WFP Country Director Stephen Kearney “a massive boost to the local economy and to hundreds of small businesses that would otherwise struggle to stay afloat.” (WFP, 2019). Voucher and transfer programs could be effective in alleviating economic strains in developing areas during the pandemic, which has seen many who were employed in informal work lose their primary source of income. These programs also ensure that locally produced goods remain in circulation and help prevent supply chain stagnation.

Concerning health literacy, South Korea is a global leader in creating effective programs to educate individuals on how to lead healthy lives and prevent the spread of communicable diseases. KOFIH has made great strides improving health literacy in partner countries in Africa and South East Asia with several of their projects running for multiple years on well-funded annual budgets. One such project in Myanmar’s Yangon region which began in 2014 has worked to promote health literacy in sanitation among the community as well as train local volunteers in basic medicine. A related project began in 2019 in the Philippines where KOFIH, in partnership with the WHO, worked to improve and promote health-seeking behaviors among the urban poor of Manila, this project is currently working on a three year budget of ₩1 billion (roughly \$900,000), a substantial sum for a health literacy program and has seen compelling results for project prolongment. (KOFIH, 2020) (Kim, Park, Shin, & Kim, 2019). KOICA has also deployed mobile medical clinics to promote health literacy and provide medical services for a number of years. Former agency head Kim In-shik called the program a success, and a cost-efficient means of serving remote areas which lack essential infrastructure (Shin, 2016). Another KOICA program, World

Friends Korea, has sent thousands of volunteers around the world in the name of development assistance, many of whom were tasked with promoting public health in developing regions. Their work has advanced not only health literacy in disadvantaged regions, but also been a victory for South Korea's public image, drawing comparisons with the work of the United States' Peace Corps (Baker, 2017).

The experiences accumulated by the years of work these programs have carried out are essential in creating public health campaigns during the COVID-19 pandemic. The health literacy programs conducted by KOFIH, KOICA, and others are trusted by the communities they work in and have deep connections with partner governments, putting them in a ready position to craft customized campaigns for local areas to meet the unique challenges presented by local deficiencies in health literacy. These programs are also well networked with other international aid organizations such as the WHO, allowing them to produce broader campaigns with effective messages related to COVID-19. Improving health literacy in key subjects such as hygiene and basic medicine are critical to containing the spread of the pandemic in the developing world.

SOUTH KOREAN HUMANITARIAN AID DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: A WIN-WIN FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND GLOBAL HEALTH

International development assistance and aid as an approach to public diplomacy has garnered increasing attention in the last decade as both analysis from academia and feedback from the public sphere confirm the benefits which can be realized from effective humanitarian campaigns (Çevik, 2015) (Rawnsley, 2014) (Pamment, 2016). South Korea's position as a bridge between the developed and developing world allows it to use innovative methods to foster cooperation for international development and humanitarian aid. Due to this, South Korea has been able to "promote its positive image among recipient nations and other foreign audiences" boosting its international prestige and reputation and showing the utility of international aid as a tool for strategic public diplomacy (Baker, 2017, p.

40). The COVID-19 pandemic presents an opportunity for South Korea to use its ‘bridge’ reputation to make gains in the realm of public diplomacy as well as become an integral force in the international effort to contain the virus. This win-win scenario is a cornerstone of South Korea’s public diplomacy strategy, especially in the developing world, where the relationships between Seoul and its partner countries work to meet the needs of a recipient country by finding sustainable program solutions which match South Korea’s soft power capacities and policy goals (Morin-Gelinas, 2016).

South Korea’s aid infrastructure in the developing world and its ongoing policies and programs as described in the previous section fit well within Karolina Zelinska’s description of “development diplomacy”; specifically aid such as training, consultations, and small-scale projects embedded in local communities which show to be the most promising in meeting both public diplomacy and aid goals (Zielińska, 2016, pp. 9, 23). Aid which was dispensed in the early months of the pandemic has already begun to produce positive gains for South Korea’s international reputation and the international reputation of organizations which participated in the procurement and dispersal of the donated resources. After LG contributed their donations to aid efforts in Indonesia, BKPM’s spokesperson Tina Talisa said “Here, we can see that LG is not only an investor but also Indonesia’s best friend. We certainly hope that the current solid teamwork between Indonesia and South Korea will become stronger.”² (Prasidya, 2020). In Kenya, a hospital serving as one of the country’s leading COVID-19 response centers was built with funding from KOICA in 2018 and with continued financial support from the organization has been vital in coordinating the country’s fight against the pandemic. Esther Somoore Kaziado, a state health official in Kenya said in response to the aid from South Korea “Thank you for strengthening our health care capabilities so that we can respond immediately to the Corona 19 situation, I hope that we will overcome the current crisis with [the help of] Korea, which has the most advanced infectious disease response capabilities.”³ (Bone & Kim, 2020) (Kang, 2020). These accolades

2 Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal (BKPM) is the Capital Investment Coordinating Board of Indonesia, a non-departmental government institution

3 Translated from the original Korean quote found in (Kang, 2020)

are not unique; the quality of assistance provided by South Korea to countries in need have gilded its reputation around the world.

South Korea will continue to receive dividends from its public diplomacy efforts during the COVID-19 pandemic well into the future. Its humanitarian aid and development assistance to the developing world during the global crisis, cement its place as a bastion of cooperation and guidance which is recognized not only by governments, but also by the populations who are the direct beneficiaries of South Korea's assistance programs. The public and private organizations which organize these programs are both the propagators of this public diplomacy success and its recipients. Public organizations such as KOICA, KOFIH, and the South Korean government itself, benefit from the prestige of successful aid campaigns through receiving increased funding from international bodies, increased interest in the South Korean model of governance and development, as well as new opportunities for partnerships as the prestige from associating with South Korea grows. Private organizations who contribute to aid projects stand to receive not only international recognition for their efforts, which increases their brand reputation, but also stand to see increased revenues as demand rises for quality South Korean goods such as PPE, sanitization products, and medical equipment. This rise in demand could present the opportunity for these brands to further internationalize and open manufactories in new markets.

CONCLUSION & POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

South Korea has fared better than most other countries thus far during the COVID-19 pandemic. Its successful containment protocols and robust healthcare measures have ensured many of the hardships being endured elsewhere remain foreign. These successes have led to the global community turning to South Korea for guidance and assistance in their fight against the virus, though for many, especially in the developing world, the high costs associated with effective containment has put them at an insurmountable disadvantage. Noting that as a constituent of the global community they remain at risk so long as others remain burdened by the virus, South Korea

has used its extensive aid infrastructure to implement assistance programs and distribute aid to those most in need, proving itself as a global leader in a time of crisis. Organizations such as KOICA and KOFIH that have had a presence in the developing world for decades and have created a positive image for themselves and for South Korea among their network of partners. With this reputation as a reliable benefactor they are able to launch successful aid programs with the dualistic purpose as acts of public diplomacy and humanitarian aid. Their portfolio of success lays the groundwork for the larger programs which will be necessary for global containment of COVID-19. Private conglomerates have also showed their ability to contribute to ending the pandemic; the donation of money and critical resources from LG and Hyundai to developing nations has served as an effective tool for brand building, both for themselves and for South Korea, with the economic incentive of increasing stability in areas of production.

The humanitarian actions taken by the public and private sector in South Korea during the COVID-19 pandemic have served to improve its prestige not only in the developing world, but to the entire international community. These public diplomacy successes have reaffirmed findings by (Zielińska, 2016), (Baker, 2017), and others that aid and development assistance present circumstances for countries to improve their international image while helping build a better world. As the pandemic continues, South Korea's reputation as a bridge between the developed and developing world creates new opportunities for its public diplomacy strategy, with countries from both sides of the development spectrum seeking out Korean expertise. The benefits from these actions during a time of crisis will pay out long after the threat of the virus has subsided.

This paper closes with three public diplomacy policy recommendations which serve to work in alleviating the challenges the developing world faces during the pandemic mentioned above, namely: procuring medical supplies, a disruption in subsistence aid, and low rates of health literacy.

1. The creation of a partnership between the South Korean public and private sector to foster the domestic manufacturing of PPE and other medical supplies in the developing world. Aiding the growth of domestic manufacturing in critically needed resources creates three benefits for both South Korea and for recipient countries. One, most obviously, is meeting

the demand of these products locally which directly correlate to the containment of COVID-19. Secondly, local production of these products can provide employment and market opportunities in areas which have had traditional economic structures disrupted since the beginning of the pandemic, creating stability where many are now facing an uncertain future. Thirdly, developing local production presents an opportunity for South Korean industries to increase their brand presence in these areas as well as ensure that production meets the standard of quality that is to be expected of their goods.

2. In order to meet the growing concern of food insecurity during the pandemic, voucher and transfer programs can be created similar to those seen in the partnership between South Korea and the WFP which promote economic stimulation along with meeting humanitarian needs in areas which are not under a complete lock-down. In areas under lock-down where normal food distribution through markets is impossible, direct food distribution through food trucks is necessary. This method of distribution is able to take advantage of local organizational knowledge of neighborhoods and population centers to create plans of aid dispersal which can avoid mass gatherings which could serve to spread the virus.

3. To effectively promote health literacy in key areas such as sanitation, hygiene, and symptom recognition, a partnership between aid organizations and South Korea's booming entertainment production industry can produce high quality, easy-to-digest messages and programs which serve to inform the public on how to best combat COVID-19. This media could prove particularly persuasive in areas where the South Korean *hallyu* has taken hold, especially if these programs have the cooperation of 'big name' labels and studios. Inspiration and successful precedent can be found in Deutsche Welle's *Crime Fighters* radio and internet drama broadcast in Africa which successfully tackles a number of social issues specifically targeting young Africans, as well as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime's international media campaign which creates anti-drug abuse and illicit trafficking media for global consumption (UNDOC, 2020) (Deutsche Welle, 2020).

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